Is the Golden Rule a Foundational Moral Principle or A Rule of Thumb?

[Bradski]

So does that entail it is permissible to be immoral if one is not courageous enough to be moral?

If someone points out an hypocrisy on your part, that is sufficient reason to take the morally inferior option because your courage is insufficient to opt for the higher?

Doesn’t it merely entail that the option you lack the courage to endorse or act on is still the right option, but merely that you lack the courage to carry it out? Otherwise, one’s entire moral system collapses to “what I decide I am capable of” or “what I have the courage to carry out.”

That merely justifies the morally timid or tepid, does it not?

I let this pass because I seriously thought you were stating the obvious and it didn’t require a reply. But now I see that Tony has chipped in with one of his usual succinct posts and just in case he gets hold of the wrong end of the stick (hi Tony – nice of you to join the discussion), I might clarify.

Yes, if someone points out an hypocrisy on my part, then that means I simply lack the courage to act on it. It doesn’t mean that I am entitled to adjust my morality to suit. Because as you say: ‘that merely justifies the morally timid or tepid’.

 

[Bradski]

We’ve discussed what might be considered divinely sanctioned moral positions - effectively a command by God. That is, if God commands something, then it is not just morally permissible to do it, but morally imperative. Because, as Peter has pointed out, He will know the outcome of all acts whereas it is impossible for us to know. We are not in a position to refuse because we don’t know what the ultimate good is going to be (I’m ignoring the elephant in the room which is that no evil must be done that good may come of it).

If the command is something that we would have classed as evil without divine sanction, such as killing children, then it goes without saying that some of us would (hopefully) have some reservations about following through with it.

So the question arises, not how would you convince a third party that what you were about to do was actually commanded by God (you would feel that you would know beyond any doubt), but what would someone else have to do to convince you?

If you were an Israelite and the leader of your group told you that you had to kill everyone, including all the children, because it had been commanded by God, how do you know he’s telling the truth and it’s morally acceptable? How do you know he’s not a homicidal maniac?

 

[PRmerger]

Are you asking this in light of Christian revelation, or specifically what we would do if we were ensconced within the pugilistic, pagan, barbaric cultures of ancient Israel?

 

[Bradski]

Are you asking this in light of Christian revelation, or specifically what we would do if we were ensconced within the pugilistic, pagan, barbaric cultures of ancient Israel?

I’m not asking what you would do. I’m asking how would someone convinve you that what they were about to do do had been commanded by God.

 

[PRmerger]

I’m not asking what you would do. I’m asking how would someone convinve you that what they were about to do do had been commanded by God.

If I were an Israelite?

 

[Peter_Plato]

The Golden Rule is an ethical, Humanist principle that existed long before Christianity or any other religion.

The GR is a fundamental precursor to a functioning society. As societies by necessity existsed before Christianity et al, the rule must have existed. Christianity (and doubtless other religions) then wrote it down and pretended they thought of it. It is this ridiculous notion that promotes the laughable (and demonstrably false) presumption that religion is the root of morality.

My point in the original post was that as a rule of thumb intentionally directed at the Apostles, the Golden Rule has a very specific foundation that was not proposed in precursor societies.

The fundamental principle that Jesus stipulates as the “content” of Christian ethical beliefs added onto the form ( the Golden Rule ) was for them, in Jesus’ words, to “Love as I have loved you.” That sets the baseline ethical standard for the Apostles because it establishes the context for the conditional in the GR: ”as you would have them do to you." That is, they are to love in the same way that Jesus loved them, which then becomes the way they are to love others via the GR. This is further expanded under, “Greater love has no one than this: to lay down one’s life…” and also “You must love your enemies as yourself.”

If we accept your claim that other cultures came up with the rule prior to Christianity or Judaism, as an “ethical humanist” principle, it amounts to no more than a very simple logical principle, “Treat like things (or humans) alike.” Which says nothing concerning “how” to treat them unless how to treat “oneself” is clearly stipulated.

The problem, as pointed out in my original two or three posts, is that the GR can’t be a “fundamental moral principle” because it doesn’t specify how you SHOULD treat yourself and THAT fully depends on the nature of “oneself.”

Without that specification, it is insufficient as a moral principle. Certainly, it is a fundamental logical principle, “Treat like things alike,” but since it fails to specify how to treat oneself to begin with, it is woefully lacking as a foundational moral principle.

As it is, it cannot be the foundation of any culture’s ethics, it can only serve as a rule of thumb after specifying how you would want to be treated and under what conditions.

As foundational principles, I know of no other cultures that set the standard for how to love oneself. Jesus does with “…as I have loved you…” and since Jesus gave up his life for the sake of all humanity, that would mean being willing to forfeit one’s own life for others, including, ostensibly one’s enemies.

