Is this a good way to respond to the Euthyphro dilemma?

[JDGaney]

I wrote this in the form of an essay.

What is the Euthyphro dilemma? The proposition goes like this:
Is it good because God wills it? Or does God will it because it is good?
Basically it suggests that God’s will can change and everything is subjective, or that there is another source of morality independent of God, which makes God a simple messenger. Now, I may not have a philosophy degree, nor may I be well versed in any of these materials, but I would like to give a shot at answering this.
What is this that we are living in? Space, time, or any form of existence? We can tell through this form of existence that there are clearly some forms of right and wrong that are non-negotiable. Truths such as pedophilia, or physical and emotional abuse, and stealing are evident to us. This seems to be natural to us, and it fits in line with our understanding of existence. Why can’t it be that God, all wise and all knowing, can create a form of existence that is formulated around his knowledge of right and wrong? This is reflective of God. God’s name, as revealed to Moses is I AM WHO AM. God is being. God is the source of everything. If God, who claims to have created everything, commands something in this form of existence, should we not compare that to what we have understood to be right and wrong, and if it lines up, should we not accept it?
But how can we reconcile this to a God who gave Moses the Law that prescribed death as the proper sentence for nearly every violation? How can we reconcile this to a God who commanded his people to wipe out entire civilizations? I have heard several scholars comment on this and state that everything in the Bible must be viewed in light of the crucified and risen Jesus.
Our key to understanding it comes from the fifth chapter of the Book of Revelation, in which the visionary witnesses a bizarre scene in Heaven that depicts the worship of the elders and angels. There is great distress because there is no one who can open an important scroll with seven seals. But the visionary is told to take hope, for the Lion of Judah, the Root of David, has overcome everything. And before them comes a lamb, who, though standing, has been slain. And they all cry out:
Worthy are you to take the book and to break its seals; for you were slain, and purchased for God with Your blood men from every tribe and tongue and people and nation.
All of the Bible must be read in light of the Lamb of God, who took all the due punishment for sin upon himself. We can see throughout the Old Testament that God commands all forms of sin and idolatry to be dealt with and no tolerance. If we encounter sin, we cannot keep some of it for ourselves, as King Saul did, who was rebuked by the prophet Samuel for taking the Agag, King of the Amalekites, and the best of his livestock, and is subsequently stripped of his title as King of Israel. Agag is brought to Samuel before the Lord and he hacks his subject to pieces with a sword.
In the Law of Moses, death is the punishment for breaking nearly every command. Jesus has come to not abolish the Law, but to fulfill. The Law has been transcended. Whoever has a wrathful thought is now guilty of murder, whoever lusts is guilty of adultery, but no longer before the courts of man, but the eternal court of God. Jesus has taken all just punishment for sin upon himself.

Feel free to comment and tell me I missed the point.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

I wrote this in the form of an essay.

What is the Euthyphro dilemma? The proposition goes like this:
Is it good because God wills it? Or does God will it because it is good?
Basically it suggests that God’s will can change and everything is subjective, or that there is another source of morality independent of God, which makes God a simple messenger. Now, I may not have a philosophy degree, nor may I be well versed in any of these materials, but I would like to give a shot at answering this…[snip]…

We are good because God made us and he has made nothing that is not good. God does not change his will because he does not change. What appear to us as change in God’s plans are not changes from God’s point of view. He has infinite and perfect foreknowledge and he has planned and executed every possible contingency. There is nothing subjective in God’s creation and he is the only source of truth and morality.

Linus2nd

 

[edarlitrix]

Thank you for posting, but I do not grasp the connection between your comments on the Law being transcended and God creating (?) morality. It may be that I am being lazy though.

I just thought I would share you some thoughts on this dilemma that I had in discussion with an atheist. It might help clarify your own position.

David,

I now realize that my explanation of the third alternative [to the Euthyphro dilemma] was unclear and incomplete. Here is a better explanation from William Lane Craig:

“We don’t need to refute either of the two horns of the Euthyphro dilemma, because the dilemma it presents is a false one: There’s a third alternative, namely, God wills something because He is good. What do I mean by that? I mean that God’s own nature is the standard of goodness, and His commandments to us are expressions of His nature. In short, our moral duties are determined by the commands of a just and loving God. So moral values are not independent of God because God’s own character defines what is good. God is essentially compassionate, fair, kind, impartial, and so on. His nature is the moral standard defining good and bad. His commands necessarily reflect His moral nature. Therefore, they’re not arbitrary. When the atheist demands, ‘If God were to command child abuse, would we be obligated to abuse our children?’ he’s asking a question like ‘If there were a square circle, would its area be the square of one of its sides?’ There is no answer because what it supposes is logically impossible.
So the Euthyphro dilemma presents us with a false choice, and we shouldn’t be tricked by it. The morally good/bad is determined by God’s nature, and the morally right/wrong is determined by His will. God wills something because He is good, and something is right because God wills it.” (On Guard 135-6).

