Life's "ultimate meaning", and the value of money

[Touchstone]

Touchstone

I’m afraid that most of your post was long winded and incoherent. One point, though, really interested me.

*God’s will may be perfectly efficacious and binding on reality, which couldn’t be more different from man’s “plane”. **But even so, it’s still subejctive, and in fact, maximally subjective. ***God is the apotheosis of subjectivity. On Christianity, God’s thoughts can and do shape reality itself. Everything and anything is subject to his will. You cannot get more subjective and less objective than that. Objectivity measure the independence of a thing, or an aspect of a thing from mind and will. Per Christianity, there is no way in principle to be more subjective than God is, for nothing obtains independently, ever, from his mind and will. The very universe was created at his behest, according to Christianity. That’s maximal subjectivity.

Since God’s will is absolute, it is likewise objective because it is law without exception. All humans are equally valued as His children. That’s hardly the same as the subjective preference some parents may have for their different children.

It’s not without exception, though. The Bible is filled with stories of those who opposed God’s will with their own will. All observers do not see the same thing on this question, as it’s subjective, “assigned”. You can say God’s assignment trumps all others, but that just speaks to authority, not objectivity.

Setting aside “value” and looking at existence, if we stipulate, arguendo, that God created all things and they exist by his will and can be changed or destroyed at any time at his pleasure, the existence of these objects – all of them – that God created is no different than being “thoughts in God’s mind”, the very picture of subjectivity. Just like you dreaming or imaging a world, the features and forms are subject to a whim; think it’s different and the next moment, it is.

In any case, I don’t need to say that the God’s subjectivity is identical or even similar to man’s. Only that it is essentially subjective – that is, predicated on mind/will. The deer in the meadow’s subjective will is not the same as mind as a human, but what it values is just as subjective as what I value.

Yes, all of creation is a product of God’s will, but it is also a product of His intellect. And his intellect is not subject to the willy-nilly assignment of values.

Again, this is not a salient feature of objectivity or subjectivity. It needn’t be capricious to be subjective. It just needs to be predicated on mind and/or will. A perfectly predictable, consistent subjective proposition is just as subjective as the most capricious one.

God* knows* exactly what He wills. He knows that He has created a universe independent of His own being, even though the universe cannot exist without His will sustaining it.

Can you see the contradiction, there. You said on successive clauses of one sentence that the universe is independent of His own being, and yet **dependent **(cannot exist with His will) on him. This is precisely the confusion that I’m focusing on in the OP – Catholics suppose because the universe (in their view) is distinct from God that it obtains, when its convenient, independently. It’s an inconsistency. If the universe is dependent on God’s will, the Catholic universe is a purely subjective one. That’s the Catholic’s prerogative to believe that. It might be true. But either way, it’s dependent on mind, ontologically. Subjective.

However, God is not to be confused with the universe, unless you are a pantheist. For that reason, God permits evil, even though it is no part of Himself or His will. That is, God does not value evil, and has even given us the power to overcome it if we will.
I think the confusion is between distinct and dependent. On Catholicism, the universe is distinct from God, but is always dependent on God.

[quooe]
Because we are separate from God, objects of his creation rather than emanations of Himself, we are imperfect. Our imperfection comes from the fact that we contain less objectivity (truthfulness) in our values than God owns. Our subjectivity (willingness to assign our own subjective values rather than God’s objective will) is always the source of our undoing. God objectively values life, as He does all creation. The abortionist, for example, subjectively denies that objectively true value (God’s will) and substitutes for God’s will his own.
You are confusing what you hold to be a Very Special Subject with the concept of objectivity, which is only meaningful as “mind-exclusive”. I understand the mistake. God’s such a different kind of mind/will that we “gerrymander” around it, supposing God’s will is somehow “powerful enough” to be “objectifying” in its execution.

In short, subjectively assigning values that depart from God’s objective values is what gets us into trouble.

Per Catholicism, indeed. But this also proves out God’s subjectivity – we know from just this here that multiple minds with competing values now exist, thereby negating any objectivity of those values. Even the term - ‘God’s objective values’ – gives the game away; an objective value, if it is objective, intrinsic, cannot be “God’s”. It would obtain in the life, or whatever object we are considering. Making it a possessive of God signals the very subjectivity you are trying to deny by just applying the word “objective”!

-TS

 

[Touchstone]

Charlemagne II:

I came to this discussion late, so I’m not sure what exact definition you had in mind for subjective as opposed to objective valuations.

I’ve been operating on the definitions in common use in philosophy since long before I was born.

However, if you are giving a different definition for God’s subjectivity as opposed to human subjectivity, then it’s a new game.

