And in which way do you mean “person”, Orthodox theology states he was very much a human person, with everything that goes along with that.
Actually, no. Conciliar Christian theology says that he has a human will, but NOT a human person. The subject/person of the Incarnation is the Logos, who is, obviously, a divine person.
The Logos is always eternal, the flesh is not. Though they are bound together they are not the same, just as the soul is not the same as the body.
This doesn’t answer any of the objections that I put to the idea of the Incarnation as contradictory. Instead you just restate the problem. The questions pertain to the relation between the Logos and the assumed human nature. Did the Logos change or not in the assumption of the human nature? If yes, you have a contradiction in the being of God. If no (which is generally the Christian answer), then either the human nature somehow constitutes, eternally, who the Logos is (again contradicting the being of God), or there was no incarnation.
We just agree that he is everywhere, a meaningless agreement as far as this topic goes.
Not really a meaningless agreement, though, I suspect we will find that we don’t actually agree about the implications. God’s already total, intimate and complete relationship to the creation was yet another objection to the Incarnation that was raised back in the original thread. I mentioned it, again,
here (though you may not have read down that far yet. I know you said you were pushed for time).
Reason is not something which applies to one side and not the other. You have used reason to “prove” that God must be limited.
On the contrary, I have argued that God cannot do that which contradicts God, and that it is inappropriate to predicate contradictions to God.
The problem with this first premise is that language is not the end of all, and thus limitations in language do not prove limitations in the divine.
We would agree on this. It is for instance appropriate to say all sorts of things about God (i.e., God is the One), but we do not think that idea we might have of the One encapsulates or completely contains God. God is beyond our thought. This still does NOT allow one to predicate contradictions.
For instance, when pseudo-Dionysius makes the claim on the one hand that God is Good, he is arguing that God is the source of all that is good. But when he turns around, later, and denies that God is Good, he is denying that our idea of the Good completely comprehends God. This is NOT a contradiction because he is not predicating the ideas of God
in the same way. And no one has any problem with that. In fact the Mystical Theology is a brilliant text. And you can find similar dialectical pairings of language in pagans Plotinus or Proclus, or, later in Jewish sources like Maimonides.
We are concerned with contradictions: this involves predication of contraries
in the same sense.
I showed in my past post where these “contradictions” (actually Paradox’s (which means duel truths) actually do exist in the natural world. Your own argument, utilizing reason, says this is impossible. But I say, if a paradox can exist in the natural world, why is the divine limited from them?
I don’t know why you are bringing up paradoxes, since the objection was specifically to contradiction, and a set of contradictions, regarding the Incarnation, were twice offered. If you would like to argue that they are not contradictions, but are instead ‘paradoxes’, you should feel free to do so. You could define the term (which I assume would have to involve explaining how paradoxes can be rationally held…as opposed to Zeno’s paradoxes for instance, where you are not supposed to hold the conclusions at all, even though the premises and arguments are sound and the conclusions are not logical impossibilities), explain why the Incarnation is a paradox and not a contradiction, and how we can tell the difference between the two.
You use name calling against my arguments (insisting on calling a paradox a contradiction for the sake of demonization)
I have only ever been interested in contradictions. God does not do that which contradicts God, and it is inappropriate to predicate contradictions to God. I listed what I took to be contradictions regarding to the doctrine of the Incarnation. There is no demonization here, and “contradiction” is not some inappropriately pejorative term. If you do not think they are contradictions, you should say why.
So far the main thing I have gotten from you is that it is inappropriate for me to say that you can’t predicate contradictions of God because that limits God. If what you are saying instead is that I shouldn’t deny the predication of paradoxes to God, then I haven’t, so far at least. And since I haven’t said that, I don’t know how to take it as a response to me. You still need to respond to what I have identified as contradictions (not in you per se, but in the doctrine of the Incarnation), and say something about paradoxes.
and then in the same sentence declare I am guilty of non sequiturs?
What I said here is that once one allows that contradictions can be predicated of God, then the language becomes nonsense and any old non-sequitur will do (i.e., that it doesn’t matter what you say).
Your argument that you do not hold God to be limited because certain Christian writers may have imposed limits on God is one large nonsequitur!
The argument was that one cannot predicate contradictions of God, and that God cannot do that which contradicts God. Thomas and Anselm just happen to agree with me on this matter.