In case you missed the logic…

1. We are to love others as Jesus loved us.
   Love one another. As I have loved you, so you must love one another. (John 13:34)
2. “Others” includes our enemies.
   You have heard that it was said, ‘Love your neighbor and hate your enemy.’ But I tell you, love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you, (Matt 5:43)

Therefore, our standard for “Do unto others…” is to love them as Jesus loved us, even our enemies. That is even to the point of giving up one’s life when necessary.

This creates the foundation for the “rule of thumb” (the Golden Rule) that gives no indication, on its own, as to what treatment I ought to accord myself, before applying that to others.

As I said before, “Treat like things alike,” the logical precursor for “Do unto others,” says nothing about how to treat things (or humans,) just to treat them the same.

Without the “how” stipulation, the Golden Rule is empty. All form and no substance. So the fact that it existed prior to Christianity isn’t much of a claim.

 

[Bradski]

If I were an Israelite?

That was just an example. Feel free to be whoever you like. But if being one person as opposed to another makes a difference, could you clarify why that might be so?

 

[PRmerger]

That was just an example. Feel free to be whoever you like. But if being one person as opposed to another makes a difference, could you clarify why that might be so?

If I were a Christian, the way that I would know if something someone was going to do had been commanded by God was if it conformed to that which has been revealed in the Word of God.

 

[PRmerger]

That was just an example. Feel free to be whoever you like. But if being one person as opposed to another makes a difference, could you clarify why that might be so?

If I were an Israelite, the way that I would be convinced something had been commanded by God was if it conformed to the Ten Commandments.

If the Ten Commandments had not yet been given, then I would use my conscience.

However, without the Word of God to enlighten my conscience, my reasoning and intellect would be darkened by a lack of supernatural wisdom.

 

[Peter_Plato]

I’m not asking what you would do. I’m asking how would someone convinve you that what they were about to do do had been commanded by God.

That is the problem and the crux of the issue with assessing OT claims. Only a 3omni God could possibly provide the conditions which would be sufficiently convincing to warrant knowing (in an absolute sense) that it was, indeed, a command by God.

Any attempt by one human to convince another would be hearsay only and not sufficient to justify a moral determination concerning the command. You couldn’t possibly have the kind of absolute assurance that God commanded X, if the only warrant you had was **Joe told me that God commanded X. **

That means one person trying to convince another that God commanded X, could not possibly provide the epistemological warrant necessary for believing it to be the case, since someone telling someone else can only provide a hearsay justification.

Same problem exists for trying to justify OT events to detractors today. Only God could provide the direct epistemological warrant necessary to convince a skeptic. He would, presumably, know precisely which internal psychological and moral doubts would need to be overcome to convince a moral doubter.

To put the burden of that proof on any human person is to fail to consider (perhaps intentionally) what the nature of proof adequate to entail certainty would look like.

 

[Bradski]

If I were an Israelite, the way that I would be convinced something had been commanded by God was if it conformed to the Ten Commandments.

If someone told you that he been commanded to kill, it would contradict the ten commandments, so you wouldn’t be convinced.

If the Ten Commandments had not yet been given, then I would use my conscience.

Your concience would not be in a position to know the final outcome of why God had commanded this man to kill, so you either wouldn’t know or your concience (I hope) would say: this is a bad thing. So you wouldn’t be convinced.

However, without the Word of God to enlighten my conscience, my reasoning and intellect would be darkened by a lack of supernatural wisdom.

So God would need to tell you as well. If He doesn’t, then you wouldn’t be convinced.

 

[Bradski]

That is the problem and the crux of the issue with assessing OT claims.

Any attempt by one human to convince another would be hearsay only and not sufficient to justify a moral determination concerning the command.

It doesn’t have to be an OT event. We can move on from that. But if you want to use that as an example, then you’re saying that you couldn’t trust anyone who told you that it was the right thing to do. Therefore, killing children in this case must have been, to you, the wrong thing to do and the correct thing to do would be to try to prevent it.

Then again, if you had been given the command, knowing that no-one could trust you (if you can’t trust them, then why should thery trust you) then you can’t really tell anyone as they would try to stop you.

You are saying that for God’s commands to be carried out by a number of people, He must command each of them. That you can’t pass God’s commands on to anyone.

 

[PRmerger]

If someone told you that he been commanded to kill, it would contradict the ten commandments, so you wouldn’t be convinced.

Ok.

Your concience would not be in a position to know the final outcome of why God had commanded this man to kill, so you either wouldn’t know or your concience (I hope) would say: this is a bad thing. So you wouldn’t be convinced.

If my conscience were fully formed, and enlightened by the light of natural reason, then yes.

So God would need to tell you as well. If He doesn’t, then you wouldn’t be convinced.

Yes. That’s why we have the fullness of revelation in the Word of God.

