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Texas_Roofer
Guest
The issue is if it were not objective truth in 162 BC and the other “truth” only exists to a few in fact a tiny percent of people then these truths are relative to time and place, and thus the problem.
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packermann
Guest
You are confusing categories. An event that has happened in history is an objective reality. Take the assasination of JFK. Even though this event did not happen before 1963, that does not mean that it is not objectively true. Just because there may be someone in a third world who never even heard of JFK, it still does not negate the fact that objectively JFK did actually live and die even if though millions in the third world are not even aware of this.
This is YOUR problem. If an event that comes into being, and is not known to everyone in this planet, is not an objective truth, then your own existence is objectively true. There was a time that you did not exist. And unless you are a very famous celebrity, only a tiny percent of the people are aware of your existence. So would you agreee that you do not objectively exist?
You are confusing ultimate, necessary existence with contingent existence. An ultimate, necessary existence would always exist. This is God. And only God is Absolute Truth. And any attributes of God, such as love or purity would also be absolute truth. Contingent existence is not necessary existence. A contingent being does not have to exist, and there was a time that the contingent being did not exist. We and all creation are contingent. There was a time that we did not exist. We are not absolute truth. Only God is absolute truth. But it is objectively true that we exist. My existence does not depend on what percentage of people believe in my existence. My existence is not relative but objectvely true. But since I am not a necessary being, there was a time when I did exist. This only means my existence is not absolutely true. But my existence is still objectively true.
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Texas_Roofer
Guest
Thank you
I see no difference between your post and Deacon Ed B. I understand your point however I do not agree with it. Since many have no knowledge of these “events” they can not be “absolute, objective, truth(s)” these “events” are relative to those who know and understand them.
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Deacon_Ed_B
Guest
By this same rational, since not all believe in God or the Trinity, the conclusion would have to be that God and the Trinity do not exist. To be absolute objective truth, not everyone has to know it or believe it. That puts fact in the category of circumstance which is a false step. The earth itself is round. Primitive peoples may not have this concept. That does not make it true or false, it just makes it unknown to some. I do agree with a **packermann **though, God is the only absolute, objective truth.
Prayers & blessings
Deacon Ed B
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packermann
Guest
You say you understand but then you respond by show you do not. My point was that there is a difference between absolute truth and objective truth. You’re argument assumes that they are the same without first proving that they are.
BTW, as I pointed out, atheism eventually leads to the death of science. Your position makes science impossible. Scientific experiments are also events. So when scientists come up with conclusions through experimentation that two parts of hydrogen and one part of oxygen brings water, this is true whether it is done in Kansas or New York. This is true whether people know it or understand it. If scientists ever start say “Our conclusions are only true for us, but we cannot say they are true for anyone else.”, then there is no point to science (Nietchie, a relativist himself, saw the hypocrisy of his fellow atheists who deny the existence of objective truth and yet cling to science as if it is objectively true).
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dbg
Guest
No one wouldn’t say even that. One wouldn’t make any definite claims at all. One might say, “Maybe there’s no truth” – and there would be nothing self-contradictory about it. If you preface all your statements with “Maybe” or “It seems like … but I can’t say for sure” then you can’t run into any self-contradictions. Then the only thing you could do is make your own positive argument for the existence of truth which I suppose could go:
Either there is truth or there isn’t.
If there is, there is truth
If there isn’t then there is the truth that there isn’t
Either way, there is truth
So, there’s truth
But there’s a problem with that argument. It’s defining “truth” as any true proposition – which is fine – but it is ALSO assuming that a proposition is either true or false but could not be neither true nor false – which is debatable.