I’m not concerned with describing “God’s subjectivity” and “man’s subjectivity” as species of subjectivity. That’s fine and wouldn’t change the impact of anything I’m advocating, here.

Yes, God does impose his values on Creation, and in that sense is subjective, and supremely so. But He is certainly not subjective in the sense of the word as it applies to human values, such as how we value a twenty dollar bill.

Fine. I understand. I haven’t suggested that any of us here on earth are “supreme”. Rather, I’m pointing at the location of valuation. It comes from mind, all the way around. It doesn’t obtain in life itself, it’s not intrinsic. It’s assigned, or “imposed” as you say. Once we understand that, the claim that 'life has intrinsic value" can be understood for what it is – conceptually broken, incoherent.

If you want to cast it as “supreme valuation”, like the government minting money and declaring “legal tender”, only times ten, fine. Doesn’t change anything. That’s just speaking to authority, and doesn’t concern at all the question of value or meaning as “objective” with respect to life itself, intrinsic.

The values He assigns are objectively intrinsic to His creation … that is, truthful and fixed with respect to the objects of his creation. They are objectively real, not false or imaginary.

On Catholicism, they can’t be objectively real. Only God can be objectively real on Catholicism. As an omnipotent being, God can will the universe out of existence as easily as he willed it into existence – “Let there be nothing! And it was good.”. God is objectively real on that view, but the universe conjured from the mind of God, that is perfectly subjective. No more objective than a dream you might have.

What I see here is a confounding of two definitions of subjectivity. One concerns ontological subjectivity (which may be said of God), and the other concerns psychological subjectivity, which may be said of men.

Psychological subjectivtity is the same ontological subjectivity, humans just have limited powers in what they can cause to exist by virtue of their minds. God, putatitvely, creates universes on a whim. The human can’t do that, but he can “create” value. Man does, subjectively what he can to create, alter, destroy, and God does the same. God’s got mad skillz where man is a n00b, but this is just a matter of degree; man can only create thoughts and mental constructs, God can create anything.

The sense is the same, then, and between God and man, we are talking about degrees.

But where does that get us so far as the point of this thread is concerned?

If we understand that God “imposes” value, to use your word, then the jig is up. What obtains intrinsically doesn’t need be and can’t be imposed; it’s inherent apart from any imposition, assignment, judgment.

Therefore, to claim that life has “intrinsic meaning” is either to a) speak in contradictions (i.e. to invoke something like a “squared circle”, a “value without a valuer”) or b) speak in euphemisms, where “intrinsic meaning” is really “meaning assigned subjectively but by an authority I respect and consider supreme”. Both a) and b) are problematic.

If we look at how we value and use money, we have a illustrative example of the efficacy and utility of subjective valuation; the subjective valuation of money is demonstrably effective in mediating transactions and exchanges in innumerable human contexts.

In your next to last paragraph in the first post you seem to be saying that these subjective values you enumerate are all we need in this life.

I don’t think it’s a matter of need. This is how it works, demonstrably. Money doesn’t have “intrinsic value”. But it’s useful and practically effective all the same.

That, of course, is not true if God exists and His objective (true and fixed) will is that we should put our relationship with him above all other preferences.

Again, this is “authoritative subjectivity” per your views, not objectivity.

Indeed, if we value money rather than God, when we cross the river Styx, we will not even have two coins to pay the boatman.

The irony in your use of that metaphor is delicious.

-TS

 

[Touchstone]

It would be difficult to correct all of the errors in these paragraphs, but I’ll address one basic and obvious point. You start off asking about how words get/acquire meanings, then in an attempt to illustrate your point you discuss an example of a meaning got/acquired a word, and conclude by switching back to your original formulation - apparently oblivious to the reversals of the terms. Then you trail off into irrelevant drivel.

It’s an association – symbol and concept. Gell-Mann created the association. He attached the concept to the label, the idea of the particle to ‘quark’. As an association, it works both ways. “Quark” takes on a new meaning, and the concept in Gell-Mann’s head is given a name.

There are no reversed terms in what I laid in the example of Gell-Mann.

Dictionaries: descriptive, yes; not prescriptive, no (your error here: false dichotomy). You are very obviously wrong here (VERY). Think about it. If you don’t get it, just say “I don’t get it” and I’ll explain.

Why don’t you ever say precisely what you think is wrong? Once or twice, it might appear you are just being coy. But it’s a distinct pattern, which suggests that you just don’t know, all you know is you disagree somehow, and suppose asking me to think about it will somehow compensate for you inability to do so and articulate the problems. This is deja vu of the laborious kind. Now I have to take the time to press for the substance of your objection. If something is very obviously wrong here, then spell it out.

So what’s your argument?

