Jesus, the Foundation of Science

[grannymh]

I’m still back on the argument from intelligibility in the universe so if you don’t mind I am going to insert some comments here since the thread seems to have shifted to some kind of an intelligent being required to govern actions of inanimate things that don’t appear to have an end or purpose. That to me is not the same concept as intelligibility within the universe itself.

I rather like intelligibility in nature because intelligibility, not being something material in time and space, is comprehended by the human intellect. What we see is “working order”. Some might refer to the universe as a system of beautiful mathematics. Personally, I like the way Impressionism translates the intelligibility of our surroundings.

If unintelligent blind processes led to the matter-energy of the universe, so what? The result is the proof of the pudding. The result is more marvelous than one can hope to imagine. Add the beauty of rainbow colors, Alaskan majesty, and music from evening birds and happy insects – all is still intelligible by human minds and human emotions.

Granted that we do not completely comprehend all that surrounds us. Thus, we continually work to increase our understanding. If some day, we understand everything about the universe, will that change the intelligibility of it? Not really. In itself, the universe is capable of being understood. It is our power of comprehension which changes in growth. If we are capable of understanding the material/physical universe, what else are we capable of understanding?

Blessings,
granny

:snowing:

 

[hecd2]

I’m still back on the argument from intelligibility in the universe so if you don’t mind I am going to insert some comments here since the thread seems to have shifted to some kind of an intelligent being required to govern actions of inanimate things that don’t appear to have an end or purpose. That to me is not the same concept as intelligibility within the universe itself.

I rather like intelligibility in nature because intelligibility, not being something material in time and space, is comprehended by the human intellect. What we see is “working order”. Some might refer to the universe as a system of beautiful mathematics. Personally, I like the way Impressionism translates the intelligibility of our surroundings.

If unintelligent blind processes led to the matter-energy of the universe, so what? The result is the proof of the pudding. The result is more marvelous than one can hope to imagine. Add the beauty of rainbow colors, Alaskan majesty, and music from evening birds and happy insects – all is still intelligible by human minds and human emotions.

Granted that we do not completely comprehend all that surrounds us. Thus, we continually work to increase our understanding. If some day, we understand everything about the universe, will that change the intelligibility of it? Not really. In itself, the universe is capable of being understood. It is our power of comprehension which changes in growth. If we are capable of understanding the material/physical universe, what else are we capable of understanding?

Blessings,
granny

:snowing:

Indeed, and I think the current discussion about the Five Ways started from my initial observation that the argument for God from the intelligibility or comprehensibility of the world stands out for me, given my disposition, as the most telling of those available; more so than Aquinas’s arguments. Others’ mileage may vary. So yes, I broadly agree with what you say here.

Alec
evolutionpages.com

 

[The_Exodus]

OK - so the argument from governance is about things that lack intelligence acting ‘for the best’ and therefore requiring an intelligence to move them towards an end. Everything that we have learned about the way the world works, starting with Galileo and proceeding up to today, by way of Newton, Darwin, Bohr and Einstein belies the idea that inanimate things have an end or a purpose and that any intelligence is required to govern their action - instead what we see from the galaxies to bacteria can be explained by the consequence of applying unintelligent blind processes to the matter-energy of the universe. Every scientist that I mentioned, and many more, added another brick in that wall, and Galileo played his part by insisting that where our observations about the world conflict with interpretations of revelation, then the former should take precedence. He also introduced the idea of inertia and constant motion in the absence of external forces - see below. The universe, as we observe it, does not require an intelligence to govern or control its unfolding or manage it on a moment by moment basis. Don’t forget that Aquinas was part of a tradition that thought that the end of all earthy objects and their proper place was the centre of the earth, and the end and proper place of fire was the edge of the universe. (There is a sense in which things we have learned about the world are evidence against a guiding intelligence or at least a benevolent one - Darwin was particularly disturbed by the facts of the life cycle of parasitoid wasps; there are many other ways in which the world works that present a terrible challenge to theodicy, particularly if one assents to the governance argument)

I want to jump in here. This looks fun.

All of the above, it seems to me, is rhetoric: a piling up of well-known scientific names. At rock bottom, what of substance was said here besides “important man x, y, and z said such and such”?

What would be more helpful to the Thomists here is for you explain the idea of “blind causality.” That is, submit it to philosophic scrutiny, and present what you mean. Part of the talking past one another has to do with the fact that – as JP2Admirer pointed out – such terms as “blind processes” are thrown about without any explanation at all.

So far as I can see, the notion of a “blind process” is unintelligible, much like you find the notion of “absolute heat.” Perhaps you could expand on what you mean?

 

[The_Exodus]

I think that your example here is a tautology - what you are saying is that all members of a set which is defined by its similar behaviour, behave similarly (I am using the term behaviour rather loosely to paraphrase me, but I am sure you take my point). That does not represent the fallacy. The fallacy is not claiming that what is true of some, is true of all. The fallacy is claiming that given a set where *all *members have a certain property then the set as whole has that property. Here’s an example from biology. “All cells in the human body replicate by division. The human body is composed entirely of cells. Therefore humans replicate by division.” This is the fallacy which Aquinas potentially falls into when he claims that what is true about entities within the world is necessarily true of the world itself.

