Is God a contingent being?

[cpayne]

It doesn’t make sense to say this under the doctrine of divine simplicity, since what God is “capable” of doing and what He does are, ontologically, one and the same thing.

Okay, this is a problem. The doctrine of creation has always stressed God’s freedom in creating, and not only freedom in creating, but freedom in creating *this *rather than that.

So either something is a little screwy with divine simplicity, or capability and action are not ontologically identical. It’s easy enough to see they are not ontologically identical in humans; human ontology and functioning are separate. Can ontological description and actual functioning be different in God without compromising divine simplicity?

 

[cpayne]

That last question may have been a little opaque so let me try again.

Example: Ontologically evil is a lack or privation, even though functionally it has real effects. Its ontological description and functional description are different.

Likewise could we say of God that ontologically God is the creative Supreme Being with all knowledge of all possible worlds and the actual world, even if functionally that description could be manifested differently in other possible worlds?

 

[cpayne]

As I read through other posts on this thread, let me explain my seeming preoccupation with this. It doesn’t really have to do with God, necessarily, but with modal logic. You see, I have used modal logic and the “possible worlds” allowance in arguing for God’s existence (obviously derived from Alvin Plantinga).

Since I’ve used modal logic and the idea of possible worlds for my own purposes, it bothers me that the same ideas can be turned contrary to what I think about God.

That why I keep returning like a swallow to Capistrano.

 

[SeekingCatholic]

If this is true then you have divorced the notion of first cause from the Church’s understanding of God entirely by a word trick of modal logic.

And this is precisely what turns me off from ideologues of whatever variety, Catholic, atheist, or anything else. When cornered, they can’t possibly admit they are wrong, but resort to intellectual dishonesty and BS of the first order. Claiming that my argument is merely a “word trick of modal logic” is BS on the same order as saying the reason communism hasn’t worked is because the right people weren’t in charge.

Sorry, but this is **not **a word trick of modal logic. “Contingent”, “necessary”, and “world” have real meanings in modal logic and are not mere “word tricks”. If the Church’s claims cannot withstand the critical analysis of modal logic then so much the worse for the Church’s claims. You know you cannot actually defend them using modal logic, so you resort to the total BS argument of claiming that it is a mere “word trick” without actually explaining how or why it is so.

And that “this” is true (meaning that different possible existences demand a different first cause in essence) does not follow from modal logic, but from the Church’s own doctrine of divine simplicity.

However that doesn’t mean that your assertion is true. That is why I was arguing definition, because I want to understand why you phrase the argument the way you did. Are you seeking to disprove the notion of God? Because if you are, you cannot do it by changing the definition of what words mean and declaring you are using different form of logic so it is OK.

Total BS. There is a substantive content to the argument which you have yet to refute and can’t magically wish away by merely stating that all I am doing is changing definitions. The Church’s claim is in fact that God is a “necessary” being according to what “necessary” being means according to modal logic; He must exist in all possible worlds, and that means the claim can be evaluated according to modal logic.

Even in a philosophy forum, if you are arguing about things pertaining to theism, it is necessary to explain why you wish to redefine terms from their classical understanding.

No it isn’t. Theism is supposed to be in accordance with reason, which means in accordance with the tenets of logic, including modal logic. I am therefore well with in my rights to be using modal logic, and to use “contingent”, “necessary”, and “world” according to their understanding in modal logic.

 

[SeekingCatholic]

Okay, this is a problem. The doctrine of creation has always stressed God’s freedom in creating, and not only freedom in creating, but freedom in creating *this *rather than that.

So either something is a little screwy with divine simplicity, or capability and action are not ontologically identical. It’s easy enough to see they are not ontologically identical in humans; human ontology and functioning are separate. Can ontological description and actual functioning be different in God without compromising divine simplicity?

No. God can have no “attributes”. It cannot be possible to distinguish separate ontological realities in God; that is the very definition of divine simplicity. With regard to this, if He has the potential to create more good then He has done, then He has an unactualized potency; He is not pure act. If He has potency, He is not simple.

