Is lying always wrong?

[Steadfast_love]

I don’t know how to say this without sounding “flip”, but I thought that one of the advantages of having a Magisterium is to avoid the problem of “personal interpretation” of Scripture. Here, we’ve seen a fascinating dialogue between devout and knowledgeable Catholics on both side of this issue, each citing the other to various aspects of the CCC as well as using Scripture and Reason. Nonetheless, and notwithstanding the authority of the Magisterium, this discussion almost sounds like a fight between sola scriptura Protestants over the interpretation of a difficult scriptural passage. Now, I suspect that both positions in this discussion will simply say that they are the ones correctly representing the Church’s position, but isn’t that the same situation Protestants find ourselves in when we argue over Scripture?

I’m a Protestant in the process of joining the Catholic church so I’d like to field your question.

The essential difference is that the Catholics don’t give up on one another and form a break away church. It’s exactly the same difference between marriage verses just shacking up. Shacking up is more fun and whimsical but marriage is solid. It will endure. In the Catholic church we’re in it together for the long haul… not just until a younger and sexier church catches our eye.

 

[Steadfast_love]

Respectfully, it is you that is in error.

I had thought that the KoC and Vatican would be the most up to date. Mea culpa.

Section 2483, Sentence 2: Mentiri est contra veritatem loqui vel agere ad inducendum in errorem.

You will note that the clause to which you so mightily cling, ad illam cognoscendam non habet, is conspicuously absent until some six sections later.

And more to the point, it’s absence standardizes the definition of what it is to lie. 2483, 2484 To lie is to speak or act against the truth in order to lead someone into error.

In the context of the currently typified edition, the balancing of the right to know the truth with truthfulness can be met with silence or discreet language. Not a lie. Period.

So silence and discreet language are the good version of a lie? Like worship is the good version of idolatry, marriage is the good version of lust and so forth…

Once it can be firmly established that lying is speaking or acting with the intention to deceive, regardless of who it is (this is further confirmed by the Brief of this particular section (CCC 2508: Mendacium est falsum dicere cum intentione fallendi proximum. / Lying consists in saying what is false with the intention of deceiving one’s neighbor.), then the power of justified means enters into play CCC 1753: A good intention (for example, that of helping one’s neighbor) does not make behavior that is intrinsically disordered, such as lying and calumny, good or just. The end does not justify the means. Thus the condemnation of an innocent person cannot be justified as a legitimate means of saving the nation. On the other hand, an added bad intention (such as vainglory) makes an act evil that, in and of itself, can be good (such as almsgiving).

1753 only begs the question. Of course it is wrong to lie (or do any other evil) to achieve a good end. But is decieving the Gestapo either by silence or by discrete language the same as a lie?

I think the question on this thread is misleading. Lying is always wrong just like murder is always wrong, because “Lie” and “Murder” exclusively signify the evil versions of protecting truth and taking life.

**Is it always wrong to murder? **
Yes, murder is always wrong but killing Nazis can be good, even heroic.
**Is it always wrong to lie? **
Lying is always wrong but decieving Nazis can be good, even heroic.

 

[Neo_Canaan]

**Is it always wrong to murder? **
Yes, murder is always wrong but killing Nazis can be good, even heroic.
**Is it always wrong to lie? **
Lying is always wrong but decieving Nazis can be good, even heroic.

That is dumb. Denying even a Kraut a chance to repent an tell lies is by no means heroic. you’d burn in hell with the Nuzi unless you repent.

 

[MikeDunphy]

From the Catechism on the current USCCB website:
2483 Lying is the most direct offense against the truth. **To lie is to speak or act against the truth in order to lead someone into error. **By injuring man’s relation to truth and to his neighbor, a lie offends against the fundamental relation of man and of his word to the Lord.

If anyone is curious why official Catholic websites have different versions of the Catechism, the reason is that there were some revisions going from the first to the second edition. Orionthehunter quotes a revised edition. Steadfast love was quoting the first edition.

 

[MilesXpisti]

**Is it always wrong to murder? **
Yes, murder is always wrong but killing Nazis can be good, even heroic.
**Is it always wrong to lie? **
Lying is always wrong but decieving Nazis can be good, even heroic.