I’m not sure I understand your transition/parallel.

I understand your objection – that Aquinas’ epistemology is subject to tautological meaninglessness. It is a common enough objection, no doubt, but I think it rests on a misunderstanding of Thomas’ metaphysic (I know scientists hate that word, but bear with me.)

Certain notions are applicable to all beings because such notions are transcendental and apply to all reality – all being – as such. An example of this would be the principle of contradiction. All beings must, as it were, “abide by” this law, because it is the fabric of being and existence.

With regard to tautologies, such as “x cannot be not x,” it is certainly true that, such knowledge, once aquired, is tautological when stated, particularly to one who already grasps it. But it is not a mere meaningless repetition, for it expresses a intelligble grasping of being or reality.

Perhaps you could expand on your statement: “is the fallacy which Aquinas potentially falls into when he claims that what is true about entities within the world is necessarily true of the world itself.” Could you expand?
hec:

The truth also contradicts Aristotle’s and Aquinas’s ideas on these subjects

How, precisely?

By the way, their ideas lie fundamentally on their metaphysic of act and potency, and if one does not understand this notion, one really has no grasp of what they say about motion or change.

 

[The_Exodus]

Your comments immediately above were in response to my statement that quantum events such as radioactive decay or spontaneous particle generation lack a proximate cause in a rather profound way. I didn’t say anything about the intelligibility of nature and I’m struggling to understand how your response is directly relevant to my observation.

The response he made was relevant because the notion of “spontaneous generation” or something coming into being from absolutely nothing is an absurd claim, in the sense that “nothing” has no relation to “being,” and therefore has no possible or intelligible connection with existence as such. Thus, to posit that “it” came to be is simply incoherent. Indeed, by using the word “it” I immediately break the strain of absurdity and create a mental image of surprise or forceful explosion. Yet these images themselves are only related in our mind insofar as they have some sort of relation to being.
hec:

My problem with the premise is that I don’t concede the impossibility of existing here and now if we proceed to an infinity in causes

Niether did Aquinas think it impossible to proceed to infinity in past causes. Indeed, he thought one was unable to tell either way by reasoning whether the world either existed from all eternity or not.

With respect, if you were not aware that Aquinas’ proofs have nothing to do with “horizontal” or “temporal” causation, I do not think you have much understanding of Aquinas’ metaphysics.

 

[hecd2]

I want to jump in here. This looks fun.

Cool. The discussion with JP2A has the potential to take more of my time than I can afford and is already getting away from us. I don’t know whether I have the time, energy or knowledge to get engaged with someone else - originally I had intended to explain my position (however absurd, ignorant or illogical he, you or anyone else finds it), leave it at that and not get involved with an extended debate, but I’ll do my best to give you at least one round of response. It might be a while though - I’ve already spent more time today on other threads than I can afford.

When I started out on this discussion with JP2A I said the following:
“you are looking for more of an explanation for my position which I’ll attempt here, while repeating the disclaimers that a) I am not a philosopher b) these can be at best skeletons of arguments on a forum like this and c) I don’t expect that they will change your mind as they are commonplace arguments that you must have seen before.” Those disclaimers stand. I don’t, by the way, find claims helpful or valid that arguments that challenge Aquinas’s proofs necessarily misunderstand them. His arguments are a posteriori and plain enough - they are based on the extrapolation of observations about the world and to the extent that the observations are true or the extrapolations are warranted they stand or fall. Aquinas’s metaphysics is not impervious to better knowledge about the world.

Alec
evolutionpages.com

 

[LogisticsBranch]

In all fairness to members, The Exodus and JP2Admirer, who have mentioned Aquinas, there is THE PONTIFICAL ACADEMY OF ST THOMAS AQUINAS. Here is an except from the Vatican:

*The Pope gathers the fruits of the large-scale movement, which, from the nineteenth century to the threshold of the third millennium, led philosophers to deepen metaphysical research into the ultimate questions regarding man and the mystery of the human person himself. Then, taking into account the importance of the human sciences, their contribution to knowledge regarding man, and the new questions generated by scientific research, directed towards a deeper knowledge concerning the mystery of man, the Pontiff invites the Academicians to follow the indications on the subject proposed by Vatican Council II, as well as the guidelines that he himself has constantly proposed to the Church, ever since his first encyclical whose beginning Redemptor Hominis made clear the chief direction of his pontificate. In the words of the Holy Father, Benedict XVI, in his address for the feast of St Thomas:

The relationship between faith and reason is a serious challenge to the currently dominant culture in the Western world, and for this very reason our beloved John Paul II decided to dedicate an Encyclical to it, entitled, precisely, Fides et Ratio, Faith and Reason. Recently, I too returned to this topic in my Discourse to the University of Regensburg. (…) St Thomas Aquinas, with farsighted wisdom, succeeded in establishing a fruitful confrontation with the Arab and Hebrew thought of his time, to the point that he was considered an ever up-to-date teacher of dialogue with other cultures and religions. He knew how to present that wonderful Christian synthesis of reason and faith which today too, for the Western civilization, is a precious patrimony to draw from for an effective dialogue with the great cultural and religious traditions of the East and South of the world (Angelus, St Peter’s Square, Sunday, 28 January 2007). *
vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_academies/san-tommaso/past.html

As far as JP2Admirer’s questions asked of me, he may like to review the link(url) that I earlier provided on page 2. Or I can return and quote from the source for him.

