Morality and Subjectivity

[Betterave]

I’v elost sight of what the larger issue is in this discussion about emergence. Can someone explain?

Good question. I can try:

Sair grants the “epistemological objectivity” of morality while acknowledging that it is “metaphysically subjective” and denying that it is “metaphysically objective.” But calling something “metaphysically subjective” isn’t very informative unless we can get clear about what such an ascription actually means. The “emergentism” debate is about trying to get clear about the so-called “emergence” (or not) of “metaphysical subjectivity” from a “metaphysically objective” substrate.

 

[Betterave]

Hi Sair,
In case what I wrote before was unclear, here it is again parsed a bit (and hopefully clarified):

When you say “there can be little doubt that we experience something *we understand *as free will,” I think this is probably not quite right. To be more precise: there is little doubt that we experience something that traditionally we have been accustomed to calling free will. I think the question here is if and how we understand it, and in particular, whether or not it makes sense to continue calling it ‘free will,’ regardless of other changes in our worldview.

It seems to me that the notion of free will comes to us from a particular conceptual framework wherein freedom implies partial independence from material (and social) determination by virtue of an immaterial (i.e., spiritual, i.e., intellectual and voluntative) power (whose proper mode of being is as informing matter). That there is some kind of artificial distinction between “our brains” and “us” is really not an issue - I think we can agree there isn’t (at least not in the basic cases which we have phenomenal access to). The issue is about how we should understand the total functioning of the brain (physical object) vis-a-vis the totality of “us” phenomena that are associated with it.

(I think it’s important to note the oddity of an expression you have used a few times: “understanding ourselves from the inside” - as if “we” are “inside” something, presumably that physical blob of grey matter inside our skulls? Or what? This is a strange thought, isn’t it?)

 

[Touchstone]

What is your definition of consciousness? Further, do dogs and cats have consciousness. If they do, then why is it not true that consciousness has nothing to do with the spiritual soul and is a purely material property of a living animal.

Consciousness I understand to be “awareness of one’s surroundings”, processing external stimuli as part of one’s cognitive processes. By that measure dogs and cats are (normally) conscious. Thus, I think it is true that consciousness is a natural phenomenon, having nothing to do with a spiritual soul, which is a concept I find to be wholly without substantiation as a real, actual entity.

Hi TS,
Actually parsimony is a formal methodological postulate/constraint, the substantive import of which is always highly mediated by our initial worldview (I’ve tried to explain this to you before, if you remember, though not in these exact words). Not begging the question here is a much more straightforward logical requirement. You’re right about reasons though; we’ll see where we end up on those! To clarify what I have granted: what we experience as free will is what we experience as free will, whether or not we adhere to materialistic explanations of mental phenomena (and whether or not those explanations ultimately turn out to be coherent and ‘performative’). It’s a fairly trivial point, it seems to me.

I hear you on parsimony. I’m happy to let anyone reading make what they will of heuristics that eschew parsimony.

I’m glad we can agree that the experience of free will is what it is. Under normal circumstances that would be a trivial statement. But if read much right here on this forum, you will find a lot of allegiance to the idea that because we might feel a sensation that our free will, or our mind itself is “spiritual”, “supernatural”, or otherwise untethered from physical reality, that that is, ipso facto, grounds for embracing that idea, that our “self” is disembodied in some way, or, preempting Kreeftian attempts at Catholic pseudo-monism, something that transcends the physical milieu.

But, given what you’ve just allowed – and I agree this is a pretty basic point, but nevertheless one theist get wrapped around the axle on, time and again – we now understand that this sensation is not dispositive for us; if we had a fully natural/materialist mind, we could expect just those very inclinations and intuitions, that we were ‘spiritual souls’ of some kind.

If that’s not clear, that means that our senses there don’t tip things one way or another for us, as the “sense of the spiritual soul” is explained on naturalism, too.

