Moral Absolutism

[john_doran]

Let us use the Nazi example. They come looking for someone to kill. You use a mental reservation. No intention of lying. The information you give is incomplete. The Nazi comes away with a misunderstanding, but that misunderstanding is not because you lied. He holds that misunderstanding because you spoke the truth, but not the naked truth. He was not entitled to the naked truth.

i would say that your example requires an application of the principle of double effect: it’s not that you intend to deceive the nazis, but simply that you foresee their being deceived as an unintended consequence of what you actually say to them.

moral absolutism with regard to lying is difficult to maintain in the face of the many strong counter-intuitive consequences of the position. three of the main ones follow:

1. if you have jews hiding in your basement, and the nazis come to your door and ask you, point blank, “do you have any jews in your basement, yes or no?”, what do you do?
2. how do we understand communicative acts like feinting on the football field, or the battle field, or in a game of chess? they are actions the primary intent of which is to cause your opponent to believe something that you yourself do not believe - namely that you are going to do the thing your misdirection makes it seem you’re going to do.
3. how do we understand the use of untruth in humour? part of the setup of many jokes involves causing the subject to believe an untruth, in order that the untruth will be revealed as such at the punchline; still, knowledge of future truthfulness cannot excuse one’s otherwise current deceitful actions. can it?

there are others, but these are the ones that i kick around in my head most often.

oh, and i’m not sure about the sustainability of the concept of a “right to truth”; it was the first thing that occurred to me when considering cases like the nazi one you describe, but i’ve never been able to come to a satisfactory account of such a right, at least that distinguishes it sufficiently from the concept simply of not having an obligation to answer a question at all (i.e. a “right to truth”, if it is to do any useful conceptual work here, it seems to me, must somehow justify acts of intentional deceit rather than just allow one to maintain silence. and i can’t see how it could ever do such a thing).

 

[fix]

1. if you have jews hiding in your basement, and the nazis come to your door and ask you, point blank, “do you have any jews in your basement, yes or no?”, what do you do?

Mental reservation. No lying. The answer is no. The reservation says “not for you to kill”. That does not contradict absolutism does it?

1. how do we understand communicative acts like feinting on the football field, or the battle field, or in a game of chess? they are actions the primary intent of which is to cause your opponent to believe something that you yourself do not believe - namely that you are going to do the thing your misdirection makes it seem you’re going to do.3) how do we understand the use of untruth in humour? part of the setup of many jokes involves causing the subject to believe an untruth, in order that the untruth will be revealed as such at the punchline; still, knowledge of future truthfulness cannot excuse one’s otherwise current deceitful actions. can it?

I do not think things like jokes and games are in the same category. The act of teling a joke is morally neutral, right? If that were not so then things like fiction books would all be sinful.

oh, and i’m not sure about the sustainability of the concept of a “right to truth”; it was the first thing that occurred to me when considering cases like the nazi one you describe, but i’ve never been able to come to a satisfactory account of such a right, at least that distinguishes it sufficiently from the concept simply of not having an obligation to answer a question at all (i.e. a “right to truth”, if it is to do any useful conceptual work here, it seems to me, must somehow justify acts of intentional deceit rather than just allow one to maintain silence. and i can’t see how it could ever do such a thing).

If I am understanding you correctly I would say that there is no absolute right to the naked truth in every single circumstance. What if you agreed to keep someone’s confidence? Would you think it morally correct to release that information each time a stranger asked you a direct question? I would say no.

Telling that stranger that you cannot give that information would be keeping them from the truth, right?

 

[Mirdath]

Mental reservation. No lying. The answer is no. The reservation says “not for you to kill”. That does not contradict absolutism does it?

It is still deceit. Tricky question.

However, if you look at it another way, answering truthfully is tantamount to cooperation in a much greater wrong. While the Church says ‘one may never do evil so that good may result’, I find sometimes there’s just no nice way out of a situation.