Science helps philosophy and theology to better understand the human being. Love, honesty and compassion make us unique. This unique human capacity extends our power to do good beyond the family. Close and enduring friendships with religious and non-religious (atheists) which make us important to others, naturally enhance our sense of significance. True friends value and accept us as we really are and allow us to return this grace. Contributions of love and support in a friend’s life, enhance our sense of personal significance as well, and bring deeper meaning to our lives so thinkth me.

 

[hecd2]

All of the above, it seems to me, is rhetoric: a piling up of well-known scientific names. At rock bottom, what of substance was said here besides “important man x, y, and z said such and such”?

OK, so I have a little unexpected time to give a first response to one or two of these. You are right that there was rhetoric there, but there is also substance. Aquinas claims in his argument from governance that “We see that things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result.” My references to a few prominent scientists was meant to stand for the body of knowledge that methods of natural science have accumulated; that body of knowledge is consistent with a non-telic view of the causes of natural phenomena. Natural bodies, shall we say planets, do lack intelligence, but they do not ‘act for an end…so as to obtain the best result’ (whatever that is) and therefore they do not require an intelligence to direct them. The key thing about the methods of natural science is their success in describing the behaviour of natural entities without the concept of purpose and without the need to appeal to a guiding intelligence. Mechanistic descriptions of behaviour are actually more successful than others. In this respect, science has backed up the intuitions of Democritus with evidence which calls the argument from governance into question. (If you disagree, perhaps you could explain what end a body under the gravitational influence of another acts for or what its best result is; ditto, say for the North American tectonic plate. I am not setting out these challenges to be tricksy - if you genuinely think that inanimate objects need a guiding intelligence to direct them to some end then I’d like to understand your perspective with reference to specific examples.)

What would be more helpful to the Thomists here is for you explain the idea of “blind causality.” …]

So far as I can see, the notion of a “blind process” is unintelligible, much like you find the notion of “absolute heat.” Perhaps you could expand on what you mean?

Sure - I mean a blind process to stand in contrast to a process that is guided by an intelligence. The process of weaving a Persian carpet is planned and guided by an intelligence for an end - the intelligence is human and the purpose is a completed carpet that is a beautiful, enduring and comfortable floor covering. A blind process is mechanistic. It acts regardless of the consequences. There is change, movement, to no specific end, usually according to some deterministic or stochastic rule. The propagation of light through a dielectric medium is one such process; mutational events on a genome is another.

By the way, do you have a coherent concept of absolute heat or something being perfectly hot?

Alec
evolutionpages.com

 

[hecd2]

Niether did Aquinas think it impossible to proceed to infinity in past causes. Indeed, he thought one was unable to tell either way by reasoning whether the world either existed from all eternity or not.

With respect, if you were not aware that Aquinas’ proofs have nothing to do with “horizontal” or “temporal” causation, I do not think you have much understanding of Aquinas’ metaphysics.

Hmm, well, I certainly do not claim to be an expert in the interpretation of Thomist philosophy. Far from it. One of the motivations for continuing to engage in this way beyond my time available and my competence is to learn from those like you who have thought about this for longer and more formally than I have. Nevertheless, I can read as well as the next man, so let me hazard a response to this in the light of what I can read.

Aquinas proposed that world could have existed eternally using the argument that a created entity does not have to precede God in time and there need not be a time when it did not exist. The concept of an entity existing eternally is not contradictory and so the world could have existed eternally. All this is thrashed out in De Aeternitate Mundi in which there is no mention of an infinity of past causes whether in order or time.

However, in the second and third Ways, there is the proposition of the impossibility of an infinity of causes in order as follows: “Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or only one. Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes” “Now it is impossible to go on to infinity in necessary things which have their necessity caused by another, as has been already proved in regard to efficient causes.” My emphasis.

My beef is with the propositions that if there is an infinity of causes in order (to use Aquinas’s terminology) then there cannot be an ultimate effect; or the impossibility of going on to infinity in necessary things which have their necessity caused by another. (I didn’t mention horizontal (?) or temporal causes - you did). I don’t see that logic demands that these propositions are true - what stands against an infinite chain of efficient causes in order or necessary things caused by another?

BTW, as I acknowledged my ignorance of Aquinas’s metaphysics at the outset, it would be tremendously appreciated if you would refrain from pointing it out again.

Alec
evolutionpages.com

 

[hecd2]

I’m not sure I understand your transition/parallel.

I understand your objection – that Aquinas’ epistemology is subject to tautological meaninglessness. It is a common enough objection, no doubt, but I think it rests on a misunderstanding of Thomas’ metaphysic (I know scientists hate that word, but bear with me.)