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dbg
Guest
You are confusing the law of non-contradiction with the law of the excluded middle. Rejecting the latter does not entail rejecting the former.
en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Law_of_excluded_middle&oldid=222464157
See in particular:
en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Law_of_excluded_middle&oldid=222464157#Bertrand_Russell_and_Principia_Mathematica
See also:
en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Principle_of_bivalence&oldid=207140979
And (you can skip to this one if you wish)
en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Multi-valued_logic&oldid=219974939
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john_doran
Guest
this isn’t right: even if you say “maybe there’s no truth”, you’re still saying that at least one thing is true, namely that perhaps there is no truth.
the nature of the problem for global skepticism (the claim that there isn’t - or may not be - any truth) is that it is performatively self-refuting, which simply means that the position is refuted in the very act of stating it. look, to make any assertion is to make a statement that one is (tacitly) asserting to be true. if you don’t make (what you take to be) a true statement when you say something, then you’re not actually saying anything…
in other words, the problem with global skepticism is that the position cannot even be consistently stated.
this misses the mark: since global skepticism is only rejecting the existence of truth, it doesn’t matter if there are propositions that are neither true nor false, or if there are an infinite number of other values or states of propositions.
so. even if bivalence does not hold, it is still true that one cannot consistently state the global skeptical position.
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dbg
Guest
That’s correct. My mistake. Thanks. I included a link to an article on that as well.
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dbg
Guest
I disagree.
When one asserts that P, one is asserting also by implication that P is true (and under deflationary concepts of truth these are one and the same).
However when one says “Maybe that P” one is not making an assertion, I would argue (one is not asserting “Maybe that P”) One is rather expressing a fancy. One is not expressing a judgment of the intellect, but merely a train of thought of the intellect. One can utter sentences whose semantic content one does not assert. Uttering “Maybe that P” would be roughly equivalent to “I wonder if that P” or “P? Hmmm.”
The rest of your post, while admirable and interesting in its subject matter, is lost to this initial error of yours. And it is erroneous to say that when one does not assert, one does not say if by the latter you mean make meaningful utterances.
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Texas_Roofer
Guest
There is a difference between existence and known existence one is physical the other is mental. Consider a mother holding a baby the mother may know many things her baby does not know so what is “truth” to the mother is not “truth” to the baby. Neither the mother nor the baby changes physical existence, yet neither the mother or baby can comprehend all existence, so it is their level of comprehension not existence which rules the mental world. Additionally neither the mother nor baby can free themselves of false knowledge so even what they believe (know) as “truth” is diluted with falsehoods.
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john_doran
Guest
yes. but deflationary accounts of truth have the distinct disadvantage of being false.
is the proposition “maybe P” true? isn’t “maybe P” synonymous with “possibly, P”?
look, “maybe p” is simply and straightforwardly not synonymous with “I wonder if P”, or “P? Hmmm”.
i understand now that you may very well have been using the sentence “maybe p” to express those other senses, but doing so is utterly idiosyncratic in the same way that it would be if i started using “possibly, p” to mean “P is a ham sandwich”.
that having been said, even questions can be put into propositional form: “I wonder if P” is just “it is true that I wonder if P”.
one cannot engage in rational dialogue without making assertions.
one can make all kinds of meaningful utterances without saying a single thing that is true or false, but that’s hardly interesting (and, i would have thought, clearly beside the point).
put it this way: one cannot state a (philosophical or scientific) position or a belief without making an assertion. and since the analysis of opposing viewpoints on the nature of truth is what we’re engaged in here, then one needs to assert in order to participate. period.
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john_doran
Guest
incidentally, your point about “maybe p” still fails to avoid the ambit of my claim, which is that the global skeptical position cannot be stated consistently.
if you’re not saying anything that is true or false, then you’re not stating a position on an issue*; a fortiori* you’re not stating a position on gobal skepticism.
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dbg
Guest
I agree that one cannot make any assertions without implying that some things are “true.” But one can be in an internal state of doubting everything including doubting whether or not he doubts everything and not make an assertion or when uttering something that would in a normal person’s case be an assertion, be a mere conversational exercise in convenience (an engaging in a kind of mere formalism).
In case I wasn’t clear, I do not doubt everything. I do not doubt for instance that I am experiencing certain “qualia” in this present moment.
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