 

[Peter_Plato]

It doesn’t have to be an OT event. We can move on from that. But if you want to use that as an example, then you’re saying that you couldn’t trust anyone who told you that it was the right thing to do. Therefore, killing children in this case must have been, to you, the wrong thing to do and the correct thing to do would be to try to prevent it.

Then again, if you had been given the command, knowing that no-one could trust you (if you can’t trust them, then why should thery trust you) then you can’t really tell anyone as they would try to stop you.

You are saying that for God’s commands to be carried out by a number of people, He must command each of them. That you can’t pass God’s commands on to anyone.

Not exactly. What I am saying is that God could have provided the level of absolute certainty to the Israelites as a whole (or to a necessary contingent of their leaders) in such a way that THEY (each of them as necessary) would have had absolute assurance and the moral warrant necessary to carry out the act. However, THAT level of certainty could not possibly provide warrant for anyone else not directly “in the line of experience,” so to speak, in particular, not to individuals thousands of years removed from the situation. Any evidence, even if it met the level of burden necessary to morally justify the Israelites acting on the command could not possibly achieve the same level of burden to us or anyone else. The saying, “You had to be there,” certainly does apply here.

We could create a scenario that might provide, even for you, a similar level of certainty.
Suppose a plant in your living room suddenly came ablaze during a party you were hosting with hundreds of people attending. A voice came from the blaze instructing all in your party to take immediate action against the current mayor of your city. (We’ll leave the action undefined at this point.) Suppose further that anytime anyone in your party expressed some doubt about the action, the voice provided some “tidbit” about that individual’s personal life that no one else had a clue (not embarrassing or degrading, but simply an internal and private fact). Further suppose that the voice provided information about what the mayor was planning that involved a great deal of destruction and mayhem for all citizens unless your party took immediate action. Again, anytime anyone expressed doubt that the mayor was capable of such things, the voice could provide compelling counter information to show why those doubts required reassessment.

Given that the “revelation” was to a large group and in such a manner as to provide certainty concerning the mayor and his intentions, what possible objection could you have to carrying out the “command” of the voice? What level of action (left undefined) would the compelling nature of the experience warrant?

Would it make a difference if the voice commanded something relatively harmless such as a demonstration in front of the mayor’s house, something more dire such as forcibly imprisoning him or even more drastic?

Why would the nature of the “command” create any more uncertainty about the voice than any other? Wouldn’t the epistemological certainty provide warrant for carrying out whatever the voice ordered, since any uncertainty sufficient to dissuade the most dire action should also be sufficient to dissuade any moral agent from any action whatsoever?

Please don’t water down the experience. We are speaking of absolute epistemological certainty. Suppose you and all of your party had that level of absolute certainty that this voice, due to the compelling nature of its “knowledge” and directions, was supernaturally “Real” and authoritative; what possible moral reason would exist for not doing what it commanded?

In case you haven’t figured this out yet. The issue goes to the heart of moral authority. Who or what constitutes ultimate moral authority and why? Ourselves? A moral law? God? Wouldn’t the certain nature of the voice, entail that it would overrule our own authority?

On the other hand, as Christians, some of us, at least, have the assurance that this kind of scenario is not - since Jesus’ incarnation - in God’s play book, so to speak.

“If those days had not been cut short, no one would survive, but for the sake of the elect those days will be shortened. At that time if anyone says to you, ‘Look, here is the Messiah!’ or, ‘There he is!’ do not believe it. For false messiahs and false prophets will appear and perform great signs and wonders to deceive, if possible, even the elect. **See, I have told you ahead of time. **(Matt 24:22-25)

 

[Roscoe_Turner]

Not exactly. What I am saying is that God could have provided the level of absolute certainty to the Israelites as a whole (or to a necessary contingent of their leaders) in such a way that THEY (each of them as necessary) would have had absolute assurance and the moral warrant necessary to carry out the act. However, THAT level of certainty could not possibly provide warrant for anyone else not directly “in the line of experience,” so to speak, in particular, not to individuals thousands of years removed from the situation. Any evidence, even if it met the level of burden necessary to morally justify the Israelites acting on the command could not possibly achieve the same level of burden to us or anyone else. The saying, “You had to be there,” certainly does apply here.

We could create a scenario that might provide, even for you, a similar level of certainty.
Suppose a plant in your living room suddenly came ablaze during a party you were hosting with hundreds of people attending. A voice came from the blaze instructing all in your party to take immediate action against the current mayor of your city. (We’ll leave the action undefined at this point.) Suppose further that anytime anyone in your party expressed some doubt about the action, the voice provided some “tidbit” about that individual’s personal life that no one else had a clue (not embarrassing or degrading, but simply an internal and private fact). Further suppose that the voice provided information about what the mayor was planning that involved a great deal of destruction and mayhem for all citizens unless your party took immediate action. Again, anytime anyone expressed doubt that the mayor was capable of such things, the voice could provide compelling counter information to show why those doubts required reassessment.

