Logical/Metaphysical Proof of the Existence of God?

[NowAgnostic]

Allow me to summarize the MTW in a less esoteric manner:

1. Something has always existed.
2. Whatever exists is either temporally necessary or temporally contingent.
3. It is possible that all contingent beings collectively fail to exist at some past time.
4. It is necessarily the case that possible truths are explicable.
5. It is necessarily the case that something is explicable only if something exists.
6. Therefore, a temporally necessary being exists.

In light of our discussion, I’m not sure which of these reformulated premises you deny. Perhaps you reject (5), but I can’t think of any way to justify the claim that something can be explicable if nothing exists.

But if nothing exists, there’s nothing to explain. Anyway, my main disagreement here is with the logic. Allow me to rephrase just a little:

1a. Necessarily, if something presently exists, it was not the case nothing existed in the past. (A premise I grant.)
1b. Something exists now. (Observation).
1c. Therefore, something has always existed. (MP)
2. Necessarily, each being is either temporally contingent or temporally eternal. (Law of Excluded Middle.)
3. Possibly, all temporally contingent beings failed to exist in the past. (A premise I grant.)
4. Necessarily, contingent facts are explicable. (I’ll grant this ad arguendo, not really convinced about it though.)
5. Necessarily, something is explicable only if something exists. (A premise I grant.)

from which you somehow conclude

1. Necessarily, if something presently exists, a temporally necessary being exists.

I do not get the logic here at all. Yet even so there’s an obvious modal fallacy. You can never end up with a necessary conclusion from a contingent premise.

The main disagreement it seems we have (feel free to point out anything you still disagree with above) is over the step from “temporally necessary being” to God.

Let’s get to that later.

 

[punkforchrist]

NowAgnostic:

But if nothing exists, there’s nothing to explain.

What about the existing past time? Or the existence of future temporally contingent beings?

Anyway, my main disagreement here is with the logic. Allow me to rephrase just a little:

1a. Necessarily, if something presently exists, it was not the case nothing existed in the past. (A premise I grant.)
1b. Something exists now. (Observation).
1c. Therefore, something has always existed. (MP)
2. Necessarily, each being is either temporally contingent or temporally eternal. (Law of Excluded Middle.)
3. Possibly, all temporally contingent beings failed to exist in the past. (A premise I grant.)
4. Necessarily, contingent facts are explicable. (I’ll grant this ad arguendo, not really convinced about it though.)
5. Necessarily, something is explicable only if something exists. (A premise I grant.)

from which you somehow conclude

1. Necessarily, if something presently exists, a temporally necessary being exists.

I do not get the logic here at all.

The only being that would exist to explain something, given the lack of any temporally contingent beings, would be a temporally necessary being.

Yet even so there’s an obvious modal fallacy. You can never end up with a necessary conclusion from a contingent premise.

The conclusion isn’t meant to be logically necessary in the first place. What the MTW is stating is that there must be a temporally necessary being in those worlds where something presently exists, but I see no reason to conclude that every possible world has something that exists in the present.

 

[NowAgnostic]

What about the existing past time? Or the existence of future temporally contingent beings?

They don’t exist. There’s no past and no future if nothing exists because there’s no time.

The only being that would exist to explain something, given the lack of any temporally contingent beings, would be a temporally necessary being.

OK we can put in
6. Necessarily, if something presently exists, and at some time in the past there were no temporally contingent beings, a temporally necessary being exists. (From 1a and 2)

We don’t even need to worry about explanations for that.

The conclusion isn’t meant to be logically necessary in the first place. What the MTW is stating is that there must be a temporally necessary being in those worlds where something presently exists, but I see no reason to conclude that every possible world has something that exists in the present.

Yes the conclusion you want is logically necessary. You want

Necessarily, if something presently exists, a temporally necessary being exists

whereas the correct modal inference is

Possibly, if something presently exists, a temporally necessary being exists.

It would indeed be another modal fallacy to go from your false inference to

If something presently exists, necessarily a temporally necessary being exists.

 

[punkforchrist]

They don’t exist. There’s no past and no future if nothing exists because there’s no time.

I asked earlier, but you may have not seen the question: Is time temporally contingent or temporally necessary?

Yes the conclusion you want is logically necessary.

