Moving back to my contention in the opening post that the Golden rule is more like the “form” that morality takes, it would seem necessary to begin to specify the content.
While I do agree that the content required by moral thinking would need to be objective, I don’t think mere objectivity (defined as accepted by some, most or all moral agents) is sufficient to make something obligatory.
That is why I am suggesting that the place to begin moral discussion is to presuppose that what “moral” means is “obligatory for all moral agents” and then move from there to determine which principles are to be viewed as absolutely obligatory and objectively so.
All right thinking moral agents would agree that, objectively speaking, such principles are obligatory, even though immoral agents would disagree. The point being that the determinations of immoral beings should not count against such principles because immoral beings would be, by definition, incapable of rendering moral judgements.
We would not appeal to pedophiles to determine whether pedophilia is morally wrong precisely because someone who engages in pedophilia could not render an unbiased judgement on the issue. (Recall neutrality as a stipulation.)
That also means that even though universal agreement is lacking as to whether pedophilia is wrong - pedophiles might disagree - that is not sufficient to nullify the moral determination.
Again, that is the move by moral relativists to discount moral determinations. They claim the existence of individuals or cultures that practice certain acts are sufficient to discredit these acts as morally obligatory. I would disagree. The existence of individuals or cultures that practice immoral acts simply means immoral or morally defective individuals and cultures do, in fact, exist.
That said, I am proposing the following principle as an absolutely binding principle on all human moral agents:
When the choice is between directly ending the life of a human being and the convenience of another human being, the value of life ought always supercede the value of convenience.
Convenience is defined as any aspect of existence or any choice which requires less resources than an alternative. In other words, a convenience is anything which makes life easier for the moral agent. Convenience should never be the option that overwhelms or directly takes the life of a human being, simple convenience or taking the option of saving of resources should never “weigh” more than, or result in, the direct taking of a persons’ life.
In a previous post, responding to Roscoe Turner, regarding the means by which moral rules can be “empirically” determined (the instrument by which they are to be measured,) I replied that the most appropriate instrument for making moral determinations is a fully functioning human moral agent. There is no better instrument. Human beings (at least those which are functioning well, morally speaking) are the most capable instruments for determining what “moral entails,” so the burden falls on us as moral agents to make "empirical’ moral determinations.
Again, that all humans do not agree simply means some are defective as instruments for moral detection. They are, plainly put, “immoral” or defective moral agents.
With that stated, I am proposing the bold faced rule above as a kind of “calibration” test to determine whether the agent is indeed capable of making accurate moral determinations. Given that human moral agents are indeed moral agents, then the value of a human life should take precedence, as the calibration test implies, over any other determinations. A moral agent who cannot subscribe to that “calibration test” simply does not qualify as a “moral agent.”
Notice there is no reference to God to alienate or eliminate atheists a priori. Atheists should not be disqualified simply because they don’t subscribe to a belief in God. However, I would claim, they must pass the calibration exercise.
I am open to a better “calibration” principle, but I do think the rest of my contention holds. That human moral agents are the best means of determining human moral determinations and that some objective filter is required to rule out those incapable of exhibiting sound moral thinking. To argue against these is simply to “fall back” on relativism as a default, though, untenable and indefensible, moral position.
