Is the Christian God self-contradictory?

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The notion of a good and omnipotent God seems to contradict itself. Not only is his supposed product (i.e. universe, multiverse etc) NOT a reflection of good, but the very nature of omnipotence requires knowledge of the greatest good AND the darkest evils. So if one would argue against the “evil” nature of God, could you not accept instead a sort of nuetrality that would result from having all the best thoughts, AND all of the worst? Certainly compassion and love were created by him, but so was hate and fear. Thus reflecting a nuetral stance like that of nature.
This ignores the “in media res” nature of the Creation described in Catholicism. Evil in the world today does no require neutrality or evil on the part of God, who exists outside of time, and sees the full “coming around” of Creation due to the Incarnation.

BTW, I like your screen name. I would have used it myself not to many years ago 🙂
 
This ignores the “in media res” nature of the Creation described in Catholicism. Evil in the world today does no require neutrality or evil on the part of God, who exists outside of time, and sees the full “coming around” of Creation due to the Incarnation.
What is “in media res”? Time and completed ellipticals are not relevant here. The nature of creation and by reflection that of God itself is what I was debating . God created all that exists, therefore evil was created by God. Check with a philosophy teacher, if you except the first half of this argument, the second half MUST be true. to believe anything else would be a fallacy. Even if you contend that Satan made evil (which would be a duelistic religion like zoroasterianism) God still made satan, and therefore still made evil, and the being who was obviously evil. Everything means just that …EVERYTHING.
BTW, I like your screen name. I would have used it myself not to many years ago 🙂
Thanks, I get a lot of comments about it for some reason…don’t you people know that I am a sign of the end of days!! 😉
 
Wormwood: You’re making a couple of leaps of logic and see m to have a few misunderstandings about the nature of evil from a Catholic perspective. I’ll start with the latter first.

Evil is not a “thing”, it can’t be quantified. In fact, evil is a privation of something, namely good. In an absolute sense, nothing is “evil”, it’s just “less good”, but we use evil as a shorthand to describe things that fall far enough away from normative levels of goodness.

Now, the fallacy your showing is that just because something creates something else, it doesn’t mean the first creator caused what its creation causes. If the creation is an automaton, this could be said, but if the creation has its own will, it has its own means of deviating from its creator’s design. Humans are not dominos that are stacked and knocked over.

If you read post #67-68, you’ll see my argument for why God, being good, must have made creatures with the ability to do evil in order for them to be good according to their nature. The fact that they chose evil does not take away from their initial goodness. Now, “in media res” means “in the middle of things”, and it’s very relevant to the discussion. God exists outside of time, but creation is temporal. We are stuck in the perspective of time, and see the results of our evil choices, but God is not limited in His perception in the same way. He sees then, now, and the future. He sees the completion of Salvation History, when Creation is brought back to the perfect good, and all of that was initiated by the coming of Christ. God used out own free will to commit evil as a turning point for Salvation for Creation, in the sacrifice of Himself on Calvary. He turned our lust for imperfection into the means of perfecting Creation, and did so without violating our free will.

To put is briefly, God solved the paradox of free will and perfect good with the Incarnation and Passion. Again, post #67 goes into much more detail, and I recommend reading it before asking for any clarifications (which I’ll be happy to give).

As for your name, remember that Catholics have a much different view of the end times than Protestants, and that really your name just means “bitterness” 😛
 
Check with a philosophy teacher, if you except the first half of this argument, the second half MUST be true.
This is actually one of my problems with modern philosophy teaching in schools, namely that it fails in logic a large portion of the time. In this case the mistake is actually not one of logic per se, but one of misdefining “evil”. The error in logic that most modern philosophies make is assuming causality, namely that since I made this, I’m responsible for what this does.

I believe this error stems from the strong current of materialism that infected modern thinking, and largely destroyed transcendant logic. In the material world, espescially in scientific endeavors, we must assume causality in order for our observations to be useful. The fact that causality is necessary in material examination in order for observations to be useful does not mean that causality can truly be assumed in any circumstance; logic is essentially “fudged” in order to make science a useful tool.