How? If nothing exists at the present in some possible world, the temporally necessary being does not exist either. Hence, it is not logically necessary.

You want

Necessarily, if something presently exists, a temporally necessary being exists

whereas the correct modal inference is

Possibly, if something presently exists, a temporally necessary being exists.

It would indeed be another modal fallacy to go from your false inference to

If something presently exists, necessarily a temporally necessary being exists.

Overlooking the fact that I disagree with your conclusion about modal inference, how does this imply the logical necessity of a temporally necessary being?

 

[grannymh]

I’m willing to listen to anyone who can provide a proof of the existence of God, in his or her own words, not merely referring to Aquinas or Craig or Plantinga or anyone else, but of course you’re free to copy-and-paste from their arguments as much as you’d like. The proof should start with clearly stated metaphysical assumptions, epistemologically basic beliefs. They are necessary and it’s OK - nothing can be done without them. Then, a logically deductive, valid argument needs to be shown which concludes the existence of God. God will be defined as an infinite being (without limitations), purely actual (without any potency), and a being who, if He exists, exists necessarily, from which the traditional attributes (omnipotence, omniscience, simplicity, etc.) follow.

Would the human species be considered a demonstration of the existence of God.

Bessings,
granny

All human life is worthy of profound respect.

 

[Ridgerunner]

You guys are having a good time, and I don’t have the knowledge to enter into it, nor the desire to simply be an irritating interruption.

What this is all about of course, is the language of human reason. I am put to mind of the declaration of an Argentine writer, (Borges, I believe is his name) famously skilled for both his Spanish and English writings, that Kipling’s “Harp Song of the Dane Women” can’t really be translated into Spanish. I have asked some bilingual people to look it over, and so far, all have agreed.

What we’re talking about here is the language of humans. We don’t know the language of God, and even if we thought we did, we would have to stipulate that we’re not likely to fully or properly translate it into “human” if you can’t even translate “Harp Song of the Dane Women” from English to Spanish.

In “human” the only argument that can be had is whether human logic necessitates disbelief in God.

 

[punkforchrist]

Here’s how Maydole informally summarizes the argument:
Robert Maydole:

Assume for the reductio that (1): A temporally necessary being does not exists. This is equivalent by Premise 9 to saying that (2): Everything is temporally is contingent. (2) and Premise 1 entail that (3): Everything possibly fails to exist at some time. And (3) implies with Premise 2 that (4): It is possible that there was a time when nothing existed. On the other hand, since it is necessarily the case that something is possibly true, it follows by Premise 3 that (5): It is necessarily the case that something is explicable. Yet (5) and Premise 4 imply that (6): It is necessarily the case that there was not a time when nothing existed. Since (6) contradicts (4) a temporally necessary being exists. Call this being ‘G’.

Now from it follows Premise 5 and the existence of G that (7): Possibly G is unlimited. Premise 3 then implies that if G were possibly unlimited, its unlimitedness would be explicable, that is, that (8): If possibly G is unlimited, then possibly something explains it. (7) and (8) imply (9): It is possible that something explains the unlimitedness of G.

Assume for another reductio that (12): G is not supreme. From (12) and Premise 8 we have (13): G is not unlimited. And from (13) and Premise 6 we get (14): It is not possible for G to explain itself. Yet Premise 7 implies (15): If it is not possible for G to explain itself, then it is not possible for G to explain the unlimitedness of G. This is because nothing else can explain the unlimitedness of an unlimited being, and anything which explains its own unlimitedness must also explain itself.16 (14) and (15) imply (16): It is not possible for G to explain the unlimitedness of G. But Premise 7 also entails (17): It is not possible for anything other than G to explain the unlimitness of G. And (16) and (17) together imply (18): It is not possible that something explains the unlimitedness of G. Since (18) contradicts (9) we must conclude that the reductio assumption (12) is false, and thus that G is supreme.

You may wish to check out his two papers on this: www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Reli/ReliMayd.htm

springerlink.com/content/rxh882j335445w4m/

I especially recommend the latter. That’s where the quotation above comes from, and it is more detailed than the former.

 

[NowAgnostic]

I asked earlier, but you may have not seen the question: Is time temporally contingent or temporally necessary?