Given that the “revelation” was to a large group and in such a manner as to provide certainty concerning the mayor and his intentions, what possible objection could you have to carrying out the “command” of the voice? What level of action (left undefined) would the compelling nature of the experience warrant?

Would it make a difference if the voice commanded something relatively harmless such as a demonstration in front of the mayor’s house, something more dire such as forcibly imprisoning him or even more drastic?

Why would the nature of the “command” create any more uncertainty about the voice than any other? Wouldn’t the epistemological certainty provide warrant for carrying out whatever the voice ordered, since any uncertainty sufficient to dissuade the most dire action should also be sufficient to dissuade any moral agent from any action whatsoever?

Please don’t water down the experience. We are speaking of absolute epistemological certainty. Suppose you and all of your party had that level of absolute certainty that this voice, due to the compelling nature of its “knowledge” and directions, was supernaturally “Real” and authoritative; what possible moral reason would exist for not doing what it commanded?

In case you haven’t figured this out yet. The issue goes to the heart of moral authority. Who or what constitutes ultimate moral authority and why? Ourselves? A moral law? God? Wouldn’t the certain nature of the voice, entail that it would overrule our own authority?

On the other hand, as Christians, some of us, at least, have the assurance that this kind of scenario is not - since Jesus’ incarnation - in God’s play book, so to speak.

This seems to start to infringe on free will. If there is no doubt about the certainty of the command and the certainty of the commander.

It also seems to suggest that God’s nature changes. i.e. it’s no longer in God’s playbook.

Both are contrary to the Catholic notion of God.

 

[PRmerger]

This seems to start to infringe on free will. If there is no doubt about the certainty of the command and the certainty of the commander.

How is that an “infringement on free will”?

We are certainly free to disobey any commands.

 

[Peter_Plato]

This seems to start to infringe on free will. If there is no doubt about the certainty of the command and the certainty of the commander.

It also seems to suggest that God’s nature changes. i.e. it’s no longer in God’s playbook.

Both are contrary to the Catholic notion of God.

Free will does not mean we are free to determine the nature of morality. We are still obligated to obey moral principles. Is that obligation an infringement of free will, as well, then?

Does free will, in your eyes, entail the freedom not merely to carry out moral obligations but the freedom to author them, as well? You see no difference between free moral agency and moral authority?

Your perspective is that free will constitutes not merely the ability to act freely according to moral principles, but, necessarily, the freedom to determine the nature of those moral principles? Is that not against Catholic doctrine?

 

[Roscoe_Turner]

Free will does not mean we are free to determine the nature of morality. We are still obligated to obey moral principles. Is that obligation an infringement of free will, as well, then?

Does free will, in your eyes, entail the freedom not merely to carry out moral obligations but the freedom to author them, as well? You see no difference between free moral agency and moral authority?

Your perspective is that free will constitutes not merely the ability to act freely according to moral principles, but, necessarily, the freedom to determine the nature of those moral principles? Is that not against Catholic doctrine?

If all doubt of the action and it’s consequences are removed there is no choice. You would have a limited omnipotence for that action. You would already know what happened. What choice you had made. Or… all doubt wouldn’t have been removed.

 

[PRmerger]

If all doubt of the action and it’s consequences are removed there is no choice. You would have a limited omnipotence for that action. You would already know what happened. What choice you had made. Or… all doubt wouldn’t have been removed.

No, Roscoe.

Logic and reason tells us that the above is nonsensical.

For example: I have no doubt, at all, that if I press on the brake, my car will slow down. Action: pressing on the brake.
Consequence: car slows down.

No doubt. At all.

But, I always have a choice to brake or not.

I have no doubt that there are microbes in the creek water, even if they aren’t visible to me.

Yet, I have the free will to drink from this creek, if I so choose. I know what the consequences will be.

 

[Roscoe_Turner]

No, Roscoe.

Logic and reason tells us that the above is nonsensical.

For example: I have no doubt, at all, that if I press on the brake, my car will slow down. Action: pressing on the brake.
Consequence: car slows down.

No doubt. At all.

But, I always have a choice to brake or not.

I have no doubt that there are microbes in the creek water, even if they aren’t visible to me.

Yet, I have the free will to drink from this creek, if I so choose. I know what the consequences will be.

Having confidence and no doubt are two different things.

In having no doubt you would have to be omniscient or there is always room for doubt. You would have to be able to see the consequences of any possible variance. You would have to be able to see heaven and hell and feel each’s pleasure and pain. To have no doubt would be to have the mind of God. I think I heard a story with an apple and a snake that was similar.