Is this a good way to respond to the Euthyphro dilemma?

[tonyrey]

Thomas Nagel, a well-known atheist, pointed out that existence is valuable because it is a source of opportunities. As King Lear said, nothing will come of nothing.

Your conclusion is that nothing is necessary - and nothing is necessarily valuable -which is a totally negative position. Yet, as Nagel pointed out, existence is valuable because it is a source of opportunities. And why are you reasoning if reasoning is valueless?!

Your view amounts to nihilism which is clearly self-contradictory: it presupposes its own value! If everything is worthless everything is absurd - including the notion that everything is absurd. How do you proceed from there? You maintain the Euthyphro dilemma at the cost of destroying your credibility…

 

[tonyrey]

The Dilemma can be reformulated without “love” in it. For the sake of argument day this does solve the Euthyphro Dilemma. Does it solve the Euthyphro-Prime Dilemma?

You have succeeded in eliminating not only love but also the validity of reasoning from the scene. There are no dilemmas because nothing makes sense…

 

[Rhubarb]

Your conclusion is that nothing is necessary - and nothing is necessarily valuable -which is a totally negative position. Yet, as Nagel pointed out, existence is valuable because it is a source of opportunities. And why are you reasoning if reasoning is valueless?!

Your view amounts to nihilism which is clearly self-contradictory: it presupposes its own value! If everything is worthless everything is absurd - including the notion that everything is absurd. How do you proceed from there? You maintain the Euthyphro dilemma at the cost of destroying your credibility…

I think the “totally negative” position is that everything is necessarily not-valuable. I’m just saying I don’t see a reason to believe these things you mentioned are necessarily valuable. They MIGHT be valuable. Maybe Nagel is right - I’d have to look at his argument more closely. I’m not married to my position.

 

[Rhubarb]

You have succeeded in eliminating not only love but also the validity of reasoning from the scene. There are no dilemmas because nothing makes sense…

Can you say more about what you mean? I don’t see how a restatement like “Does God command the good, or is what God commands the good” any less valid than the original formulation. The consequences of the Dilemma still seem to be in effect.

I’d like to point out, too, that ultimately I don’t think the Euthyphro Dilemma needs to be an impediment to belief in God.

 

[tonyrey]

Your conclusion is that nothing is necessary - and nothing is necessarily valuable -which is a totally negative position. Yet, as Nagel pointed out, existence is valuable because it is a source of opportunities. And why are you reasoning if reasoning is valueless?!

I think my statements are clear enough:

1. Your conclusion is that nothing is necessary - and nothing is necessarily valuable - is a totally negative position.
2. Existence is valuable because it is a source of opportunities.
3. If reasoning is valueless it is illogical to participate in a philosophical discussion.
4. Nihilism is self-refuting.
5. The assumption that the Creator is not necessarily good is inconsistent with the value of existence - and with the value of reasoning.
6. The distinction between God and goodness is arbitrary unless there is evidence that goodness can exist without God.
7. God does not command what is good but reveals that He is good and asks us to love others as He loves us.

 

[Rhubarb]

I think my statements are clear enough:

Firstly, please don’t take my disagreement as a call to stop your belief in these arguments. I’m not trying to convince anyone anything, except what problems the Dilemma can bring up. If you are satisfied with your answer to it, then rock out!

1. Your conclusion is that nothing is necessary - and nothing is necessarily valuable - is a totally negative position.
2. Existence is valuable because it is a source of opportunities.
3. If reasoning is valueless it is illogical to participate in a philosophical discussion.
4. Nihilism is self-refuting.
5. The assumption that the Creator is not necessarily good is inconsistent with the value of existence - and with the value of reasoning.
6. The distinction between God and goodness is arbitrary unless there is evidence that goodness can exist without God.
7. God does not command what is good but reveals that He is good and asks us to love others as He loves us.

