OK…in regard to violence in previous times, there is a table here (
newscientist.com/embedded/20worst) that appears in the book I mentioned.
It’s no good looking at any era and say it is more dangerous or safer without taking into consideration the population at the time. It’s obviously more dangerous to live somewhere (or sometime) where there are 100 people and 10 of them will die a violent death than it would be to live somewhere where there are 1000 and ten will die a violent death.
So the deaths in the table are adjusted for population.
The problem with “adjusted for population” is that it presumes the “adjusted” event could
actually take place at a future time in its inflated glory. If we compare, for example, Genghis Khan to Adolf Hitler, the only reason Mr. Khan’s adjusted number can possibly reach 778 million is precisely because it is statistically inflated. Even if I were to admit that Genghis Khan were as hideously evil as Adolf Hitler I have no reason for accepting that his death count would even come near 778 million (or whatever it would be adjusted to 1940-45). It is just plain silly to think, given all factors that the number is a realistic one.
As deceptively compelling as the chart is, I don’t find it realistic precisely because it is skewed. It would be like saying, if I killed one man at the time of Genghis Khan that would be the equivalent of killing 17 or 18 men today. Why do I have any reason to think that is even plausibly true?
In addition, even accepting the face value of the chart, there is still the question of the lax moral view on abortion having resulted in the deaths of something like 1.5 billion children, which is about double Mr. Khan’s “production.” Why was that chilling statistic left off of Pinker’s chart?
Lastly, his chart says nothing about the sheer numbers of horrific events. Why does he not speak of the frequency of such events in the past century as opposed to historical frequency. The statistics on war and democide does factor frequency by making it a question of deaths per 100 taking into account all events, not just the ones that serve a purpose.
Apart from the Second World War, I’ll be surprised if you come anywhere close to getting any of the top ten. I certainly didn’t. In fact, some of the most violent episodes I had never heard of.
You are quite possibly safer from a violent death today than anyone who has ever lived in previous times.
I doubt that precisely because the means to bring about the death of massive numbers of humans today are far in excess of any means available in the past.
It is certainly not true that yet to be born children are “possibly safer” than ever before because the probability of them making it out of their mother’s womb is approaching 50/50 in many countries. (In particular, those which would be described as liberal and democratic.)
Now, in regard to your axiomatic basis for some sort of moral committee, unless I’m reading you incorrectly, the test for membership is whether you think that abortion should be allowed.
And is it the reason you reject the “axiomatic basis” that it clearly points to abortion being wrong? You don’t like the implications, so you reject the premise?
We can play that game until the cows come home. That is just to say: I want to be moral to the extent that I want to be moral so I’ll just deny any principles that take me where I don’t want to go. It is putting the cart before the horse regarding moral thinking.
If your default position is, “I can be made to do only what I want to do,” then you have eliminated every principle that might obligate you to some other action a priori. That position subscribes to the notion that moral obligation is merely optional. So your obligation not to rape or murder only holds IF you want it to be so? What if you don’t want it to be so? No obligation exists EXCEPT where you want it to exist? The rapist doesn’t want the obligation, so no obligation?
Well, I’m going to cheat and put down that I think it shouldn’t. So I’ve turned up for the first meeting and I ask if it shouldn’t be agreed that barrier methods of contraception should be made easily available. So that we can work to reduce the number of abortions. Seeing that people will be having sex outside marriage. Which is something with which I have no problems.
Now, is there a morally correct answer to contraception, or just one that is right for some people and not for others. Ditto sex in and outside of marriage.
So your position is that you won’t agree to any basic principles because those might lead to some conclusion that you find unacceptable?
Regarding the basic axiom: I noticed you failed to give a direct response to why it is defective as a starting point. (Other than it has implications you don’t like about abortion.
In other words, are you claiming that it is sometimes morally acceptable to value the convenience of some human beings above the lives of other human beings?
If true, then perhaps Genghis Khan was showing morally upright behaviour and Pinker’s use of him as a representative of evil was in error? After all, valuing convenience over life would make the deaths of 1.5 billion human beings morally acceptable. On the same principle (or lack of it) Mr. Khan was merely acting on convenience. What’ strong with that? His victims were preventing him from fulfilling his freedom, goals and ambitions! What’s another 778 million, eh?