P1. Meaning necessarily implies a relation to a mind.
P2. The -]value/-] meaning only obtains from mind, i.e., rational life, life with mind, not from life qua -]life/-] mindless, -]intrinsically/-].
C. Therefore… “intrinsic meaning of life” is incoherent? - non sequitur. Therefore “intrinsic meaning of life” refers to the intrinsic meaning of the kind of life that characterizes minds.

No, P1 and P2 don’t work, syllogistically (it doesn’t address incoherence in the premises). This does:

A. “Value” implies a “value-er”; value is assigned, and not intrinsic.
B. A statement that posits value but negates a value-er is incoherent, negating what is implied.
C: “Life has intrinsic value” is a statement that posits value, but negates a value-er.
D: Therefore, the statement “Life has intrinsic value” is incoherent.

-TS

 

[Touchstone]

I’ve confused subject and object, have I? Please explain.

Here’s what you imply here, probably without realizing it: You can actually *know *about what happens in a world without having any *real ontological interaction *with it.

It’s not a real world. It’s a hypothetical, a construct of my mind. I know about it, because I’ve defined it thus in my mind. But I’m not in it. A different universe is by definition utterly inaccessible to real interaction, or real knowledge. The point of the hypothetical was to test the concept – what would the value be in such a world?

So real knowledge is not dependent on real experience. Do you actually want to try to embrace that position (consistently, I mean)?

See above. It was, and is a hypothetical world. Now that you understand that, can you answer the question?

First, the existence of gold is only partially determined by its chemical/physical constitution.

Ok, just marking it down here that you are talking about existence. You grant that gold’s physical properties are endemic to its existence. I wonder if you will suppose that valuation by minds is a predicate for gold’s existence?

Second, the existence of gold may be identical in one respect, its chemical constitution and amount, but it cannot possibly be (objectively!) identical in all respects if it has value in one world and not in another.

Aha. So you do suppose that *valuation by minds *is a predicate for gold’s existence! So now gold doesn’t exist if it’s not valued by minds? Or does it? You’re stuck, as you’re confusing existence, which doesn’t depend on valuing by minds, with valuation, which does depend on valuing by minds. The fundamental difference is now apparent, and the meaning of ‘intrinsic’ is, too. Gold has physical properties that are fundamental to its existence – constituent atoms of a certain type, physical location and extent, etc. But “valuation” is not among them. And the clumsy attempt here you’ve made to add “valuation” as a predicate for existence shows it well.

If the gold existed strictly ‘exclusively of mind’ *in all respects *in both universes, then it would be equally valueless in both universes. Can you see that?

The valuing by minds has perfectly no bearing on whether the gold exists in either world. Valuation by minds is not a predicate for the existence of gold.

If there is a huge nugget of gold sitting under a rock on the Moon, this gold is in this universe, but it is objectively true that it is not valuable (even we exist and we value gold).

Why not? If it were found and recovered, it could be traded for valuable goods, or cash. Do you suppose the bold buried deep in the Placerville foothills in 1840 was not valuable because it had not yet been located? This is a bizarre claim you are making.

This is true because of the *objective *conditions governing the value of gold. A more down-to-earth example: many deposits of hydrocarbons are not valuable, while others are ‘black gold.’ Which is the case for a given deposit is again a matter of the objective conditions governing the value of hydrocarbons.

The objective conditions (on a materialist model, on Catholicism, those conditions are that way because that’s the way God’s will made the world to be) are what they are, irrespective of any and all minds. But the value is assigned by minds, even if the different configurations of matter obtain objectively. “Fool’s Gold” objectively exists in the same way that gold exists. But the valuation difference between them derive from minds.

Eventually you have to get this: that’s a non sequitur.

I’ll just include in here what I originally said, that you identify as a non-sequitur:

A moon can possibly exist without minds. A value can’t. The moon can possibly exist objectively. “Meaning of life” cannot.

See my A-D above. Value implies value-er, of necessity. “Existing moon” does not imply a mind, of necessity.

Again, you got this bass-ackwards: Gell-Mann chose a word for a meaning, not a meaning for a word.

That is a difference without a distinction. In associating “quark” with the concept we now associate with that word, he gave a concept a new name, and the word “quark” a new meaning.

No, your basic comprehension of terms is way wrong (as I’ve explained) and your theology is way wrong (based on the wrongness of your comprehension of terms).

I still have no idea what you use as the definition of “objective” and “subjective”. Perhaps it would help to get those out there in the clear to clear this up.

Again, please, please don’t ignore this point: that is a non sequitur.

OK, well let’s break it down. What part of this, reformatted as a syllogism with a defintion, do you object to:

Def1: “Value” implies a “value-er”; value is assigned, and not intrinsic.