Respectfully, I would call this into question. As stated by the Catechism, “as long as the danger of war persists and there is no international authority with the necessary competence and power, governments cannot be denied the right of lawful self-defense, once all peace efforts have failed.” (CCC 2308) But there is nothing heroic or just about the intentional killing involved in war, even of combatants. Simply, as with the case of the gestapo, ultimately culpability may be rendered to the most venial of states, but the act is still unjust: “The fifth commandment forbids the intentional destruction of human life.” CCC 2307. Our Lord said, “Greater love than this no man hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends.” Secundum Iohannem 15,13. We may choose to lose our lives in protection of others, but never are we morally justified to take it for the same ends. So to is it with speaking falsely.
Steadfast love:

rr1213:

The essential difference is that the Catholics don’t give up on one another and form a break away church. It’s exactly the same difference between marriage verses just shacking up. Shacking up is more fun and whimsical but marriage is solid. It will endure. In the Catholic church we’re in it together for the long haul… not just until a younger and sexier church catches our eye.

The essential difference is that the Catholics don’t give up on one another and form a break away church. It’s exactly the same difference between marriage verses just shacking up. Shacking up is more fun and whimsical but marriage is solid. It will endure. In the Catholic church we’re in it together for the long haul… not just until a younger and sexier church catches our eye.

Too right, and I thank my brother for his discourse. We are all seeking the Truth as we can understand it, but from a single immutable source, unchanging through history, rather than coming up with something more convenient. Moreoever, I’m quite positive that if either of us were corrected formally, we would amend ourselves with the teaching of the Church, rather than going into schism to preserve the pride of our own judgment. This is where interpretation is tempered with divinely revealed Truth.

 

[Ham1]

I think the confusion here has to do with the concept of the object of a moral act.

Certainly, it is never permissible to lie. Lying is instrinsically evil as is murder. However, as noted by others here and the Catechism, there are circumstances in which is is morally permissible to deceive another. This deception is NOT lying. It is a fundamentally different object and is NOT intrinsically evil. It may appear to us to be the same object but we know in fact it is not. It shares the same seeming act in the human species but in the moral species (as defined by right reason) it is a completely different act.

Another common instance of this in moral theology is the idea of murder. The object in a murder is “the killing of an innocent human being.” The principal condition of “innocent” specifies the object to the moral order of “evil.” If we take away the condition of “innocent” and replace it with the condition of “in self defense” the object of the act is fundamentally changed. It is not properly justified murder, but rather a different act altogether that is specified to the moral order as “good” or at the very least “indifferent.” But it is not fundamentally disordered as is “murder.”

In the case lying or deceiving, we could say that the human (not moral) act is to mislead another. In the case, of lying we add the principal condition of “to lead into error.” In the case of legitimate deception, we add the principal condition of “to one who has no right to the truth.” These principal conditions specify the acts to 2 different moral categories, one good, one evil, and make them fundamentally different objects and fundamentally different acts.

By the way, this is not something I made up, this is the reasoningpulled from St. Thomas Aquinas in the Summa Theologica and Pope John II in Veritatis Splendor. Incidentally, it is this way of analyzing the structure of the moral act that is so vehemently opposed by the liberal proportionalist theologians.

I hope this was helpful and did not muddy the water too much.

 

[quasimodo]

I think the confusion here has to do with the concept of the object of a moral act.

Certainly, it is never permissible to lie. Lying is instrinsically evil as is murder. However, as noted by others here and the Catechism, there are circumstances in which is is morally permissible to deceive another. This deception is NOT lying. It is a fundamentally different object and is NOT intrinsically evil. It may appear to us to be the same object but we know in fact it is not. It shares the same seeming act in the human species but in the moral species (as defined by right reason) it is a completely different act.

Another common instance of this in moral theology is the idea of murder. The object in a murder is “the killing of an innocent human being.” The principal condition of “innocent” specifies the object to the moral order of “evil.” If we take away the condition of “innocent” and replace it with the condition of “in self defense” the object of the act is fundamentally changed. It is not properly justified murder, but rather a different act altogether that is specified to the moral order as “good” or at the very least “indifferent.” But it is not fundamentally disordered as is “murder.”

In the case lying or deceiving, we could say that the human (not moral) act is to mislead another. In the case, of lying we add the principal condition of “to lead into error.” In the case of legitimate deception, we add the principal condition of “to one who has no right to the truth.” These principal conditions specify the acts to 2 different moral categories, one good, one evil, and make them fundamentally different objects and fundamentally different acts.

By the way, this is not something I made up, this is the reasoningpulled from St. Thomas Aquinas in the Summa Theologica and Pope John II in Veritatis Splendor. Incidentally, it is this way of analyzing the structure of the moral act that is so vehemently opposed by the liberal proportionalist theologians.

I hope this was helpful and did not muddy the water too much.

a wonderful addition to the discussion, Ham1

 

[MilesXpisti]

I think the confusion here has to do with the concept of the object of a moral act.