Now don’t think I’m knocking science at all, because I work in science, namely medical science. I believe that for science to be useful, it must make the assumptions that it does, including the assumption of materialistic causality. What I don’t believe is that this assumed model is truly useful for explaining everything, as anyone who works in medicine could likely tell you. When I’m examining a patient, I absolutely must assume causality if I’m to be of any use in treating them, but anyone with experience in medicine will tell you that causality fails as often as it succeeds. One could argue that this is just because we don’t know all the factors involved, but in such medical studies we’ve always ended up with more questions and confusion the more factors we’ve uncovered. It’s an exhilarating field, with new advancements and questions being raised all the time, and many, if not most of us, definately believe in miracles; we’re in the business of proving miracles, really.

😃
 
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atheos_sum:
I don’t think it depends on what P happens to be, unless God can choose *not to know *a particular P. In which case, he wouldn’t be omniscient. In my view, in order for God not be contradictory there are a number of things that could happen: one of them is that he is less than omniscient.

It does not depend on what P is, precisely because God knows all Ps, not just specific ones: not just ones that do not involve evil; not just ones do not involve salvation.
sure. but if among the propositions that god knows are propositions about free choices, then god’s knowing those propositions is not incompatible with those choices being free.

for example, if what god knows is that “john doran will freely choose to respond to atheos_sum at 7:28am on august 8, 2005”, then how does god’s knowing that i will make a free choice in any way impugn the freedom of that choice?
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atheos_sum:
In my view, here we are simply giving the predetermined act of “eating cornflakes for breakfast” the euphemistic name of a “freely chosen act.” This is much like Orwellian doublespeak in my view.
fair enough. but just stipulating it as “doublespeak” is not enough to make the point.
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atheos_sum:
Please explain to me how, in a universe that is foreordained, any act could be called a “freely chosen act.”
well, the obvious answer is that any choice that is “foreordained” to be free, will be freely made.
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atheos_sum:
But you have raised another point of interest. This is, whether there are “alternative states of affairs?” Do you follow? The absence of alternatives states of affairs presupposes that Sam has no other alternatives to cornflakes. So, in the absence of alternatives, there is no room for freedom. Even though Sam imagines that he himself is choosing freely, the alleged “alternatives” are nothing more than illusions. This is because in my view there is only one actual state of affairs.
well, if that’s right, then everything is necessary, and it would make no sense at all to speak of any possible-but-not-actual states of affairs.
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atheos_sum:
It is necessary that it be “impossible” for him to choose “Wheaties” in order for God to be omniscient. If Sam does choose Wheaties, then our Someone is not truly omniscient. Do you follow?
no. not at all. if omniscience is something like “knowing every true proposition and no false ones”, then, as long as there are true propositions about free choices, an omniscient being will know them.
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atheos_sum:
I wish I knew what you meant by “demonstrate that there are no true propositions about free choices” and I don’t understand what follows either.
i think that most of our problems here stem from this point…

a true proposition about free choice is just what it sounds like: a proposition that some free agent makes a choice, which proposition is true.

look - your attempts at demonstrating an incompatibility between omniscience and free choice only work if there are no true propositions about free choices: i.e. you can only make your case if you assume that there’s no such thing as free will, since there’s nothing in the definition of “omniscience” that rules it out. do you see what i’m saying?

omniscience is defined in terms of propositional knowledge, or at least it is for me and any number of other (not necessarily catholic) theologians and philosophers. but defined in those terms, it would only be possible to develop a prima facie argument against free choice only if there is some ancillary incompatibility between propositions and free choces. that is, if there are no true propositions about free will.

but if that’s true, then you’d (A) have to provide an independent demonstration of it, and (B) your agument about omniscience would be superfluous, since we would already know there’s no free choice.
 
God is omnipotent, and therefore can mess around the laws of Logic if he wants to. He just doesn’t most times: he likes to make sense to us.
 
john doran:
sure. but if among the propositions that god knows are propositions about free choices, then god’s knowing those propositions is not incompatible with those choices being free.
First of all, “Propositions* about* free choices”? What does this mean? I’m going to ask this later.

You’ve essentially said this “If among the propositions that god knows are propositions about X, then god’s knowing those propositions is not incompatible with those propositions being X.” I’ve just substituted variables here.

You have essentially just added “free choice” as a kind of coefficient, if you will, of X. Of course, you just get the same X on the other side of the equation as you began with. It’s like (5x) = (5x). That’s no surprise, but it doesn’t add anything to this conversation. It’s doublespeak, as I said.

