Justice

[Oreoracle]

Ah, yes. This view. Now, I can see why people are utilitarians (that’s what you are, right?).

Yep, and I’m glad to hear that you can sympathize with their position, even if you don’t fully agree (most around here can’t sympathize, if you haven’t noticed).

You are talking about … the ends justify the means, right (unless there are other utilitarian systems I don’t know about … there could be hundreds … I’m unread on the topic)?

There may be slight confusion here. You see, consequentialism is the position that the moral values of actions are derived from consequences (of those actions), so that’s where you’ll hear things such as “the ends justify the means.” Utilitarianism is sometimes used as a slang term making it synonymous with consequentialism, but it is actually only a branch of consequentialism in the more exact usage.

Now … just out of curiosity … what are the ends in utilitarianism?

In my case, the end is the greatest production of happiness (see the greatest happiness principle proposed by Jeremy Bentham). This was the original end of utilitarianism when it was founded by Bentham and expounded further by Mill (it is also similar to the beliefs of Epicureans). To avoid ambiguity, I consider happiness and pleasure to be the same, defining both as “the feeling produced by the satisfaction of preferences.” (This makes me both a classical and preference utilitarian, in case you’re curious.) Similarly, suffering and pain are considered the same and are equated to badness/evil (and, of course, they are defined as “the feeling produced by the dissatisfaction of preferences”).

Now why would I adopt this as my ethical end? The reason is simple: while Christians derive their ethics from metaphysics, I derive mine from psychology. With a combination of observation, introspection, and psychoanalysis, I’ve come to the conclusion that we all ultimately seek to satisfy our preferences, which serve as the impetuses of our actions. Even the most altruistic actions can be traced back to one’s preference of helping others and the resultant pleasure that is experienced when one has done so (and the resultant suffering when one does not). As such, it seems reasonable to uphold the general (public) happiness as an end, and condemn that which we all wish to avoid, suffering, as evil.

Do they differ from utilitarian to utilitarian? I assume they would. And wouldn’t some ends be bad? And if so, doesn’t justice start to fit into the picture?

I’m not really sure what you mean here. Perhaps I answered this above. If not, can you elaborate?

 

[Areopagite]

Yep, and I’m glad to hear that you can sympathize with their position, even if you don’t fully agree (most around here can’t sympathize, if you haven’t noticed).

Yeah … I apologize on behalf of those people. Of course, I’ve done a lot of non-sympathizing myself with people. So I can … sympathize … with those people. Yeah.

There may be slight confusion here. You see, consequentialism is the position that the moral values of actions are derived from consequences (of those actions), so that’s where you’ll hear things such as “the ends justify the means.” Utilitarianism is sometimes used as a slang term making it synonymous with consequentialism, but it is actually only a branch of consequentialism in the more exact usage.

Interesting. Didn’t know that.

In my case, the end is the greatest production of happiness (see the greatest happiness principle proposed by Jeremy Bentham). This was the original end of utilitarianism when it was founded by Bentham and expounded further by Mill (it is also similar to the beliefs of Epicureans). To avoid ambiguity, I consider happiness and pleasure to be the same, defining both as “the feeling produced by the satisfaction of preferences.” (This makes me both a classical and preference utilitarian, in case you’re curious.) Similarly, suffering and pain are considered the same and are equated to badness/evil (and, of course, they are defined as “the feeling produced by the dissatisfaction of preferences”).

I gotcha. I am familiar with this view. Thanks for clearing this up.

Now why would I adopt this as my ethical end? The reason is simple: while Christians derive their ethics from metaphysics, I derive mine from psychology. With a combination of observation, introspection, and psychoanalysis, I’ve come to the conclusion that we all ultimately seek to satisfy our preferences, which serve as the impetuses of our actions. Even the most altruistic actions can be traced back to one’s preference of helping others and the resultant pleasure that is experienced when one has done so (and the resultant suffering when one does not). As such, it seems reasonable to uphold the general (public) happiness as an end, and condemn that which we all wish to avoid, suffering, as evil.

Now, even though you say that people should aim for the greatest amount of happiness/pleasure for the greatest amount of people, is it possible sometimes that helping others might actually cause pain to the individual (who’s trying to give happiness to others)?

Could it be possible that when one doesn’t work for public happiness/pleasure, that this could be called an injustice? And conversely, that the just thing to do would be to work for public happiness/pleasure?

Also, are some pleasures intrinsically greater than others? I believe I heard Mill eventually state that this was so. For example, he eventually said that the pleasures of intellectual activity were intrinsically higher than … eating, I think it was (if Mill didn’t say this I apologize … but I’m almost dead certain that he did).

That’s all the questions I have for now. Thanks.

 

[Oreoracle]

Now, even though you say that people should aim for the greatest amount of happiness/pleasure for the greatest amount of people, is it possible sometimes that helping others might actually cause pain to the individual (who’s trying to give happiness to others)?

