Logical/Metaphysical Proof of the Existence of God?

[NowAgnostic]

Well, (6) doesn’t entail the proposition that a temporally necessary being doesn’t exist.

Where did I say it did? I put 6 forward as a hypothetical subspace of all logically possible universes. I can define 6 anyway I wish. Of course by definition 6, as I defined it, does not contain a temporally necessary being since all beings in those universes are temporally contingent.

I’m afraid I’m not sure where you think the refutation of MTW took place above.

Read again. I showed that existence of something, plus the possibility of universes where all temporally contingent beings were at some point not in existence, did not entail the existence of a temporally necessary being by examining the subspaces of logically possible universes.

If we say that time is temporally necessary, then (6) is possible, but of course, I admit that would somewhat obscure the nature of the temporally necessary being.

(6) would not be possible then. Only temporally contingent beings exist there.

If we say it’s not possible that all temporally contingent beings fail to exist at the same time, then it’s still a matter of question-begging. One needs to already assume the impossibility of this in order to support the conclusion that (6) is necessarily false.

It isn’t question-begging when you are refuting an argument to use one of its premises or a conclusion of one of its premises. Assuming the argument is sound, its premises must be true, so one is certainly allowed to use a conclusion of one the premises in the refutation. If the conclusion refutes the argument, it’s invalid.

I guess I can’t make you see how silly the MTW really is. It’s arguing (in S5)

1. If a temporally necessary being does not exist, then it is impossible that all temporally contingent beings were at one point not in existence.
2. But it is possible that all temporally contingent beings were at one point not in existence.
3. Therefore, a temporally necessary being exists.

But you can’t argue from a contingent fact or hypothetical contingent fact in the actual world or any set of possible worlds to a necessary fact! That’s what 1 attempts to do.

 

[punkforchrist]

One final note: the use of S5 in support of one of the premises does not entail the use of S5 as we form a conjunction between premises. We might say:

1. All men are mortal.
2. Socrates is a man.
3. Therefore, Socrates is mortal.

Both premises use induction, and yet, the form of the argument is deductive. The same is true with respect to my use of S5 in the MTW. You may already be aware of this, but I thought it prudent to point out in case anyone else was confused.

NowAgnostic:

Where did I say it did? I put 6 forward as a hypothetical subspace of all logically possible universes. I can define 6 anyway I wish. Of course by definition 6, as I defined it, does not contain a temporally necessary being since all beings in those universes are temporally contingent.

You may define any premise you like, of course. I do find it interesting, though, that we both agree that (6) is impossible. Doesn’t a denial of (6) imply the existence of a temporally necessary being - even if it is time itself?

 

[NowAgnostic]

Those things are still meaningful, even if they are not capable of being actualized in this world.

No, “not capable of being actualized in this world” is meaningless in S5, and implies a lesser modal logical system than S5. What is implied is a lesser logical system in which all logically possible universes aren’t accessible to ours - in none of the universes in the subset of universes accessible to ours is the thing actualized.

Take the statement “it’s impossible for anything to travel faster than light”. In S5 the statement is false. There are logically possible universes in which things travel faster than light. But of course the statement has meaning in another, implied logical system with the accessibility relation of other possible universes with the same form of the laws of physics as ours.

In any case, I assume you accept S5. Correct me if I’m wrong, though.

I accept S5, but it’s just a matter of how you choose to look at things and/or what’s convenient. Accessibility relations are pretty much whatever you want them to be.

What leads you to believe these worlds can’t be divided?

Because in S5 every logically possible universe is accessible from every other one.

Again, I’m not sure what you mean by saying that it’s “meaningless” in S5.