1. As I said, I believe that a belief that there is nothing that is valuable - or even more strongly, everything is not-valuable is a more negative position than saying that these erstwhile values we’re discussing is only contingently valuable.
2. Existence offers opportunities, sure. Now, are opportunities valuable? Maybe. I’m not so sure.
3. I never said reasoning is valueless. In the context of philosophy, it’s super-valuable. Value theories are super-complex.
4. Depends what we’re nihilists about. I’m a unicorn nihilist. I don’t think that’s self-refuting. Regardless, I’m most certainly not being a nihilist about values - I’m saying that values are contingent on the value-holder. That isn’t denying that values exist.
5. I’m not seeing a contradiction. Can an evil-but-omnipotent being never deal with valuable things? How about a not-quite-good-but-not-quite-evil being? Aquinas seems to recognize that goodness is a spectrum in the Argument from Degree. Perhaps this is the lynch-pin of the argument for the goodness of God that I’m missing. I’d love to hear more on this point - that a creator deity must necessarily be a certain way as to its ‘moral nature.’
6. Whaaaat? Now, I grant that a deity exists for the same of argument. But I haven’t granted any moral properties of said deity. In this world, assuming there is (a deity with certain properties) that is equivalent to good. Which means, in a possible world, (a deity with a different set of properties) can be equivalent to “good.” By your (5) you might think this is an inconsistent position - but it’s totally consistent with the (5) I suggest.
7. If what I said for (6) works, then a deity revealing the ‘good’ can also do so, but what is the ‘good’ is different than what it is in our actual world.

I’m totally open to being convinced against my understanding - I just need more. But I understand if you don’t want to waste your time, or beat your head against a wall. I’m sure I’ve heard the “if reasoning is valueless, why are you reasoning?” line before on the radio show - slogans don’t go far for me. Especially when they aren’t addressing what I said.

 

[tonyrey]

1. As I said, I believe that a belief that there is nothing that is valuable - or even more strongly, everything is not-valuable is a more negative position than saying that these erstwhile values we’re discussing is only contingently valuable.
2. Existence offers opportunities, sure. Now, are opportunities valuable? Maybe. I’m not so sure.
3. I never said reasoning is valueless. In the context of philosophy, it’s super-valuable. Value theories are super-complex.
4. Depends what we’re nihilists about. I’m a unicorn nihilist. I don’t think that’s self-refuting. Regardless, I’m most certainly not being a nihilist about values - I’m saying that values are contingent on the value-holder. That isn’t denying that values exist.
5. I’m not seeing a contradiction. Can an evil-but-omnipotent being never deal with valuable things? How about a not-quite-good-but-not-quite-evil being? Aquinas seems to recognize that goodness is a spectrum in the Argument from Degree. Perhaps this is the lynch-pin of the argument for the goodness of God that I’m missing. I’d love to hear more on this point - that a creator deity must necessarily be a certain way as to its ‘moral nature.’
6. Whaaaat? Now, I grant that a deity exists for the same of argument. But I haven’t granted any moral properties of said deity. In this world, assuming there is (a deity with certain properties) that is equivalent to good. Which means, in a possible world, (a deity with a different set of properties) can be equivalent to “good.” By your (5) you might think this is an inconsistent position - but it’s totally consistent with the (5) I suggest.
7. If what I said for (6) works, then a deity revealing the ‘good’ can also do so, but what is the ‘good’ is different than what it is in our actual world.

I’m totally open to being convinced against my understanding - I just need more. But I understand if you don’t want to waste your time, or beat your head against a wall. I’m sure I’ve heard the “if reasoning is valueless, why are you reasoning?” line before on the radio show - slogans don’t go far for me. Especially when they aren’t addressing what I said.

1. Is the value of reasoning contingent?

1. If opportunities are valueless the opportunity to reason is also valueless - a self-refuting conclusion.
2. Is reasoning valuable in every possible world? If not why not?
3. Is the value of reasoning entirely contingent on the value-holder?
   1. “an evil-but-omnipotent being” is an oxymoron. Evil is a defect and a weakness.
   2. Goodness is an expression of love which exists in every possible world. Nothing would exist without the creative power of love. How else could something exist?
   3. You need to clarify whether you believe moral values are entirely subjective, whether reasoning is a luxury rather than a necessity and whether reasoning originated in molecular activity.

 

[Rhubarb]

1. Is the value of reasoning contingent?

1. If opportunities are valueless the opportunity to reason is also valueless - a self-refuting conclusion.
2. Is reasoning valuable in every possible world? If not why not?
3. Is the value of reasoning entirely contingent on the value-holder?
   1. “an evil-but-omnipotent being” is an oxymoron. Evil is a defect and a weakness.
   2. Goodness is an expression of love which exists in every possible world. Nothing would exist without the creative power of love. How else could something exist?
   3. You need to clarify whether you believe moral values are entirely subjective, whether reasoning is a luxury rather than a necessity and whether reasoning originated in molecular activity.