I do not think things like jokes and games are in the same category. The act of teling a joke is morally neutral, right? If that were not so then things like fiction books would all be sinful.

As I recall, the Baltimore Catechism says somewhere that a lie told in jest is a venial sin. Note the particular there: it’s a lie, not a fabrication. The former actually deceives; the latter is understood to be false from the start.

 

[fix]

It is still deceit. Tricky question.

How is it deceit? There was no intention to deceive.

However, if you look at it another way, answering truthfully is tantamount to cooperation in a much greater wrong. While the Church says ‘one may never do evil so that good may result’, I find sometimes there’s just no nice way out of a situation.

Nope, the ends never justify the means.

As I recall, the Baltimore Catechism says somewhere that a lie told in jest is a venial sin.

Can you say where that is? I would like to read it.

Note the particular there: it’s a lie, not a fabrication. The former actually deceives; the latter is understood to be false from the start.

I see no distinction?

 

[Mirdath]

How is it deceit? There was no intention to deceive.

By answering ‘no…’ and completing the statement in your head, you are intentionally misleading Herr Gestapo.

Can you say where that is? I would like to read it.

I’m apparently mistaken as to its presence in the Baltimore (it’s been a long time since I went over it thoroughly), but it’s in Charles Hart’s The Student’s Catholic Doctrine:

There are three kinds of lies: there is the Jocose Lie, or the lie told in jest; the Officious Lie, which is a lie told to save ourselves or others some inconvenience - to ward off some evil or to procure some advantage for ourselves or our neighbour; and the Malicious Lie, which is told with the express purpose of injuring another. This last is a mortal sin whenever it causes a serious injury to our neighbour’s goods or honour; it is venial, if the wrong caused be but trivial. The jocose lie and the officious lie, though wrong, never exceed a venial sin when they do no grave injury to anyone, or cause no grave scandal.

I see no distinction?

The ‘jocose lie’, as Rev. Hart puts it, is not understood to be a fiction by the audience or the target. It’s intended to deceive in order that the humorous truth may be revealed at the end. There’s no such illusion with a story presented as fictional. It may ask the audience to suspend disbelief, but it leaves them the option of doing so or not – unlike the jocose lie, which railroads the audience down one path.

 

[fix]

By answering ‘no…’ and completing the statement in your head, you are intentionally misleading Herr Gestapo.

No, one would be withholding information that the Nazi is not entitled to know.

 

[Mirdath]

No, one would be withholding information that the Nazi is not entitled to know.

And to do so, you are misleading him.

 

[fix]

And to do so, you are misleading him.

The speaker did not intend to mislead him.

It should be observed that when a wide mental reservation is employed the simple truth is told, there is no statement at variance with the mind. For not merely the words actually used in a statement must be considered, when we desire to understand its meaning, and to get at the true mind of the speaker. Circumstances of place, time, person, and manner form a part of the statement and external expression of the thought.

Lying

 

[Mirdath]

The speaker did not intend to mislead him.

How not, exactly? The speaker is saying one thing, while privately meaning a different thing. Whether or not it is technically considered a ‘lie’ in the eyes of the Church, it is still deceit. The questioner may not have a right to the truth, but do you have a right to deceive?

The idea of mental reservation, even the wide variety, is a cheap utilitarian cop-out. Sure, there are times when it may do a great deal of good, and it may be done with the best of intentions, but let’s not have any delusions about its nature.

 

[fix]

How not, exactly? The speaker is saying one thing, while privately meaning a different thing. Whether or not it is technically considered a ‘lie’ in the eyes of the Church, it is still deceit. The questioner may not have a right to the truth, but do you have a right to deceive?

The idea of mental reservation, even the wide variety, is a cheap utilitarian cop-out. Sure, there are times when it may do a great deal of good, and it may be done with the best of intentions, but let’s not have any delusions about its nature.

So, every single thought you have must always be revealed to every single person who asks? Should we give tests to each person we speak with to be certain there is no ambiguity?