When Craig talks of God being “essentially compassionate, fair, kind, impartial, etc.” he does not mean they are properties we ASCRIBE to God, but they are “properties” that can be ascribed to HUMANS that we use when talking about God but which are literally DERIVED from God. All of the properties we humans call “good” are just the raw, “essential nature of God.” It is not as though God is “transcendant” to good, he IS good—not good as an adjective, but good as a noun (kind of like Plato’s Form of the Good). Notice Craig doesn’t say, “What is good defines God’s own character,” he says, “God’s own character defines what is good.”

Edarlitrix,

…

[WLC] says: “. . . God’s own nature is the standard of goodness, and His commandments to us are expressions of His nature” and " . . . God’s own character defines what is good".

To claim that God’s own nature and “The good” are unavoidably coextensive, in fact one and the same thing, is, as i’ve said, merely a euphemistic way of saying that “God is power”.

The concept “good” is co-dependent upon the concept “bad”, these concepts are mutually parasitic on each other. The one makes no sense, and has no real meaning, without the other.

Imagine, if you will, God prior creation. What would it mean here to say that God is “Good”? The word “Good” here is superflous, and adds nothing to our knowledge of anything. “Good” only makes sense as a concept if “bad” is conceivable or capable of being actualised. But if God is the only being in the universe then God just IS and all moral concepts are nonsensical, prior to creation.

WLC, on the other hand, wants to suggest that the concept of “good” pre-dates creation itself because it is intrinsic to God’s nature, and thus the concept of “good” is valid even if God is the only being in the universe (strictly speaking, of course, the universe didn’t exist at this point and God is presumed to exist outside space and time). The idea of the concept “good” pre-dating creation strikes me as mere wordplay and confusion because its counterpart, the concept of “bad”, has yet to make its appearance.

His allusions to child abuse and square circles is, I think, deliberately obscurantist. A square circle is a conceptual impossibility because we understand that a square and circle are definitionally incompatible. We can see this impossibility purely on a priori grounds, but we also know that both squares and circles actually exist. The same can’t be said of God.

All WLC is doing is defining God in such a way that he can’t be refuted by any logical or empirical methods. All one has to do is say that God transcends these human dialectical and empirical instruments, and before long, you arrive at a God who is ineffable. But if it’s an ineffable God that’s being affirmed, then silence is the best wisdom, but in practise, virtually no believer conforms to this model.

I’m also astonished that he is attempting to portray something like child abuse (and, by extension, injustice generally) as being fundamentally alien to God’s nature. WLC seems to be saying, in reply to his atheist interlocutor, “The moral dilema you pose, in reality, just can’t happen, because God would never countenance the suffering of innocent children”.

Has he read the Bible?

Obviously, with the aid of bad arguments and selective blindness, every counter argument can be refuted, misrepresented or simply ignored. I doubt anything I could possibly say would give WLC pause for thought, because, in the final analysis, man is not a rational, truth-seeking animal, but a being dominated by concrete, immediate, practical, visceral and psychological needs and desires.

I’m sorry, but I see no evidence that any “third” possibility exists regarding this question. God is, first and foremost, ultimate power, and concepts of “good” are derivative phenomena that subsequently emerge from this primordial, axiomatic fact.

You may read the full conversation here: nietzscheasfisherman.blogspot.com/2010/07/nietzsche-and-pascal.html?showComment=1359338796178#c7472160105144481358

 

[Ignatius]

Since God is all good and the source of All good, the answer is both/and. It is good because God made it so, and God loves it because it is good.

 

[tonyrey]

It is a false dilemma because goodness doesn’t exist independently of God. God is not only good; God is goodness because God is Love and Love is the Alpha and Omega, the Source of truth, goodness, justice, beauty, joy and fulfilment. Everything that exists is fundamentally good because without God nothing would exist:

“In Him we live, move and have our being.” Acts 17:28

 

[Rhubarb]

It is a false dilemma because goodness doesn’t exist independently of God. God is not only good; God is goodness because God is Love and Love is the Alpha and Omega, the Source of truth, goodness, justice, beauty, joy and fulfilment. Everything that exists is fundamentally good because without God nothing would exist:

“In Him we live, move and have our being.” Acts 17:28

I don’t see how this isn’t the first horn of the dilemma, but in other words. If God is the source of all the good, then the good is being reduced to facts about God, be it his nature or whatever else. That means that what is good can change if the nature of God were to change. (In a possible world, mind you) If the nature of God entailed stomping baby puppies was good, would that make it good? That seems like a hard thing to suggest.