Yes. In most cases, I think it would be understandable for the individual to refrain from helping others if it will result in self-harm. I’ll elaborate on this below…

Could it be possible that when one doesn’t work for public happiness/pleasure, that this could be called an injustice? And conversely, that the just thing to do would be to work for public happiness/pleasure?

It seems that you’re using “justice” as “cooperation with moral obligations,” right? I have to admit, I have mixed feelings about obligations. On one hand, I don’t feel that living in solitude, shying away from the public, being a hermit, etc., is an evil lifestyle. In that regard, inaction seems neutral to me, and since justice doesn’t allow for neutrality, I reject it. On the other hand, we can dream up scenarios where the opportunity for moral action is so accessible and great that only a vile person wouldn’t take advantage of it. But that’s just it: we’re making a judgment about the person, not the lack of action. We can’t say that inaction has moral value, because inaction is a negative item (so it can’t have qualities any more than non-existence can). Inaction can speak loads about a person, though. But then, utilitarianism isn’t in the business of judging the morality of people, since many aspects of personalities have no bearing on consequences at all.

Also, are some pleasures intrinsically greater than others? I believe I heard Mill eventually state that this was so. For example, he eventually said that the pleasures of intellectual activity were intrinsically higher than … eating, I think it was (if Mill didn’t say this I apologize … but I’m almost dead certain that he did).

He probably said that. The more popular quote that conveys the same idea is, “It’s better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a pig satisfied.”

And yes, some pleasures are greater than others because preferences are, for the most part, hierarchal…but there are different hierarchies for different persons! You and I desire different things at differing degrees in differing proportions. As such, it would be arrogant of me to claim that my preference is representative of all corresponding preferences of all people. This also means that “intrinsic” would be a misleading description of an aspect of human consciousness (and the consciousnesses of other sentient beings) that is subject to much diversity and fickleness.

 

[Eucharisted]

A lot of people confuse fairness and justice.

I think you do so in your post.

You said, “not everything in nature is just”, I disagree with you, nature can be nothing but just, it is not fair at times though.

Please provide examples of how nature is not just.

Good point!

 

[Spock]

I think a bit of clarificaton is in order. The example I presented was supposed to show the absurdity that “two wrongs make one right”. That a later “punishment” (which is a violent action against the perpetrator) somehow will redo the “balance” that the criminal action disrupted. Just because an act is declared “just” and “legal” does not make it acceptable. A state-sanctioned “execution” is just a euphemism for cold-blooded murder - performed by the strong party (the state).

Now, of course I agree that violent elements should not be allowed to go on a rampage. But let’s not cloak ourselves in moral righteousness. Let’s call it what it is: partly revenge for the deed, and partly a preventive act of further deeds of the same kind.

There is only one way to ensure a nice, balanced state of affairs: the “perfect prevention of undesired actions”. Unfortunately we do not have the wherewithal to do that.

Now I am going to throw the monkey wrench into this thread. God allegedly has that option, and he does not use it. Crimes are allowed by God, and the usual “whitewashing” is that God knows best, and whatever he allows is in the best interest of us, even if we are not privy to the details. From this “arguement” it follows that all of our punishing procedures are way out of whack - we are punishing the perps for something that was allowed by God - because of its intrinsucally beneficial nature. Why should we punish someone who was “subcontracted by God” to further God’s plan, just because we do not understand why and how it was good? Now let the fireworks commence.

 

[Areopagite]

Yes. In most cases, I think it would be understandable for the individual to refrain from helping others if it will result in self-harm.

Are you against self-sacrifice? Like soldiers dying to protect their country, or people dodging in front of a bullet to save someone they care about? Stuff like that?

It seems that you’re using “justice” as “cooperation with moral obligations,” right? I have to admit, I have mixed feelings about obligations. On one hand, I don’t feel that living in solitude, shying away from the public, being a hermit, etc., is an evil lifestyle. In that regard, inaction seems neutral to me, and since justice doesn’t allow for neutrality, I reject it.

Wouldn’t you say though that a hermit, so long as he is doing something that isn’t giving him pain, is doing the right thing … even if it’s inaction. And hence, in your terms, it would be a just occupation?

On the other hand, we can dream up scenarios where the opportunity for moral action is so accessible and great that only a vile person wouldn’t take advantage of it. But that’s just it: we’re making a judgment about the person, not the lack of action. We can’t say that inaction has moral value, because inaction is a negative item (so it can’t have qualities any more than non-existence can).

Inaction is indeed a negative term, and fittingly, it may be quite fitting to have some other negative terms (like immorality) be predicated of it. I suppose it wouldn’t have positive characteristics, but that doesn’t mean it doesn’t have negative ones. For example, we have the negative item of having winglessness. So the negative characteristic that is thus implied for us is that “we can’t fly (like birds, at least).” Hence, I’m not sure why a negative term necessarily does not admit of characteristics (for I argue that it can have negative characteristics at least).