Because when we say “if a”, we mean in the subset of worlds in which a is true. “If possibly a” means in the subset of worlds in which a is possibly true, which is meaningless in S5. If a in fact does not entail a logical contradiction, then this subset is all possible worlds (because in S5 every logically possible world is accessible from every other one), and therefore “if possibly a” means the same thing as “necessarily”. If a does entail a logical contradiction, by the same argument “if possibly a” means the same thing as “necessarily not” (only applied to the subspace of universes in which Z is true if the construction is “if Z then if possibly a then…”)

So in S5 the premise

1. Necessarily, if something exists now, then if possibly all temporally contingent beings failed to exist at the same time in the past, a temporally necessary being exists.

is equivalent to

1. Necessarily, if something exists now, then if possibly I am president of the United States, a temporally necessary being exists.

is equivalent to

1. Necessarily, if something exists now, a temporally necessary being exists.

You don’t need any fancy argumentation about what is “explicable”. The problem is justifying the premise of course.

Necessary in those worlds where something presently exists.

I know what you mean here: necessarily, if something exists, it must be explicable. It’s OK: I’m using a similar kind of sloppy language above.

Possibilia are explicable in the actual world, even assuming that there was never a time in which there were no temporally contingent beings. One such possibility, even if it’s not an actuality, is that there was such a “time”.

Fine, but again, “explicable in the actual world” is meaningless in S5 if the definition of “X is explicable” is “there is a possible world which X is explained”. X may be completely unexplained in the actual world. Yet, it is explicable if there is a possible world where it is.

We might call such a world W. In W, there is always at least one existing temporally contingent being. Yet, we may also consider W*, in which there was a past time in which no temporally contingent being existed. It is true in W that in W* there was a past time in which no temporally contingent being existed.

OK, no problem here.

This means that whatever is true in W* is explicable in W, but no temporally contingent being can explain the existence of a temporally necessary being. Hence, the explicability found in W can only be the result of a temporally necessary being.

Right, and the temporally necessary being exists in W* but not in W. It is true in W that the temporally necessary being exists in W*, and there is the explanation. Surely you can’t be insisting that everything that exists in the actual world could be an explanation for everything that exists in every possible world? Following your logic, my parents exist in every possible world. I must be explicable. My parents explain me. So even in world W where I don’t exist, it is true in W* (the actual world), thus it is true in W that I exist in W*, I must be explicable in W, therefore my parents exist in W?

Entire libraries of books have been written on this subject. I thought you just wanted a rough-and-ready definition, something that might be best illustrated through the use of connotation (as opposed to strict denotation). I hope you don’t mind that I don’t have enough time right now to defend a comprehensive definition.

That’s fine, but you didn’t even give a rough-and-ready definition.

By the way, have you read Pruss’ The Principle of Sufficient Reason: A Reassessment? If you can get through some of the wordiness, it’s a great resource.

Well I’m reading it on books.google.com now.

I’ll let you have the last word on this, since it appears we are at an impasse. If you’d like, we can continue discussing the MCA.

OK.

 

[NowAgnostic]

One final note: the use of S5 in support of one of the premises does not entail the use of S5 as we form a conjunction between premises. We might say:

1. All men are mortal.
2. Socrates is a man.
3. Therefore, Socrates is mortal.

Both premises use induction, and yet, the form of the argument is deductive. The same is true with respect to my use of S5 in the MTW. You may already be aware of this, but I thought it prudent to point out in case anyone else was confused.

Yes, but when your premises contain modal descriptors like “necessarily” or “possibly” you can’t use S5 in support of the premises and switch to a different system when you form conjunctions, because “necessarily” and “possibly” don’t have the same meaning and the modal relations aren’t the same. For instance, the relations that what is possible is necessarily possible and what is necessary is necessarily necessary aren’t true in all systems.

You may define any premise you like, of course. I do find it interesting, though, that we both agree that (6) is impossible. Doesn’t a denial of (6) imply the existence of a temporally necessary being - even if it is time itself?

1. Universes with only temporally contingent beings, and there was a point at which all temporally contingent beings failed to exist.

Depends on the definition of “temporally necessary”. If the definition of a temporally necessary being is that, if it exists, it is logically impossible for it to fail to exist at any time, then time is temporally necessary. There can’t be a time when there’s no time. If there is added to the definition of a temporally necessary being is that it must exist for an infinity of time, then time could be finite and hence not temporally necessary.