And I must stress that it is special pleading to use divine simplicity when it suits one (e.g. the Euthyphro dilemma, solved if God’s commanding something and it being good are ontologically one and the same thing) but then make all kinds of “exceptions” when it gets one into a corner (e.g. God’s “freedom” in creating).

 

[Voco_proTatiano]

No. **God can **have no “attributes”. It cannot be possible to distinguish separate ontological realities in God; that is the very definition of divine simplicity. With regard to this, if He has the potential to create more good then He has done, then He has an unactualized potency; He is not pure act. If He has potency, He is not simple.

And I must stress that it is special pleading to use divine simplicity when it suits one (e.g. the Euthyphro dilemma, solved if God’s commanding something and it being good are ontologically one and the same thing) but then make all kinds of “exceptions” when it gets one into a corner (e.g. God’s “freedom” in creating).

Friend,
You have said: “G_d cannot.”
That is a denial of G_d’s omnipotence.
G_d may choose not to, but G_d CAN.

 

[cpayne]

"God, who cannot lie . . . " Signed, the Apostle Paul

 

[SeekingCatholic]

Okay, this is a problem. The doctrine of creation has always stressed God’s freedom in creating, and not only freedom in creating, but freedom in creating *this *rather than that.

So either something is a little screwy with divine simplicity, or capability and action are not ontologically identical. It’s easy enough to see they are not ontologically identical in humans; human ontology and functioning are separate. Can ontological description and actual functioning be different in God without compromising divine simplicity?

Maybe the problem really lies in God allegedly having “freedom”. The notion is incoherent with divine immutability as well as simplicity. The idea that God could have “done something different” implies that there is a metaphysical (even if not temporal) “before” prior to God making His choice. But, as we have seen, this implies God’s will changing, and thus His essence changing. So, this is impossible, and it is therefore simply nonsense to say “God could do all things” as though His will could be different than it is.

 

[SeekingCatholic]

Friend,
You have said: “G_d cannot.”
That is a denial of G_d’s omnipotence.
G_d may choose not to, but G_d CAN.

Well you have to be a little more perspicacious than that, I think. God can’t create a squared circle? God isn’t omnipotent!

Clearly the right definition of omnipotence is “God can do anything which it is possible to do”. Which, if the only thing possible for Him to do is what He has actually done, leads to no conflict.

 

[cpayne]

Maybe the problem really lies in God allegedly having “freedom”. The notion is incoherent with divine immutability as well as simplicity. The idea that God could have “done something different” implies that there is a metaphysical (even if not temporal) “before” prior to God making His choice. But, as we have seen, this implies God’s will changing, and thus His essence changing. So, this is impossible, and it is therefore simply nonsense to say “God could do all things” as though His will could be different than it is.

Hmmm. Well, I don’t know. We do say things like “Perfect freedom lies in obedience to God’s will.” In that case, God would automatically be the most perfectly free being possible, since His essence would be in perfect harmony with His will.

But I don’t think that’s what is meant by God’s freedom. Still, as you say, in what sense is an unchangeable will “free”?

 

[cpayne]

I’ll be back later or tomorrow. I need to check out a couple of Summas on this.

 

[cpayne]

In the ST, Aquinas covers some of these questions, but it’s too much to summarize here. In ST I.9.1 he discusses immutability, and in I.19.3 he discusses whether or not God creates necessarily. He argues that contingent causes must be made to act by an external power—so far so good.

Then he argues that the divine will, which is NECESSARY (because identical via simplicity with the necessary existence of God), determines its own willing of things “to which it has no necessary relation.”

It seems to me that Aquinas is arguing that God can necessarily will things, even different contingencies, without thereby changing His own essence or simplicity. He does this by arguing that there are two different senses of “necessity.” (I.19.3, in the “I answer that” section.)

However, I’d appreciate it if others would also take a look at these arguments (SUMMA THEOLOGIAE: Home). I’ve really got to take off now.