E. A statement that posits value but negates a value-er is incoherent, negating what is implied.
F: “Life has intrinsic value” is a statement that posits value, but negates a value-er.
G: Therefore, the statement “Life has intrinsic value” is incoherent.

E-G valid on modus ponens; If P, then Q. P, thus Q.

Where’s the problem, in your view?

The perpetual darkness may be ‘conspicuous’ to the blind man, but not so much to those who can see.

By all means, help yourself to your ideas of special knowledge and supernatural insight.

-TS

 

[Charlemagne_II]

Touchstone,

Again, I’m sorry to say again that your thoughts are rambling and incoherent. I think your forte may be science. It certainly isn’t philosophy. The irony is that you think everything you say must be objectively true, even though every value you have you claim to be subjective.

If you had ever taken a philosophy course, you would know how absurd that position is. :tsktsk:

Or maybe you wouldn’t?

Get a good dictionary of philosophy, study the terms objective and subjective, then let me know when you are ready to resume.

Bye for now.

 

[Betterave]

It’s an association – symbol and concept. Gell-Mann created the association. He attached the concept to the label, the idea of the particle to ‘quark’. As an association, it works both ways. “Quark” takes on a new meaning, and the concept in Gell-Mann’s head is given a name.

There are no reversed terms in what I laid in the example of Gell-Mann.

First paragraph: irrelevant blah. Second paragraph/sentence: an obviously false assertion, which ignores the fact that I just pointed out that you did reverse terms and explained exactly how you did. What more to say…?

Why don’t you ever say precisely what you think is wrong? Once or twice, it might appear you are just being coy. But it’s a distinct pattern, which suggests that you just don’t know, all you know is you disagree somehow, and suppose asking me to think about it will somehow compensate for you inability to do so and articulate the problems. This is deja vu of the laborious kind. Now I have to take the time to press for the substance of your objection. If something is very obviously wrong here, then spell it out.

This is rich! When I do tell you precisely what’s wrong you ignore it; when I don’t you complain. I told you not to waste your time with whining like this. I told you: all you have to do is say, “I don’t get it” - was that too complicated for you? LOL! You’re unbelievably arrogant and irrational in making this jump from “I don’t get it” to “I shouldn’t ask for an explanation, I should just accuse this guy of not getting it himself.”

To explain: We refer to dictionary definitions prescriptively all the time. Therefore, dictionaries are prescriptive, not just descriptive, QED.

No, P1 and P2 don’t work, syllogistically (it doesn’t address incoherence in the premises). This does:

A. “Value” implies a “value-er”; value is assigned, and not intrinsic.
B. A statement that posits value but negates a value-er is incoherent, negating what is implied.
C: “Life has intrinsic value” is a statement that posits value, but negates a value-er.
D: Therefore, the statement “Life has intrinsic value” is incoherent.

-TS

Thank you for trying to construct a clear argument. That’s much nicer to deal with than your usual sloppy assertions and obscurely implied arguments.

A. “Value” implies a “value-er”; [therefore] value is assigned, and not intrinsic ****.

Your first premise here is a non sequitur. Therefore, C and D are too.**

 

[Betterave]

awww pooop, I lost my reply to your second post, TS. I’ll try again later.

 

[Touchstone]

First paragraph: irrelevant blah. Second paragraph/sentence: an obviously false assertion, which ignores the fact that I just pointed out that you did reverse terms and explained exactly how you did. What more to say…?

What’s the false assertion? There’s no “reversing”, for the reason stated – it’s an association that works either way. For the label (“quark”), a new meaning is created for it, for the concept of the particle we now know as “quark”, a new label was created.

This is rich! When I do tell you precisely what’s wrong you ignore it; when I don’t you complain. I told you not to waste your time with whining like this. I told you: all you have to do is say, “I don’t get it” - was that too complicated for you? LOL! You’re unbelievably arrogant and irrational in making this jump from “I don’t get it” to “I shouldn’t ask for an explanation, I should just accuse this guy of not getting it himself.”

Well, I may just not be smart enough to untangle the things you post here. I certainly think I may not be adequately patient. I like specifics. You’re very short on specific claims and arguments. I’ll admit to being neither adept nor inclined to the “dart throwing game” you are clearly committed to, where you say “false”, but not what or why, or how, leaving to to guess. I think there just may be an intractable communication problem between the two of us somewhere. I think it’s you, and vice versa, so it’s a stalemate on that level, I guess. Having read back a bit, you seem to have the same problem with people you disagree with, generally, while I think I can point to discussions with theists here which are productive and move along in the discussion, even if the disagreements remain, for what it’s worth.

To explain: We refer to dictionary definitions prescriptively all the time. Therefore, dictionaries are prescriptive, not just descriptive, QED.

