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That is like asking whether there is an atom which reproduces itself by mating with another atom.Is there an atom that is pain?
That is like asking whether there is an atom which reproduces itself by mating with another atom.Is there an atom that is pain?
Pain is a product of a complex living biological system.So? What difference does that make? Is pain a complex living biological system?
You mean, “when pain is provoked”. I mentioned in a previous post that those devices detect electrical phenomena. But electrical phenomena are not “pain”.JuanFlorencio:![]()
I don’t think so. There are devices which when connected to specific body points will show various wave patterns when pain is introduced.there is no device which can be affected by “pain”…
The point is: Are sensitive living beings well explained by means of a reductionist materialistic language. I believe the answer is “No”, and this is what I am trying to justify.IWantGod:![]()
Pain is a product of a complex living biological system.So? What difference does that make? Is pain a complex living biological system?
We understand reality through correlation between things. There will be no base for us to agree on reality if we question this main principle. Think of causality. Why do we believe that it exists? Because there is a correlation between motion of things.Seventh step:
Someone will say: Sensation is an emergent property of matter when it is organized as a nervous system. What can it mean? Sensations might be emergent in the sense that what did not exist before the apparition of nervous systems, comes into existence with them; but saying that they are a property of certain organized matter is not rigorous: As I have said before, a property of a material object is either an aspect of its organization (or structure) or one of its interaction modes; however, sensation is clearly none of these.
But sensation exists only in association with a nervous system!
It is known that if a part of the nervous paths of a living being is altered or destroyed, sensation may disappear. Also, if one of the chemical substances which participates in the interaction chains of the actuating nervous system is inhibited by a foreign reagent, sensation will be transformed or inhibited as well. Finally, if the material thing which is interacting with our body is withdrawn, sensation will fade out and eventually it will disappear. So, we can establish a gross correlation between sensation and the interactions of these material things; but such correlation cannot be intended to mean that sensation is a physical property of any of those material things. It is just a coexistence kind of correlation…
I do not question causality, and as for correlation I distinguish other types besides cause-effect.We understand reality through correlation between things. There will be no base for us to agree on reality if we question this main principle. Think of causality. Why do we believe that it exists? Because there is a correlation between motion of things.
Moreover, you need to elaborate that what is the use of brain if we experience, decide understand and think with our minds.
Yes, it seems that emergent property just appear when the number of constitutes is large enough. No need to say that I don’t understand emergent property. Mark A. Bedau said (Emergence - Wikipedia):What if we take into account that the amount of atoms in a sensitive living being is enormous? They form cells, and these, in great amounts too, form tissues; and these, organs; and these, a living organism. What if we take into account that the amount of cells in our nervous system is incredibly large? May a large number of nervous cells display interaction modes that are not observed in individual cells? May sensation be explained resorting to the potentiality of large numbers?
Although strong emergence is logically possible, it is uncomfortably like magic. How does an irreducible but supervenient downward causal power arise, since by definition it cannot be due to the aggregation of the micro-level potentialities? Such causal powers would be quite unlike anything within our scientific ken. This not only indicates how they will discomfort reasonable forms of materialism. Their mysteriousness will only heighten the traditional worry that emergence entails illegitimately getting something from nothing.
I understand what you are trying to say but I don’t think that is a correct way to describe an emergent phenomena. Emergent phenomena in some simple system, like superconductor, is related to collective and coherent motion of electrons in the system.For new interaction modes to appear when several individual entities become together, those entities must have appropriate interaction modes themselves:
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It is strange to me that you think of consciousness as an emergent property. I think that should be a property of soul in your system of belief.Evidently the emergent interaction mode is observable in its effects (otherwise it could not be called an “interaction mode”), and it might be observable too in its development as an orchestrated symphony of individual interactions. The new interaction mode is the result of a dynamic structure that has taken form. But the associated sensation, if any, cannot be observed in any way; therefore, it is not an “emergent interaction mode” itself.
Nevertheless, if the emergent interaction mode is the object of sensation, it could be said that sensation has been explained meaning that its object has been explained. But nothing more than this.
Why don’t you question causality? We accept it as a fact only by observing the motion in things.I do not question causality, and as for correlation I distinguish other types besides cause-effect.
Ok. I read that part and discuss it.I have not talked yet about understanding nor decisions, but only about sensation, which is a kind of experience. You can read again my last posts and perhaps you could make the inference that in my opinion our body is the object of our sensations.
Electrical conductivity (and supervonductivity) is the property of a very complex material system, such like a metal. Nothing simple in it.I understand what you are trying to say but I don’t think that is a correct way to describe an emergent phenomena. Emergent phenomena in some simple system, like superconductor, is related to collective and coherent motion of electrons in the system.
If you read my posts again and conclude that for me conciousness is not an emergent property of matter, then your reading will be better this time.It is strange to me that you think of consciousness as an emergent property. I think that should be a property of soul in your system of belief.
What else do you think is needed to accept causality?Why don’t you question causality? We accept it as a fact only by observing the motion in things.
We cannot of course directly observe pain. That is only the person who is in pain that is directly, first person, observes/experience pain. We can however measure pain if we knew the relation of pain with specific part of brain activity.Evidently the emergent interaction mode is observable in its effects (otherwise it could not be called an “interaction mode”), and it might be observable too in its development as an orchestrated symphony of individual interactions. The new interaction mode is the result of a dynamic structure that has taken form. But the associated sensation, if any, cannot be observed in any way; therefore, it is not an “emergent interaction mode” itself.
I don’t understand what you are trying to say here. What do you mean with object of sensation? Could you please elaborate?Nevertheless, if the emergent interaction mode is the object of sensation, it could be said that sensation has been explained meaning that its object has been explained. But nothing more than this.
I meant that we realize causality through the correlation in motion of things. The correlation is the key thing here. Why we cannot apply the same principle to correlation between brain activity and consciousness saying that the brain activity create consciousness?What else do you think is needed to accept causality?
As Franz Brentano said, “To be conscious is always to be conscious of something”. That “something” is the object of consciousness. So, if you explain a given object of sensation, in a certain manner you have explained the conscious state; but just “in a certain manner”.JuanFlorencio:![]()
We cannot of course directly observe pain. That is only the person who is in pain that is directly, first person, observes/experience pain. We can however measure pain if we knew the relation of pain with specific part of brain activity.Evidently the emergent interaction mode is observable in its effects (otherwise it could not be called an “interaction mode”), and it might be observable too in its development as an orchestrated symphony of individual interactions. The new interaction mode is the result of a dynamic structure that has taken form. But the associated sensation, if any, cannot be observed in any way; therefore, it is not an “emergent interaction mode” itself.
I don’t understand what you are trying to say here. What do you mean with object of sensation? Could you please elaborate?Nevertheless, if the emergent interaction mode is the object of sensation, it could be said that sensation has been explained meaning that its object has been explained. But nothing more than this.