 

[punkforchrist]

Let’s move on, then, to the MCA. I’ll state it again for a refresher:

1. It is possible that the collection of all contingent beings has an external cause.
2. If an external cause exists, that cause is a necessary being.
3. Hence, a necessary being possibly exists.
4. Whatever is possibly necessary exists in all possible worlds.
5. Therefore, a necessary being exists in the actual world.

As stated before, this argument definitely does make use of S5. If you are willing to grant S5, then the only premises that need to be examined are (1) and (2). I take (2) to be conceptually self-evident, and (1) to be rather benign.

Notice I also modified the argument from a form of the W-PSR to a W-CP (“weak causal principle”). That’s why the new (1) has left out the notion of “explanation”, and substitutes instead the notion of basic causality. I figure that may help circumvent any difficulties that may arise in trying to understand what it means for one thing to explain another.

 

[NowAgnostic]

Let’s move on, then, to the MCA. I’ll state it again for a refresher:

1. It is possible that the collection of all contingent beings has an external cause.
2. If an external cause exists, that cause is a necessary being.
3. Hence, a necessary being possibly exists.
4. Whatever is possibly necessary exists in all possible worlds.
5. Therefore, a necessary being exists in the actual world.

As stated before, this argument definitely does make use of S5. If you are willing to grant S5, then the only premises that need to be examined are (1) and (2). I take (2) to be conceptually self-evident, and (1) to be rather benign.

I’ll grant (3) through (5) follow from (1) and (2) in S5 which I accept.

There is a hidden premise in your argument though which should be made explicit in going from (1) to (2) to make the argument valid. You are assuming all causes are beings (ontological entities). Otherwise the cause external to the collection of all contingent beings could itself be contingent if it is not a being. So let me rewrite the argument slightly so it is unquestioningly valid:

1. It is possible that the collection of all contingent beings has an external cause. (Premise)
2. All causes are beings (Premise)
3. All existent beings are contingent or necessary (LEM)
4. All existent causes are contingent beings or necessary beings. (2 & 3)
5. An external cause cannot be a contingent being, since then it would be part of the collection of all contingent beings and not external. (Definition of external)
6. If an external cause exists, that cause is a necessary being. (4 & 5)
7. Hence, a necessary being possibly exists. (1 & 6)
8. Whatever is possibly necessary exists in all possible worlds. (S5 Axiom)
9. Therefore, a necessary being exists in the actual world. (S5 Axiom)

Premise (2) is OK in theory if you admit actions as ontological entities or beings. For instance, this post exists because I typed it. My typing must be an ontological entity then. Most metaphysicians AFAIK wouldn’t have a problem with that.

But now premises (2) and (1) are logically contradictory.

Let’s look at (1). It “seems” (1) must be benign but let’s see where it goes in S5.

1. It is possible that the collection of all contingent beings has an external cause. (Premise)
2. The collection of all contingent beings exists contingently (Premise)
3. If a cause exists, its effect exists. (Definition of cause).
4. An existing entity is either contingent or necessary (LEM)
5. If a cause necessarily exists, its effect necessarily exists (3 & K axiom).
6. If the external cause of the collection of all contingent beings exists necessarily, then the collection of all contingent beings exists necessarily. (from 5)
7. The collection of all contingent beings does not exist necessarily (2 & 4)
8. Therefore, the external cause of the collection of all contingent beings is contingent. (6, 7, MT).

(1) is your own premise. (2) is easily shown - if the collection exists necessarily then each member of the collection exists necessarily and there are no contingent beings, contrary to the assumption that there are. (3) is just the definition of cause (not to be confused with the idea that a cause logically entails the effect - it doesn’t). (4) should not be controversial. (5) should not be controversial in S5. (6), (7), and (8) should be obvious.

But now, combining (8) from here with (5) from above (An external cause cannot be a contingent being) then we get that an external cause cannot be a being, contrary to premise (2) above.