An excellent question. The definition implied by the MTW seems to say that “temporal necessity” for an entity means that there never is a time at which it fails to exist. Then time is temporally necessary, obviously. There can’t be a time when there’s no time - that would be a logical contradiction. Time isn’t God, though. So this definition doesn’t work. Note though the null-world still has no time, no past, present, or future.

If on the other hand “temporal necessity” means existing for an infinite amount of time then time could be finite and bounded so in this case time would be temporally contingent.

How? If nothing exists at the present in some possible world, the temporally necessary being does not exist either. Hence, it is not logically necessary.

Overlooking the fact that I disagree with your conclusion about modal inference, how does this imply the logical necessity of a temporally necessary being?

I’m not saying your argument implies this. It doesn’t. But it still involves a modal fallacy. Your argument goes like this (abbreviated):

1. Necessarily, if something exists now, then if all temporally contingent beings failed to exist at some time, a temporally necessary being exists.
2. Possibly, if something exists now, all temporally contingent beings failed to exist in the past.

therefore
3. Necessarily, if something exists now, a temporally necessary being exists.

1. Something exists now.
2. Therefore, a temporally necessary being exists.

Now indeed you are not concluding
5. Therefore, necessarily a temporally necessary being exists. That would be a modal fallacy.

Necessarily if a, then b does not imply if a, then necessarily b.

But how can you not see that the inference to 3. is also a fallacy. I grant 1. and 2. They don’t entail 3.
You are arguing (I don’t know to make the funny symbols for modal logic but anyway)

1. Necessarily, a → (b → c)
2. Possibly, a → b.
   therefore
3. Necessarily, a → c.

Don’t you see in order to make this inference you would need 2. Necessarily, a → b.

 

[punkforchrist]

I would agree that a modal fallacy is being committed as you state the argument above, and your analysis shows why it would if those were the only considerations, but you’re still missing the explicability premise. Let’s assume that a temporally necessary being does not exist. This would imply that every existing thing is temporally contingent. With the previous two statements in conjunction with one another, we may conclude that everything possibly fails to exist at some time. So far, I think you agree with all this, but I’m just restating it to keep us in perspective.

It is also possible, given the above summary, that there is some past time in which nothing existed. But, since something is possibly true at this time, it follows necessarily that something is explicable. Now, if literally nothing at all exists, then there is no such thing as explicability, which is a contradiction. From this, and the fact that there are presumably no temporally contingent beings existing, it follows that a temporally necessary being exists.

Now, you stated earlier that in the null world nothing exists, so there’s nothing capable of explicability anyway. However, this misses the point about the nature of explicability; for, so long as something exists in another possible world, explicability remains.

For the record, I agree that God and time aren’t synonymous.

 

[NowAgnostic]

I would agree that a modal fallacy is being committed as you state the argument above, and your analysis shows why it would if those were the only considerations…

Good, glad you see it.

…but you’re still missing the explicability premise. Let’s assume that a temporally necessary being does not exist. This would imply that every existing thing is temporally contingent. With the previous two statements in conjunction with one another, we may conclude that everything possibly fails to exist at some time. So far, I think you agree with all this, but I’m just restating it to keep us in perspective.

I don’t agree with this. Let’s look at the first premise again, for it is the key to your argument. It would help if you phrase things in the traditional modal fashion like I am doing.

1. Necessarily, if something exists now, then if all temporally contingent beings failed to exist at some time, a temporally necessary being exists.

Now from modus tollens we have:
1a. Necessarily, if something exists now, if a temporally necessary being does not exist, all temporally contingent beings did not fail to exist at some time.

From the law of excluded middle, we can therefore conclude that
1b. Necessarily, if something exists now, something always existed.

Your explicability condition results in a revised 1, which I’ll call 1*. I’m not sure I buy your explicability condition anyway, but I’ll let it go for now.

1*. Necessarily, if something exists now, then if possibly all temporally contingent beings failed to exist at some time, a temporally necessary being exists.

This is different than before.

But again from MT:

1*a. Necessarily, if something exists now, if a temporally necessary being does not exist, it is impossible that all temporally contingent beings failed to exist at some time.

So either way assuming a temporally necessary being does not exist does not result in a “time” in which nothing existed.

It is also possible, given the above summary, that there is some past time in which nothing existed.