Can you give me an example of where that happens? I can’t think of one, and since the compilers of dictionary don’t prescribe meaning, but only describe it’s usage in practice, any references to it in a presecriptive sense would be committing the same error you are apparently committed to, here, the idea that dictionaries define words for language users, rather than describe how it’s used.

A good test would be to see what words dictionary compilers create themselves, assign meaning, and add to the lexicon apart from what they observe as usage in the community of speakers of that language. Another test would be to see where dictionary compilers are trying to fix “wrong meaning”, and asserting their authorit

Again, here we are bogged down in the most basic, asinine details. If we have to bicker about whether a dictionary is descriptive or not, or how words get their meaning, there’s no hope for a productive debate or discussion.

Thank you for trying to construct a clear argument. That’s much nicer to deal with than your usual sloppy assertions and obscurely implied arguments.

Heh. It’s no different, it’s just reiteration of my previous text, nearly word for word.

A. “Value” implies a “value-er”; [therefore] value is assigned, and not intrinsic ******.

Your first premise here is a non sequitur. Therefore, C and D are too.
It’s not a “therefore”. It’s a restatement for clarity. What “implies” means is that a valuer assigns value. It was just added so there wouldn’t be any confusion about what was implied. “not assigned objectively” is non-sense, sense the assignment – do we need to argue about what “assign” means now??? – by definition places the value as a result of the valuer’s action. If the value was was intrinsic, their would be no value-er implied or needed! If value is assigned to an object that value is by virtue of THAT ASSIGNMENT not intrinsic to the object.

If you have a problem with this, then lay out your case. Does value imply a value-er or not? If not, then money’s value has nothing to do with what participants in a market place think or decide; money is obejctively valuable or not, and economic actors either realize the objective value, or they do not, just like they either accept the atomic structure of gold or they do not – the atomic structure of gold doesn’t change based on what anyone thinks of it (except for God, on Catholicism, who can will it into a different structure if he so pleases, subjectively).

If value does imply a valuer, what is the implicated in that relationship, in your view. My claim is that that a valuer assigns value, giving an object an assigned – not intrinsic, but assigned – value. Some kind of priority, interest or importance based on the thoughts, desires or goals of a a valuer. What do you suppose is implicated?

-TS

 

[Touchstone]

awww pooop, I lost my reply to your second post, TS. I’ll try again later.

Really, don’t bother.

-TS

 

[Betterave]

I’ll address just this for starters:

Well, I may just not be smart enough to untangle the things you post here. I certainly think I may not be adequately patient.

It may be that you’re not smart enough or not patient enough, but there are other possibilities. (I think Mark Antony also considered this possibility in this thread, but in a much more humble, good-natured, wise way than you - you might do well to consider his example.) I think you’re probably smart enough and you could be patient enough, but you’re not open-minded enough. You’re so busy repeatedly making the same assertions that feel good to you that you are unable to take in the fact that your assertions have been criticized with very serious criticisms and that you need to address those criticisms if you want to have any claim to being a rational person when you continue to assert your usual assertions.

Besides being closed-minded, or perhaps this is just a specific manifestation of your closed-mindedness, you need to ask questions when you don’t understand, instead of fulminating about how your interlocutor never answers questions or makes arguments - when that is patently false…

I like specifics. You’re very short on specific claims and arguments.

…I challenge you: pick any post of mine you like and tell me that it is has no answers to questions, no specific claims, and no arguments in it. Go ahead.

I’ll admit to being neither adept nor inclined to the “dart throwing game” you are clearly committed to, where you say “false”, but not what or why, or how, leaving to to guess.

TS, are you serious? Leaving you to guess? Name one place where I have done this. (In case you’re tempted to think otherwise: When I specifically instruct you to say “I don’t get it” if you don’t get it, that is not leaving you to guess.)

I think there just may be an intractable communication problem between the two of us somewhere. I think it’s you, and vice versa, so it’s a stalemate on that level, I guess.

It’s only a stalemate because you are refusing to listen to and respond to my specific criticisms of your communication strategies. You don’t make any such criticisms of me, and any vague criticisms (or rather, accusations) you do make I respond to.

Having read back a bit, you seem to have the same problem with people you disagree with, generally, while I think I can point to discussions with theists here which are productive and move along in the discussion, even if the disagreements remain, for what it’s worth.

What is the ‘productive’ value of these discussions where your disagreements remain? (I guess by your definition it’s a purely ‘subjective’ thing?) If you have irrational and confused views to begin with, and you still have 'em to end with, that ain’t productive in my book, brother. Do your other theist interlocutors think it is? Charlemagne doesn’t seem to think so…

 

[Black_Rose]

Touchstone, are you arguing that definitions are nominalist, instead of essentialist?