No, you misunderstand my point as did JP2A. Let me try again. My point is not that saying that ‘all members of a set which is defined as those elements which behave similarly, behave similarly’ is tautological (although it is, in spite of what you say about transcendental truths). I am not suggesting that Aquinas is falling into a tautology but into a fallacy of composition where the claim is that because p is true of all members of the set then p is necessarily true of the set itself. I gave an example of the fallacy by referring to the replication of human cells and humans. In the same way, it is not warranted to claim that because something is true of all entities in the world, then it is necessarily true of the world itself.

Alec
evolutionpages.com

 

[The_Exodus]

\ Aquinas claims in his argument from governance that “We see that things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result.”

First of all, sorry if I came across rude. To be honest, I respect and enjoy your posts on the way you dialogue very much. Any time I have ever read something you’ve written, I’ve noticed an openness to the opposing view and humility.

Second, Aquinas’ proofs take up 1/1000th of the summa (maybe less, actually.) In fact, the summa itself was written for beginners in theology. Aquinas did not intend to go into detail in the proofs, nor does he lay out an epistemology. I think the proofs are still sound, and that St. Thomas had an epistemology, but I only want to point out that I don’t think it’s a good idea to squeeze the summa too tightly in this respect.

The best to read are the Thomists themselves, particularly of late Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange, who wrote the best exposition of the proofs that I know of.

Anyway, I say all the above as preface.
hec:

Natural bodies, shall we say planets, do lack intelligence, but they do not 'act

for an end…so as to obtain the best result’ (whatever that is) and therefore they do not require an intelligence to direct them. The key thing about the methods of natural science is their success in describing the behaviour of natural entities without the concept of purpose and without the need to appeal to a guiding intelligence. Mechanistic descriptions of behaviour are actually more successful than others.

Indeed I agree. But I would say that the only way science can predict the behavior of such objects, is because they do, in fact, act toward an end. “Acting toward an end” simply describes the fact that effects proceed the same from the same cause. Science is built on this supposition, and it is often overlooked. But its existence is quite profound I think.

We can predict, and understand the movement of inanimate bodies, only because they, so to speak, “act reasonably.” If this was not the case, and if bodies acted unintelligibly, it doesn’t seem to me we could predict or understand their movements. Their effects would have no intelligible relation to their causes.
hec:

A blind process is mechanistic. It acts regardless of the consequences. There is change, movement, to no specific end, usually according to some deterministic or stochastic rule. The propagation of light through a dielectric medium is one such process; mutational events on a genome is another.

My trouble is I don’t see how mechanistic movements are blind. Indeed, the moment we say they are intelligible or predictable, it seems to me we are saying they are the very opposite.

The word blind, so far as I can make out, only makes sense with some notion we have of the idea of purposeful. Thus I say my dart-throw was “blind” because I took no notice of the throwing board. Yet, if there was no throwing board, I don’t see how it would make sense to call the throw blind. It would just be a dart-throw. That’s why I can’t really understand the idea that the universe’s processes are “blind.”
hec:

By the way, do you have a coherent concept of absolute heat or something being perfectly hot?

The concept is not of “absolute heat” per se, but of a certain quality – hotness in this case – existing in an infinite mode. In other words, the notion JP2A was getting at was that we seem to experience certain qualities: hotness, goodness, etc. and he was asking if you could imagine a mode in which these qualities existed infinitely more intensely.

 

[The_Exodus]

Aquinas proposed that world could have existed eternally using the argument that a created entity does not have to precede God in time and there need not be a time when it did not exist. The concept of an entity existing eternally is not contradictory and so the world could have existed eternally. All this is thrashed out in De Aeternitate Mundi in which there is no mention of an infinity of past causes whether in order or time.

Correct, though I would say that his ideas are best represented by what he said in ST I I q. 44, 45, and 46.
hec:

My beef is with the propositions that if there is an infinity of causes in order (to use Aquinas’s terminology) then there cannot be an ultimate effect; or the impossibility of going on to infinity in necessary things which have their necessity caused by another. (I didn’t mention horizontal (?) or temporal causes - you did). I don’t see that logic demands that these propositions are true - what stands against an infinite chain of efficient causes in order or necessary things caused by another?

If I understand you right, your contention seems to be this: it seems that Aquinas had no problem with admitting of an infinity of past causes, yet, for some reason he maintains that it is impossible to go back infinitely in efficient causes. There seems to be a rub here. Why is one infinity impossible and the other not?

This is a great observation, btw. And it goes back to what I said about “horizontal” and “vertical” causes.

Often, we picture in our minds “horizontal” causes. That is, we imagine a cause being preceeded by another one in time, and so on. Like a row of dominos falling left to right. But the problem with thinking in this way is that we have mentally transitioned into a temporal causality view as well.

