Is God a contingent being?

[SeekingCatholic]

SC,

I don’t see how he would be actual in another possible world, he can only be actual in the actual world, whichever that world is (and it happens to be ours).

A possible world is what might be, or what could have been. If it is possible that Bob does not exist, there is a possible world in which he does not exist. There are other worlds in which Bob is actual, but other entities are not. So he can be actual in other possible worlds.

In other words, Bob can’t be actualized unless he is actualized in W1 (ours).

No, there are other possible worlds in which Bob exists, and if they been actualized instead of ours he would still exist.

You can’t compare really actualized Bob’s across worlds, because there is only one world where Bob is really actualized. Right?

VC

I don’t think this is the right way to put it. Our world is the only actual world. However in some of the other possible worlds Bob would also exist - had they been actualized instead of ours, Bob would still exist.

 

[SeekingCatholic]

By “aspect” I meant “an aspect as perceived by us” a la Aquinas. I used the word “aspect” precisely because it implies something seen by us rather than something that has a distinct existence within God.

As Aquinas pointed out, there is no way to talk about God at all except by using language that would normally imply that he has various “aspects”–but we must make it clear that these only relate to our knowledge of God and not to how God is in Himself.

OK.

Aquinas certainly thought that God could act in contingent ways without ceasing to be absolutely simple and without becoming contingent in any way.

But you can’t distinguish God’s actions from His existence if He is absolutely simple! They are ontologically one and the same thing, even if we can make a conceptual distinction. And so the same conundrum presents itself; if God’s actions are contingent, then His existence is contingent. Accordingly, it’s said that God cannot change His will because He is immutable - implying that any change in His will would be equivalent to a change in His essence.

I suspect that he could think this because of his understanding of “movement” as the bringing from potentiality to actuality of the thing moved. We tend to think that action involves a movement of the agent, which would imply what you are saying–that God cannot act contingently without having contingency within Himself.

I think he’s quite agreed that you cannot perceive God acting in the sense of “before” the act and “after” the act. There’s no metaphysically “before” God’s act.

I don’t claim that this is wholly satisfactory or that saying “Aquinas thought X” proves that X is correct. But it should at least make us think a bit harder about the issue–clearly Aquinas didn’t think that the distinction I’ve drawn (God’s simple essence perceived by us as “will” vs. the actions that proceed from that will) was nonsensical.

I don’t think it “nonsensical” either - as long as it is understood as a conceptual and not an ontological distinction. But ontologically there can be no distinction between the power of willing and the act of willing anymore than there can be between the ability to know and God’s actual act of knowing.

 

[HelenaMT]

According to classical theism, God is absolutely simple. What this means is that there is absolutely no composition in God; His essence is identical **in substance **to His knowledge, His will, His justice, His mercy, and all of His other attributes and powers.

Now, imagine other possible worlds with a different set of contingent beings (or no contingent beings). These could only occur because God willed them so. But since God’s will is different in these worlds, that means His essence is also different, which means it is a different being, a different God, in these worlds. Which means that the God in this world is not a necessary being, but a contingent one, since the same God does not exist in all possible worlds.

Or, alternatively, one could posit (although contrary to classical theism, which posits God’s freedom in creation) that this world is the only possible one. This would save God being a necessary being, but at the cost of every other being also being a necessary being.

If the definition of contingent is a being that may or not exist, or that is dependent on another for it’s existence, and we accept that God’s will and God are identical, in order to treat God as a necessary, not contingent being , we need to say that there are no other possible worlds other than this one. There needs to be the “limitation” on God that He could not have created/willed another one.

In other words, the world he willed is the only one He could have, since if He could have willed another world, it’s very creation would have been born of a different act of will, and therefore a different “God”. And if we are part of that *one *creation He *could *will, we are necessary as well. He couldn’t have created a world where we didn’t exist without having been a different God.