–look, i know you think humans have free will, but blatantly trying to fool me in this way is not honest. Ludwig saw most disagreements as a result of ‘language games’. Do you think that if one sorts out this ‘language game’ for me that i will see the truth in your conclusion?
john doran:
for example, if what god knows is that “john doran will freely choose to respond to atheos_sum at 7:28am on august 8, 2005”, then how does god’s knowing that i will make a free choice in any way impugn the freedom of that choice?
It does impugn on your freedom, oh absolutely. I am just as surprised as you since you think it doesn’t. Say God knows that you will make some kind of a “free choice” to eat Wheaties at time T. But, say, at time T you felt like eating Cornflakes? What could you do? Another example: The Lord tells Peter he will deny Him three times (but actually he denied him more than three) before time T. But say at time T Peter didn’t want to deny the Lord three times. Perhaps only twice is what he wanted. Perhaps he would like to freely choose to not deny him at all. What could he do?
john doran:
well, the obvious answer is that any choice that is “foreordained” to be free, will be freely made.
No. It cannot be both. Just like for a prime number to be a composite number, it needs to be a composite number and thus not be a prime number; for a “foreordained” being to be a free being, it needs to be a free being and thus not be a “foreordained” one. What more do these sentences tell us in terms of truth-value except something which we already logically understood: the law of identity, and excluded middle.
john doran:
well, if that’s right, then everything is necessary, and it would make no sense at all to speak of any possible-but-not-actual states of affairs.
You aren’t very explanatory. When you say, “Then everything is necessary,” this is too vague for me to agree with you. If an omniscient being exists, then by virtue of this, the future already exists. Moreover, there is one future, not numerous “possible” futures. Every choice is already made—non-omniscient beings like you or I just don’t know what they are.

Also,

doesn’t it make sense to stipulate “possible states of affairs” and stipulate “alternative states of affairs”? I don’t say they necessarily follow, in fact, if you understood me, i think they are incompatible with the argument. But many theologians use this language. But you say we cannot speak of them, or introduce them to this discussion? I was using them to illustrate my point, not saying that I accepted them.

continued…
 
john doran:
no. not at all. if omniscience is something like “knowing every true proposition and no false ones”, then, as long as there are true propositions about free choices, an omniscient being will know them.

What are you saying exactly? There are true propositions, and yes, God must know them. What does it mean to say “about free choices”? As in your statement, “No true propositions about free choices”? What about them?

There are no true propositions which make claims like, “created beings are able to make choices which are not as a result of the deity’s compulsion or predestination” if you begin with the benign assumption of an omniscient and all-creating deity.
john doran:
look - your attempts at demonstrating an incompatibility between omniscience and free choice only work if there are no true propositions about free choices: i.e. you can only make your case if you assume that there’s no such thing as free will,

If that is true, then you can only make your case if you assume the opposite.

Nonetheless, all this about “assuming” is facetious. No one “assumes” a corollary. This in my view all stems from the theists’ hostility towards reason, despite the fantastic argumentative presentations. If you do not like a corollary, you say that it was “assumed” instead of acknowledging that it naturally succeeds. And this is not prima facie.
john doran:
since there’s nothing in the definition of “omniscience” that rules it out. do you see what i’m saying?

If there were something in the definition of omniscience which excluded free will, theologians would not have chosen that word to describe the deity (to avoid this debate obviously.) But there is no such word like the one you demand, as far as I’m aware. And for those in favor of predestination, the very prospect of a debate with an attribute of God which analytically meant “free will is impossible” would be begging the question in favor of predestination.

Are you saying that since definitions do not include possible corollaries, then corollaries ought to be ruled out of the question? Definitions do not list corollaries, for very parsimonious reasons, since they might be innumerous and it also depends on what the defined-thing was in combination with.
john doran:
omniscience is defined in terms of propositional knowledge, or at least it is for me and any number of other (not necessarily catholic) theologians and philosophers. but defined in those terms, it would only be possible to develop a prima facie argument against free choice only if there is some ancillary incompatibility between propositions and free choces. that is, if there are no true propositions about free will.

but if that’s true, then you’d (A) have to provide an independent demonstration of it, and (B) your agument about omniscience would be superfluous, since we would already know there’s no free choice.

So, before the prima facie argument is even presented, you would already know there’s no free choice? By virtue of what exactly? All you’re really saying when you say I would already understand its truth if it was a prima facie argument is really just saying this, “it isn’t obvious to me that your argument is true,” which I already understand. There was no need to restate it so fantastically.
 