I could say a lot about these points, but I want to focus in on your new 5. By the definition bandied around, the definition of good and evil is defined by the nature of the deity in any given possible world. I’ll call good and evil in respect to our world good and evil. Good is tied up with the God, either in being equated with or tied up with the God’s nature. This is why I take that it COULD BE true, that God IS goodness and it is contrary to His nature to be anything else. If evil is a defect, it must be because we’re defining God as the ultimate, and evil is something that is not contained in the ultimate.

However, in a possible world where the deity has a different nature than God in our world, the good of that world (I’ll call it good, and its opposite evil) will also be defined by the deity, either equating it with that deity or that deity’s nature. So, in that world, just like ours, the deity IS goodness, and it would be contrary to the deity’s nature to be otherwise. And, just like in our world, to be evil could be seen as a defect because it isn’t contained in the deity, which is the ultimate of that possible world.

[What I’m describing is consistent for each possible world - the relations between God and **good and evil matches the relation between the deity of the possible world and good and evil. Er, provided I got the stories just right.]

HOWEVER. Things are just such in the possible world that the in the possible world, good=evil and evil=good to a third possible observer outside both worlds. Due to the relations between the deity and good/evil, this story seems logically possible without contradictions? I think so.

 

[tonyrey]

I could say a lot about these points, but I want to focus in on your new 5. By the definition bandied around, the definition of good and evil is defined by the nature of the deity in any given possible world. I’ll call good and evil in respect to our world good and evil. Good is tied up with the God, either in being equated with or tied up with the God’s nature. This is why I take that it COULD BE true, that God IS goodness and it is contrary to His nature to be anything else. If evil is a defect, it must be because we’re defining God as the ultimate, and evil is something that is not contained in the ultimate.

However, in a possible world where the deity has a different nature than God in our world, the good of that world (I’ll call it good, and its opposite evil) will also be defined by the deity, either equating it with that deity or that deity’s nature. So, in that world, just like ours, the deity IS goodness, and it would be contrary to the deity’s nature to be otherwise. And, just like in our world, to be evil could be seen as a defect because it isn’t contained in the deity, which is the ultimate of that possible world.

[What I’m describing is consistent for each possible world - the relations between God and **good

and evil matches the relation between the deity of the possible world and good and evil. Er, provided I got the stories just right.]

HOWEVER. Things are just such in the possible world that the in the possible world, good=evil and evil=good to a third possible observer outside both worlds. Due to the relations between the deity and good/evil, this story seems logically possible without contradictions? I think so.
The hypothesis that good=evil in a possible world overlooks two facts:

1. Good is positive and evil is negative.
2. Good is an expression of love and evil is the result of lack of love.

It is a logical impossibility for the roles to be reversed nor is there any evidence that another world could defy logic. A more convincing argument would be to base your conclusion on what happens in the only world that we know.

 

[Rhubarb]

The hypothesis that good=evil in a possible world overlooks two facts:

1. Good is positive and evil is negative.
2. Good is an expression of love and evil is the result of lack of love.

It is a logical impossibility for the roles to be reversed nor is there any evidence that another world could defy logic. A more convincing argument would be to base your conclusion on what happens in the only world that we know.

I’m not hypothesizing that good=evil. I’m saying that using the same maneuvers, you can get to good or evil depending on the nature of the deity. Heck, it doesn’t even have to be total depraved evil - just sort of evil. Or just not as good. A change in the nature of the deity in the possible world changes the nature of good, evil, love, and every other thing that might be reduced to facts about the deity. It’s not a matter of subjectivity - it’s a matter of grounding. What grounds these facts that you’re asserting, because it seems that the same grounding can lead to the possible world I described if we assume for the sake of argument that the possible deity’s nature is that way. It’s not ridiculous to imagine an evil creator being - in the same way it’s ridiculous to try and imagine that a square is a circle.

 

[tonyrey]

I’m not hypothesizing that good=evil. I’m saying that using the same maneuvers, you can get to good or evil depending on the nature of the deity. Heck, it doesn’t even have to be total depraved evil - just sort of evil. Or just not as good. A change in the nature of the deity in the possible world changes the nature of good, evil, love, and every other thing that might be reduced to facts about the deity. It’s not a matter of subjectivity - it’s a matter of grounding. What grounds these facts that you’re asserting, because it seems that the same grounding can lead to the possible world I described if we assume for the sake of argument that the possible deity’s nature is that way. It’s not ridiculous to imagine an evil creator being - in the same way it’s ridiculous to try and imagine that a square is a circle.