 

[tonyrey]

It is a false dilemma because goodness doesn’t exist independently of God. God is not only good; God is

“the good is being reduced to facts about God” presupposes that the good and God are distinguishable!

That means that what is good can change if the nature of God were to change. (In a possible world, mind you) If the nature of God entailed stomping baby puppies was good, would that make it good? That seems like a hard thing to suggest.

“if the nature of God were to change” presupposes that God is mutable yet divine perfection implies that the essential nature of God cannot be negative in any way and it leaves no room for evil or decadence. Love is certainly dynamic and creative but it enhances and enriches rather than degrades and impoverishes the lover.

 

[Rhubarb]

“the good is being reduced to facts about God” presupposes that the good and God are distinguishable!

“if the nature of God were to change” presupposes that God is mutable yet divine perfection implies that the essential nature of God cannot be negative in any way and it leaves no room for evil or decadence. Love is certainly dynamic and creative but it enhances and enriches rather than degrades and impoverishes the lover.

The argument depends on God being indistinguishable from the good. I’m not presupposing anything else.

If the good by necessity aligns with the diety’s nature, (phrased like that to show we are not talking about any entity in the actual world) suppose a possible world where the deity’s nature is such that smashing baby puppies aligns with said nature. In that possible world, smashing baby puppies is, therefore, good. This tension is what I think the first horn of the Euthyphro Dilemma shows to us. (Among other things) I don’t think it’s contradictory to imagine an evil diety in some other possible world, so at least I think the possible world I describe isn’t logically inconsistent.

 

[tonyrey]

“if the nature of God were to change” presupposes that God is mutable yet divine perfection implies that the essential nature of God cannot be negative in any way

A deity who smashes baby puppies is certainly not a God indistinguishable from the good! Our starting point is not fiction but fact, not a possible world but the actual world in which we live. The vast majority of people appreciate the gift of life because it is the basis of everything we hold most precious. It doesn’t make sense to believe God would deliberately torture and kill His creatures while giving them so many opportunities for pleasure, joy and fulfilment. Goodness cannot co-exist with evil and certainly not for all eternity. Jesus prayed that “they may be one as we are one”, in the perfect unity that love alone can give…

Not only that. An evil God is a fantasy because evil is self-destructive. There is plenty of evidence in this world that virtues bring their own reward and vices incur their own punishment. **God cannot be negative in any way. ** Although they were surrounded by polytheists the Jews had the unique insight that God is He Who Is: the Necessary Being, the Creator - not the Destroyer.

 

[Rhubarb]

A deity who smashes baby puppies is certainly not a God indistinguishable from the good! Our starting point is not fiction but fact, not a possible world but the actual world in which we live. The vast majority of people appreciate the gift of life because it is the basis of everything we hold most precious. It doesn’t make sense to believe God would deliberately torture and kill His creatures while giving them so many opportunities for pleasure, joy and fulfilment. Goodness cannot co-exist with evil and certainly not for all eternity. Jesus prayed that “they may be one as we are one”, in the perfect unity that love alone can give…

Not only that. An evil God is a fantasy because evil is self-destructive. There is plenty of evidence in this world that virtues bring their own reward and vices incur their own punishment. **God cannot be negative in any way. ** Although they were surrounded by polytheists the Jews had the unique insight that God is He Who Is: the Necessary Being, the Creator - not the Destroyer.

Our starting point is definitely the the actual world we live in. But we can use possible worlds to explore what might be in the realm of logical possibility. An evil creator deity is LOGICALLY possible - which means it can introduce problems to topics that depend upon the notion of a deity. If the definition of that which is good is so tied into the nature of the deity, then a change in the nature of the deity changes that which is good. You could answer “God doesn’t work that way in the actual world” and that might be true. But then what is the good isn’t necessary - that is, across all possible worlds. Not in the same way that a bachelor is necessarily unmarried. There is no possible world where a bachelor is married. Let met try rephrasing what I mean.

If goodness is contingent upon the deity, then a change in the deity’s nature changes what is good. Which means that acts like smashing baby puppies could be good in some possible world even though it seems ludicrous that this could be so. But that’s the logical entailment of the horn of the dilemma.

Also I’d like to point out that I’m not saying either horn is right. I just am saying that i think the horn shows a stronger problem than what was presented.