 

[SeekingCatholic]

In the ST, Aquinas covers some of these questions, but it’s too much to summarize here. In ST I.9.1 he discusses immutability, and in I.19.3 he discusses whether or not God creates necessarily. He argues that contingent causes must be made to act by an external power—so far so good.

Then he argues that the divine will, which is NECESSARY (because identical via simplicity with the necessary existence of God), determines its own willing of things “to which it has no necessary relation.”

It seems to me that Aquinas is arguing that God can necessarily will things, even different contingencies, without thereby changing His own essence or simplicity. He does this by arguing that there are two different senses of “necessity.” (I.19.3, in the “I answer that” section.)

However, I’d appreciate it if others would also take a look at these arguments (SUMMA THEOLOGIAE: Home). I’ve really got to take off now.

Yes, but it should be evident Aquinas’ arguments are self-contradictory. What he’s arguing is essentially this:

There is a minimal concept of God (let’s call it God-minus). Here there are things “absolutely” necessary, such as God-minus willing His own goodness, such that the very **definition **of God would be self-contradictory if not allowed.

There is an added concept of God (let’s call it God-plus). Here there are things not absolutely necessary according to the **definition **of God, such as God-plus willing the good of other creatures, ordered to His own goodness but not essentially, absolutely necessary for it. But these things can be necessary considered “ex suppositione”, since God’s will cannot change. So far so good.

But so far all that has been demonstrated is that one out of the set of God-minus and all the possible God-plusses corresponding to all the possible sets of created beings must exist. This doesn’t prove God-minus is essentially identical to any of the God-plusses or that they are essentially identical to each other. Aquinas is merely assuming because none of these contradict his **definition **of God they must be essentially the same.

But is the essence of God-plus really the same of God-minus? Obviously not, if God’s will is ontologically equivalent to His essence. Aquinas does what (seemingly) all good philosophers do when in a bind: equivocate on the meaning of a pivotal term. Aquinas’ answer is that it is not “natural” to God to will those things He does not will with absolute necessity, even though not contrary to His nature, is a rather obvious equivocation on the meaning of “nature” and “natural”. We don’t mean by “nature” what we have defined something to be, we mean by “nature” what it actually is. And what God actually is, is His will.

Moreover, if this (the will to create) is not something “natural” to God but something added on, then it is an accident, but an absolutely simple God cannot have any accidents.

 

[Voco_proTatiano]

Well you have to be a little more perspicacious than that, I think. God can’t create a squared circle? God isn’t omnipotent!

Clearly the right definition of omnipotence is “God can do anything which it is possible to do”. Which, if the only thing possible for Him to do is what He has actually done, leads to no conflict.

A squared circle does indeed exist: it is called a cylinder.
Viewed along its axis, it is a circle, across its equator, a square.
G_d exists outside of any universe, for all creation exists in G_d.

What impossible in this universe, is not necessarily impossible outside it.

The laws of this universe do not allow for the Big Bang.
Its laws lie out side of this universe, or as physicists describe it, in a higher dimensional continuum.

As for Paul, he was only a man.
Some of the time he spoke with inspiration,
sometimes he saw through a glass darkly.
Sometimes the rantings of Saul were in his mouth.

It is indeed possible for G_d to do what we perceive as evil, and to reveal that which we perceive as false.
It is not G_d who is at fault, but our perception.

The destruction of the universe at the end of time, can be perceived as the grossest of genocide. But it has been promised, that this will occur, and physicists accept that this is true.

In a valid perception, this is G_d performing evil.

The account of the creation in Genesis was inspired by G_d.
In some literal senses, it is a gross falsehood.

In a valid perception, this is G_d spreading lies.

Sometimes a higher purpose is served by performing what seems evil, to our limited understanding, and sometimes a tale, which is factually false, can encapsulate a higher truth, just like the parables of Our Lord.

There is NO limit upon G_d’s omnipotence.
There are some inevitable results of some abilities.
For instance, should G_d choose to see the end of days, the end of days will thereupon happen, for this universe, and as far as we can tell, all possible universes, depend upon uncertainty for their existence. Schroedinger’s cat.