Also, morality pertains to “what one should do.” And presumably you would say that one should not do stuff that brings about harm (either for oneself and/or general public). Thus, this would be a moral precept for you, right?

He probably said that. The more popular quote that conveys the same idea is, “It’s better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a pig satisfied.”

And yes, some pleasures are greater than others because preferences are, for the most part, hierarchal…but there are different hierarchies for different persons! You and I desire different things at differing degrees in differing proportions. As such, it would be arrogant of me to claim that my preference is representative of all corresponding preferences of all people. This also means that “intrinsic” would be a misleading description of an aspect of human consciousness (and the consciousnesses of other sentient beings) that is subject to much diversity and fickleness.

Judging by what you said, here, it seems that you perhaps disagree with Mill when he said “It’s better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a pig satisfied.” Or, at least, you wouldn’t say this is a universal truth for everyone. Right?

 

[Oreoracle]

Are you against self-sacrifice? Like soldiers dying to protect their country, or people dodging in front of a bullet to save someone they care about? Stuff like that?

Perhaps I wasn’t clear. I’m not saying that self-sacrifice is immoral (on the contrary, it can be a very good thing), I just think that refusing to act is permissible (though it’s not always the best option).

We can organize it like this: A positive contribution to the general happiness is good (we can use positive numbers to indicate the degree of goodness), a negative contribution is bad (we can use negative numbers here), and inaction is neutral (we can use zero to represent this). My major disagreement with justice is its “black or white” nature. It doesn’t allow for the possibility of neutrality or morally insignificant actions*.

Anyway, that’s the only logical conclusion we can get with utilitarianism; if there’s no contribution, there is no consequence. If there is no consequence, there is no moral value. Otherwise, we’d be making utilitarianism into a sort of “virtue ethic” which is simply dishonest.

*By neutrality, I mean “the quality of causing no net benefit or loss to the general happiness.” Actions that are morally insignificant don’t contribute to the general happiness at all, while other actions may contribute equal amounts of goodness and badness, thus balancing each other out. I thought it was necessary to mention that morally insignificant actions are a subset of morally neutral actions.

Wouldn’t you say though that a hermit, so long as he is doing something that isn’t giving him pain, is doing the right thing … even if it’s inaction. And hence, in your terms, it would be a just occupation?

I don’t know if I could consider self-harm good or bad in itself. Denying autonomy the freedom of neutrality sounds almost like a fascist maneuver (no offense). Don’t you think someone should be free to do as they please so long as others aren’t dependent on their well-being? And if an individual isn’t the best judge of what will make them happy, who will be left to determine such things? (There are exceptions to my position, of course, but it’s something to think about.)

Inaction is indeed a negative term, and fittingly, it may be quite fitting to have some other negative terms (like immorality) be predicated of it. I suppose it wouldn’t have positive characteristics, but that doesn’t mean it doesn’t have negative ones. For example, we have the negative item of having winglessness. So the negative characteristic that is thus implied for us is that “we can’t fly (like birds, at least).” Hence, I’m not sure why a negative term necessarily does not admit of characteristics (for I argue that it can have negative characteristics at least).

Okay, so couldn’t “inaction” imply “not good nor bad?” My problem is that, in justice-based systems, “not good” automatically implies “bad” and vice-versa. This seems to be a false dichotomy.

Also, morality pertains to “what one should do.” And presumably you would say that one should not do stuff that brings about harm (either for oneself and/or general public). Thus, this would be a moral precept for you, right?

Not exactly. My moral precepts are concentrated on how one should treat others. Maybe we could convert your suggestion to “one should prevent others from harming themselves.” To further complicate things, this does not imply “one should not allow others to harm themselves” because inaction cannot have moral value and thusly cannot “ought not be.” (This is because inaction doesn’t exist in any form other than, as you’ve said, a sort of description.")

I hope that made sense.

Judging by what you said, here, it seems that you perhaps disagree with Mill when he said “It’s better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a pig satisfied.” Or, at least, you wouldn’t say this is a universal truth for everyone. Right?

I agree that preferences and pleasures are hierarchal, but I disagree with both Mill and Bentham’s attempts to organize the quantity/quality of pleasures as though such things are universal. (With Bentham, we see this manifest as the “hedonic calculus.”)

So yes, there are hierarchies, but they vary.

 

[Areopagite]

I think a bit of clarificaton is in order. The example I presented was supposed to show the absurdity that “two wrongs make one right”

Of course, imprisoning a criminal isn’t a wrong. It’s justice. That’s what I (and most people) would say. So it first must be proved that all imprisonment is wrong.

A state-sanctioned “execution” is just a euphemism for cold-blooded murder - performed by the strong party (the state).

Well, usually “murder” is defined as “unjust killing.” Many people say that a executions can be just, and thus would not call it murder.