I disagree for the following reasons:

1. The distinction between God and goodness is arbitrary** unless there is evidence that goodness can exist without God**.
2. Divine perfection implies that God cannot be negative in any way and leaves no room for evil or decadence.
3. An evil God is a fantasy because evil is self-destructive.
4. God cannot possibly be evil, become evil or do evil because He is the Ultimate Reality, i.e. pure existence without any defect or limitation; otherwise He wouldn’t be eternal, indivisible and indestructible.
5. Existence is valuable because it is a source of opportunities.
6. To deny that existence is valuable is self-contradictory. Existence is valuable in every possible world.
7. To deny that reasoning is valuable is self-contradictory. Reasoning is valuable in every possible world.
8. God is necessarily good is because existence is necessarily good.
9. Goodness is an expression of love and evil is the result of lack of love.
10. The nature of God cannot change because truth, goodness, freedom, justice, beauty and love are aspects of divine perfection.
11. God asks us to love others as He loves us because without love we cannot be fulfilled and united to others.
12. Love is the Supreme Reality - the only source of lasting joy and fulfilment.

 

[tonyrey]

I’m not hypothesizing that good=evil. I’m saying that using the same maneuvers, you can get to good or evil depending on the nature of the deity. Heck, it doesn’t even have to be total depraved evil - just sort of evil. Or just not as good. A change in the nature of the deity in the possible world changes the nature of good, evil, love, and every other thing that might be reduced to facts about the deity. It’s not a matter of subjectivity - it’s a matter of grounding. What grounds these facts that you’re asserting, because it seems that the same grounding can lead to the possible world I described if we assume for the sake of argument that the possible deity’s nature is that way. It’s not ridiculous to imagine an evil creator being - in the same way it’s ridiculous to try and imagine that a square is a circle.

There is a superb analysis of evil in The Divine Names:

1. Good things have all one cause. If evil is opposed to the Good, then hath evil many causes. The efficient causes of evil results, however, are not any laws and faculties, but an impotence and weakness and an inharmonious mingling of discordant elements. Evil things are not immutable and unchanging but indeterminate and indefinite: the sport of alien influences which have no definite aim. The Good must be the beginning and the end even of all evil things. For the Good is the final Purpose of all things, good and bad alike. For even when we act amiss we do so from a longing for the Good; for no one makes evil his definite object when performing any action. Hence evil hath no substantial being, but only a shadow thereof; since the Good, and not itself, is the ultimate object for which it comes into existence.

1. Unto evil we can attribute but an accidental kind of existence. It exists for the sake of something else, and is not self-originating. And hence our action appears to be right (for it hath Good as its object) while yet it is not really right (because we mistake for good that which is not good). ‘Tis proven, then, that our purpose is different from our action. **Thus evil is contrary to progress, purpose, nature, cause, principle, end, law, will, and being. Evil is, then, a lack, a deficiency, a weakness, a disproportion, an error, purposeless, unlovely, lifeless, unwise, unreasonable, imperfect, unreal, causeless, indeterminate, sterile, inert, powerless, disordered, incongruous, indefinite, dark, unsubstantial, and never in itself possessed of any existence whatever. **How, then, is it that an admixture of the Good bestows any power upon evil? For that which is altogether destitute of Good is nothing and hath no power. And if the Good is Existent and is the Source of will, power, and action, how can Its opposite (being destitute of existence, will, power, and activity), have any power against It? Only because evil things are not all entirely the same in all cases and in all relations. In the case of a devil evil lieth in the being contrary to spiritual goodness; in the soul it lieth in the being contrary to reason; in the body it lieth in the being contrary to nature.