For instance, consider the statement:

A puppy is a young dog.

A nominalist would read the statement from right to left, saying that the designated label to a “young dog” is a “puppy” while an essentialist would say that “a young dog” describes the “essence” of a “puppy”.

In science we do not ask the question “what is quark?”. Actually, a quark is merely the label that is given to subatomic particles that interact through the strong (color) force where it can hadronize with three quarks, or a single quark can interact with an antiquark forming a meson that will decay within microseconds. Since the label “quark” is universally accepted and entrenched among scientists, the term will not be replaced in the short-term. To the nominalist scientist, the label only serves as an expedient to communicate empirical phenomenon through writing or speech.

Actually, this describes it quite well.

 

[Touchstone]

Touchstone, are you arguing that definitions are nominalist, instead of essentialist?

Defintions are whatever we agree they are. I do have a nominalist disposition (to speak of “essence” is to invoke incoherent concepts, so far as I can see), but a definition
should provide the basic working concepts for communication, understanding being the priority, agreement a different matter. I understand what Plato was talking about conceptually, for example, in talking about “essence”, I just don’t see that as a grounded ontology. The communication works, even if disagreement obtains.

For instance, consider the statement:

A puppy is a young dog.

A nominalist would read the statement from right to left, saying that the designated label to a “young dog” is a “puppy” while an essentialist would say that “a young dog” describes the “essence” of a “puppy”.

Yes, I’ve been given examples of this like before, and I definitely fall into the “label” view, but from a definitional standpoint, I don’t think it matters, does it? We are association a symbol with a referent. This label points at that. Whether I understand “young dog” to be a nominalist description or an essentialist metaphysical insight I think is external to the association itself.

In science we do not ask the question “what is quark?”. Actually, a quark is merely the label that is given to subatomic particles that interact through the strong (color) force where it can hadronize with three quarks, or a single quark can interact with an antiquark forming a meson that will decay within microseconds. Since the label “quark” is universally accepted and entrenched among scientists, the term will not be replaced in the short-term. To the nominalist scientist, the label only serves as an expedient to communicate empirical phenomenon through writing or speech.

Right. Science in my experience is typically nominalist in its language. It’s part of the method, being descriptive, and putting a premium on discussion which can be objective (descriptions that can be validated by any observer, for example), and don’t depend on particular metaphysical extensions beyond the description. That’s why it’s called “nominalism”, after all – it values economy and austerity in its terminology.

Actually, this describes it quite well.

OK, thanks for the link.

How do you suppose Popper’s nominalism/essentialism divide factors in here, regarding the assignment of value or meaning, vs. the “intrinsic value” of an object?

-TS

 

[The_Exodus]

The communication works, even if disagreement obtains.

But communication cannot “work” if all language is equivocal.

touchstone:

I don’t think it matters, does it?

Oh no, it certainly doesn’t matter if whenever we speak we are saying words which have no actual univocal meaning. It doesn’t matter if when I say “tree” your mind understands something wholly other than what I intend to communicate…

 

[Betterave]

What’s the false assertion? There’s no “reversing”, for the reason stated – it’s an association that works either way. For the label (“quark”), a new meaning is created for it, for the concept of the particle we now know as “quark”, a new label was created.

What’s the false assertion?: “There are no reversed terms in what I laid in the example of Gell-Mann.” The association can work either way, true; but it worked in only one of those ways in GM’s case, rather than the other. He started with a meaning, then searched for and found a label for it. He did not start with a word/label, so as to then search for a meaning for it.

Can you give me an example of where that happens? I can’t think of one, and since the compilers of dictionary don’t prescribe meaning, but only describe it’s usage in practice, any references to it in a presecriptive sense would be committing the same error you are apparently committed to, here, the idea that dictionaries define words for language users, rather than describe how it’s used.

T: Word W means definition D.
B: No it doesn’t.
T: Yes it does. It says that right here in my dictionary.
B: No, you dropped an important word from the definition given in the dictionary.
T: I don’t care, definitions are all arbitrary and stipulative anyway.
B: No they’re not. Look up these three words, ‘definition,’ ‘arbitrary,’ and ‘stipulative’ in the dictionary. You are using those terms incorrectly and the dictionary prescribes the correct uses of words. You can ignore that if you want, but it makes communication difficult.

…get the point yet?

A good test would be to see what words dictionary compilers create themselves, assign meaning, and add to the lexicon apart from what they observe as usage in the community of speakers of that language. Another test would be to see where dictionary compilers are trying to fix “wrong meaning”, and asserting their authorit

You are assuming that descriptions are a disjunct category from prescriptions. An objective description, however, obviously has prescriptive force. That’s why it is possible to say stuff like, “Bill obviously doesn’t understand the meaning of that word he’s using - he should look it up in the dictionary before he tries to use it again.”