Now, of course I agree that violent elements should not be allowed to go on a rampage. But let’s not cloak ourselves in moral righteousness. Let’s call it what it is: partly revenge for the deed, and partly a preventive act of further deeds of the same kind.

Aristotle and Plato (and the Scholastics) would all say that punishment also benefits the criminal himself, removing a disorder that was gained with their crime. So, there’s that aspect too.

Also, I’m not clear what you mean by revenge.

Now I am going to throw the monkey wrench into this thread. God allegedly has that option, and he does not use it. Crimes are allowed by God, and the usual “whitewashing” is that God knows best, and whatever he allows is in the best interest of us, even if we are not privy to the details. From this “arguement” it follows that all of our punishing procedures are way out of whack - we are punishing the perps for something that was allowed by God - because of its intrinsucally beneficial nature. Why should we punish someone who was “subcontracted by God” to further God’s plan, just because we do not understand why and how it was good? Now let the fireworks commence.

It’s a good question. Fabulous question, I would go so far as to say.

The premise I would take issue with is this: “Since God allows evil actions, thus those evil actions are actually good and not deserving of punishment.” Punishment is to repair evil actions, and evil actions don’t become morally good even if God allows them. They can be called “good” insofar as it brings about some other benefit (examples of this: gaining some knowledge after the criminal’s punishment, gaining courage for those who fought against the evil, etc.)

Perhaps I wasn’t clear. I’m not saying that self-sacrifice is immoral (on the contrary, it can be a very good thing), I just think that refusing to act is permissible (though it’s not always the best option).

Catholic Moral Theologians would agree that there are some proposed good actions that are not obligatory. Going to India and feeding the poor would be good, but it would not be immoral for me to not do that. It would go beyond the call of duty, go beyond moral obligation, would be heroic, but it would not be evil if you didn’t do it (unless … you had a special revelation from God commanding you to do it).

Nonetheless, there is some inaction that is evil. For example, if you know that a airplane is missing a part, and it would eventually crash without it, and you have the time and ability to tell someone that … and you don’t, then that would be evil. Disagree?

Nonetheless, some possible good actions are not morally obligatory. But I don’t see how this idea goes against the concept of justice.

We can organize it like this: A positive contribution to the general happiness is good (we can use positive numbers to indicate the degree of goodness), a negative contribution is bad (we can use negative numbers here), and inaction is neutral (we can use zero to represent this). My major disagreement with justice is its “black or white” nature. It doesn’t allow for the possibility of neutrality or morally insignificant actions*.

As I just stated, this is not true. It is not unjust to not go and help starving people in India.

If there’s no contribution, there is no consequence. If there is no consequence, there is no moral value.

Hmm. My airplane example would beg to differ.

 

[Areopagite]

Otherwise, we’d be making utilitarianism into a sort of “virtue ethic” which is simply dishonest.

I’m not sure what you mean here. Are you saying that utilitarianism is not a moral system, even though you said it was a branch of consequentialism, which, as you said, is a moral system? You said something like this here:

There may be slight confusion here. You see, consequentialism is the position that the moral values of actions are derived from consequences (of those actions), so that’s where you’ll hear things such as “the ends justify the means.” Utilitarianism is sometimes used as a slang term making it synonymous with consequentialism, but it is actually only a branch of consequentialism in the more exact usage.

I perhaps am ignorant what you mean by “virtue ethic.”

I don’t know if I could consider self-harm good or bad in itself. Denying autonomy the freedom of neutrality sounds almost like a fascist maneuver (no offense).

Once again, neutrality could be permissible, depending on what exactly you’re talking about. Some neutrality doesn’t seem permissible though. I’m just say though, one can believe in morality and justice and still be neutral and even inactive about certain things without contradiction.

Don’t you think someone should be free to do as they please so long as others aren’t dependent on their well-being? And if an individual isn’t the best judge of what will make them happy, who will be left to determine such things? (There are exceptions to my position, of course, but it’s something to think about.)

If what pleases them turns out to be harmful for themselves (even if it gives them some amount of pleasure), I would say the shouldn’t do it. Morality (as talked about by both Plato and Aristotle … and most philosophers I think) is what one should do to be good/whole/complete, which is what the essence of happiness is (according to them at least). Thinking that one is happy doesn’t mean that one is necessarily happy. I had a friend who, during her teenage years, thought that she was happy, even though she constantly wanted to kill herself. Later on, she recovered from that, got her life straightened out, and no longer had suicidal urges. She realized that, even though she thought she had been happy, she really had not been happy the whole time.

Now, whether certain bad but pleasing things should be permitted is another question. It depends what you mean by permission. Ethical systems should definitely not permit it. But whether governments should take direct action against every moral evil is different issue. There are some moral evils that governments should not be concerned with, for there would be too much potential for doing evil if the government tried to crack down on them (e.g. governments should not have and enforce a law against thinking bad thoughts … there is no prudential way to accomplish this effectively and without the government falling into corruption and abuse very quickly).