1. How can evil things have any existence at all if there is a Providence? Only because evil (as such) hath no being, neither inhereth it in things that have being. And naught that hath being is independent of Providence; for evil hath no being at all, except when mingled with the Good. And if no thing in the world is without a share in the Good, and evil is the deficiency of Good and no thing in the world is utterly destitute of Good, then the Divine Providence is in all things, and nothing that exists can be without It. Yea, even the evil effects that arise are turned by Providence to a kindly purpose, for the succour of themselves or others (either individually or in common), and thus it is that Providence cares individually for each particular thing in all the world. Therefore we shall pay no heed to the fond argument so often heard that “Providence shall lead us unto virtue even against our will.” ‘Tis not worthy of Providence to violate nature. Wherefore Its Providential character is shown herein: that It preserves the nature of each individual, and, in making provision for the free and independent, it hath respect unto their state, providing, both in general and in particular, according as the nature of those It cares for can receive Its providential benefactions, which are bestowed suitably on each by Its multiform and universal activity.

1. Thus evil hath no being, nor any inherence in things that have being. Evil is nowhere qua evil; and it arises not through any power but through weakness. Even the devils derive their existence from the Good, and their mere existence is good. Their evil is the result of a fall from their proper virtues, and is a change with regard to their individual state, a weakness of their true angelical perfections. And they desire the Good in so far as they desire existence, life, and understanding; and in so far as they do not desire the Good, they desire that which hath no being. And this is not desire, but **an error **of real desire.

ccel.org/ccel/rolt/dionysius.iv.v.html

The Creator cannot therefore be evil in any respect whatsoever.

 

[tonyrey]

The Euthyphro dilemma disappears when we understand that God is goodness and goodness is God. In a Godless universe good and evil would be simply human conventions because everything would be purposeless. There would be no reason for anything and existence would be absurd. Yet how could reasoning be derived from irrational molecules? Insight presupposes a Supreme Intellect and an intelligible universe. Existence is not accidental and purposeless but rational and purposeful.

Evil is inevitable in a created universe because only God is perfect in every respect:

**85 God is infinitely good and all his works are good. Yet no one can escape the experience of suffering or the evils in nature which seem to be linked to the limitations proper to creatures: and above all to the question of moral evil. **

Evil is essentially an imperfection and therefore negative. It does not exist in the true sense of the word but it is real and not an illusion because it is dysteleological, i.e. it frustrates the purpose of life by causing suffering, death, disease, deformity and despair. It is literally the antithesis of Creation in its destructive consequences.

Natural evil is the inevitable result of being finite creatures. Moral evil is due to ignorance but it is culpable ignorance because we can distinguish good from evil. We would never harm others if we realised we harm ourselves far more by harming them. That is why God cannot be evil in any respect because He is Love and created us for love: to be perfect as He is perfect…

 

[tonyrey]

…If God, who claims to have created everything, commands something in this form of existence, should we not compare that to what we have understood to be right and wrong, and if it lines up, should we not accept it?
But how can we reconcile this to a God who gave Moses the Law that prescribed death as the proper sentence for nearly every violation? How can we reconcile this to a God who commanded his people to wipe out entire civilizations?

The obvious answer is that Moses misinterpreted the Will of God. Even though he was inspired he was not infallible. Everything in the Old Testament should be interpreted in the light of the teaching of Jesus that God is a loving Father.

 

[GaryTaylor]

The Euthyphro dilemma disappears when we understand that God is goodness and goodness is God. In a Godless universe good and evil would be simply human conventions because everything would be purposeless. There would be no reason for anything and existence would be absurd. Yet how could reasoning be derived from irrational molecules? Insight presupposes a Supreme Intellect and an intelligible universe. Existence is not accidental and purposeless but rational and purposeful.

Evil is inevitable in a created universe because only God is perfect in every respect:

85 God is infinitely good and all his works are good. Yet no one can escape the experience of suffering or the evils in nature which seem to be linked to the limitations proper to creatures: and above all to the question of moral evil.

Evil is essentially an imperfection and therefore negative. It does not exist in the true sense of the word but it is real and not an illusion because it is dysteleological, i.e. it frustrates the purpose of life by causing suffering, death, disease, deformity and despair. It is literally the antithesis of Creation in its destructive consequences.

Natural evil is the inevitable result of being finite creatures. Moral evil is due to ignorance but it is culpable ignorance because we can distinguish good from evil. We would never harm others if we realised we harm ourselves far more by harming them. That is why God cannot be evil in any respect because He is Love and created us for love: to be perfect as He is perfect…

Tony, I think further in that its presupposed that good exists independent of God first needs to be proved. I contend it can’t be done without admission of evolution of the species of mankind or ID which admits theory on mans interconnect morality, love, perfection, survival, etc. Which admits C, God Is good, the third leg to the undefined first two. Further this dilemma gives two horns without clarity to solve good or god, which renders it not logical, as if we all agree on good and god and gods, and gods including their evil deeds, or even Platos juridical dilemma. Then if thats not enough we add a “or” to the first and second leg. Is that an inclusive or exclusive or? I mean at that point how many variables now apply for the process of elimination to reach census? I would say if we would understand the two horns in census then it already indicates a collective thinking in morality and reason, perfect, love and like higher conscience thinking and at the same time validates the third horn from narrow ambiguous thinking and wording.