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cardenio:
God is omnipotent, and therefore can mess around the laws of Logic if he wants to. He just doesn’t most times: he likes to make sense to us.
I don’t think any respected theologian would take that view seriously. It’s escapist and evasive, despite the fact that this implies that God is illogical.
 
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Ghosty:
This is actually one of my problems with modern philosophy teaching in schools, namely that it fails in logic a large portion of the time. In this case the mistake is actually not one of logic per se, but one of misdefining “evil”. The error in logic that most modern philosophies make is assuming causality, namely that since I made this, I’m responsible for what this does.
😃
you and i are done debating, of course, but i would recommend that you read Kant (read him again, since you say you’ve already read him before), specifically what he wrote about intentions and consequences. just a recommendation.
 
Evil is not a “thing”, it can’t be quantified. In fact, evil is a privation of something, namely good. In an absolute sense, nothing is “evil”, it’s just “less good”, but we use evil as a shorthand to describe things that fall far enough away from normative levels of goodness.
Now, the fallacy your showing is that just because something creates something else, it doesn’t mean the first creator caused what its creation causes. If the creation is an automaton, this could be said, but if the creation has its own will, it has its own means of deviating from its creator’s design. Humans are not dominos that are stacked and knocked over.
So by your reasoning, Hitler was just “less good” than Christ? You seem to understand philosophy. The true fallacy is that you are using a one sided continuum. Evil is in fact a tangible alignment, despite the semantics of half empty/half full. If a being is all knowing and all powerful then his creations can not create anything outside of his power. Where would the notion of evil (or less good) come from? A random occurance in the human mind? You can’t choose THIS as the time to believe in spontaneous creation 🙂
I believe this error stems from the strong current of materialism that infected modern thinking, and largely destroyed transcendant logic. In the material world, espescially in scientific endeavors, we must assume causality in order for our observations to be useful. The fact that causality is necessary in material examination in order for observations to be useful does not mean that causality can truly be assumed in any circumstance; logic is essentially “fudged” in order to make science a useful tool.
I could say the same for your logic. Causality is not a necessity, unless that is the ultimate goal of proof. You do not have to know WHY the sun sets to know that does indeed set.
 
So by your reasoning, Hitler was just “less good” than Christ? You seem to understand philosophy. The true fallacy is that you are using a one sided continuum. Evil is in fact a tangible alignment, despite the semantics of half empty/half full.
It’s not a fallacy if it’s true. The belief that evil is simply a defect of good goes back all the way in the Judeo-Christian theology, to the very roots of the faith. There has never been a time in this theological tradition in which evil has been understood to be a tangible thing in and of itself. There have been certain demarkations of “less good” that are more forcefully referred to as evil, Hitler’s actions are a good example as you’ve shown, but it does not change the fact that evil is simply the absence of good.
If a being is all knowing and all powerful then his creations can not create anything outside of his power. Where would the notion of evil (or less good) come from? A random occurance in the human mind? You can’t choose THIS as the time to believe in spontaneous creation 🙂
I’m not sure if I follow you, but the notion of evil comes from the examination of turning against God, who is viewed as the eternal good. If you look in the Tanach, espescially Genesis, you will see this demonstrated. I’m not trying to say that you should take Genesis at face value in this debate, but it is worthwhile because it shows how the early Jews viewed evil in relation to good. As can be seen in the depiction of the Fall of Man, evil is perceived not as a tangible “other”, but rather disobedience towards God. You’ll notice in Genesis that Creation is described as “very good”, and then Adam and Eve Fall based on rejecting God’s plan. There is no depiction of evil as an opposing force, though the serpent is definately portrayed as also going against God’s plan.
I could say the same for your logic. Causality is not a necessity, unless that is the ultimate goal of proof. You do not have to know WHY the sun sets to know that does indeed set.
Again, that’s a materialist question, not a transcendental one. Regardless, that the sun sets can be deduced from the factors that cause it to set (i.e. rotation of the Earth), without actually having to observe the fact that the sun sets. In a philosophical sense, a deduction is a much stronger proposition than an induction because it doesn’t assume the result in order to ask the question (i.e. “The sun sets, therefore there must be factors that cause it to set”). When you build up from smaller facts, you have a better chance of not making assumptions to fit your conclusion, and the theory is far less likely to be denied out of hand. 😃
 