This is exactly what you said before. Of course, when I said “some time” above, I mean “the same time”, because for nothing to exist, all temporally contingent beings must fail to exist at the same “time” (which I maintain is a logically impossibility in itself, but anyway).

But, since something is possibly true at this time, it follows necessarily that something is explicable. Now, if literally nothing at all exists, then there is no such thing as explicability, which is a contradiction. From this, and the fact that there are presumably no temporally contingent beings existing, it follows that a temporally necessary being exists.

Yes but I have shown what you maintain to be possibly true to be in fact impossible, given premise 1 or revised premise 1*. However I don’t accept your explicability premise entails 1*. All it does is entail that a null-world is impossible.

 

[punkforchrist]

NowAgnostic:

I don’t agree with this. Let’s look at the first premise again, for it is the key to your argument. It would help if you phrase things in the traditional modal fashion like I am doing.

1. Necessarily, if something exists now, then if all temporally contingent beings failed to exist at some time, a temporally necessary being exists.

Now from modus tollens we have:
1a. Necessarily, if something exists now, if a temporally necessary being does not exist, all temporally contingent beings did not fail to exist at some time.

From the law of excluded middle, we can therefore conclude that
1b. Necessarily, if something exists now, something always existed.

Your explicability condition results in a revised 1, which I’ll call 1*. I’m not sure I buy your explicability condition anyway, but I’ll let it go for now.

The explicability premise is an independent premise, but I won’t be picky.

1*. Necessarily, if something exists now, then if possibly all temporally contingent beings failed to exist at some time, a temporally necessary being exists.

This is different than before.

But again from MT:

1*a. Necessarily, if something exists now, if a temporally necessary being does not exist, it is impossible that all temporally contingent beings failed to exist at some time.

You’re basically presenting a reductio ad absurdum argument. Of course, the consequent of your (1*a) above is this: □~p. Or, more vividly, ~◊p. You allude to this explicitly by stating that it is impossible that all temporally contingent beings should fail to exist at the same time.

If this is what your objection comes down to, then I’m afraid I’m not at all persuaded. It is extremely counter-intuitive for one thing, but more importantly, it entails a universal negative. Just on epistemic grounds, can you demonstrate any contradiction in the idea of all temporally contingent beings failing to exist at the same time? If not, then we are epistemically justified in concluding that there is at least one possible world in which this state of affairs is instantiated.

So either way assuming a temporally necessary being does not exist does not result in a “time” in which nothing existed.

The problem here, as before, is that something presently does exist, which (granting the explicability premise) means that “a state of affairs in which no temporally contingent beings exist is explicable” holds in the actual world.

This is exactly what you said before. Of course, when I said “some time” above, I mean “the same time”, because for nothing to exist, all temporally contingent beings must fail to exist at the same “time” (which I maintain is a logically impossibility in itself, but anyway).

This is an important point, but I don’t want to get hung up on the nature of time.

Yes but I have shown what you maintain to be possibly true to be in fact impossible, given premise 1 or revised premise 1*. However I don’t accept your explicability premise entails 1*. All it does is entail that a null-world is impossible.

See above. I think your objection amounts to a misplaced modality, e.g. the impossibility of p. This is what the objector must demonstrate. The claim of the argument is precisely that a temporally necessary being must exist in those worlds where something exists in the present. So, it begs the question to use ~◊p as a premise in favor of the conclusion that something presently exists and may have been preceded by only temporally contingent beings.

 

[punkforchrist]

Here is what this all basically comes down to. Let p = it is possible that all temporally contingent beings collectively fail to exist at some past time; r = a temporally necessary being exists; and s = nothing exists at some past time.

1. □(~◊s → ~◊p ^ r])

What I’m suggesting is that:

2a. ~~◊p

Or, ◊p.

On the other hand, in order for your objection to work, we have to have:

2b. □(~◊p)

The simplification of (2b) is, of course, ~◊p. I can’t think of any way to justify (2b).

 

[NowAgnostic]

If this is what your objection comes down to, then I’m afraid I’m not at all persuaded. It is extremely counter-intuitive for one thing, but more importantly, it entails a universal negative. Just on epistemic grounds, can you demonstrate any contradiction in the idea of all temporally contingent beings failing to exist at the same time? If not, then we are epistemically justified in concluding that there is at least one possible world in which this state of affairs is instantiated.