 

[GaryTaylor]

I can’t see how this isn’t a false dichotomy which doesn’t satisfy the logic aspect let alone the truth aspect. The A and B horn are the same. Reverse the wording on the B horn and it makes the OR inclusive thus both are mutually exclusive “A and B”

This is a paradigm which forces theists to choose between a false dichotomy.

Here is the equation from a theist view.

a] Does good exist because God IS good

OR

b] God IS good so good exists.

 

[tonyrey]

Tony, I think further in that its presupposed that good exists independent of God first needs to be proved. I contend it can’t be done without admission of evolution of the species of mankind or ID which admits theory on mans interconnect morality, love, perfection, survival, etc. Which admits C, God Is good, the third leg to the undefined first two. Further this dilemma gives two horns without clarity to solve good or god, which renders it not logical, as if we all agree on good and god and gods, and gods including their evil deeds, or even Platos juridical dilemma. Then if thats not enough we add a “or” to the first and second leg. Is that an inclusive or exclusive or? I mean at that point how many variables now apply for the process of elimination to reach census? I would say if we would understand the two horns in census then it already indicates a collective thinking in morality and reason, perfect, love and like higher conscience thinking and at the same time validates the third horn from narrow ambiguous thinking and wording.

I’m sorry not to have replied sooner, Gary, but I didn’t notice your post. You’re obviously right in pointing out the need to explain “good” without God. It is simpler to deny that it is an objective attribute but then the dilemma disappears! If it does exist beyond the mind it has to be explained without reference to the physical world; otherwise it becomes expediency - in which case the dilemma again disappears!

For the materialist the OP is immaterial )) in the sense of irrelevant. There is little doubt that the concepts of God and good are closely related and the principle of economy eliminates the need to consider them separately. God is essentially good and good is incomprehensible without God. What reason is there for it to exist in a purposeless, meaningless universe? None whatsoever!

 

[tonyrey]

Tony, I think further in that its presupposed that good exists independent of God first needs to be proved. I contend it can’t be done without admission of evolution of the species of mankind or ID which admits theory on mans interconnect morality, love, perfection, survival, etc. Which admits C, God Is good, the third leg to the undefined first two. Further this dilemma gives two horns without clarity to solve good or god, which renders it not logical, as if we all agree on good and god and gods, and gods including their evil deeds, or even Platos juridical dilemma. Then if thats not enough we add a “or” to the first and second leg. Is that an inclusive or exclusive or? I mean at that point how many variables now apply for the process of elimination to reach census? I would say if we would understand the two horns in census then it already indicates a collective thinking in morality and reason, perfect, love and like higher conscience thinking and at the same time validates the third horn from narrow ambiguous thinking and wording.

In other words the dilemma isn’t false. It doesn’t even exist!

 

[GodMadeMe]

Our starting point is definitely the the actual world we live in. But we can use possible worlds to explore what might be in the realm of logical possibility. An evil creator deity is LOGICALLY possible - which means it can introduce problems to topics that depend upon the notion of a deity. .

It makes not sense to speak of God as subject to possible worlds, because there are no possible worlds without an eternal unchanging act of reality in which things are possible.
;

 

[Rohzek]

In all honesty, I don’t understand why this is a dilemma. To me the answer is simple: God is good by virtue of being God. This also jives with the doctrine that God is omnipotent. What is or isn’t good is solely determined by God’s will. How else would one explain the mass genocide in the OT and the pacifist notions in the NT? People usually counter this by saying that God is immutable. I agree, but I don’t think changing one’s mind means changing one’s nature. The way I see it, the immutability quality applies only to nature. Otherwise, you have a ton of contradictions throughout the scriptures and everything is just awash at best. Did God not change his mind and take a different course of action when Moses begged him not to kill all of the Israelites? The answer seems pretty obvious.

Just my 2 cents.