 

[tonyrey]

*A deity who smashes baby puppies is certainly not a God indistinguishable from the good! Our starting point is not fiction but fact, not a possible world but the actual world in which we live. The vast majority of people appreciate the gift of life because it is the basis of everything we hold most precious. It doesn’t make sense to believe God would deliberately torture and kill His creatures while giving them so many opportunities for pleasure, joy and fulfilment. Goodness cannot co-exist with evil and certainly not for all eternity. Jesus prayed that “they may be one as we are one”, in the perfect unity that love alone can give…

The Deity cannot possibly be evil, become evil or do evil because He is the Ultimate Reality, i.e. pure existence without any defect or limitation; otherwise He wouldn’t be eternal, indivisible and indestructible. Imperfection is the result of Creation and God doesn’t have to create Himself. Of course imperfection is not morally evil because it is the inevitable result of being a creature and not being divine. We are not to blame for being imperfect with our limited knowledge, intelligence and power!

Even moral evil is ultimately due to ignorance because we wouldn’t harm anyone if we knew we are really harming ourselves. When we destroy our relationships with others we become corrupt and poisonous like rotten apples. But our ignorance is culpable because we know it is wrong to harm them. God cannot possibly become ignorant because He is omniscient. He knows everything because He has created everything. It follows that He is necessarily and eternally good. It is logically impossible for Him to cease being the loving Father of His children. Disunity is not a credible explanation of reality. We know well enough what happens when there is discord in this world: destruction and self-destruction. An evil God is sheer fantasy in any possible world…

 

[Rhubarb]

The Deity cannot possibly be evil, become evil or do evil because He is the Ultimate Reality, i.e. pure existence without any defect or limitation; otherwise He wouldn’t be eternal, indivisible and indestructible. Imperfection is the result of Creation and God doesn’t have to create Himself. Of course imperfection is not morally evil because it is the inevitable result of being a creature and not being divine. We are not to blame for being imperfect with our limited knowledge, intelligence and power!

Even moral evil is ultimately due to ignorance because we wouldn’t harm anyone if we knew we are really harming ourselves. When we destroy our relationships with others we become corrupt and poisonous like rotten apples. But our ignorance is culpable because we know it is wrong to harm them. God cannot possibly become ignorant because He is omniscient. He knows everything because He has created everything. It follows that He is necessarily and eternally good. It is logically impossible for Him to cease being the loving Father of His children. Disunity is not a credible explanation of reality. We know well enough what happens when there is discord in this world: destruction and self-destruction. An evil God is sheer fantasy in any possible world…

Again, I want to point out that I’m not saying what you said is wrong. I don’t think I’m getting my point across though. The first horn of the dilemma requires that the deity is pure existence. Because then the good is defined necessarily by said deity. This means that a change in the deity’s nature would mean a change in how good is defined.

If one were to grant that the deity is ‘pure existence’, the metaphysical reality that underpins all of our world, how do we go from that premise to the deity cannot be evil? It seems there are added presuppositions needed to get to that claim.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

JDGaney,

No, sadly, your solution doesn’t work. On your solution, goodness seems to be defined by God’s voluntary will – which means that it is arbitrary.

edarlitrix has a much better idea, though I think I can add to it. Here’s my solution:

1. God does not voluntarily create the moral law, in the same way He voluntarily creates physical objects.
2. The moral law is a part of God’s nature.
3. God does not control His own nature.

Once we have those three axioms, the Euthyphro Dilemma does not create a problem at all.

 

[tonyrey]

*The Deity cannot possibly be evil, become evil or do evil because He is the Ultimate Reality, i.e. pure existence without any defect or limitation; otherwise He wouldn’t be eternal, indivisible and indestructible. Imperfection is the result of Creation and God doesn’t have to create Himself. Of course imperfection is not morally evil because it is the inevitable result of being a creature and not being divine. We are not to blame for being imperfect with our limited knowledge, intelligence and power!

Do you agree that existence is not only positive but also valuable? If these are just presuppositions there is no reason to be reasonable! Could reasoning itself be redefined to be valueless?

 

[Rhubarb]

Do you agree that existence is not only positive but also valuable? If these are just presuppositions there is no reason to be reasonable! Could reasoning itself be redefined to be valueless?

I don’t believe that existence is necessarily positive or valuable, nor negative or un-valuable. I also don’t believe that existence necessarily exists either. At least, I don’t believe that the above is self-evident. I’d love to hear an argument for the contrary.