The problem here, as before, is that something presently does exist, which (granting the explicability premise) means that “a state of affairs in which no temporally contingent beings exist is explicable” holds in the actual world.

See above. I think your objection amounts to a misplaced modality, e.g. the impossibility of p. This is what the objector must demonstrate. The claim of the argument is precisely that a temporally necessary being must exist in those worlds where something exists in the present. So, it begs the question to use ~◊p as a premise in favor of the conclusion that something presently exists and may have been preceded by only temporally contingent beings.

I agree the way I put it might be question-begging. However, I think the modalities are also misplaced in your own argument. Will you agree that this is a fair summary of the MTW:

1. Necessarily, if something exists now, then if possibly all temporally contingent beings failed to exist at the same time in the past, a temporally necessary being exists.
2. Necessarily, if something exists now, then possibly all temporally contingent beings failed to exist at the same time in the past.
3. Therefore, necessarily, if something exists now, a temporally necessary being exists.

This argument is certainly valid. However premise 2 is false. As you point out, we can indeed epistemically conceive of a world in which all temporally contingent beings failed to exist at some point in the past. This would support

1. Possibly, if something exists now, then possibly all temporally contingent beings failed to exist at the same time in the past.

But that is not sufficient to support the inference to 3. Is it true that in **all **worlds where something exists, it is possible for all temporally contingent beings to fail to exist. The answer is no. We can also epistemically conceive of a world in which such a thing is impossible. A world in which, when one temporally contingent entity is destroyed, another is created, is one in which no matter how far you go back you will never arrive at a point when there is nothing.

As an aside, if you maintain that only things, but not facts, need explanations, then what exactly is there to explain about the null-world?

 

[punkforchrist]

NowAgnostic:

I agree the way I put it might be question-begging. However, I think the modalities are also misplaced in your own argument. Will you agree that this is a fair summary of the MTW:

1. Necessarily, if something exists now, then if possibly all temporally contingent beings failed to exist at the same time in the past, a temporally necessary being exists.
2. Necessarily, if something exists now, then possibly all temporally contingent beings failed to exist at the same time in the past.
3. Therefore, necessarily, if something exists now, a temporally necessary being exists.

As a tentative summary, that’s fine. I would prefer to flesh the argument out more, though, including the modification of a “possibility” premise that you refer to below.

This argument is certainly valid. However premise 2 is false. As you point out, we can indeed epistemically conceive of a world in which all temporally contingent beings failed to exist at some point in the past. This would support

1. Possibly, if something exists now, then possibly all temporally contingent beings failed to exist at the same time in the past.

But that is not sufficient to support the inference to 3. Is it true that in **all **worlds where something exists, it is possible for all temporally contingent beings to fail to exist. The answer is no.

I would say yes. If X is true in W, then it is also true in W* that X is true in W. This means that “X is true in W” is explicable in W*.

We can also epistemically conceive of a world in which such a thing is impossible. A world in which, when one temporally contingent entity is destroyed, another is created, is one in which no matter how far you go back you will never arrive at a point when there is nothing.

There’s nothing about this scenario that would preclude the existence of a temporally necessary being, and given the above analysis, we have to take into consideration the explicability of possibilia.

As an aside, if you maintain that only things, but not facts, need explanations, then what exactly is there to explain about the null-world?

Well, I’m persuaded that only things can explain anything. Facts are abstract objects, and abstract objects don’t stand in causal relations. I’m also hesitant to give the label of “null-world” to our hypothetical scenario. A null-world has no past, present, or future. Our scenario, on the other hand, allows for something to exist at some temporal designation, even if not at one or more particular “times”.

 

[NowAgnostic]

As a tentative summary, that’s fine. I would prefer to flesh the argument out more, though, including the modification of a “possibility” premise that you refer to below.

OK. What does it mean to say something is possible (or impossible) in the actual world or in any world? Or that there are worlds in which X is not possible. Modal logicians say this type of thing. Now it can’t be merely that X does not exist in that world. What it is meant is that there is something in that world which makes X logically impossible, even though in itself X is possible.