Aquinas’ proofs rest on “hierarchical” or “vertical” causes. In other words, flip that left to right causation to one moving from bottom to top (or top to bottom). Unless there is some first bottom as foundation, there can be nothing built on it. An infinite amount of preceeding causes would be an infinitely insufficient explanation, since it would never posit an initial foundation or cause to give rise to all the others. Each cause would be “caused by another” and so on, infinitely. But a series of infinite causes, all of which “are caused by another” is insufficient, just as much as one cause, which is “caused by another” would be. Not temporally speaking, since all causes may temporally be caused by others infinitely, but, in terms of “right now,” if everything was caused by a preceeding efficient cause, it would be absurd to posit that, right now, an infinite amount of causes were at work, all of which were caused by others, in the same way that it would be to post only one cause was at work, which itself is caused by another.

That is the general idea, anyway.
hec:

BTW, as I acknowledged my ignorance of Aquinas’s metaphysics at the outset, it would be tremendously appreciated if you would refrain from pointing it out again.

Will do. I apologize if I was a butthole.

 

[grannymh]

OK, so I have a little unexpected time to give a first response to one or two of these. You are right that there was rhetoric there, but there is also substance. Aquinas claims in his argument from governance that “We see that things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result.” My references to a few prominent scientists was meant to stand for the body of knowledge that methods of natural science have accumulated; that body of knowledge is consistent with a non-telic view of the causes of natural phenomena. Natural bodies, shall we say planets, do lack intelligence, but they do not ‘act for an end…so as to obtain the best result’ (whatever that is) and therefore they do not require an intelligence to direct them. The key thing about the methods of natural science is their success in describing the behaviour of natural entities without the concept of purpose and without the need to appeal to a guiding intelligence. Mechanistic descriptions of behaviour are actually more successful than others. In this respect, science has backed up the intuitions of Democritus with evidence which calls the argument from governance into question. (If you disagree, perhaps you could explain what end a body under the gravitational influence of another acts for or what its best result is; ditto, say for the North American tectonic plate. I am not setting out these challenges to be tricksy - if you genuinely think that inanimate objects need a guiding intelligence to direct them to some end then I’d like to understand your perspective with reference to specific examples.)

If I may, I would like to approach that challenge sideways.
First, I do think philosophies start out based on one’s perception of reality. It is wise to evaluate a philosophy based on its perceived degree of correspondence with the reality before us. Granted that syllogisms are useful tools, but first we need to look at the evidence for a particular philosophy.
It is common sense that we live in an observable material world and should be using our material senses to understand it.

Nonetheless, the reason I spaced out a number of modern philosophers in a course I took was that they got hung up on the validity of their mind’s interpretation of their sense experience and thus not only had trouble with their own existence but they couldn’t figure out if they existed in someone else’s mind. O.K. that is an exaggeration, but as I look back, I now believe that the trouble was that they weren’t really considering all of reality. By that I mean there is a material reality and a spiritual reality.

Proposing that inanimate objects need a guiding intelligence to direct them to some end assumes that a material object has a material end. I am not sure of the science above but let’s say gravitational influence is what is necessary to guide a loose rock, planet or a very ripe apple to some designated spot. This is why I have trouble with a guiding intelligence when something else can do the same thing. Yes, I do have some conception of first cause, intermediate cause, etc. But I prefer a more definite spiritual reality that somehow I can experience.

To tie all this together, we need to look at reality as being both material and spiritual regardless of our personal world view. We may not be able to slip spiritual reality under the proverbial microscope but we can recognize it with our ability to reason, use analytical evaluation, and above all learn an actual spiritual reality from our universe.

An example of a spiritual reality is the intelligibility of the universe. The end of each material object is to be part of the intelligibility which our human minds can come to understand. Because an inanimate object cannot determine its own end; yet, in spite of this, it is part of the intelligible universe, then there is something else other than the purely natural physical/material. There is the material placement of objects in the universe and there is the immaterial intelligibility which can be learned. Thus, one can say that there is a material reality about the universe and there is a spiritual reality.

What I am trying to do is to shift the meaning of a guiding intelligence to something we can experience–in this case, the experience is learning more and more stuff about our surroundings. What is interesting about the intelligibility of the universe is that asteroids can upset things;
yet intelligibility remains even though it may take awhile to figure out. We have to use our senses to learn about the universe; yet the mathematics of physics is not part of physical mountains or planets; it is part of the intelligibility. The beauty of nature is seen by our eyes; yet our eyes cannot see beauty touching our emotions. If we did not accept the spiritual power of beauty, our eyes would be useless in the Alaskan mountains.

Blessings,
granny

The shepherds sing; and shall I silent be?”
from the poem “Christmas” by George Herbert

 

[The_Exodus]

I am not suggesting that Aquinas is falling into a tautology but into a fallacy of composition where the claim is that because p is true of all members of the set then p is necessarily true of the set itself.

Would an accurate rendition of your objection be this: “all humans have mothers. Therefore, the human race must have a mother.” ?

 

[hecd2]

First of all, sorry if I came across rude.

No worries. I’m being over-sensitive. I am very confident that we understand and respect each other even if we disagree. I have had a lot of pleasure from discussions with you and a couple of other guys recently partly (mainly?) because you are forcing me to think about things and, I hope and expect, vice versa.