Certainly, it is never permissible to lie. Lying is instrinsically evil as is murder. However, as noted by others here and the Catechism, there are circumstances in which is is morally permissible to deceive another. This deception is NOT lying. It is a fundamentally different object and is NOT intrinsically evil. It may appear to us to be the same object but we know in fact it is not. It shares the same seeming act in the human species but in the moral species (as defined by right reason) it is a completely different act.

Another common instance of this in moral theology is the idea of murder. The object in a murder is “the killing of an innocent human being.” The principal condition of “innocent” specifies the object to the moral order of “evil.” If we take away the condition of “innocent” and replace it with the condition of “in self defense” the object of the act is fundamentally changed. It is not properly justified murder, but rather a different act altogether that is specified to the moral order as “good” or at the very least “indifferent.” But it is not fundamentally disordered as is “murder.”

In the case lying or deceiving, we could say that the human (not moral) act is to mislead another. In the case, of lying we add the principal condition of “to lead into error.” In the case of legitimate deception, we add the principal condition of “to one who has no right to the truth.” These principal conditions specify the acts to 2 different moral categories, one good, one evil, and make them fundamentally different objects and fundamentally different acts.

By the way, this is not something I made up, this is the reasoningpulled from St. Thomas Aquinas in the Summa Theologica and Pope John II in Veritatis Splendor. Incidentally, it is this way of analyzing the structure of the moral act that is so vehemently opposed by the liberal proportionalist theologians.

I hope this was helpful and did not muddy the water too much.

To address first, we must arrive the fundamental defintion of a lie, independent of circumstance. A lie, as defined by the Catechism is: Lying consists in saying what is false with the intention of deceiving one’s neighbor (CCC2508). Our friends at Merriam-Webster take pretty much the same tack: an assertion of something known or believed by the speaker to be untrue with intent to deceive.

Once we establish that we are deceiving someone, it objectively becomes a lie. After that, St. Thomas Aquinas chimes in, and apparently, I’ve read a very different version of the book that yours.

(Housed at New Advent) Summa Theologica, Second Part of the Second Part, Question 110, Article 3: Whether every lie is a sin?

"An action that is naturally evil in respect of its genus can by no means be good and lawful, since in order for an action to be good it must be right in every respect: because good results from a complete cause…

Moreover, as written by HH John Paul II, in Veritatis Splendor he wrote:

"In order to justify these positions, some authors have proposed a kind of double status of moral truth. Beyond the doctrinal and abstract level, one would have to acknowledge the priority of a certain more concrete existential consideration. The latter, by taking account of circumstances and the situation, could legitimately be the basis of certain exceptions to the general rule and thus permit one to do in practice and in good conscience what is qualified as intrinsically evil by the moral law. A separation, or even an opposition, is thus established in some cases between the teaching of the precept, which is valid in general, and the norm of the individual conscience, which would in fact make the final decision about what is good and what is evil. On this basis, an attempt is made to legitimize so-called “pastoral” solutions contrary to the teaching of the Magisterium, and to justify a “creative” hermeneutic according to which the moral conscience is in no way obliged, in every case, by a particular negative precept.

No one can fail to realize that these approaches pose a challenge to the very identity of the moral conscience in relation to human freedom and God’s law. Only the clarification made earlier with regard to the relationship, based on truth, between freedom and law makes possible a discernment concerning this ‘creative’ understanding of conscience."

He further stated that this discernment can only come from reason borne not of interior conscience but of reason “enlightened by Divine Revelation and by faith.”

 

[Ham1]

To address first, we must arrive the fundamental defintion of a lie, independent of circumstance. A lie, as defined by the Catechism is: Lying consists in saying what is false with the intention of deceiving one’s neighbor (CCC2508). Our friends at Merriam-Webster take pretty much the same tack: an assertion of something known or believed by the speaker to be untrue with intent to deceive.

Once we establish that we are deceiving someone, it objectively becomes a lie. After that, St. Thomas Aquinas chimes in, and apparently, I’ve read a very different version of the book that yours.

(Housed at New Advent) Summa Theologica, Second Part of the Second Part, Question 110, Article 3: Whether every lie is a sin?

"An action that is naturally evil in respect of its genus can by no means be good and lawful, since in order for an action to be good it must be right in every respect: because good results from a complete cause…

Moreover, as written by HH John Paul II, in Veritatis Splendor he wrote:

"In order to justify these positions, some authors have proposed a kind of double status of moral truth. Beyond the doctrinal and abstract level, one would have to acknowledge the priority of a certain more concrete existential consideration. The latter, by taking account of circumstances and the situation, could legitimately be the basis of certain exceptions to the general rule and thus permit one to do in practice and in good conscience what is qualified as intrinsically evil by the moral law. A separation, or even an opposition, is thus established in some cases between the teaching of the precept, which is valid in general, and the norm of the individual conscience, which would in fact make the final decision about what is good and what is evil. On this basis, an attempt is made to legitimize so-called “pastoral” solutions contrary to the teaching of the Magisterium, and to justify a “creative” hermeneutic according to which the moral conscience is in no way obliged, in every case, by a particular negative precept.