Okay, so couldn’t “inaction” imply “not good nor bad?” My problem is that, in justice-based systems, “not good” automatically implies “bad” and vice-versa. This seems to be a false dichotomy.

I hope I have shown that this is not necessarily true.

Not exactly. My moral precepts are concentrated on how one should treat others. Maybe we could convert your suggestion to “one should prevent others from harming themselves.” To further complicate things, this does not imply “one should not allow others to harm themselves” because inaction cannot have moral value and thusly cannot “ought not be.” (This is because inaction doesn’t exist in any form other than, as you’ve said, a sort of description.")

I hope that made sense.

Um … not entirely.

I agree that preferences and pleasures are hierarchal, but I disagree with both Mill and Bentham’s attempts to organize the quantity/quality of pleasures as though such things are universal. (With Bentham, we see this manifest as the “hedonic calculus.”)

So yes, there are hierarchies, but they vary.

Now, is it possible that a person may be wrong about what is pleasurable most pleasurable to him? For example, one may thinking that being a couch potato is the best for him. However, he may be ignorant that he would actually enjoying studying science, philosophy, math, etc. much better. No?

 

[James_S_Saint]

“Justice” means “resetting it right” (from ‘just = right = balanced concern’).

Justice is adhering to the plan (hopefully agreed upon) from whence right was derived. The plan is what yields the rules. The rules not being adhered to is what creates “injustice” (“he cheated”).

God/Reality presents the options available from which to set your “plan of life” (Christians are to follow Jesus’ plan from which they get their rules/morals/right).

Non-Christians get their rules from which to declare what is just/right from their other sources, at times merely a “feeling” and in some cases merely the feeling of vengeance or sufficient revenge.

Legal justice refers to adherence to government provided laws presumed to be followed honestly and guided by Truth although more recently in America, such a notion has been relegated to merely proving to be the more worthy liar after the idea that “perception is reality”, “survival of the fittest”, and “the only moral is to not get caught by the wrong people”.

 

[Spock]

Of course, imprisoning a criminal isn’t a wrong. It’s justice. That’s what I (and most people) would say. So it first must be proved that all imprisonment is wrong.

First, I do not disagree at all. But I have some reservations about the “justification”, and I will elaborate a bit later.

Well, usually “murder” is defined as “unjust killing.” Many people say that a executions can be just, and thus would not call it murder.

Again, I don’t disagree, in principle. Murder is also defined as intentionally taking the life of another human - and execution fits the bill. (Not to mention wars, which are mass murders, sanctified by the states). Of course “many people” say the opposite.

Aristotle and Plato (and the Scholastics) would all say that punishment also benefits the criminal himself, removing a disorder that was gained with their crime. So, there’s that aspect too.

I rather doubt that the criminals would agree. In their own eyes they are correct and we are all wrong.

Also, I’m not clear what you mean by revenge.

Just what the word imples. Someone hurts you (or your loved ones) and you want to repay in kind. By the way, the “eye for eye” principle (which is out of fashion these days) would also lead to some strange scenarios: “what is the fitting punishment for a rape?”… just think about it (I cannot explictly say it, because of the forum’s rules).

Now, let’s see my reservations. The first starting point is this principle: “it is wrong to use force against others”. If we leave it as is, unqualified, then the force of imprisonment (or any other punishment) is also wrong, since it violates the principle. Therefore the principle is usually presented in a modified format: “it is wrong to use force against others, unless…” and then comes a justification. For example: “unless they did something wrong before”, or “unless it serves their benefit (which is unclear to them)”, or “unless it is used in self defense”, or some other justification. This version also can have some problems. Who decides whether the justification is “right”? And then we arrive to the rule of majority which is simply expressed as the principle of “might makes right”. And that is a major problem.

It’s a good question. Fabulous question, I would go so far as to say.

The premise I would take issue with is this: “Since God allows evil actions, thus those evil actions are actually good and not deserving of punishment.” Punishment is to repair evil actions, and evil actions don’t become morally good even if God allows them. They can be called “good” insofar as it brings about some other benefit (examples of this: gaining some knowledge after the criminal’s punishment, gaining courage for those who fought against the evil, etc.)

We could get into the problem of evil here, which is not the purpose of this thread. In a nutshell, it is usually asserted that the evil allowed by God must be “positive”, in the sense that it will bring forth some greater good, which more than balances the evil aspect of the original deed itself, and which greater good cannot be achieved without allowing or permitting the deed itself. This is the opposite of gratuitous evil (which does not have such consequences). It is also argued that God never allows unnecessary (gratuitous) evil, and from that it follows that the evil allowed logically brings forth otherwise unobtainable greater good - and if that is the case, why punish it? (This is yet again one of the contradictions that baffles me.)