Second, Aquinas’ proofs take up 1/1000th of the summa (maybe less, actually.) In fact, the summa itself was written for beginners in theology. Aquinas did not intend to go into detail in the proofs, nor does he lay out an epistemology. I think the proofs are still sound, and that St. Thomas had an epistemology, but I only want to point out that I don’t think it’s a good idea to squeeze the summa too tightly in this respect.

It’s all I have time to do, really. I have loads of other interests, so this is not the only priority on my time. I’ve read the bulk of the Summa plus some commentaries, and most of Aristotle’s Physics. That’s what I have to play with. I assume the Ways are accurate albeit very brief summaries of the full arguments and that’s all I have the time to squeeze. Plus, being a beginner in philosophy, it’s perfect for me. Nevertheless, my expectation is that the arguments, even if dumbed down, are in principle as Aquinas intended. I do think that they are cogent of their time but that their epistemic foundations have been weakened by a better understanding of the behaviour of the world and that they rely on intuitive claims for self-evident truth that are not at all obvious or self-evident.

The best to read are the Thomists themselves, particularly of late Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange, who wrote the best exposition of the proofs that I know of.

Thanks - it’s now on my reading list.

Indeed I agree. But I would say that the only way science can predict the behavior of such objects, is because they do, in fact, act toward an end. “Acting toward an end” simply describes the fact that effects proceed the same from the same cause. Science is built on this supposition, and it is often overlooked. But its existence is quite profound I think.

If that is what acting to an end means, then that is part of what I call the argument from intelligibility. This whole discussion with you and JP2A started from me saying that of all arguments for God’s existence I find the argument from the world’s intelligibility most powerful. But although behaving in the same way under the same conditions (an *element *of intelligibility - not all of it - there’s more to intelligibility as I see it than that) is part of the premises of the fifth Way, it seems to me that Aquinas claims more than predictable behaviour. Acting to an end means more than consistent behaviour, surely - it means acting with purpose and it has the idea of a “best result” built in. If all that’s meant is consistent and not chaotic behaviour (which as far as we can see is true) then the argument fails for me because no guiding intelligence is needed for that (although you could argue that an intelligence is needed to set up the conditions for that, which is a teleological argument not an argument from governance). If Aquinas means more than mere consistency, the argument still fails for me, because the ‘more’ (purpose and best result) is not justified in the light of modern science.

We can predict, and understand the movement of inanimate bodies, only because they, so to speak, “act reasonably.” If this was not the case, and if bodies acted unintelligibly, it doesn’t seem to me we could predict or understand their movements. Their effects would have no intelligible relation to their causes.

Agreed - this is essential but not sufficient for intelligibility, but see above.

My trouble is I don’t see how mechanistic movements are blind. Indeed, the moment we say they are intelligible or predictable, it seems to me we are saying they are the very opposite.

They are blind because they do not act to a purpose (an end). They act as they act according to some rules (and finding those rules is called natural science), but they are blind to outcomes. They are process driven and not outcome driven.

The concept is not of “absolute heat” per se, but of a certain quality – hotness in this case – existing in an infinite mode.

Should I take infinite hotness to mean infinite temperature? If so, it *is *a hypothetical concept that we can entertain. So would you say that if Aquinas’s statements that fire embodies this hypothetical infinite temperature, that the concept of relative temperature depends on it, and that this infinite temperature embodied in fire is the cause of all hot things - that if these statements are false to fact (as they are) that the Fourth Way should escape unscathed?

Alec
evolutionpages.com

 

[hecd2]

If I understand you right, your contention seems to be this: it seems that Aquinas had no problem with admitting of an infinity of past causes, yet, for some reason he maintains that it is impossible to go back infinitely in efficient causes. There seems to be a rub here. Why is one infinity impossible and the other not?

This is a great observation, btw. And it goes back to what I said about “horizontal” and “vertical” causes.

Often, we picture in our minds “horizontal” causes. That is, we imagine a cause being preceeded by another one in time, and so on. Like a row of dominos falling left to right. But the problem with thinking in this way is that we have mentally transitioned into a temporal causality view as well.

Aquinas’ proofs rest on “hierarchical” or “vertical” causes. In other words, flip that left to right causation to one moving from bottom to top (or top to bottom). Unless there is some first bottom as foundation, there can be nothing built on it. An infinite amount of preceeding causes would be an infinitely insufficient explanation, since it would never posit an initial foundation or cause to give rise to all the others. Each cause would be “caused by another” and so on, infinitely. But a series of infinite causes, all of which “are caused by another” is insufficient, just as much as one cause, which is “caused by another” would be. Not temporally speaking, since all causes may temporally be caused by others infinitely, but, in terms of “right now,” if everything was caused by a preceeding efficient cause, it would be absurd to posit that, right now, an infinite amount of causes were at work, all of which were caused by others, in the same way that it would be to post only one cause was at work, which itself is caused by another.

That is the general idea, anyway.