 

[punkforchrist]

I’m going to add an asterisk next to each of the premises of your counter-argument in order to avoid confusion. I disagree with 3* and 5*. Each premise, in its own way, makes use of the Rowe/van Inwagen objection, except instead of saying that the explicans entails the explicandum, we are saying that the cause entails the effect. I realize you say that 3* doesn’t mean this, but I see no way the counter-argument can work without it. 5*, of course, relies on 3* and system K’s necessitation rule (the latter of which I agree with, and is standard in any modal logic).

What you will need to demonstrate in order for your objection to be successful is that a cause cannot exist without its effect. More specifically, you would need to show why a necessary cause cannot exist without a necessary effect. There may very well be some fact that impresses the necessary being to create some world W* instead of W. The contingency of all facts does not entail the contingency of all causes.

Also, in my original premise (2), I’m not supposing that the “cause” is an action per se. Rather, it is the entity by which that action is brought about. In this case, we have even more reason to say that a cause does not necessitate its effect.

 

[NowAgnostic]

I’m going to add an asterisk next to each of the premises of your counter-argument in order to avoid confusion. I disagree with 3* and 5*. Each premise, in its own way, makes use of the Rowe/van Inwagen objection, except instead of saying that the explicans entails the explicandum, we are saying that the cause entails the effect. I realize you say that 3* doesn’t mean this, but I see no way the counter-argument can work without it. 5*, of course, relies on 3* and system K’s necessitation rule (the latter of which I agree with, and is standard in any modal logic).

What you will need to demonstrate in order for your objection to be successful is that a cause cannot exist without its effect. More specifically, you would need to show why a necessary cause cannot exist without a necessary effect.

I see you agree with 5* given 3* and the necessitation rule. So the point of contention then is

3*. If a cause exists, its effect exists.

I can easily demonstrate this under the normal understanding of what a cause is. Under the normal understanding, this is true by definition of what a cause is. Surely you’d agree with “A is the cause of B” entails B? I was guilty of sloppy language when I said a “cause does not entail the effect”. What I meant was the existence of something which happens to be a cause in a particular world does not logically entail the effect in every world in which it exists. However, the fact that it does happen to be a cause does entail the effect. What I meant was this:

Let’s posit some entity A, which may or may not cause B; A causes B in some worlds and not in others. Thus B is not logically entailed merely by A’s existence. But in those worlds in which A exists and B does not A is not a cause of B! The fact that A is a cause of B entails that B exists. In those worlds, A exists, true, but not as the cause of B. But in every world in which A exists as the cause of B, B exists. You can of course posit other worlds in which A causes C, which again leads to three possibilities: A causing nothing, A causing B, or A causing C. Again the fact that A is a cause of C entails that C exists. And so on.

This is looking at A being the “cause of B” as A having a contingent attribute of causing B, the normal way of looking at things, that contingent attribute however implying something ontological (e.g. A acting to cause B).

There may very well be some fact that impresses the necessary being to create some world W* instead of W. The contingency of all facts does not entail the contingency of all causes.

Yes it does, and demonstrably in your specific example if a contingent fact determines what is going to be caused. The cause is not necessary. W instead of W* could have been created had the contingent fact been different, and therefore the cause would have been different. In W the agent is the cause of W, not W*, and in W* the agent is the cause of W*, not W.

Surely you would agree with “a necessary being is the cause of W” entails W? (There’s another problem here with the idea of divine simplicity but I’ll let that go for now.)

Also, in my original premise (2), I’m not supposing that the “cause” is an action per se. Rather, it is the entity by which that action is brought about. In this case, we have even more reason to say that a cause does not necessitate its effect.

If what you mean is that the mere existence of the entity does not entail the action being brought about and hence the effect I agree. But that entity is not a cause in those worlds where that action is not brought about. It seems you mean something different by “cause” though than what I am understanding. I have to leave now so I’ll start thinking about it and be back later.

 

[punkforchrist]

Yeah, I think we are using “cause” in two different ways. You seem to be using it as a verb, and I as a noun. (1) should be interpreted like this: It is possible that the collection of all contingent beings is caused by an external being. The “cause” in question is the being that causes, rather than the action itself. This is one of many “normal understandings” of “cause.” After all, Aristotle listed four different types of causes, so I don’t think we have to stick to only one definition.