 

[Nepenthe]

Mirdath already specifically said otherwise, fix.

And as to ‘testing for ambiguity,’ everyone does that, constantly and automatically, whether consciously or not.

 

[cpayne]

Here’s an example of what Mirdath is talking about, I think: If you say to the Nazi’s question, “No” with the mental reservation “not for you to kill,” that’s intentional deception because the direct answer directly deceives.

If my wife says, “Are you going to the grocery store?” and I answer truthfully, “Yes” with the mental reservation “and then to Dairy Queen,” that’s not a deception; it’s just a reservation. To be sure, it might be a reservation my wife would argue with should she know about it. Which is why it’s reserved. But it’s not a direct intentional deception.

 

[Mirdath]

Here’s an example of what Mirdath is talking about, I think: If you say to the Nazi’s question, “No” with the mental reservation “not for you to kill,” that’s intentional deception because the direct answer directly deceives.

If my wife says, “Are you going to the grocery store?” and I answer truthfully, “Yes” with the mental reservation “and then to Dairy Queen,” that’s not a deception; it’s just a reservation. To be sure, it might be a reservation my wife would argue with should she know about it. Which is why it’s reserved. But it’s not a direct intentional deception.

Right on

In any absolute morality, sometimes the moral choice will not be the best choice. That doesn’t make the best action moral – we’re not utilitarians here – but it makes it wiser. Of course, this is totally in contradiction with Catholic ethical teaching

 

[cpayne]

Of course, this is totally in contradiction with Catholic ethical teaching

Why so? Doesn’t Catholic ethical teaching recognize that sometimes the right moral choices lead to poor consequences? Or am I missing your point?

By the way, I thought you were a fan of Kant’s Categorical Imperative. Isn’t that an example of absolutism? and even a “rule-based” absolutism?

(I also thought of a way around the Nazis-knocking-on-the-door ethical dilemma: Install a peephole!)
:newidea:

 

[john_doran]

The speaker did not intend to mislead him.

but isn’t that self-evidently false? the point of the speaker’s answer - “no” - is to cause the nazi to believe something that the speaker herself believes is not true: namely that there are no jews hiding in the basement. in other words, if the nazis didn’t believe her answer, then she would clearly have failed in her efforts. and, necessarily, the point of an action is what intended.

Mirdath:

The idea of mental reservation, even the wide variety, is a cheap utilitarian cop-out. Sure, there are times when it may do a great deal of good, and it may be done with the best of intentions, but let’s not have any delusions about its nature.

exactly. well said.

Mirdath:

The questioner may not have a right to the truth, but do you have a right to deceive?

again, bang-on. (all this agreeing with you is making me a little disoriented… ).

my not having a right to the truth is not the same thing as you having a right to provide me with falsehoods; it just means that you have no positive duty to provide me with an answer to the question.

fix:

So, every single thought you have must always be revealed to every single person who asks?

no. one need only tell those things that one believes one’s interlocutor either has a right to know, or that one feels like telling.

“none of your business”, though perhaps often impolitic, gets to the heart of the matter as an answer for much of what people may want to know, but which we have no duty to disclose. like the contents of my basement…

 

[Mirdath]

Why so? Doesn’t Catholic ethical teaching recognize that sometimes the right moral choices lead to poor consequences? Or am I missing your point?

It does, but you’re still supposed to act morally

By the way, I thought you were a fan of Kant’s Categorical Imperative. Isn’t that an example of absolutism? and even a “rule-based” absolutism?

I wouldn’t call it rule-based, but absolutist, most certainly yes. Doesn’t mean it always tells you the best response you’ve got – just like any other moral code can lead you into a sticky situation. Sometimes you’re hanging up a picture, sometimes you’re trying to cut a 2x4. A screwdriver could eventually get through it, but why try?