That’s fair enough - my comments were with regard to both what I would call logical causality (that which you call vertical) and temporal causality (that which you call horizontal). I don’t accept the argument from the impossibility of an infinite temporal chain of causes (thereby rejecting the kalam argument) - and so does Aquinas (given his acceptance of the non-contradiction of a past eternal universe), and so it seems, do you. But you say that the concept of an actual infinity of logical (vertical) causes (and necessary things) is absurd. How so? The supporters of the kalam argument criticise the possibility of an infinite chain of temporal causes on the grounds that there is an actual present, and a past eternal series would never reach an actual present. I think that this is flawed, but at least it’s a potential justification for claiming that an infinite temporal series cannot be. What is the justification for claiming that an infinite logical or vertical series of causes cannot be? I don’t distinguish them on the same basis that the elements of any countably infinite set can be put into one to one correspondence. If one is possibly true, then the other is possibly true. Another way to put this is that both situations are met in the case of a past eternal universe where there is no first cause either temporally or vertically. It could be just one damn thing after another - turtles all the way down.

Would an accurate rendition of your objection be this: “all humans have mothers. Therefore, the human race must have a mother.” ?

Hmm - I think this basically reflects my objection but is subject to (invalid) challenge as a fallacy by misinterpretation of such concepts as Mitochondrial Eve (the Most Recent Common Ancestor of all extant humans in matrilineal descent). I prefer my example which is not ambiguous in this way: All human cells replicate by division. Humans are composed entirely of cells. Therefore humans replicate by division".

Alec
evolutionpages.com

 

[The_Exodus]

I have had a lot of pleasure from discussions with you and a couple of other guys recently partly (mainly?) because you are forcing me to think about things and, I hope and expect, vice versa.

I appreciate your openmindedness, and find it estimable. Rest assured, you are causing me to think things out very carefully.
hec:

It’s all I have time to do, really. I have loads of other interests, so this is not the only priority on my time. I’ve read the bulk of the Summa plus some commentaries, and most of Aristotle’s Physics. That’s what I have to play with. I assume the Ways are accurate albeit very brief summaries of the full arguments and that’s all I have the time to squeeze. Plus, being a beginner in philosophy, it’s perfect for me. Nevertheless, my expectation is that the arguments, even if dumbed down, are in principle as Aquinas intended. I do think that they are cogent of their time but that their epistemic foundations have been weakened by a better understanding of the behaviour of the world and that they rely on intuitive claims for self-evident truth that are not at all obvious or self-evident.

I think those are very good tools. Avicenna was said to have read Aristotle’s Metaphysics some 40 times in his life, by the way (just an interesting tidbit.)

My point is that the thought of Aquinas and Aristotle is very different from modern thought (obviously.) There is a huge chasm of universal skepticism, phenomenology, materialism, scientism, and a dubious attitude towards metaphysics which separates them from us. Following the Scholastic period was a time of intense nominalism and scrutiny, by people like Ockham. Ages of stout reason are almost always followed by skepticism, it seems to me.
hec:

But although behaving in the same way under the same conditions (an *element *of intelligibility - not all of it - there’s more to intelligibility as I see it than that) is part of the premises of the fifth Way, it seems to me that Aquinas claims more than predictable behaviour. Acting to an end means more than consistent behaviour, surely - it means acting with purpose and it has the idea of a “best result” built in.

This is true. What Aquinas means, according to the sources I’ve read, is based on a metaphysical axiom that “every being desires to preserve itself.” Now, he is not speaking of “conscious” desire, but a sort of innate striving to be, which, he claims, can be found in all levels of matter. Even inorganic matter “desires” to preserve its nature. This is why he spoke as he did about fire. Its “nature” is to “rise.” This may be a crude example, but the point he is making has to do with substance and action. Every substance we observe – whether man or molecule – tends to exist in a particular way. It strives to “be itself” so to speak. The plant, for instance, strives to blossom. This would be the “best result.” But the particular best result does not always follow, for the plant may be destroyed in a storm.
hec:

If all that’s meant is consistent and not chaotic behaviour (which as far as we can see is true) then the argument fails for me because no guiding intelligence is needed for that (although you could argue that an intelligence is needed to set up the conditions for that, which is a teleological argument not an argument from governance).

This is part of the argument, no doubt. I just cannot imagine how one can admit consistent behavior, and not think an intelligent cause is moving or motivating such behavior. We are reading a rational universe. If it was irrational, it seems to me the words would be unintelligible.
hec:

They are blind because they do not act to a purpose (an end). They act as they act according to some rules (and finding those rules is called natural science), but they are blind to outcomes.

But the rules presuppose an outcome. Any “rule” or type of behavior one may discover about a certain substance, necessarily involves an outcome towards which that substance is “tending.”
hec:

Should I take infinite hotness to mean infinite temperature?

I don’t believe so, because that makes me at least think of numbers on a thermometer. Think of hotness as “the quality of being hot.”
hec:

If so, it *is *a hypothetical concept that we can entertain. So would you say that if Aquinas’s statements that fire embodies this hypothetical infinite temperature, that the concept of relative temperature depends on it, and that this infinite temperature embodied in fire is the cause of all hot things - that if these statements are false to fact (as they are) that the Fourth Way should escape unscathed?