No one can fail to realize that these approaches pose a challenge to the very identity of the moral conscience in relation to human freedom and God’s law. Only the clarification made earlier with regard to the relationship, based on truth, between freedom and law makes possible a discernment concerning this ‘creative’ understanding of conscience."

He further stated that this discernment can only come from reason borne not of interior conscience but of reason “enlightened by Divine Revelation and by faith.”

What you have written here is good. Of course, a lie is always wrong as affirmed by St. Thomas. But a “benevolent deception” (for complete lack of an accurate english word - I don’t know what else to call it) is not a lie. Just as killing in self-defense is not a murder. However, St. Thomas speaks of 2 types of conditions. or circumstances. He references conditio particularis (commonly known as circumstances that do not “enter into the object of the act”) and also conditio principalis (conditions that fundamentally alter the object of an act into something different).

A great example of this difference is the act of sexual interourse. On it’s own we would call it indifferent or a human act. In short, we need more information in order to determine whether the act is moral or immoral. When the conditio principalis of “with spouse” or “with non-spouse” is added, then the act is designated to a moral species (good on the one hand and evil on the other). At this point the two acts have fundamentally different objects, marital intercourse and fornication, the first a good act, the second an intrinsically evil act. Even though biologically, or at a human level, the acts remain the same, morally they are completely different.

Lying, by definition is disordered and is morally evil. Using the nalogy above lying is akin to fornication and is always evil. The question is can one commit an act on a human level (say, misleading another with words) that when viewed with a conditio principalis of “to one who does not have a right to the truth” is actually a moral act? Such an act would be as different from lying as marital intercourse is from fornication. It would be a fundamentally different object.

 

[AndyF]

Is lying always wrong? Can one get away with “white lies”? Civilization is obviously based on people normally and always telling the truth. Suppose you lied to someone to make them feel better. Is that wrong? Or suppose there was some sort of emergency, and you say “It’s going to be okay”. Is that a lie?

In a perfect world of fraternal love and caring, yes. But has it is now it should be judged on what the greater good it would cause.

Is an admition of a one night stand by a spouse who is remorseful and vows to not err again worth the risk of tearing away of a loving parent away from his children and wife? Seems to me the only one left to gloat over the marriage remnants would be the “instigator”.

M2C

AndyF

 

[Church_Militant]

So your saying it,s ok to sin because Jesus paid the price. So we can trample the blood of Jesus Christ. God save us.

Okay, well, let’s look at a very practical application.

You say that it is always wrong, (ie: a sin) to lie.

Do you really believe that?

Example: If I was to post on another religious forum, one that I disagree with, and violate their rules to the point that I am banned for it and then I come back around and re-register on that same forum and begin to post the same stuff again, am I not lying to them because I have agreed (twice now) to abide by their rules, and have not done so. In fact I have attempted to decieve them, all in the name of my “witness for Christ”.

Doesn’t that seem like lying and dishonesty, which falls under that same commandment?

A person who does this apparently does not believe that he is willfully sinning, but I sure think he is. In fact, I feel that if he’s doing it in the name of his faith, that there has to be something somewhat askew with his conscience. (We Catholics would say that his conscience is not “rightly formed.”)

It is that same sort of rationalizing of sin that allows people to be rude, uncharitable, mean spirited, and even bigotted against others who don’t share their beliefs, and where does it end then? That kind of rationalization could ultimately lead into some really grave sin.

This brings up something else. This kind of rationalization may also prove that n-Cs, (whether they will admit it or not…and they won’t!) actually do believe that some sins are not grave…(or mortal?) and therefore, deny with their mouth what they really believe and practice in their life. They display that their consciences actually convict them that some sins are “veniel” in nature and others are more grave and therefore “mortal”.

I just wanted to bring this up because I’m pretty darned sure that someone around here has done this very thing. Too bad for them, I’m a pretty observant guy.
Pax Domini sit semper vobiscum.

 

[JimG]

Some of the rather fundamentalist interpretations of the precept against lying that I see on this thread are just silly.

When asked “How are you?,” my wife would invariably reply “Just fine!” with a big smile, no matter what kind of day she was having—even if it was not going well. It made everyone’s day go better and made for civil discourse. To my knowledge, no one ever angrily accused her of the sin of lying.