It’s not a fallacy if it’s true. The belief that evil is simply a defect of good goes back all the way in the Judeo-Christian theology, to the very roots of the faith. There has never been a time in this theological tradition in which evil has been understood to be a tangible thing in and of itself.
Well what about the fallen prince of darkness? And like I said we are debating semantics here. Evil being an absence of good, could be restated as good being an absence of evil and be no less true. It is the classic optimist/pessimist view debate. Murder of innocents is evil, rape is evil, mindless selfishness and lying also evil. Granted there are varying degrees of (not so good) but it is still the opposite of good. If there was no evil, there would be no good. It is like having right without left. If there was no left, you wouldn’t need a word for right because there isn’t anything other than right to compare it to.
Again, that’s a materialist question, not a transcendental one.
Are you refering to metaphysics?
Regardless, that the sun sets can be deduced from the factors that cause it to set (i.e. rotation of the Earth), without actually having to observe the fact that the sun sets.
But that is the exact opposite of my meaning…You stressed the importance of causality in importance of an argument…and I was stating that I disagreed on these grounds.
When you build up from smaller facts, you have a better chance of not making assumptions to fit your conclusion, and the theory is far less likely to be denied out of hand. 😃
Ahem…this is just a dodge the question of creator of evil. To make this no longer a semantic misunderstanding, call it what you will. There are still thoughs and deeds that are “evil” for lack of a better word…and to be good or to be less good are all concepts originating in God, as everything must originate in an all powerful all knowing creator of all. Even if it was not manifest until through his creations, he still created them and whatever capacity they may have.
 
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atheos_sum:
First of all, “Propositions* about* free choices”? What does this mean? I’m going to ask this later.

You’ve essentially said this “If among the propositions that god knows are propositions about X, then god’s knowing those propositions is not incompatible with those propositions being X.” I’ve just substituted variables here.
i know that’s what i did - it was, in fact, the point of my original post…

let’s try this again.

your argument is that god’s foreknowledge is incompatible with free will, presumably because “god knows that john doran will do X” is incompatible with “john doran is free with regards to X”.

my point is simply that whether or not god’s foreknowledge is incompatible with free choice depends on what it is that god foreknows. for example, if what god knows is that some agent will make a free choice at some point, then your alleged conflict between god’s omnisicence and free will disappears.

my use of logical formalism is simply illustrative: it’s not the form of the argument simpliciter that gets you where you want to go, but rather the content. but if that’s true, then the only way to get your conclusion out of the argument - i.e. that there is no free will - is to include it in the premises. which, as you know, is to beg the question.

put another way, you have to show that X cannot be a proposition including “free choice”.
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atheos_sum:
You have essentially just added “free choice” as a kind of coefficient, if you will, of X. Of course, you just get the same X on the other side of the equation as you began with. It’s like (5x) = (5x). That’s no surprise, but it doesn’t add anything to this conversation. It’s doublespeak, as I said.
exactly. which is what you’re doing, too: there is no free will because god knows everything you’re going to do, and god doesn’t know anything about free will.

atheos_sum said:
–look, i know you think humans have free will, but blatantly trying to fool me in this way is not honest. Ludwig saw most disagreements as a result of ‘language games’. Do you think that if one sorts out this ‘language game’ for me that i will see the truth in your conclusion?

i’m not trying to fool anyone.
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atheos_sum:
It does impugn on your freedom, oh absolutely. I am just as surprised as you since you think it doesn’t. Say God knows that you will make some kind of a “free choice” to eat Wheaties at time T. But, say, at time T you felt like eating Cornflakes?
i don’t think that makes any sense: if you stipulate that i freely choose to eat wheaties at time t, then ***that’s ***what i wanted to do.
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atheos_sum:
Another example: The Lord tells Peter he will deny Him three times (but actually he denied him more than three) before time T. But say at time T Peter didn’t want to deny the Lord three times. Perhaps only twice is what he wanted. Perhaps he would like to freely choose to not deny him at all. What could he do?
if peter did, in fact, freely choose to deny jesus three times, then that’s what he wanted to do.
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atheos_sum:
No. It cannot be both. Just like for a prime number to be a composite number, it needs to be a composite number and thus not be a prime number; for a “foreordained” being to be a free being, it needs to be a free being and thus not be a “foreordained” one. What more do these sentences tell us in terms of truth-value except something which we already logically understood: the law of identity, and excluded middle.
why can’t a choice be foreordained to be free? why can’t god create john doran at time t in a set of circumstances in which it is necessary for me to make a free choice? while i agree that a choice can’t be free if the choice itself is determined - i.e. if i am determined to choose to eat wheaties instead of cornflakes - but that’s not the same thing as being unable to avoid having to choose wheaties or cornflakes and it being totally up to me.
 