 

[NowAgnostic]

Yeah, I think we are using “cause” in two different ways. You seem to be using it as a verb, and I as a noun. (1) should be interpreted like this: It is possible that the collection of all contingent beings is caused by an external being. The “cause” in question is the being that causes, rather than the action itself. This is one of many “normal understandings” of “cause.” After all, Aristotle listed four different types of causes, so I don’t think we have to stick to only one definition.

Well I disagree with the last part. X can’t be a cause of Y if Y isn’t caused and doesn’t even exist. You can’t ontologically equate the cause with the being that causes, since the same being can cause something in one world and not in another. Unless you want to make the quality of being a causer part of the essence of the being, so that the two worlds wouldn’t have the same being. Either way, premise 3* stands and the MCA the way you put it is unsound.

The argument you’re really trying to make is:

1. It is possible that the collection of all contingent beings is caused by an external being.
2. If that external being exists, it is a necessary being.
3. Hence, a necessary being possibly exists.
4. Whatever is possibly necessary exists in all possible worlds.
5. Therefore, a necessary being exists in the actual world.

(2) - (5) are fine so let’s concentrate on (1).

In (1) we must assume that the act of causation of the necessary being is not itself necessary - otherwise there would no contingent beings. We must also assume that the contingent act of causation is not an ontological “being” in itself - otherwise it would also be part of the collection of contingent beings needing to be caused by an external being. But then another act of causation would be necessary for that, and so on to infinity. So if acts of causation aren’t ontological entities they must be attributes. So the question is, is it logically possible for there to be a necessary being with contingent attributes? Well I’m really tired. More tomorrow.

 

[NowAgnostic]

OK, it seems this version, with a modified version of the weak CP is one which avoids modal collapse.

Other possible versions are:
Every contingent fact has an explanation (Strong PSR).
Possibly, every contingent fact has an explanation (Weak PSR).
Every contingent thing and every contingent event has a cause (Strong CP).
Possibly, every contingent thing and every contingent event has a cause (Weak CP).

These result in modal collapse. (I will have to admit I wasn’t impressed by Pruss’ attempt to defend the PSR from this objection. He’s engaged in denial of the obvious.)

So in this new version we have
Possibly, every contingent thing, but not every contingent event, has a cause. (Modified weak CP).

where an act of causation is considered to be an event, not an ontological entity or thing.

So the question is whether this should be accepted as an epistemologically basic belief. Do we really believe stuff “just happens”?

 

[JesuisSean]

Simply point your mind toward the truth, and your question will be answered. A logical approach indeed.

 

[Ismael]

So the question is whether this should be accepted as an epistemologically basic belief. Do we really believe stuff “just happens”?

Well that’s th atheist’s conclusion I believe.

 

[punkforchrist]

NowAgnostic, I don’t believe stuff “just happens,” but for the sake of argument, we need only assume that concrete things possibly have causes. “Events” are a peculiar sort; they’re not concrete the way you and I are, but nor are they abstract objects. I wouldn’t say that God’s choosing to create some possible world implies anything about His “attributes,” since an attribute tends to refer to a thing’s essence.

We might say that the possibility premise is properly basic. It seems just as reasonable to me as inferring that other minds exist, if not more. We may also support this premise by pointing to actual instances in which things do have causes. Such an approach would be inductive, even if not one hundred percent conclusive, but that goes a long way in establishing the rational acceptability of theism.

By the way, Happy Thanksgiving!

 

[punkforchrist]

Well that’s th atheist’s conclusion I believe.

That is especially the case if the atheist concedes that the universe either had a beginning, or else has a finite hierarchy of simultanouesly existing causes. A house without a foundation will collapse, so one may rationally infer that nature requires a “foundation,” so-to-speak. This is what St. Thomas Aquinas means whenever he refers to a First Cause. Notice, though, that this (unlike the kalam argument) doesn’t require that the universe had a beginning. A house that has existed from all eternity still requires a foundation. By analogy, nature, even assuming that it is eternal (I don’t believe it is) must be sustained by a First Cause. If there are only intermediate causes in nature, then the entire collection would be caused by nothing, and most of us accept the statement that such a thing is metaphysically impossible.