Again, here we are bogged down in the most basic, asinine details. If we have to bicker about whether a dictionary is descriptive or not, or how words get their meaning, there’s no hope for a productive debate or discussion.

There is only no hope if you continue to ignore my arguments/assume I don’t have any (because apparently you think you know everything already), and if you continue to assume that your views are right before you have seriously asked yourself (or anybody else) whether anything might be wrong with them.

Heh. It’s no different, it’s just reiteration of my previous text, nearly word for word.

It’s not a “therefore”. It’s a restatement for clarity.

It may not be a “therefore,” but it’s certainly not a “restatement for clarity”: A not-= B. It’s also certainly not a definition of value.

A) “Value” implies a “value-er”; B) value is assigned, and not intrinsic.

What -]“implies/-]” A means is that a valuer assigns value [not that this value is not intrinsic, i.e., not that it is not assigned objectively]. It was just added so there wouldn’t be any confusion about what was implied. “not assigned objectively” is non-sense, -]sense/-] **since ** the assignment – do we need to argue about what “assign” means now??? – by definition places the value as a result of the valuer’s action. If the value -]was/-] was intrinsic, their would be no value-er implied or needed! If value is assigned to an object that value is by virtue of THAT ASSIGNMENT not intrinsic to the object.

Here’s a good definition for ‘assign’: to determine the quality of something: to determine that somebody or something has a particular quality, name, use, or category. To assign is to determine, and yes, this is always the result of an act of assignment or determination. It does not follow, however, that the object of an assignment/determination of value is subjective, just because the act of assignment/determination is.

If you have a problem with this, then lay out your case. Does value imply a value-er or not?

I already laid out my case, and I just did it again. Please try to read it and understand it this time and ask questions if you have trouble. Dont jump to the conclusion that since *you *dont understand it, it must be asinine.

If not, then money’s value has nothing to do with what participants in a market place think or decide; money is obejctively valuable or not, and economic actors either realize the objective value, or they do not, just like they either accept the atomic structure of gold or they do not – the atomic structure of gold doesn’t change based on what anyone thinks of it (except for God, on Catholicism, who can will it into a different structure if he so pleases, subjectively).

This is very confused, but I wont respond to it now as I think you have enough to chew on. Please repost it once youve thought through what I’ve said here.

If value does imply a valuer, what is the implicated in that relationship, in your view. My claim is that that a valuer assigns value, giving an object an assigned – not intrinsic, but assigned – value. Some kind of priority, interest or importance based on the thoughts, desires or goals of a a valuer. What do you suppose is implicated?

Same as above.

 

[Betterave]

In science we do not ask the question “what is a quark?”. Actually, a quark is merely the label that is given to subatomic particles that interact through the strong (color) force where it can hadronize with three quarks, or a single quark can interact with an antiquark forming a meson that will decay within microseconds. Since the label “quark” is universally accepted and entrenched among scientists, the term will not be replaced in the short-term. To the nominalist scientist, the label only serves as an expedient to communicate empirical phenomenon through writing or speech.

Actually, this describes it quite well.

I’d have thought that in science we ask the question “what is an X?” all the time, including when X is a quark. *Why *do you deny this?

 

[Black_Rose]

Bad definition:

quarks hadronized with two other quarks.

For example, a proton is up, up, down quarks.

 

[Betterave]

Bad definition:

quarks hadronized with two other quarks.

For example, a proton is up, up, down quarks.

What is your point supposed to be here?

 

[Touchstone]

But communication cannot “work” if all language is equivocal.

Agreed! The disagreement there refers to propositional disagreement, assuming univocal terms. If you and I agree on what “God” means, conceptually, it’s not equivocation on “God” to disagree as to whether God exists or not.

Oh no, it certainly doesn’t matter if whenever we speak we are saying words which have no actual univocal meaning. It doesn’t matter if when I say “tree” your mind understands something wholly other than what I intend to communicate…

Odd that suppose that to be such a problem – I do suppose it to be a very serious problem. But I don’t pretend to be able to substantiate terms that are commonly thrown out here as if they concrete enough to even be judged as univocal or equivocal. From the Moral Relativism thread, things like this:

“God’s will is his being, which is convertible with the good.”

Is full of words, signifying nothing we could judge as univocal, as they aren’t even properly vocal, very much using “tree” when you mean “I have no clue what concept goes here”. What would “good” mean in this context? Well, it’s that which is convertible from God’s being, isn’t it? And why does on supposed God is good?

slaps head

Of course, because God’s being is convertible with the good!