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atheos_sum:
You aren’t very explanatory. When you say, “Then everything is necessary,” this is too vague for me to agree with you. If an omniscient being exists, then by virtue of this, the future already exists. Moreover, there is one future, not numerous “possible” futures. Every choice is already made—non-omniscient beings like you or I just don’t know what they are.
what i meant by saying “everything is necessary” was simply that if you do not take the existence of possible worlds, or possible states of affairs, as sufficient to constitute the alternatives in any given situation of choice, then those same possible worlds cannot be sufficient to account for ***any ***kind of possible-but-not-actual states of affairs. which would mean that everything that occurs in the actual world occurs necessarily.

for example, when we say things like “i could have been taller” or “i could have been called george instead of john”, or “that cup could easily have fallen from the counter”, we are saying that there is some possible world in which the cup falls from the counter, in which i am called george and i’m 6 feet tall. similarly when we consider things like mountains of gold or unicorns or rivers of coca cola - none of wich in fact exist, but all of which it makes perfectly good sense to believe might have existed…

in the same way, a choice is free if there is some possible world which is identical to the actual world up until the time of the choice, but in which something different is chosen. so, if i choose to eat wheaties for breakfast one morning, that choice will have been free if there is a possible world exactly the same as the actual world up until i make the choice, excpet that in that world i choose to eat cornflakes. that’s what it means to say there are open alternatives to the choice made in the actual world.
 
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atheos_sum:
What are you saying exactly? There are true propositions, and yes, God must know them. What does it mean to say “about free choices”? As in your statement, “No true propositions about free choices”? What about them?

There are no true propositions which make claims like, “created beings are able to make choices which are not as a result of the deity’s compulsion or predestination” if you begin with the benign assumption of an omniscient and all-creating deity.
i’m saying that to say god is omniscient is to say that he knows every true proposition and no false ones.

so. if there are true propositions about free choices, god will know them and his omniscience will not conflict with those free choices.

a true proposition about a free choice would presumably be something like “john doran freely chose to go and get a coffee at 8:40am on august 9, 2005”.
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atheos_sum:
If that is true, then you can only make your case if you assume the opposite.
not at all - my case is simply that you have not made yours: i am not attempting to present a demonstration of the existence of free choices.
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atheos_sum:
Nonetheless, all this about “assuming” is facetious. No one “assumes” a corollary. This in my view all stems from the theists’ hostility towards reason, despite the fantastic argumentative presentations. If you do not like a corollary, you say that it was “assumed” instead of acknowledging that it naturally succeeds. And this is not prima facie.
i don’t understand what you are saying here.
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atheos_sum:
If there were something in the definition of omniscience which excluded free will, theologians would not have chosen that word to describe the deity (to avoid this debate obviously.) But there is no such word like the one you demand, as far as I’m aware. And for those in favor of predestination, the very prospect of a debate with an attribute of God which analytically meant “free will is impossible” would be begging the question in favor of predestination.
Are you saying that since definitions do not include possible corollaries, then corollaries ought to be ruled out of the question? Definitions do not list corollaries, for very parsimonious reasons, since they might be innumerous and it also depends on what the defined-thing was in combination with.
i think we’re getting a little lost along the way here…

all i am saying is that you seem to be making an argument about omniscience the conclusion of which is something like “therefore either god is not omniscient or there are no free choices”.

my only point is that your argument begs the question, since your conclusion is only entailed if one of your premises is “there are no (true propositions about) free choices”.
 
If free will was not real we would be robots. Then one would ask - Is God really loving? To be truly loving freedom is essential.
 
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Wormwood:
Granted there are varying degrees of (not so good) but it is still the opposite of good. If there was no evil, there would be no good. It is like having right without left. If there was no left, you wouldn’t need a word for right because there isn’t anything other than right to compare it to.
saying that if X doesn’t exist, then Y wouldn’t exist isn’t the same thing as saying that if X didn’t exist, then there wouldn’t be a word for Y.

left and right are relations, and the terms for them are relational terms - remove one of the relata, and the relation ceases to exist, and the terms become otiose.

i don’t think this is the case for “good”; it’s certainly not what the theologians ghosty mentioned believed. in that tradition, “good” was a metaphysical category, roughly equivalent - to a first approximation, anyway - with “being” (just like “true”, and “beautiful”). thus, anything that has being, is, to that extent, good.

but that is as may be. i don’t think that a case for “good as absence of evil” is as easily made you suggest; i know that when i reflect on the terms “good” and “evil”, i can understand the former without the latter, and can imagine a world in which the latter doesn’t exist. but not vice versa.
 