So this is the difference between
Necessarily, if something exists, then possibly all temporal beings fail to exist at the same time
and
Possibly, if something exists then possibly all temporal beings fail to exist at the same time

I concede the latter. Certainly, if things just pop in and out of existence, then logically it is possible they all pop out of existence.
I deny the former. If a feature of the world in question is that when something is destroyed, another something is created, then it is logically impossible they all pop out of existence.

I would say yes. If X is true in W, then it is also true in W* that X is true in W. This means that “X is true in W” is explicable in W*.

Fine but then W* could be a null-world. For whatever thing in W explains X, it is also true in W* that that thing in W explains X.

There’s nothing about this scenario that would preclude the existence of a temporally necessary being, and given the above analysis, we have to take into consideration the explicability of possibilia.

Well, I’m persuaded that only things can explain anything. Facts are abstract objects, and abstract objects don’t stand in causal relations. I’m also hesitant to give the label of “null-world” to our hypothetical scenario. A null-world has no past, present, or future. Our scenario, on the other hand, allows for something to exist at some temporal designation, even if not at one or more particular “times”.

OK I’ll call it pseudo-null-world if you prefer. My question is what is necessary to explain, facts or things? Do you maintain that facts are not in need of explanation? If so, how can a thing be an explanation of another thing?

 

[NowAgnostic]

Pfc, while sometimes modal logic makes my head spin, and it’s always possible to make a mistake, the MTW is simply fallacious and here is 100% knock-down refutation. Modal logic is simply a way of dealing with the space of logically possible universes, so I can make the point clearer by specifically dividing up the space. The complete space of logically possible universes does not change with the addition of some parameter such as the existence of a temporally necessary being - that only defines a subspace.

Now what I am saying is the space is divided into:

1. Universes with only temporally contingent beings, but there was no point at which all temporally contingent beings failed to exist.
2. Universes with temporally contingent and temporally necessary beings, but there was no point at which all temporally contingent beings failed to exist.
3. Universes with temporally contingent and temporally necessary beings, and there was a point at which all temporally contingent beings failed to exist.
4. Universes with only temporally necessary beings.
5. The null-universe.

The MTW wants me to assume a temporally necessary being does not exist. The subspace then consists of:

1. Universes with only temporally contingent beings, but there was no point at which all temporally contingent beings failed to exist.
2. The null-universe.

There are still possible universes besides the null-universe. Therefore I am not forced to conclude a temporally necessary being exists in the actual world.

The MTW wants me to admit the logical possibility of all temporally contingent beings failing to exist at some point. Certainly, that’s universe space 3.

But then the MTW wants me to admit the logical possibility of all temporal contingent beings failing to exist at some point if a temporally necessary being does not exist. But, says the MTW, that’s logically impossible. Therefore, a temporally necessary being exists. This argument is fallacious. We have now a 6th hypothetical category:
6. Universes with only temporally contingent beings, and there was a point at which all temporally contingent beings failed to exist.
Either this is logically possible, or it is not. If it is not, it is because it implies some logical contradiction. This is prior to whether a temporally necessary being is assumed or not. The complete space of logically possible universes doesn’t change based on what subset is being examined.

And in fact 6 does imply a contradiction; it would imply a point at which nothing at all existed, even time. Obviously there can’t be a “time” when time doesn’t exist; that’s a contradiction in itself. But if time doesn’t exist, nothing can change since time is a measure of change.

 

[punkforchrist]

OK. What does it mean to say something is possible (or impossible) in the actual world or in any world? Or that there are worlds in which X is not possible. Modal logicians say this type of thing. Now it can’t be merely that X does not exist in that world. What it is meant is that there is something in that world which makes X logically impossible, even though in itself X is possible.

So this is the difference between
Necessarily, if something exists, then possibly all temporal beings fail to exist at the same time
and
Possibly, if something exists then possibly all temporal beings fail to exist at the same time

I concede the latter. Certainly, if things just pop in and out of existence, then logically it is possible they all pop out of existence.
I deny the former. If a feature of the world in question is that when something is destroyed, another something is created, then it is logically impossible they all pop out of existence.

The latter actually entails the former via the law of modal equivalence. ◊p = □◊p. If you are willing to grant the possibility that all temporally contingent beings should fail to exist at the same time, then for the sake of consistency, you would also have to grant that it is necessarily possible.

