I deny that “the infinity and transcendence of God” is anything other than a get-out-of-jail card. We can reason about infinite things. People have successfully done so. I also believe that your use of “transcendence” is just a way to re-introduce fuzziness. For any apparent contradiction, you will simply say “well God is transcendent, so that contradiction doesn’t apply” without specifying exactly what it is about transcendence that makes it not apply. In my view, it is just a way to disguise the fact that you’re saying “logic doesn’t apply” in order to escape what are plainly contradictions.
I’m aware you deny it, but you don’t have good grounds for doing so. Regarding the infinite, I do not deny that you can reason about infinite things, else I’d be able to say literally nothing about God. Rather, I am denying that we cannot properly understand the infinite such that every (or even most) truths about it will be accessible and intelligible to us. We can make apophatic claims and claims via analogy, though.
As far as transcendence, I do find it amusing that you accuse me of error here
for claims I don’t even make, but rather which you presume I will make. So why would transcendence gesture towards our inability to know God’s essence? Well, given the analogy of being, we understand “is” or “exists” to have different if analogous meanings. Our intellects are privy to some, but given that God stands as an infinite limit case to the analogy of being, we would expect there are modes of existence or truths about being that we cannot comprehend and thus cannot put into words. This would be my justification in saying that for any alleged contradiction, one can always appeal to a mysterian sense of “is” or “being.” And again, the analogy of being was hardly concocted to try to salvage the Doctrine of the Trinity, for example - it was around prior to that. So again, we have independent principles that can be used to defend the coherence of God. And again, this shouldn’t be surprising. Given that God is what He is, we would expect apparent contradictions to arise.
To put it another way, positive statements about God, with regard to Church teaching and the like, are actually true but epistemologically indeterminate in meaning, because we are not in a position, epistemically, to know and understand the precise meaning of the terms used. This brings us to your quip here, then:
The trinity is defined as having three internal distinctions, and simplicity as having no internal distinctions.
The first part of your statement is correct, the second part is not. All simplicity says is that there is no composition in God. For example, one can make logical distinctions and yet not introduce actual composition or division into God. Now, applying what I said above to the Trinity, we affirm that each Person of the Trinity is God, but that no Person is another Person. My contention here is that the “is” in these statements has an analogous but epistemically unreachable meaning in comparison to how we might normally use the word “is.” This is why it must be revealed. But Church teaching on the matter affirms the above statement on the Trinity as being true, we just don’t understand how - hence its status as a mystery.
Now, I know the charge is gonna come down the pipe that this is all too convenient and that one cannot properly attribute any contradiction to God, which seems like cheating. But this all flows from the principle that we cannot establish a contradiction in a concept or proposition if we cannot fully and determinately understand said concept or proposition first (or at least fully and determinately understand the aspects that we are claiming to be contradictory), and this principle seems entirely fair. The pill becomes easier to swallow once we get some epistemic humility and acknowledge that there are some things we can know a little bit about but which we cannot go super far on.
So you’re saying that your argument against the claim that God is not well defined and has many competing conceptions is the source which claims:
For one thing, not every argument for God’s existence will get you to the specific conception of God needed in order to establish the plausibility of a resurrection.
as though there are many competing conceptions of God?
I never denied that there are many competing conceptions of God; all I did was deny that it was my problem, as I’m only interested in defending a particular conception (or range of conceptions) of God anyways. I acknowledge as a practical matter that might make things obnoxiously complicated for you since there are so many conceptions to sort through, but I don’t see how that presents an actual intellectual difficulty I have to contend with.