(I also thought of a way around the Nazis-knocking-on-the-door ethical dilemma: Install a peephole!)
:newidea:

Then they break it down and du hast ein kleines Problem – they’ll take you and the Jews, no matter what you say.
john doran:

all this agreeing with you is making me a little disoriented…

Me too

 

[tdgesq]

Originally Posted by fix View Post
No, one would be withholding information that the Nazi is not entitled to know.

And to do so, you are misleading him.

Yes, you would be misleading the Nazi. As John pointed out, the decision to mislead would be based for the Catholic on the principle of double effect. The gravity of the good and evil outcomes must be weighed. Then a decision must be made. But notice that for the Kantian, there can be no such weighing of outcomes. The answer is clear - you should not mislead the Nazi.

The circumstances and consequences of a particular situation are of no moment to Kant. The decision to mislead must always be universalized. And when it is, it cannot conflict with practical reason; our ability to continue reasoning. Kant rejects the universalized proposition that it is permissible to mislead, because if this were always and everywhere permissible it would destroy language, logic and ultimately truth. Well, according to Kant anyway.

So there you go. Even if the Nazis come with instruments of torture, even if they guarantee indescribable suffering and eventual death for those people you are hiding, you should not mislead the Nazis. In fact, according to Kant we have a perfect duty not to mislead. Is that what you really believe?

 

[Nepenthe]

tdgesq- did anyone here claim to be a strict Kant-and-Kant-Onlyian or something? Mirdath sure didn’t, and I know I sure didn’t. Have you actually READ the posts in this thread?

I thought it was pretty simple - CI is a handy tool, and one that works very well with other tools (like social contract theory, for one). Cripes, it gets hard to keep it on such a kindergarten level around here sometimes, but maybe that’s just from my natural-born tinkerer pov. I have always had a nasty case of engineeritis - I don’t accept ANYthing without thorough understanding of premises, function, and a willingness to fix things by dropping them from a reasonable height including orbital distances. After the basics are accounted for, I’ll speculate away, and even run book, but I won’t say it’s anything except speculation.

john doran did a wonderful, graceful job summing things up, I thought (yeah, actually, I’ve noticed that we’ve been getting closer in stance too lately - it’s weird, but I don’t think that’s a bad thing, since closer understanding is why I stick around.

I do try to illustrate what it feels like to be a lifelong nontheist, since I gather many people here find that inconceivable, let alone that such as I are capable of virtue.

 

[Sideline]

Killing is not against the Commandment, murder is. Murder being the killing of innocent life. There is no distinction for lying. Lying is wrong is wrong. There is no word for “lying to preserve life.” The church says that lying is also acceptable if the inquiring party doesn’t have a right to that information. Why is this? If lying is a sin - being the deliberate distortion of the Truth, a good - how can it ever be used? Killing someone is not a sin because it is in just defense. Murder is a sin because it is an unjust offense. There is no such distinction for lying.

Interesting post. I have, I hope, an interesting answer.

There is the truth, and there are facts. The fact is, the person you are looking to kill is hiding under my couch. The truth is, killing is wrong. By distorting the facts, I am helping you to the truth. I am saving you from your own moral confusion. By committing the act of murder you are losing yourself in a lie. The lie of your entitlement to take a life. The truth leads you to love and light and life.

 

[Texas_Roofer]

One of the issues about your lying example is “bear false witness against thy neighbor” which implies the neighbor would be a person in good standing with God. In the specific example the Nazis unjust treatment of the Jew would indicate the Nazi may not be the quality of the “neighbor”. It is imperative to understand it is not a religious distinction it is cooperation against Natural Moral law. Had the Nazi acted in accordance with the Natural Moral Law the situation would have moral meaning, regardless of religious affiliation. Remember Jesus’ 2 commandments “ love thy neighbor as thy self” so is handing over the Jew an act you would wish be done to yourself?

Kant continues to have troubles not because of the situation example but because Kant needs to encompass Natural Moral Law while denying God’s Natural Moral Law and he nor his follower can find a way to do that.