P
Prodigal_Son
Guest
Modern philosophers constantly talk about logical possibility, which means (roughly) a state of events which are not contradictory. Rarely do they remember that our idea of logical possibility is merely a function of our ignorance. Could there be noncontradictory states of events that are – in every sense of the word – impossible? Yes!
This is important when it comes to debates about epistemology and the problem of evil. For example, the premise “a necessary being exists” does not entail any logical contradictions, but this does not imply that we *know *a necessary being is possible. (Some of us, of course, know Someone who happens to be a necessary being, but it is hard to “export” that knowledge).
Another example: In discussing the problem of evil, it is claimed that an omnipotent and good God would do any number of things that are noncontradictory to assuage suffering. But to claim that something is noncontradictory is not to say that it is possible, nor to say that God can do it. In effect, we have to decide between two definitions of omnipotence: 1) The ability to do anything logically possible, and 2) The ability to do anything *actually *possible. It seems clear to me that the second option is to be preferred, I could be wrong.
If you describe God as a being that can do anything logically possible, then you are assuming that logical possibility and actual possibility are the same. But this is a claim about the world, and what evidence do we have to make such a claim?
This is important when it comes to debates about epistemology and the problem of evil. For example, the premise “a necessary being exists” does not entail any logical contradictions, but this does not imply that we *know *a necessary being is possible. (Some of us, of course, know Someone who happens to be a necessary being, but it is hard to “export” that knowledge).
Another example: In discussing the problem of evil, it is claimed that an omnipotent and good God would do any number of things that are noncontradictory to assuage suffering. But to claim that something is noncontradictory is not to say that it is possible, nor to say that God can do it. In effect, we have to decide between two definitions of omnipotence: 1) The ability to do anything logically possible, and 2) The ability to do anything *actually *possible. It seems clear to me that the second option is to be preferred, I could be wrong.
If you describe God as a being that can do anything logically possible, then you are assuming that logical possibility and actual possibility are the same. But this is a claim about the world, and what evidence do we have to make such a claim?