 

[Oreoracle]

Catholic Moral Theologians would agree that there are some proposed good actions that are not obligatory. Going to India and feeding the poor would be good, but it would not be immoral for me to not do that. It would go beyond the call of duty, go beyond moral obligation, would be heroic, but it would not be evil if you didn’t do it (unless … you had a special revelation from God commanding you to do it).

Okay, so you’re distinguishing between actions that are only good and actions that are supererogatory (“more good than necessary”). What happens if someone fails to perform the former kind of action? Does not doing enough good count as bad? I’m not sure I follow this reasoning.

Nonetheless, there is some inaction that is evil. For example, if you know that a airplane is missing a part, and it would eventually crash without it, and you have the time and ability to tell someone that … and you don’t, then that would be evil. Disagree?

Well, there’s nothing to pin the label “evil” to. Again, “evil” is simply “what shouldn’t be.” With inaction, we can’t point at anything and say, “that shouldn’t be” because there is nothing! We can contend “it should be the case that one acted to…” but that’s about it. As you can see, we can only suggest a good action, because there’s nothing to discourage. In this sense, failing to inform others of the missing part is neither good nor bad, it is simply a missed opportunity to do a good deed.

Now, if the nature of your question was “Would you be alright with someone failing to inform others of the missing part?” then no, of course I wouldn’t. But quite simply, I can’t say anything was done wrong because nothing was done. It’s semantical, you see. I can call that man an evil person, I can say he missed a huge opportunity to maintain the general happiness, but I can’t say that he did wrong.

As I just stated, this is not true. It is not unjust to not go and help starving people in India.

Okay, so I’m not obligated to perform supererogatory actions. But as with what I said above, what would happen if I failed to produce the goodness I was obligated to produce? Would badness result? It seems to me that this is skipping over neutrality entirely.

 

[Oreoracle]

I perhaps am ignorant what you mean by “virtue ethic.”

A “virtue ethic” is a deontological ethical system wherein the primary goal is the improvement of character and not consequences. Usually, certain virtues will serve as guidelines to indicate what a “good character” would do. Such systems inevitably fail because we mostly derive the idea of “good character” from the consequences of actions in the first place (but that’s beside the point).

Utilitarianism isn’t in the business of labeling people good or bad because that may be irrelevant to consequences. Imagine a world where it is impossible to do evil, yet everyone hated each other and wanted to do evil (though their mood is not apparent). Without bad consequences, does the label “bad person” have any use whatsoever? No, it just shows our desire for people to think as we do.

I’ll get to the rest of your post later. Gotta run.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

A “virtue ethic” is a deontological ethical system wherein the primary goal is the improvement of character and not consequences. Usually, certain virtues will serve as guidelines to indicate what a “good character” would do. Such systems inevitably fail because we mostly derive the idea of “good character” from the consequences of actions in the first place (but that’s beside the point).

Why do you say that virtue ethics is deontological? Most systems of virtue ethics I know of are focused on a concrete good: happiness. Aristotle’s certainly was.

The key question about virtue ethics, which Plato attempted to answer in the Republic, was: why is it better to be virtuous than vicious, even though many virtuous people seem to be unhappy, and many vicious people happy? This question is rooted in the concept of justice, which describes a situation in which good people are rewarded and bad people punished.

As for the claim that we derive the idea of good character from consequences, this is obviously problematic. When we see a villain like Claudius become king (in Hamlet), we do not thereby form the idea that virtue involves vice.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

Spock,

I am still curious as to whether your only objection to revenge is that it is “uncivilized”? See:

forums.catholic-questions.org/showpost.php?p=5831177&postcount=11

 

[Spock]

Spock,

I am still curious as to whether your only objection to revenge is that it is “uncivilized”? See:

forums.catholic-questions.org/showpost.php?p=5831177&postcount=11

Well, I am sorry, but I forgot to reply before. I am glad you pointed it out. Personally, I find the concept of revenge quite acceptable. Fortunately I was never put in the position when my loved ones were deliberately put into harm’s way. But I suspect, that in such a case I would try to be revengeful to the best of my abilities.

However, such an attitude is “frowned upon” these days. It is called vigilantism, and legally persecuted. If I were a Christian, then I would probably accept the “turn the other cheek” concept - which precludes the taking of revenge, does it not? .

 

[Oreoracle]

If what pleases them turns out to be harmful for themselves (even if it gives them some amount of pleasure), I would say the shouldn’t do it. Morality (as talked about by both Plato and Aristotle … and most philosophers I think) is what one should do to be good/whole/complete, which is what the essence of happiness is (according to them at least). Thinking that one is happy doesn’t mean that one is necessarily happy. I had a friend who, during her teenage years, thought that she was happy, even though she constantly wanted to kill herself. Later on, she recovered from that, got her life straightened out, and no longer had suicidal urges. She realized that, even though she thought she had been happy, she really had not been happy the whole time.