 

[Ron_Conte]

lying is intrinsically evil and always immoral

one cannot redefine the term lying according to the object of the speech, such that it is a lie if it is to deceive or to do harm, and not a lie if it is to do something good, because intrinsically evil acts are always wrong regardless of the purpose, intention, or end. Redefining an intrinsically evil act according to its circumstances, intention, or end is necessarily a false definition because its morality is no longer intrinsic to the act itself.

If it is a lie, then it is wrong regardless of circumstance or intention or purpose.

You cannot lie to save lives, nor to save souls, nor even to redeem the whole world from Hell.

You can remain silent in many circumstances.
You can refrain from correcting some one else’s misunderstanding in some circumstances.
You can say some things that are true, but reserve other things that are true, if you have a grave reason.

If evil persons are searching for someone good, and they ask you if he is hiding in your house:

1. if he is not in the house, you can say he is not in the house, or you can remain silent
2. if he is in the house, you can remain silent
3. if he is in the garage, but they ask you if he is in the house, you can say he is not in the house (this is an example of mental reservation)
4. if he is in the house, you cannot lie and say that he is not in the house. That lie would certainly be a venial sin, and no circumstance or intention or goal can make it moral.

Ron Conte

 

[JimG]

Last night, watching 60 Minutes, I came upon a real life example of what is under discussion here. It was a piece about the Rwandan genocide. During the massacres, seven Tutsi women went to a Hutu clergyman begging for help. He hid them in a bathroom of his home. When the Hutu’s came looking for them to kill them, he told them “I sent them away, I sent them away.” Had he not lied, the women you see in this video would be dead now, brutally murdered. Now, how much condemnation do we want to lay on that clergyman for his lie?

To take the matter out of the realm of theoretical and into the practical, I would urge you to go to cbsnews.com/sections/60minutes/main3415.shtml and watch the video “Surviving Genocide.”

 

[rr1213]

Last night, watching 60 Minutes, I came upon a real life example of what is under discussion here. It was a piece about the Rwandan genocide. During the massacres, seven Tutsi women went to a Hutu clergyman begging for help. He hid them in a bathroom of his home. When the Hutu’s came looking for them to kill them, he told them “I sent them away, I sent them away.” Had he not lied, the women you see in this video would be dead now, brutally murdered. Now, how much condemnation do we want to lay on that clergyman for his lie?

To take the matter out of the realm of theoretical and into the practical, I would urge you to go to cbsnews.com/sections/60minutes/main3415.shtml and watch the video “Surviving Genocide.”

Did it say whether the clergyman was Catholic, Anglican or other?

 

[JimG]

Did it say whether the clergyman was Catholic, Anglican or other?

I don’t know what type of clergyman he was. The point is, he did not hesitate to mislead, even lie to, the killers. These seven women survived. Three-fourths of the Tutsi’s did not. According to the program, the killing was more efficient than the Nazi’s.

cbsnews.com/sections/60minutes/main3415.shtml

 

[patg]

if he is in the house, you cannot lie and say that he is not in the house. That lie would certainly be a venial sin, and no circumstance or intention or goal can make it moral.

And no pious moralizing can make this statement anything less than ridiculous.

 

[Ron_Conte]

Last night, watching 60 Minutes, I came upon a real life example of what is under discussion here. It was a piece about the Rwandan genocide. During the massacres, seven Tutsi women went to a Hutu clergyman begging for help. He hid them in a bathroom of his home. When the Hutu’s came looking for them to kill them, he told them “I sent them away, I sent them away.” Had he not lied, the women you see in this video would be dead now, brutally murdered. Now, how much condemnation do we want to lay on that clergyman for his lie?

His lie was an objective venial sin.

I should add that this is not merely my opinion. It is the teaching of the Church that lying is intrinsically evil, and that all intrinsically evil acts can never be justified.

See Veritatis Splendor on that point.

Ron

 

[quasimodo]

His lie was an objective venial sin.

I should add that this is not merely my opinion. It is the teaching of the Church that lying is intrinsically evil, and that all intrinsically evil acts can never be justified.

See Veritatis Splendor on that point.

Ron

And God has rewarded people for “venial sins” like this because by them they showed their fear of the Lord. Go, thou and do likewise.

 

[JimG]

So perhaps if I could summarize. The important thing here is not the flesh and blood innocent women standing before me, begging for help.

If I can help them, fine. But the really important thing is to ensure that I act to prevent even the slightest venial sin from sullying my own soul. I shall preserve my own spiritual purity, even at the cost of their lives.