So following your argument, if one wants to accept God as necessary and not contingent (and I presume believers in God would have to ! ) the choice is either to accept that this is the only possible world, and that we (and everything else in creation) are as necessary as God, or to change our definition of who God is and what are His attributes. Is that what you are getting at?

Sorry if I seem a bit thick. I just want to make sure I understand the point of your OP.

 

[cpayne]

Pardon me, but I think we are all getting stuck up a gum tree.
Either G_d exists, and is the creator of everything visible and invisible, or not.
If G_d exists anywhere, then G_d exists everywhere.
It is not proper though to ask if G_d exists in this universe, for the inverse is the truth: this universe exists in G_d.
G_d holds this universe, and indeed all possible universes in the palm of the hand.
G_d is NOT a denizen dwelling in this universe.
This universe is the creation of G_d.
Made from nothing but the essence of G_d.
So is of the substance of G_d.
As are all who dwell therein.
That is simplicity.

Just a note: This is all certainly true if the term “universe” is used as meaning “God’s creation.” However, so far in this discussion the term is used to denote “all that actually exists.” This would include God.

 

[Verbum_Caro]

A possible world is what might be, or what could have been.

So far so good.

If it is possible that Bob does not exist, there is a possible world in which he does not exist.

OK, I follow.

I should note, however, that I think the use of “exists” here might lead to some sort of equivocation in our discussion. Can I render your sentence instead as “If it is possible that Bob have only one eye, there is a possible world in which he has only one eye.”? That keeps the spirit of your sentence, right?

I can accept that, as I have rendered it (and just for purposes of our discussion assuming that every possible state of affairs represents a possible world, which it might not).

But does that mean that one eye Bob *really exists? *I don’t think so. And I don’t think one-eye Bob exists in that possible world either, in the sense I mean exist.

There are other worlds in which Bob is actual, but other entities are not. So he can be actual in other possible worlds.

Again, I don’t understand. Are you using “actual” in a different sense than is generally used in modality? My impression has been that “actual” is reserved for real things, i.e. things that have a special ontological claim.

In that use of actual which I am familiar, one would say that each actual thing is a possible thing but not every possible thing is an actual thing.

Maybe you could direct us to some source or text that can show us how you are using “actual”? That might help me.

Thanks,
VC

 

[Voco_proTatiano]

Just a note: This is all certainly true if the term “universe” is used as meaning “God’s creation.” However, so far in this discussion the term is used to denote “all that actually exists.” This would include God.

All things are made by Him, and without Him is made nothing that is made.
(Quote from my translation of the Latin.)
So G_d is All pervading, and every possible universe is contingent upon G_d, not vice versa.
The Universe(s) then being made of nothing but the essence of G_d, are then an aspect of G_d.
So this aspect of G_d is contingent upon G_d.
So G_d is contingent only upon the will of G_d, hence, upon G_d.
Thus the contingency becomes trivial.
The argument of what G_d can do is as good as done, is fallacious, for it denies the will of G_d not to so do.
G_d can see tomorrow, but does not, for in seeing tomorrow, tomorrow is destroyed. (Schroedinger’s cat).
The existence of this, and every universe is dependent upon not seeing how it will all end, for seeing the end will cause the end.

 

[SeekingCatholic]

If the definition of contingent is a being that may or not exist, or that is dependent on another for it’s existence, and we accept that God’s will and God are identical, in order to treat God as a necessary, not contingent being , we need to say that there are no other possible worlds other than this one. There needs to be the “limitation” on God that He could not have created/willed another one.

In other words, the world he willed is the only one He could have, since if He could have willed another world, it’s very creation would have been born of a different act of will, and therefore a different “God”. And if we are part of that *one *creation He *could *will, we are necessary as well. He couldn’t have created a world where we didn’t exist without having been a different God.

So following your argument, if one wants to accept God as necessary and not contingent (and I presume believers in God would have to ! ) the choice is either to accept that this is the only possible world, and that we (and everything else in creation) are as necessary as God, or to change our definition of who God is and what are His attributes. Is that what you are getting at?