 

[NowAgnostic]

NowAgnostic, I don’t believe stuff “just happens,” but for the sake of argument, we need only assume that concrete things possibly have causes.

No, you also need to believe stuff “just happens” for the sake of argument. If every event has a full explanation you end up in modal collapse.

And, (for completeness’ sake), you also need to believe the cause (or “causer”) of a contingent thing is another thing.

“Events” are a peculiar sort; they’re not concrete the way you and I are, but nor are they abstract objects.

So take your choice whether events are to be considered ontological realities (i.e. “Things”) or not and pick your poison. If they are not things, they do not need to be caused. Which means of course, God is not the first cause of everything that happens.

I wouldn’t say that God’s choosing to create some possible world implies anything about His “attributes,” since an attribute tends to refer to a thing’s essence.

Then God’s choice implies what, if anything, about Him? An accident? This is where traditional theism breaks down. If it refers to His essence, then it’s necessary and the creation of this universe is necessary. If a God who created another world is a different God (since His essence would be different), then this God is not a necessary being if another world is possible. But a simple being can have no accidents. The only way out is the absurd premise that there is nothing different about a God Who creates vs. one Who creates this world vs. one Who creates tat.

We might say that the possibility premise is properly basic. It seems just as reasonable to me as inferring that other minds exist, if not more. We may also support this premise by pointing to actual instances in which things do have causes. Such an approach would be inductive, even if not one hundred percent conclusive, but that goes a long way in establishing the rational acceptability of theism.

You can say that it’s properly basic, but you need to justify it. Why is its assumption necessary for rational discourse?

By the way, Happy Thanksgiving!

Thanks! Hope you had a good Thanksgiving too!

 

[punkforchrist]

No, you also need to believe stuff “just happens” for the sake of argument. If every event has a full explanation you end up in modal collapse.

And, (for completeness’ sake), you also need to believe the cause (or “causer”) of a contingent thing is another thing.

As I said, I’m willing to grant for the sake of argument that stuff “just happens.” Moreover, I’m using the word “cause” as the entity responsible for some action (re: event), rather than the action itself.

So take your choice whether events are to be considered ontological realities (i.e. “Things”) or not and pick your poison. If they are not things, they do not need to be caused. Which means of course, God is not the first cause of everything that happens.

Well, I believe that abstract objects are ontological realities. But, they are certainly not caused, so your objection is a bit of a red herring. Besides, only the Kalam argument makes use of “events”. The Thomistic and Leibnizian arguments suggest that every concrete thing has a source of being or explanation, respectively.

Then God’s choice implies what, if anything, about Him? An accident?

His freedom and sovereignty.

This is where traditional theism breaks down. If it refers to His essence, then it’s necessary and the creation of this universe is necessary.

I would ask you to justify this claim.

If a God who created another world is a different God (since His essence would be different), then this God is not a necessary being if another world is possible. But a simple being can have no accidents. The only way out is the absurd premise that there is nothing different about a God Who creates vs. one Who creates this world vs. one Who creates tat.

Why is it absurd? I can even think of contingent beings that remain the same in different possible worlds, despite different choices. If Jones sits under a tree in W, but takes a walk in W*, Jones is still Jones.

You can say that it’s properly basic, but you need to justify it. Why is its assumption necessary for rational discourse?

Part of what it means for something to be properly basic is that we don’t have to justify it in terms of something simpler. I would point to a lack of defeaters in support of the possibility premise, in addition to the actual instances in which things really do have causes. The latter makes use of induction, which in and of itself is properly basic.

 

[Areopagite]

Then God’s choice implies what, if anything, about Him? An accident? This is where traditional theism breaks down. If it refers to His essence, then it’s necessary and the creation of this universe is necessary. If a God who created another world is a different God (since His essence would be different), then this God is not a necessary being if another world is possible. But a simple being can have no accidents. The only way out is the absurd premise that there is nothing different about a God Who creates vs. one Who creates this world vs. one Who creates tat.