I’m not quite sure what you mean by “false to fact.” What Aquinas says about hotness can be said about other qualities, say, of desirableness, or goodness, or beauty, justice, etc. We all experience such qualities, and, if our experiences are reliable, then it seems to be possible that they may exist in an infinite mode.

I don’t want to get much into the fourth proof though, as I am not as keen on it as I am on others.

 

[The_Exodus]

But you say that the concept of an actual infinity of logical (vertical) causes (and necessary things) is absurd. How so?

Because supposing the proposition were true results in an absurdity. If there were no first cause, there could be no subsequent causes. If there was nothing fundamentally first, there would be nothing after.

I think you are grouping the first cause in the same causal chain, so to speak, as the subsequent causes. But what an infinity of vertical causes requires is one outside that chain – a cause of a different order, a different sphere. A cause which make all the others move, without itself being moved.

Suppose I said that the nature of a certain cause is “to cause another after being caused itself.” This, then, would be a contingent cause. Its nature would be to cause another, but only after it had been caused. Now, saying such an infinite number of causes exist, is still to say that “an infinite series exists, whose nature is to cause after being caused by another.” Remember, this is not temporal causality, but logical. Hence the infinite chain would never exist, were it not for some cause causing it to exist.

Augustine talks about the footprint in the sand. If a man was standing in the sand for all eternity, the footprint would be there as well, yet the footprint would still be contingent on the foot.
hec:

The supporters of the kalam argument criticise the possibility of an infinite chain of temporal causes on the grounds that there is an actual present, and a past eternal series would never reach an actual present. I think that this is flawed.

Aquinas would agree, see objection 6: newadvent.org/summa/1046.htm#article2
hec:

What is the justification for claiming that an infinite logical or vertical series of causes cannot be?.. It could be just one damn thing after another - turtles all the way down.

But that leads to absurdity, for it would mean an infinite contingent series which was necessarily existing.
hec:

I prefer my example which is not ambiguous in this way: All human cells replicate by division. Humans are composed entirely of cells. Therefore humans replicate by division".

I would dispute the second premise: that humans are composed “entirely” of cells. Could you explain what you mean?

Some of my thoughts: as soon as you say “human,” you would be distinguishing it from all its components – you would be, to use scholastic language, be giving the substance and listing some of its accidents.

 

[JP2Admirer]

Wow…I’ve missed a lot. It looks like Exodus picked up right where I left off and is maintaining my side of the argument better than I would’ve.

I just want to chime in and state that I read through Morriston’s paper on infinity and his arguments with Craig.

I would side with, surprisingly, Morriston, only because they are indeed talking about the concept of infinity in entirely different ways. I like the way Exodus explained the idea with “horizontal” and “temporal” causality, as that is a good way to visualize it. Craig’s points are valid, at least what I gleaned from this short paper, only if we are describing the temporal series of cause that have a beginning. I would suggest reading Thomas’ SCG Book II chapter 38 to see what Thomas has to say about the eternity of the world. I’ll give you two brief arguments:

"Nor is the third argument cogent. For, although the infinite does not exist actually and all at once, it can exist successively. For, so considered, any infinite is finite. There fore, being finite, any single one of the preceding solar revolutions could be completed; but if, on the assumption of the world’s eternity, all of them are thought of as existing simultaneously, then there would be no question of a first one, nor, therefore, of passing through them, for, unless there are two extremes, no transition is possible.

The fourth argument is weak. For there is no reason why an addition should not be made to the infinite on the side in which it is finite. Now, from the supposition of the eternity of time it follows that time is infinite in relation to the prior, but finite in relation to the posterior; for the present is the terminal point of the past." (Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles II, trans. James Anderson (University of Notre Dame Press, 2001)0.

(I just love it when Aquinas is frustrated with the “slowness” of his pupils and calls their arguments "weak.)

Again, I don’t know if we have time for a metaphysics lecture, but Exodus is doing a good job of showing how there has to be a “bottoming out of existence” which is much like I was going to state with Esse Subsistens (i.e. subsitent being, first cause, needing no other to exist because Its essence is existence.) I will try to jump in again here shortly. I want to visit the Young experiment first.

Thanks for keeping this going.

 

[JP2Admirer]

So I went back and looked up the Young slit experiment, and admittedly, in a very unscholarly way, tried to grasp the gist of it (yes, I did a google search on it.)

From what I could gather, there is nothing about it that challenges the principle of non-contradiction. Prima facie it looks as though there is just a dispute about the nature of light. Some say, because of the way the light is difracted, it is made up of particles and others say of it consists of waves.

This seems far different from stating that they both are and are not at the same time in the same way in reference to the same thing.

Again, I did not dig very deep, but if there are some who claim that light is both wave and not a wave, or both made up of particles and not particles at the same time in the same way in reference to the same thing, then we might run into a legitimate challenge of non-contradiction.

hecd, you can probably tell me if my unscholarly search is not telling me the whole story, so I’ll leave it to you if I messed up in summarizing it.