Do you think there’s a difference between thinking that you’re happy and feeling that you’re happy? In my experience, thinking about feelings is rarely useful.

Um … not entirely.

What exactly was unclear?

Now, is it possible that a person may be wrong about what is pleasurable most pleasurable to him? For example, one may thinking that being a couch potato is the best for him. However, he may be ignorant that he would actually enjoying studying science, philosophy, math, etc. much better. No?

Of course that’s possible, but how would you know what someone would enjoy outside of hypothetical scenarios such as this? I think we should keep controlling others’ hobbies to a minimum, because there’s a good chance that we’ll be wrong about their prefecerences and the plan will backfire.

Why do you say that virtue ethics is deontological? Most systems of virtue ethics I know of are focused on a concrete good: happiness. Aristotle’s certainly was.

Virtue ethics, supposedly, aren’t at all concerned with consequences. So we know that they can’t be consequential. But then, they seem to be indifferent not only to consequences, but to actions themselves, so maybe they’re not deontological per se.

The key question about virtue ethics, which Plato attempted to answer in the Republic, was: why is it better to be virtuous than vicious, even though many virtuous people seem to be unhappy, and many vicious people happy? This question is rooted in the concept of justice, which describes a situation in which good people are rewarded and bad people punished.

I believe Plato, through his literary Socrates, countered this line of thinking in The Republic by asking (I’m paraphrasing), “Does the art of horsemanship injure the horse? Does art itself make men less artistic? Why, then, should the practice of good make it more difficult for men to do good?” Punishing someone merely because they’re evil rarely improves their ability to do good, especially when we’re talking about the legal system. Punishment should be used for utility and not just to “balance things out.”

In any case, I can answer Plato’s question without the aid of justice: One should be virtuous to prevent others from being unhappy (and to make them happy). In fact, the virtuous people were probably unhappy precisely because the less scrupulous folk were unconcerned for their happiness and so they felt free to do anything.

As for the claim that we derive the idea of good character from consequences, this is obviously problematic. When we see a villain like Claudius become king (in Hamlet), we do not thereby form the idea that virtue involves vice.

What makes you think I would consider becoming a king a good consequence in the ethical sense? Maybe it’s good for the king, but that’s ethically irrelevant as far as I’m concerned. Making yourself happy doesn’t produce goodness any more than saving yourself exhibits heroism.

 

[Areopagite]

Murder is also defined as intentionally taking the life of another human - and execution fits the bill. (Not to mention wars, which are mass murders, sanctified by the states). Of course “many people” say the opposite.

Not just many but most … throughout history. So, I hope you think it’s reasonable to ask you to defend your statements here. It’s obviously not obvious to most people.

Murder has traditionally been defined as “the direct killing of an innocent human life.” I would say that killing someone in self-defense isn’t murder, nor would most people. From this, wars and executions could be justified. But if you disagree, please explain.

I rather doubt that the criminals would agree. In their own eyes they are correct and we are all wrong.

Well, many criminals would agree, and many criminals admit that their punishments did them good and were actually thankful for them (I know some convicts personally who have said this).

Now, when you say “in their own eyes they are correct and we are all wrong” you could say that for anything. You could say “In Creationists’ eyes, they are correct and Evolutionists are wrong.” But such claims just state the obvious. It doesn’t prove anything, except that people think that they themselves are right when they think something is right (obviously).

Now, let’s see my reservations. The first starting point is this principle: “it is wrong to use force against others”. If we leave it as is, unqualified, then the force of imprisonment (or any other punishment) is also wrong, since it violates the principle. Therefore the principle is usually presented in a modified format: “it is wrong to use force against others, unless…” and then comes a justification. For example: “unless they did something wrong before”, or “unless it serves their benefit (which is unclear to them)”, or “unless it is used in self defense”, or some other justification. This version also can have some problems. Who decides whether the justification is “right”? And then we arrive to the rule of majority which is simply expressed as the principle of “might makes right”. And that is a major problem.

It’s not a matter of anyone “deciding what’s right” it’s a matter of “how do we determine what’s right.” And this pertains to the thread that has been long since abandoned regarding morality and natural law. The objective truths of morality are derived from considering what is objectively good and best for humans and trying to stop what deters from fulfilling human nature and to promote what helps fulfill it.

We could get into the problem of evil here, which is not the purpose of this thread. In a nutshell, it is usually asserted that the evil allowed by God must be “positive”, in the sense that it will bring forth some greater good, which more than balances the evil aspect of the original deed itself, and which greater good cannot be achieved without allowing or permitting the deed itself. This is the opposite of gratuitous evil (which does not have such consequences). It is also argued that God never allows unnecessary (gratuitous) evil, and from that it follows that the evil allowed logically brings forth otherwise unobtainable greater good - and if that is the case, why punish it? (This is yet again one of the contradictions that baffles me.)