 

[MindOverMatter]

This isn’t really much help here. If I am a contingent being, there is a possible world in which I don’t exist. The trouble is, the God that exists in this world wouldn’t exist in that one. There is therefore a possible world in which God doesn’t exist, which makes His existence contingent as well. (“A” God may exist in the other world, but not “The” God that exists in this one.)

You speak of God as if he is a being out there some where.

For there to be such a thing as “possibilities” to an extent that they can be expressed in many possible worlds, there must be one ultimate unchanging unifiying factor involved with all of them. “Existence”. All things which begin to exist, require “Existence” in order to be or become and cannot be so with out it; and so it is reasonable to think that such a thing is greater then all being and therefore is trancendent above all things that exist. Otherwise there is no such thing as “contingency” or possibility. Everything would be one and the same and neccesary. Existence, however, is the only neccesary being, and cannot possibly become contingent or change or cease to be. If that were possible, then all things would cease to be.

Nothing exists in any “possible world” that doesn’t derive its being and natural qualities from Existence(God). However, “Existence” exists neccessarily and simultaneously as a timeless expression, before anything can possibly come into being.

 

[SeekingCatholic]

You speak of God as if he is a being out there some where.

For there to be such a thing as “possibilities” to an extent that they can be expressed in many possible worlds, there must be one ultimate unchanging unifiying factor involved with all of them. “Existence”. All things which begin to exist, require “Existence” in order to be or become and cannot be so with out it; and so it is reasonable to think that such a thing is greater then all being and therefore is trancendent above all things that exist.

This makes no sense. If “existence” exists, it cannot be greater than all being, for it cannot be greater than itself. Moreover, it doesn’t follow that the “existence” which exists in this world is the same as that which exists in another possible world.

Nothing exists in any “possible world” that doesn’t derive its being and natural qualities from Existence(God). However, “Existence” exists neccessarily and simultaneously as a timeless expression, before anything can possibly come into being.

So does “existence” derive its being and natural qualities from itself?

 

[Voco_proTatiano]

This makes no sense. If “existence” exists, it cannot be greater than all being, for it cannot be greater than itself. Moreover, it doesn’t follow that the “existence” which exists in this world is the same as that which exists in another possible world.

So does “existence” derive its being and natural qualities from itself?

Dear Friend,
You are now pushing the point which I was making in my reference to ‘Set Theory’
Viz:
1/ All sets have at least two sub-sets: namely, the identity set, which is simply, itself, and the empty set, which as its name suggests, has no members.
2/ Any set can be arbitrarily defined by its properties.
3/ The paradoxical definition is: the set of all sets which are not subsets of themselves. This is paradoxical, because all sets are subsets of themselves. Hence the sets complying with the definition cannot exist, so the set defined must be the empty set.
But the empty set has an identity set, which by definition is its subset, so the empty set is not empty.

At this point, ‘set Theory’ comes to the point of collapse.
The theory can only be saved by allowing the exception case for the empty set.
Viz: The empty set is not a subset of itself.

Your Modal Logicians seem to be having a similar paradoxical problem with the Prime Existence.

Everything exists within, and because of the Prime Existence, and the Prime Existence pervades everything, but is part of, and contained by, nothing.
The Prime Existence, though pervading all Worlds, exists in none of them.

Thus the Prime Existence lies outside the classical rules of Modal Logic, in the same way that the empty set lies outside the classical rules of Set Theory.

 

[Camron]

Friend,
You have said: “G_d cannot.”
That is a denial of G_d’s omnipotence.
G_d may choose not to, but G_d CAN.

Well said.

Besides that, God is many things at once according to the Bible, sometime related to what He does and sometimes related to what He is…

Examples in the Old Testament…

According to Genesis 21:22 God is with you in everything you do.

According to Genesis 31:50 God is a witness between you and me.

According to Deuteronomy 4:7 God is near us whenever we pray to Him.

According to Deuteronomy 4:24 God is a consuming fire, a jealous God.