Round and round it goes, words unattached to anything real. Not just directly, but unattached in the whole semantic graph.

Maybe we can look at “being” then. What does that signifiy, here, univocally? For a human, we can at least bind that term to our consciousness, our awareness of stimuli. But for God, we just steal the human concept, and it’s grounded in nothing, a semantic void, not even “vocal”, never mind worrying about “univocal” or “equivocal”.

That’s what I mean by the “fluff” in metaphysics. To say, “I am holding a baseball in my hand” is at some level a metaphysical statement. But that’s a statement amenable to grounded and univocal semantics, suitable for conceptualization and communication. To say "“God’s will is his being, which is convertible with the good.” is to get nearly every other word in the sentence offending the same goals, “God”, “God’s will”, “being”, “convertible” and “the good”, all being problematic, empty, inscrutable. They only suffice for communication insofar as the hearer agrees to join you in not being concerned with what those words point to conceptually, or where their semantics are grounded.

-TS

 

[Betterave]

That’s what I mean by the “fluff” in metaphysics. To say, “I am holding a baseball in my hand” is at some level a metaphysical statement. But that’s a statement amenable to grounded and univocal semantics, suitable for conceptualization and communication. To say "“God’s will is his being, which is convertible with the good.” is to get nearly every other word in the sentence offending the same goals, “God”, “God’s will”, “being”, “convertible” and “the good”, all being problematic, empty, inscrutable. They only suffice for communication insofar as the hearer agrees to join you in not being concerned with what those words point to conceptually, or where their semantics are grounded.

-TS

This coming from the guy who is unable - on his own, at least - to conceive of a prescriptive use of a dictionary, who thinks the claim that there are such uses is asinine…? Let’s just say when a guy like that calls metaphysics fluff, that’s an assertion that’s probably informed by an extraordinarily low level of insight.

 

[The_Exodus]

“God’s will is his being, which is convertible with the good.”

Is full of words, signifying nothing we could judge as univocal, as they aren’t even properly vocal, very much using “tree” when you mean “I have no clue what concept goes here”. What would “good” mean in this context? Well, it’s that which is convertible from God’s being, isn’t it? And why does on supposed God is good?

slaps head

Slap your head until some sense gets in there, since this point is a strawman. Classical Thomistic theology has claimed for the last 700 years that we don’t speak of God univocally, but analogously.

Of course, if you want the same “concrete” language between what I mean when I say “tree” and what I mean when I say “ultimate being” you’re not going to get it, but it’s never been claimed this is possible.

touchstone:

Maybe we can look at “being” then. What does that signifiy, here, univocally?

Now this is a very good question. It does, however, show that you aren’t very knowledgeable about classical metaphysics; e.g. the “analogia entis.”

touchstone:

For a human, we can at least bind that term to our consciousness, our awareness of stimuli. But for God, we just steal the human concept, and it’s grounded in nothing, a semantic void, not even “vocal”, never mind worrying about “univocal” or “equivocal”.

You are quite vague when you say “we can bind the term to our consciousness, our awareness of stimuli.” In all honesty Touchstone, I can’t help but continue to see your bias, particularly here (but also elsewhere, when you make assertions about value obtaining, etc.) You are using language as loosely as your critique of theists repudiates. If you were to argue with yourself here, of it I wanted to, I could continually subject all your terms to scruntiny and say you haven’t said anything at all.

Further, classical theism has debated, for 700+ years, how we use the term “being” when we speak of God. Scotists say univocally, Thomists say analogously, Kantians or Fideists say equivocally. This is not a new objection.

touchstone:

That’s what I mean by the “fluff” in metaphysics. To say, “I am holding a baseball in my hand” is at some level a metaphysical statement. But that’s a statement amenable to grounded and univocal semantics, suitable for conceptualization and communication.

If language is univocal when we are speaking of material things, then we must be talking about essences. Otherwise, everything is “accidental” and no one is really getting what anyone else is saying.

Further, you just said about that “being” is a term “bound to our consciousness.” What is “fluff” if not this?

touchstone:

To say "“God’s will is his being, which is convertible with the good.” is to get nearly every other word in the sentence offending the same goals, “God”, “God’s will”, “being”, “convertible” and “the good”, all being problematic, empty, inscrutable.

I suppose the statement “we can bind being to our consciousness” is free from these errors…

touchstone:

They only suffice for communication insofar as the hearer agrees to join you in not being concerned with what those words point to conceptually, or where their semantics are grounded.

The above statement is irrational. A bunch of words, when put together that way, do not convey an intelligible statement.

“Communication” implies the exchange of “knowledge.” You ought to read books 2-4 of Aristotle’s Metaphysics.