I believe I provided an answer to this in this previous post:

forums.catholic-questions.org/showpost.php?p=5789252&postcount=55

 

[NowAgnostic]

As I said, I’m willing to grant for the sake of argument that stuff “just happens.” Moreover, I’m using the word “cause” as the entity responsible for some action (re: event), rather than the action itself.

No problem here. You don’t have a Thomistic cosmological argument any more though. God is no longer necessarily the First cause of everything.

Well, I believe that abstract objects are ontological realities. But, they are certainly not caused, so your objection is a bit of a red herring.

OK, so you must restrict your CP then to contingent concrete objects. The objection still holds.

Besides, only the Kalam argument makes use of “events”. The Thomistic and Leibnizian arguments suggest that every concrete thing has a source of being or explanation, respectively.

No, not the Thomistic (#1, #2, and #5), which relies on the impossibility of an essentially ordered infinite regress of causation. If A causes B (to move from potency to act, to exist, or to act towards some end) it is held that that act of causation needs itself to be caused (by some entity C, say), unless it is the First Cause (equivocation between the act of causation and the entity doing the causing).

The Leibniz argues that every contingent fact must have an explanation (PSR), which inevitably leads to modal collapse.

By denying that every contingent fact, or every event, has an explanation, you deny that every contingent thing has a full explanation. You have a partial explanation for B’s existence insofar as A caused it to exist. You do not have a full explanation as you do not have an explanation for why A caused B and not C to exist, or nothing at all.

But your argument could conceivably be successful. It isn’t Thomistic or Leibnizian though.

His freedom and sovereignty.

Come on. The clear import of the question is what makes Him different in this world than in another possible one. You’re just dodging,

I would ask you to justify this claim.

If God is simple, there are no real distinctions. If His action or choice of action is identical to His essence, and His essence is necessary, then His action is likewise necessary.

Why is it absurd? I can even think of contingent beings that remain the same in different possible worlds, despite different choices. If Jones sits under a tree in W, but takes a walk in W*, Jones is still Jones.

But there’s something different about Jones. Saying there’s nothing different about Jones is just absurd, he’s doing something different in the different worlds.

Part of what it means for something to be properly basic is that we don’t have to justify it in terms of something simpler.

And what makes the determination of when “we” need to justify it? Seems pretty ad hoc.

I would point to a lack of defeaters in support of the possibility premise…

Not all things with no defeaters are properly basic.

in addition to the actual instances in which things really do have causes. The latter makes use of induction, which in and of itself is properly basic.

But if it needs induction to arrive at, it isn’t properly basic. Moreover, if it relies on induction, whatever follows cannot be a deductive proof.

 

[NowAgnostic]

I believe I provided an answer to this in this previous post:

forums.catholic-questions.org/showpost.php?p=5789252&postcount=55

No, not really, despite Aquinas’ attempt to get out from underneath this one. You realize he contradicts himself? He says,

God wills things apart from Himself in so far as they are ordered to His own goodness as their end… the goodness of God is perfect, and can exist without other things inasmuch as no perfection can accrue to Him from them

This is a contradiction. If the goodness of God is perfect and incapable of increasing from other things, then nothing apart from Himself can be ordered to His goodness as an end.

If the goodness of God does, in fact, increase from other things, then, necessarily willing His own goodness to the maximum extent, God necessarily wills those things which maximizes His goodness.

But we do not necessarily will things without which the end is attainable, such as a horse for a journey which we can take on foot, for we can make the journey without one. The same applies to other means.

But we do necessarily will something to make the end attainable, even if we can choose (e.g. horse or walking) the precise means. If we are the most rational, we choose the best means. But if we simply will ourselves to get there without any means, then it is impossible for there to be any means.

You said,

it’s that His creation of the world is not necessary to fulfill His divine nature…

whereas the point of contention is that His creation of the world is His divine nature by Divine simplicity.