One of these days, I’m going to get back upstream to one of your posts, without being distracted.
But I’ll do this one.
I assume you’re thinking of Togo and Sato. The Japanese “peace” faction in the Saiko Senso Shido Kaigi (which varied, but was usually about half, led by Togo, opposed by the “Four Conditions” faction of Anami, Toyoda and Umezu) , with the Emperor’s tacit approval, was attempting to feel out the Russians, as to whether they might be willing to intercede for a negotiated peace. This was primarily done by Togo’s directions to the Japanese ambassador to Moscow, Sato. Togo hoped the Russians, though they had announced earlier in the year that the peace accord between Japan and the USSR would not be renewed when it expired in 1946, might be helpful in obtaining a soft landing , rather than total surrender. Sato rightly saw that what was going on was not a sanctioned effort of the entire Supreme Council, nor was it, as Togo admitted, an attempt to surrender in any sense and must not be presented to the Soviets as such. As Sato told Togo repeatedly, the idea of a negotiated peace was a chimera. The Russians were not interested. Sato’s insistence that the only course was the acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration was accurate. But it was out of reach.
Tojo was not in the cabinet when the contact was initiated with Moscow. Hadn’t been for over a year That was Togo’s doing. One can learn a good deal about it from a number of books, Frank’s DOWNFALL being an excellent one, and Kort’s COLUMBIA GUIDE TO HIROSHIMA AND THE BOMB another. It has a goodly selection of the intercepted messages.
As to the WWI comparison, you seem to be looking in a mirror in some sense, but yes. We were not going to repeat the errors of negotiated peace, harsh war indemnities, and walking away from the resulting mess, leading as Pershing said to having to do it all over again in 25 years. We would achieve unconditional surrender, occupy the country and restructure the kokutai. Which we did.
We had no interest in allowing the Russkies to put another Iron Curtain on their far eastern exposure. What was coming in Europe was bad enough. Here, we could draw a line.The bomb made that possible.
Getting Japan to surrender, as soon as possible, to reduce the ongoing blood bath (Giangreco, again) was the primary point. Keeping the Bear at bay was another.