Sorry if I seem a bit thick. I just want to make sure I understand the point of your OP.

Yes, that’s the point.

 

[SeekingCatholic]

I should note, however, that I think the use of “exists” here might lead to some sort of equivocation in our discussion. Can I render your sentence instead as “If it is possible that Bob have only one eye, there is a possible world in which he has only one eye.”? That keeps the spirit of your sentence, right?

Yes.

I can accept that, as I have rendered it (and just for purposes of our discussion assuming that every possible state of affairs represents a possible world, which it might not).

OK.

But does that mean that one eye Bob *really exists? *I don’t think so.

No, one-eyed Bob doesn’t really exist.

And I don’t think one-eye Bob exists in that possible world either, in the sense I mean exist.

OK, but the meaning of “existing in that possible world” is an imprecise phrase, shorthand if you will. What it really means is “if that possible world were the actual one, then one-eyed Bob would really exist”.

Again, I don’t understand. Are you using “actual” in a different sense than is generally used in modality? My impression has been that “actual” is reserved for real things, i.e. things that have a special ontological claim.

In that use of actual which I am familiar, one would say that each actual thing is a possible thing but not every possible thing is an actual thing.

But a possible thing is a **hypothetically **actual thing. If it were not, it would not be possible; that’s the definition of possible.

Now this phrase is sloppy, I admit: “One-eyed Bob exists (or is actual) in some possible world” although it’s commonly used. It should really read “there is a possible world in which one-eyed Bob would exist, were that world the actual one”.

 

[cpayne]

Here I am again. I have a question about modality. (I must have dreamed about this discussion, because I woke up with this question in my mind.) :hypno:

In modal logic, is ALL modal status necessary?—that is, if P exists, it is necessary that P exists.

If the answer to this question is yes, then one of the conclusions here (speaking to SeekingCatholic) seems true, but almost trivially true. That is, if I exist in W1, then it is necessary that I exist in W1.

Is this all that is meant by saying that the things existing in W1 possess necessary existence?

 

[SeekingCatholic]

Here I am again. I have a question about modality. (I must have dreamed about this discussion, because I woke up with this question in my mind.) :hypno:

In modal logic, is ALL modal status necessary?—that is, if P exists, it is necessary that P exists.

No, in fact, that’s an elementary fallacy.

It is true to say if it is necessary that P exists, then P exists.
It is false to say that if P exists, then it is necessary that P exists.

If the answer to this question is yes, then one of the conclusions here (speaking to SeekingCatholic) seems true, but almost trivially true. That is, if I exist in W1, then it is necessary that I exist in W1.

Is this all that is meant by saying that the things existing in W1 possess necessary existence?

No. A necessary being is one that must exist in all possible worlds.

 

[cpayne]

I’m still thinking about this, but I’m not really up to taking some courses at this point to figure out what I think. So I’ll just ask a question of SeekingCatholic: What do you think are the implications of your argument? I don’t mean “either we’re necessary or God’s contingent,” which you’ve already elucidated. I mean, What theological implications do you derive from this argument?

(By the way, I’m not backing out of the argument—I just really don’t know enough to know if your answers to objections are sound. I’m taking that on faith. )

 

[Voco_proTatiano]

No, in fact, that’s an elementary fallacy.

It is true to say if it is necessary that P exists, then P exists.
It is false to say that if P exists, then it is necessary that P exists.

No. A necessary being is one that must exist in all possible worlds.

As I understand your response,
If it is necessary for Q to exist, that P exists,
and Q indeed exists, then indeed P exists.

In the case of G_d, the existence of G_d is dependent purely upon the existence of G_d. This is then technically contingent, but trivially so.

The existence of G_d is in no way dependent upon the existence of any universe(s), for the univere(s) are the creation of G_d, hence G_d pre-existed the universe(s).

The real difficulty in any of these arguments, except the trivial cases, is the proof of necessity.

That, even after science accepting that this universe began with an expansion of a singularity from a white hole, science does not accept this as a proof of the existence of G_d. Science falls back to the steady state back-story, that the universe behind the one we see is riddled with black holes and white holes, and creation and destruction are part of the continuous process.