According to Deuteronomy 4:31 God is a merciful God.

According to Deuteronomy 7:9 God is God.

According to Deuteronomy 10:17 God is God of gods and Lord of lords, the great God, mighty and awesome, who shows no partiality and accepts no bribes.

Examples in the New Testament…

According to John 3:33 God is truthful.

According to John 4:24 God is spirit, and His worshipers must worship in spirit and in truth.

According to 1 Corinthians 10:13 God is faithful; He will not let you be tempted beyond what you can bear. But when you are tempted, He will also provide a way out so that you can stand up under it.

According to 2 Corinthians 9:8 God is able to make all grace abound to you, so that in all things at all times, having all that you need, you will abound in every good work.

According to Galatians 3:20 God is one.

According to 2 Thessalonians 1:6 God is just: He will pay back trouble to those who trouble you.

According to Hebrews 12:7 God is treating you as sons.

According to Hebrews 12:29 God is a consuming fire.

According to 1 John 1:5 God is light; in Him there is no darkness at all.

According to 1 John 3:20 God is greater than our hearts and He knows everything.

According to 1 John 4:8 God is love.

The same is true for 1 John 4:16, which again says that God is love.
And since God is love He is defined in human terms using human attributes in 1 Corinthians 13 very well.

So if one is claiming to be using the traditional theistic senses of God within a truly Catholic sense, then one must be able to incorporate all these attributes into their logic. Failure to do so results in a caricature of God which bears little resemblance to God in a traditional Catholic sense.

 

[tobias]

In this wold ‘w1’, there exists a being ‘b1’. There is a possible world ‘w2’ in which b1 does not exist Therefore b1 is a contingent being.
In w1 there does not exist a certain being ‘b2’. There is a possible w2 in which b2 does exist. Therefore b2 is a contingent being

 Both b1 and b2 are contingent beings in w1 and w2, therefore in both the actual and the possible b1 and b2 are contingent beings. Therefore God has knowledge of both b1 and b2 as contingent beings in the actual and in the possible. 

   Since b1 and b2 may or may not be in w1 or w2 that may or may not exist, then a purely simple uncaused cause ( also being omniscient) has the knowledge of each propisition in the same way, as contingent beings Therefore the instantiating of this actual world with actual beings vs the instantiating of a possible world with possible beingsn (all being contingent) does not change the knowledge of the purely simple, for each proposition, no matter which are actual, remains contingent.
  
  B1 and b2 are caused, neccessarily, for one has an actual begining and the other a possible begining. Therefore the cause of b1 and b2 is neccessary, otherwise they would not be possible.  What is not demonstrable via the modal equations used in this thread is that w1 and w2 (all that exists) is a viable premise since it starts with the notion of God as uncaused cause, and then includes Him in the totality of that which is caused. (because this thread started with God as understood by classical theism). 
 But if w1 and w2 can only be understood as laid out thus far, then w1 and w2 are dependant on each ones cause. But there is no distinction that can be made that would differentiate the cause of w1 from w2.  If we have to start with the uncaused cause as part of w1 ( as God is understood by classical theism) then a w2 does not change an uncaused cause, for the instantiating is still of the same contingent beings in the same contingent worlds  (no matter which contingencies are actualized a cause is still neccessary and if we are including God in 'world' then God is still uncaused cause whether in w1 or w2).  
 No matter which world is actualized, because the uncaused cause of all that exists, actual and possible, is included in w1, then definitionally the cause is the same for w2  To change this outcome we would have to start with a  non classical theistic understanding of God, but then that poses no problem to classical theism.

 

[Voco_proTatiano]

This is all getting very circular.
As I understand it, everything in any world, including the world itself is caused.
Though the Prime Existence pervades all worlds, and is sensible of the state of all worlds, yet the Prime Existence is not part of any world or existence, rather all worlds and existences are part of the Prime Existence.
That is how I understand Classical Theism.
It may be that Modal Logic is incompatible with Classical Theism.
That is ok, Quantum Physics is incompatible with Electrodynamics.