Fine but then W* could be a null-world. For whatever thing in W explains X, it is also true in W* that that thing in W explains X.

Well, a null-world would have literally nothing in it, so there wouldn’t even be possibilia. As a result, there would be no explicability except in a world where something exists.

I admit I’m not understanding this whole explicability thing. I admit that a world in which there was at some “temporal designation” nothing, and now there is something, is not possible.

Okay.

OK I’ll call it pseudo-null-world if you prefer. My question is what is necessary to explain, facts or things? Do you maintain that facts are not in need of explanation? If so, how can a thing be an explanation of another thing?

I haven’t completely decided whether I believe all facts require an explanation. I do accept the conclusion that all things require an explanation, but my argument only assumes that they possibly have an explanation. Let’s say that “Jones is sitting under a tree” is an unexplained brute contingent fact. Even if this is so, it does not follow that the existence of Jones himself is unexplained. Jones exists only because of his parents, the surrounding environment, and so forth.

 

[punkforchrist]

NowAgnostic:

. . . We have now a 6th hypothetical category:
6. Universes with only temporally contingent beings, and there was a point at which all temporally contingent beings failed to exist.
Either this is logically possible, or it is not. If it is not, it is because it implies some logical contradiction. This is prior to whether a temporally necessary being is assumed or not. The complete space of logically possible universes doesn’t change based on what subset is being examined.

And in fact 6 does imply a contradiction; it would imply a point at which nothing at all existed, even time. Obviously there can’t be a “time” when time doesn’t exist; that’s a contradiction in itself. But if time doesn’t exist, nothing can change since time is a measure of change.

Well, (6) doesn’t entail the proposition that a temporally necessary being doesn’t exist. I’m afraid I’m not sure where you think the refutation of MTW took place above. If we say that time is temporally necessary, then (6) is possible, but of course, I admit that would somewhat obscure the nature of the temporally necessary being. If we say it’s not possible that all temporally contingent beings fail to exist at the same time, then it’s still a matter of question-begging. One needs to already assume the impossibility of this in order to support the conclusion that (6) is necessarily false.

 

[NowAgnostic]

The latter actually entails the former via the law of modal equivalence. ◊p = □◊p.

Depends on which system of modal logic you are using. That law doesn’t exist in all systems. But if you want to use S5, you would be correct in what you said above, but now the argument has not been correctly stated.

S5 is problematic BTW for certain philosophical concepts. The concept of “potency” is meaningless in S5. No one would say an elephant is potentially a frog, yet there are logically possible universes where elephants transmogrify into frogs. We say it’s “impossible” for me to travel faster than the speed of light, yet there are logically possible universes where I travel 10X faster, where 10X faster than the speed of light is the “speed limit” in them.

If you are willing to grant the possibility that all temporally contingent beings should fail to exist at the same time, then for the sake of consistency, you would also have to grant that it is necessarily possible.

Again it depends on the system of modal logic being used. I would say there are worlds in which it is possible and worlds in which it is not (meaning, considering all worlds accessible from the starting worlds), so possibly doesn’t mean necessarily possible. But that’s not something that can be said in S5. But if you want to use S5 you have to grant me an accessibility relation to all worlds too. If you want to use S5 that’s fine and you are correct in what you say about premise 2 but now the premise

1. Necessarily, if something exists now, then if possibly all temporally contingent beings failed to exist at the same time in the past, a temporally necessary being exists.

is meaningless in S5. “If possibly” is a meaningless construction in S5 because now the subset of worlds can’t be divided into those where it is possible and where it isn’t. And a contingent fact in W1 can’t entail something in W2. I’d accept

1. Necessarily, if something exists now, then if all temporally contingent beings failed to exist at the same time in the past, a temporally necessary being exists.

in S5 coupled with
2. Possibly, all temporally contingent beings failed to exist at the same time in the past.

But that doesn’t allow you to infer that necessarily, if something exists now, a temporally necessary being exists.

Well, a null-world would have literally nothing in it, so there wouldn’t even be possibilia. As a result, there would be no explicability except in a world where something exists.

So you are saying a null-world is therefore impossible because it is logically necessary that there be something to explain? A little lost here, sorry.