Well what about the fallen prince of darkness?
He’s precisely that: fallen. The whole term “fallen angel” points to the belief that he was initially good, and “fell away”. He is not the creator of evil, nor was he created evil. He chose evil.
Evil being an absence of good, could be restated as good being an absence of evil and be no less true.
Not in a Judeo-Christian worldview, it couldn’t. God is taken as existing outside of time, and as the Creator of All, and as Good. Evil, by definition, is a turning away from God. It is a viable position, and it’s the only position within the Judeo-Christian tradition. I don’t deny the existance of dualistic belief systems, or even evil-oriented ones, I’m just saying that there is no need for a dualistic explaination within the perfectly valid Judeo-Christian model.
If there was no evil, there would be no good. It is like having right without left. If there was no left, you wouldn’t need a word for right because there isn’t anything other than right to compare it to.
In the Judeo-Christian model, there is no need for evil in order for there to be good. Linguistically they serve as contrasts, and neither word would likely be used if the other didn’t exist, but that doesn’t in any way indicate that their absolute existance necessarily depends on the other. If there was only good there would be no need to say “good apples” because you could just as well say “apples”; that wouldn’t make them less good just because there’s no need for a word to indicate it.
Are you refering to metaphysics?
By transcendental I simply mean non-physical questions not dealing with experiential data per se. Metaphysics fits into this, but my understanding of metaphysics is that it is much more limited in scope than the word transcendental, dealing with the origin of things.
But that is the exact opposite of my meaning…You stressed the importance of causality in importance of an argument…and I was stating that I disagreed on these grounds.
I think we’re just talking past eachother, then. Going back to my original point, and your statement about the sun, I see that you were addressing simple material observation, when I was actually discussing the fact that science must assume causality to be useful. We’re talking about two different things, I think. When I responded, I was still going along the lines of scientific observation and formulation, and indicating that deduction is a more solid premise, which isn’t at all what you were apparently getting at.
Ahem…this is just a dodge the question of creator of evil.
Not really, it was more of a simple tangent for the purpose of expounding on a common error of modern philosophy. I even stated in my post to you that the real issue at hand was a misdefining of evil. We can drop the tangent if you like, as I’m not sure it’s pertainant to the question of evil, properly defined in a Judeo-Christian context.
There are still thoughs and deeds that are “evil” for lack of a better word
Agreed.
and to be good or to be less good are all concepts originating in God, as everything must originate in an all powerful all knowing creator of all.
Not quite. God is, by definition in Judeo-Christian belief, good. Not just “He’s a good guy”, but “goodness”. Good is good insofar as it is Godly. That which is Godly is good, that which is unGodly is evil. Being unGodly can’t originate in God, because God can’t be contrary to Himself. God can’t “will” evil because evil, by definition, is that which is opposed to God’s will. Now God created seperate beings, but gave them their own wills. In doing so, however, He didn’t “create” evil, because He did not create their wills contrary to His own. He allows them to be contrary to His own, however, which is befitting the freedom of will and what I call “perfection in kind”.

continued…
 
It’s basically saying that unGodliness must originate in God, which is a contradiction in terms. UnGodliness is, by very definition, outside of God. Evil, then, is not just “not being God”, because then EVERYTHING is automatically evil that is not God, but rather to be “defective in kind”, namely to be defective for the kind that the thing is, or not approaching Godliness to the extent possible for the kind of thing being discussed. A person who’s will is perfectly in line with God’s is “good”, because there’s nothing in its kind that prevents that level of perfection, but a person who goes against God’s will is evil, because “perfection in kind” means approaching Absolute Perfection (God, in this context), to the greatest extent possible for the thing in question (see post #67 for a more detailed explaination of this), and there is nothing inherent in being a human person that prevents them from being in line with God’s will.

Basically, to be less than God is ok and good, so long as you are only less than God to the degree necessitated by your nature. Anything less than that is when you get into varying degrees of evil.

Hopefully that helps you out a bit in understanding what’s being said. If not, just ask again for clarification 🙂

:blessyou:
 
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