In conclusion, it cannot be proven that the existence of the universe is dependent upon the existence of G_d.

The existence of G_d is dependant only trivially upon the existence of G_d.

 

[SeekingCatholic]

I’m still thinking about this, but I’m not really up to taking some courses at this point to figure out what I think. So I’ll just ask a question of SeekingCatholic: What do you think are the implications of your argument? I don’t mean “either we’re necessary or God’s contingent,” which you’ve already elucidated. I mean, What theological implications do you derive from this argument?

The implications are potentially profound. Take the problem of evil, for instance, which I think is simply insoluble in classical theism. But here, if this world is necessary, then evil simply exists as a matter of metaphysical necessity; there’s nothing God “can” do about it - He would have to have willed to be a different God - or else - evil is due to the chance factor of simply which God happens to exist.

(By the way, I’m not backing out of the argument—I just really don’t know enough to know if your answers to objections are sound. I’m taking that on faith. )

Forget about the modal logic jargon for a moment and just do this. Imagine a world somehow different than our own (remember, I’m using “world” to denote all that exists, including God). Imagine a world without the Andromeda galaxy, for instance. Is that the only thing different about that world? No, for God’s will would have to be different; He would not have willed to create the Andromeda galaxy. With me so far? Now according to divine simplicity God’s will is identical to God, ontologically speaking. That means saying that God’s will would have to be different is saying that God would have to be a different God in our imaginary world. So why do we have this world, and this God, instead of that world, and that God? Only 2 answers: 1) It’s just a matter of contingency (e.g. blind chance) as to which God exists. 2) This God exists as a matter of necessity; He is the only possible God which could exist. But then this world is also the only possible world which could exist.

 

[bogeydogg]

Is it safe to assume that any world which could exist, and does exist, does exist?

And if that world exists is it not also safe to assume that necessary being also exists? Understand, I am not positing “The” necessary being, but just that any construct which posits existence also posits being.

And if being exists is it not also safe to assume that it did not create itself?

And does not therefore any being of existence not require a cause?

 

[bogeydogg]

Also, I think you are committing a fallacy here.

Consider the first law of logic; identity. When we are talking apples we are not talking about oranges.

Christian Theism has never understood God to be contingent (that is a caused being) and it has never accepted the idea that God might not exist. So you are muddying the waters of understanding by using words which have a theological understanding in a philosophical argument which is breeding confusion.

God is not contingent because His existence is necessary because being must be, and God is not contingent to your understanding because being does not create itself. So any existence that is must have a first cause and from that cause all being exists. To posit existence without being is to posit nonexistence in which case yes, there would be no God.

But of course there would also be no us to wonder about His non existence.

 

[bogeydogg]

The implications are potentially profound. Take the problem of evil, for instance, which I think is simply insoluble in classical theism. But here, if this world is necessary, then evil simply exists as a matter of metaphysical necessity; there’s nothing God “can” do about it - He would have to have willed to be a different God - or else - evil is due to the chance factor of simply which God happens to exist.

I will never understand why people trip over evil.

Man has free will. Man is not God. Since man is not God he is less than God.

God is not evil. God cannot be evil. However God does not lack evil because evil is a depravation of God’s righteousness. So to say that God is not evil is to say that God is complete.

Since man is less than God, and evil is less than God, then man will express his lesser free will by failing to achieve a completeness found only in God, that is man is deficient. Since man is deficient he he expresses this deficiency by acting in a way which is less than Godly, that is he acts evilly.

Consequently the problem is not a problem.

Man is evil because he is deficient.

God did not cause man to be evil and therefore is not responsible for it.

God really did give man real free will that is really free, and since that free will must be deficient (because God cannot create God) then evil is man’s creation for which he is fond of blaming God. Which is in itself an expression of evil.

Praise God though that He has provided the solution for what we lack in our Lord Christ Jesus.