I haven’t completely decided whether I believe all facts require an explanation. I do accept the conclusion that all things require an explanation, but my argument only assumes that they possibly have an explanation.

That means that if there is one logically possible world without a temporally necessary being in which all things have an explanation, then your argument is refuted. I postulate it here: a universe in which 1) when some object is destroyed, another is created; and 2) in which there is an object which is destroyed in another possible world, but in point of fact exists for eternity in the actual world. Yet, there is no object which, if it exists, must logically continue to exist, is logically impossible of being destroyed. To rebut this you must either show this universe is logically impossible or that in fact not all things have an explanation.

Let’s say that “Jones is sitting under a tree” is an unexplained brute contingent fact. Even if this is so, it does not follow that the existence of Jones himself is unexplained. Jones exists only because of his parents, the surrounding environment, and so forth.

And how does all this explain the existence of Jones? I really need a good workable definition of what constitutes an “explanation”.

 

[punkforchrist]

Depends on which system of modal logic you are using. That law doesn’t exist in all systems. But if you want to use S5, you would be correct in what you said above, but now the argument has not been correctly stated.

S5 is problematic BTW for certain philosophical concepts. The concept of “potency” is meaningless in S5. No one would say an elephant is potentially a frog, yet there are logically possible universes where elephants transmogrify into frogs. We say it’s “impossible” for me to travel faster than the speed of light, yet there are logically possible universes where I travel 10X faster, where 10X faster than the speed of light is the “speed limit” in them.

Those things are still meaningful, even if they are not capable of being actualized in this world. In any case, I assume you accept S5. Correct me if I’m wrong, though.

Again it depends on the system of modal logic being used. I would say there are worlds in which it is possible and worlds in which it is not (meaning, considering all worlds accessible from the starting worlds), so possibly doesn’t mean necessarily possible. But that’s not something that can be said in S5. But if you want to use S5 you have to grant me an accessibility relation to all worlds too. If you want to use S5 that’s fine and you are correct in what you say about premise 2 but now the premise

1. Necessarily, if something exists now, then if possibly all temporally contingent beings failed to exist at the same time in the past, a temporally necessary being exists.

is meaningless in S5. “If possibly” is a meaningless construction in S5 because now the subset of worlds can’t be divided into those where it is possible and where it isn’t. And a contingent fact in W1 can’t entail something in W2.

What leads you to believe these worlds can’t be divided? Again, I’m not sure what you mean by saying that it’s “meaningless” in S5.

So you are saying a null-world is therefore impossible because it is logically necessary that there be something to explain? A little lost here, sorry.

Necessary in those worlds where something presently exists. Possibilia are explicable in the actual world, even assuming that there was never a time in which there were no temporally contingent beings. One such possibility, even if it’s not an actuality, is that there was such a “time”.

That means that if there is one logically possible world without a temporally necessary being in which all things have an explanation, then your argument is refuted. I postulate it here: a universe in which 1) when some object is destroyed, another is created; and 2) in which there is an object which is destroyed in another possible world, but in point of fact exists for eternity in the actual world. Yet, there is no object which, if it exists, must logically continue to exist, is logically impossible of being destroyed. To rebut this you must either show this universe is logically impossible or that in fact not all things have an explanation.

We might call such a world W. In W, there is always at least one existing temporally contingent being. Yet, we may also consider W*, in which there was a past time in which no temporally contingent being existed. It is true in W that in W* there was a past time in which no temporally contingent being existed. This means that whatever is true in W* is explicable in W, but no temporally contingent being can explain the existence of a temporally necessary being. Hence, the explicability found in W can only be the result of a temporally necessary being.

And how does all this explain the existence of Jones? I really need a good workable definition of what constitutes an “explanation”.

Entire libraries of books have been written on this subject. I thought you just wanted a rough-and-ready definition, something that might be best illustrated through the use of connotation (as opposed to strict denotation). I hope you don’t mind that I don’t have enough time right now to defend a comprehensive definition. By the way, have you read Pruss’ The Principle of Sufficient Reason: A Reassessment? If you can get through some of the wordiness, it’s a great resource.

I’ll let you have the last word on this, since it appears we are at an impasse. If you’d like, we can continue discussing the MCA.