Well, I’m not sure how my reply didn’t answer this, but I’ll add a new point: one reason to right the wrong is that God told us to do that. In fact, the benefit God planned for us to receive when allowing a particular evil sometimes only comes by way of us defeating and punishing the evil. I hope that kind of answer the question.

 

[Areopagite]

Okay, so you’re distinguishing between actions that are only good and actions that are supererogatory (“more good than necessary”). What happens if someone fails to perform the former kind of action? Does not doing enough good count as bad? I’m not sure I follow this reasoning.

No. “Not doing a heroic action” is not bad in and of itself. Sometimes, turning down heroism stems from bad intentions (and it would be bad in that particular circumstance), but in and of itself it’s not evil to avoid being a hero in at least some particular circumstances.

Well, there’s nothing to pin the label “evil” to. Again, “evil” is simply “what shouldn’t be.” With inaction, we can’t point at anything and say, “that shouldn’t be” because there is nothing! We can contend “it should be the case that one acted to…” but that’s about it. As you can see, we can only suggest a good action, because there’s nothing to discourage. In this sense, failing to inform others of the missing part is neither good nor bad, it is simply a missed opportunity to do a good deed.

I don’t think so. When we claim that “this particular evil shouldn’t be” it is saying that “something else should be.” Like, when we say, “This man shouldn’t be blind” we are saying “This man should have sight.” I know that “nothingness” or negative terms do not exist in reality … but they exist in the mind are have a foundation in reality. If they didn’t have a foundation in reality, we couldn’t talk about them at all. Yet, you are making claims about them … so it must have some foundation in reality. Just as “sightlessness” doesn’t exist in reality (because it’s a negative term) it exists only in the mind but says something about reality, for it is true in circumstances that “this person does not have sight” and hence he has “sightlessness.” Does that make sense? We are saying that a particular kind of thing doesn’t exist here, but it should exist (such as “sight” not existing for blind people … it’s a privation … it’s not natural for humans to be blind, so they shouldn’t be blind). And that negation of some particular thing can be talked about without contradiction.

Now, if the nature of your question was “Would you be alright with someone failing to inform others of the missing part?” then no, of course I wouldn’t. But quite simply, I can’t say anything was done wrong because nothing was done. It’s semantical, you see. I can call that man an evil person, I can say he missed a huge opportunity to maintain the general happiness, but I can’t say that he did wrong.

But we can say that by his inaction, he has become an evil person (or at least, less good, or something to that effect). Thus, inaction can be condemned. Otherwise, why call that man evil? It is because of his particular inaction in this circumstance.

Okay, so I’m not obligated to perform supererogatory actions. But as with what I said above, what would happen if I failed to produce the goodness I was obligated to produce? Would badness result? It seems to me that this is skipping over neutrality entirely.

Failing to produce what you are obligated to do would be bad. However, heroic or supererogatory actions are not obligatory but beyond the call of duty. So … what’s your question?

A “virtue ethic” is a deontological ethical system wherein the primary goal is the improvement of character and not consequences. Usually, certain virtues will serve as guidelines to indicate what a “good character” would do. Such systems inevitably fail because we mostly derive the idea of “good character” from the consequences of actions in the first place (but that’s beside the point).

Hmm … I don’t. If someone is constantly trying to do something good but the circumstances prevent him from accomplishing it, I would consider him to have a “good character.”

Utilitarianism isn’t in the business of labeling people good or bad because that may be irrelevant to consequences. Imagine a world where it is impossible to do evil, yet everyone hated each other and wanted to do evil (though their mood is not apparent). Without bad consequences, does the label “bad person” have any use whatsoever? No, it just shows our desire for people to think as we do.

Having the desire to do evil doesn’t make one evil, unless one actually chooses to foster an evil desire. Presumably, one could be wracked with evil desires (temptations) but never choose to give into them. This would make them a good person. Once again, this is different from choosing to have and/or promote those desires (such as willfully hating someone and seeking their destruction and wanting what’s worst for them). Even if no action they do is objectively immoral, so long as they have a willful evil intent, they can be considered evil (or immoral). However, intentions are usually invisible and cannot be ascertained with certainty, so as far as we could tell in a world where no objective evil was being performed, then we should normally assume that they aren’t bad people (yet, I would say sometimes people’s evil intentions can become obvious … so it’s not a hard and fast rule).

That’s what I would say … I wonder if that made any sense.

 

[Ender]

So if punishment counters crime, would crime not counter punishment?

No. Crime is to punishment as cause is to effect and I don’t think there is any logical argument to imply that the effect can be the cause. Crime and punishment could only work as you describe if they were the same thing.

The person in question has been imprisoned for doing nothing, so the balance of justice would already be disrupted. The person would then be morally obligated to commit a crime in order to restore the balance caused by the preemptive punishment.

Unmerited punishment is an unjust act that cannot be balanced by a second unjust act. Merited punishment is a just act; the two scenarios are completely different.

Ender