 

[SeekingCatholic]

Is it safe to assume that any world which could exist, and does exist, does exist?

No. It’s a minority position among modal logicians and one I don’t hold to.

And if that world exists is it not also safe to assume that necessary being also exists? Understand, I am not positing “The” necessary being, but just that any construct which posits existence also posits being.

You can’t have “a” necessary being without it being “the” necessary being, by definition, since it must exist in all possible worlds.

And if being exists is it not also safe to assume that it did not create itself?

And does not therefore any being of existence not require a cause?

I’m not following you here. Being in itself, as you have pointed out, must be uncaused.

 

[cpayne]

Forget about the modal logic jargon for a moment and just do this. Imagine a world somehow different than our own (remember, I’m using “world” to denote all that exists, including God). Imagine a world without the Andromeda galaxy, for instance. Is that the only thing different about that world? No, for God’s will would have to be different; He would not have willed to create the Andromeda galaxy. With me so far? Now according to divine simplicity God’s will is identical to God, ontologically speaking. That means saying that God’s will would have to be different is saying that God would have to be a different God in our imaginary world. So why do we have this world, and this God, instead of that world, and that God? Only 2 answers: 1) It’s just a matter of contingency (e.g. blind chance) as to which God exists. 2) This God exists as a matter of necessity; He is the only possible God which could exist. But then this world is also the only possible world which could exist.

Right; I’m following this part. I just don’t like where it goes.

If God in a possible world could will something contingently different than has been willed by the God who actually exists, the God who actually exists would be problematic as well, since classically the God who actually exists would be the same in all possible worlds.

In my life, often when I run into questions or intellectual difficulties, even if I am not actively pursuing an answer, I come across a possible solution down the road in my various studies. I have a feeling this problem might be like that; I’m going to “put it on the back burner” for a while and see what simmers.

Thanks for a very interesting discussion, everyone. :tiphat:

 

[SeekingCatholic]

Also, I think you are committing a fallacy here.

Consider the first law of logic; identity. When we are talking apples we are not talking about oranges.

Then please don’t talk about oranges.

Christian Theism has never understood God to be contingent (that is a caused being)

That’s not what “contingent” means in modal logic. We can agree every possible world has an uncaused being. The question is whether it is the same uncaused being.

and it has never accepted the idea that God might not exist.

Yes, but the question is whether that position is logically coherent.

So you are muddying the waters of understanding by using words which have a theological understanding in a philosophical argument which is breeding confusion.

This is the **philosophy **sub-forum and the words I am using also have a **philosophical **understanding. I am using the terms “contingent” and “necessary” as they are used in modal logic.

God is not contingent because His existence is necessary because being must be, and God is not contingent to your understanding because being does not create itself. So any existence that is must have a first cause and from that cause all being exists.

You’re assuming, without proof, that the first cause must be identical in all possible worlds; and your last sentence is incorrect, because the first cause, by definition, doesn’t have cause.

 

[bogeydogg]

No. It’s a minority position among modal logicians and one I don’t hold to.

I guess I wasn’t clear or you weren’t so I’ll try again. Would something which exists, exist? And since I am not assuming that the world which you posit could exist does not exist within your construct, does the world you posit could exist within the confines of your construct?

You can’t have “a” necessary being without it being “the” necessary being, by definition, since it must exist in all possible worlds.

I mean necessary being in the Parmenides sense. That is that if being exists, then being exists, that is absolute or necessary being exists. Being does not spontaneously happen and neither does it create itself because to do so would make it own antecedent cause and therefore it would exist and not exist simultaneously.

To posit the reality of necessary being as a necessary precondition to being does not demand a posit of the Theist’s God. That is what I mean by “THE” necessary being.

I’m not following you here. Being in itself, as you have pointed out, must be uncaused.

Yes but what I am asking is, does not the necessity of being demand an uncaused cause? That is, there is no such thing as an uncaused existence if we assume said existence is an effect, which would be contingent existence in the greek understanding of the word.