 

[tonyrey]

*Do you agree that existence is not only positive but also valuable? If these are just presuppositions there is no reason to be reasonable! Could reasoning itself be redefined to be valueless? *

I don't believe that existence is necessarily positive or  valuable, nor negative or un-valuable.Thomas Nagel, a well-known atheist, pointed out that existence is valuable because it is a source of opportunities. As King Lear said, nothing will come of nothing.

If reasoning is valueless why are you reasoning? And if reasoning is valuable our existence must be valuable - unless you believe it is pointless, in which case you’re getting something for nothing!

I also don’t believe that existence necessarily exists either. At least, I don’t believe that the above is self-evident. I’d love to hear an argument for the contrary

We don’t exist necessarily but that is off the topic…

 

[Rhubarb]

tonyrey:

I don't believe that existence is necessarily positive or  valuable, nor negative or un-valuable.Thomas Nagel, a well-known atheist, pointed out that existence is valuable because it is a source of opportunities. As King Lear said, nothing will come of nothing.

If reasoning is valueless why are you reasoning? And if reasoning is valuable our existence must be valuable - unless you believe it is pointless, in which case you’re getting something for nothing!

We don’t exist necessarily but that is off the topic…

I can get behind existence having contingent values. Reason, too, I can say is contingently valuable. Does an idea of intrinsic, necessary value underpin the Euthyphro debate?

And I mean I don’t believe existence itself is necessary - not just us. I’ve come across no argument that adequately shows that “the metaphysical reality”, whatever that might ve, necessarily exists. Whatever ontology does, in fact, exist seems entirely contingent in one form or another. But I don’t mean to stray into this debate - I just brought it up as a stronger positon to the question about value and positive-ness.

 

[raulpnt]

The Euthyphro dilemma has quite a beautiful and neat solution to it. The only reason why there has been disagreement and confusion on this thread as to establishing an absolute way to resolve the dilemma is because the initial question posed is worded in a misleading way. If we extract the wording from the direct translation, we will observe that the semantics of the problem are to be analyzed in the following way:

Does God love an act because it is good?

Or is an act good because God loves it?

Both of these options seem to bring us a problem which must be conceded upon admittance of their respective truths.

Firstly, if God loves an act because it is good, then it must be the case that God refers to some absolute notion of “goodness” prior to acknowledging an act’s goodness. This notion of “goodness” seems to be above God and it seems as if He must first consult it before judgment. This is extremely problematic because in our faith we do not believe anything to be above God. Rather, He is the orderer and creator of all things, and reigns immeasurably above all.

Secondly, if an act is good because God loves it, then this seems to be troublesome for many because it is merely a subjective truth which has the possibility of changing. Not only this, but an act, under this theory, is good only by virtue of the fact that God loves it, and we must do only as God says. Morality ends there.

The solution to the Euthyphro dilemma is this:
GOD IS LOVE!
Therefore, any contemplations on whether an act is good because God loves it or whether God loves an act because it is good are in vain! These contemplations overlook the fact that God Himself is love, and that God’s synonymy with love defeats the rigor of the question.

Hope this helps.

 

[oldcelt]

The Euthyphro dilemma has quite a beautiful and neat solution to it. The only reason why there has been disagreement and confusion on this thread as to establishing an absolute way to resolve the dilemma is because the initial question posed is worded in a misleading way. If we extract the wording from the direct translation, we will observe that the semantics of the problem are to be analyzed in the following way:

Does God love an act because it is good?

Or is an act good because God loves it?

Both of these options seem to bring us a problem which must be conceded upon admittance of their respective truths.

Firstly, if God loves an act because it is good, then it must be the case that God refers to some absolute notion of “goodness” prior to acknowledging an act’s goodness. This notion of “goodness” seems to be above God and it seems as if He must first consult it before judgment. This is extremely problematic because in our faith we do not believe anything to be above God. Rather, He is the orderer and creator of all things, and reigns immeasurably above all.

Secondly, if an act is good because God loves it, then this seems to be troublesome for many because it is merely a subjective truth which has the possibility of changing. Not only this, but an act, under this theory, is good only by virtue of the fact that God loves it, and we must do only as God says. Morality ends there.

The solution to the Euthyphro dilemma is this:
GOD IS LOVE!
Therefore, any contemplations on whether an act is good because God loves it or whether God loves an act because it is good are in vain! These contemplations overlook the fact that God Himself is love, and that God’s synonymy with love defeats the rigor of the question.

Hope this helps.

Observation of the human condition makes your conclusion problematic.

 

[Rhubarb]

The Dilemma can be reformulated without “love” in it. For the sake of argument day this does solve the Euthyphro Dilemma. Does it solve the Euthyphro-Prime Dilemma?