Given parity on that – and this is precisely the kind of situation where parsimony proves its worth, “all else being equal” – the naturalist view yields economy, and the theist explanation is gratuitous in terms of explanatory resources.

If the objection is only “well, parsimony, so what?”, my work on this subject is done, and I need press this no farther.

When you say “there can be little doubt that we experience something *we understand *as free will,” I think this is probably not quite right. To be more precise: there is little doubt that we experience something that traditionally we have been accustomed to calling free will. I think the question here is if/how we *understand *it, and in particular, whether or not it makes sense to continue calling it that, regardless of the other changes in our worldview. It seems to me that the notion of free will comes to us from a particular conceptual framework wherein freedom implies partial independence from material (and social) determination by virtue of an immaterial (i.e., spiritual, i.e., intellectual and voluntative) power.

Well, that’s one particular construal of the term. But it’s certainly not the only one, and not the only one that preserves agency in the compatibilist sense, avoiding Laplacian determinism.

That there is some kind of artificial distinction between “our brains” and “us” is really not an issue - there isn’t (at least not in the basic cases which we have phenomenal access to). The issue is about how we should understand the total functioning of the brain (physical object) vis-a-vis the totality of “us” phenomena that are associated with it. (I think it’s important to note the oddity of an expression you have used a few times: “understanding ourselves from the inside” - as if “we” are “inside” something, presumably that physical blob of grey matter inside our skulls? Or what? This is a strange thought, isn’t it?)

Yes, and I think that goes a ways toward accounting for our mysticism on this subject. The reality of it seems strange, creepy even. I have six kids, three of which are old enough to have matured enough to reach that “creepy” moment where they grasp what you are talking about. It’s definitely an easy way out psychologically to embrace the illusion – the ‘disembodiment’ that we experience. We embrace this “outside-ness” early on (if you read researchers in this area), far earlier than we are able to think in a disciplined, evidence-against-interest way, and by the popular reactions, many and most don’t ever let go of that, even when presented with what we’ve agreed to above.

Parsimony is nice, but when it’s expensive, psychologically, or dislocating, emotionally, out it goes, sometimes. We develop as kids to “see ourselves from the outside” – a mind somehow detached from our body, controlling it, integrated with it, but… beyond it, and once that view congeals, it takes discipline to even wrestle with that view, let alone manage it as part of a mental framework.

-TS

 

[Prodigal_Son]

That seems correct to me - I guess my problem with notions of reductionism is that to me, explaining how something - or someone! - works is not an attempt to break down the whole into its component parts, but an effort to better understand and appreciate the whole. If consciousness exists as an emergent property of molecular activity in the brain, that does not decrease my sense of wonder at its existence. Quite the contrary, in fact. Perhaps this attitude has its basis in years of studying and analysing literature - I must admit I had little time for the notion that close textual analysis reduced one’s enjoyment of the text as a whole. The opposite was true for me.

As an English major, I could not agree more.

Are we more than the sum of our parts? The emergent property hypothesis of consciousness would seem to suggest we are. But the particular collections of parts are still essential to the overall effect.

Absolutely.

The problem I find is in the insistence that there must be a divinely ordained purpose to our lives. I agree that if this were so, it would make a big difference to the way many people behave, and would certainly alter our understanding of how and why we exist (or perhaps I should say it would change our understanding back to the notion of divine creation). The difficulty is this - if, somehow, it were proved beyond doubt that humans were not created, either specially or through guided evolution, but that we did arise purely by the accidents of genetic mutation and the processes of natural selection, how would this affect our understanding of what we are, or our faith in our abilities? If a person stakes their faith on divinely ordained purpose, and then finds there is none, what do they have to fall back on? Is it despair and internal anarchy, as some think is logically necessary? Or is there hope to be found in embracing our biochemistry, our nature as conscious, rational animals with the ability to choose how we act and which preferences we pursue?

Interesting point. It’s worth noticing that the God hypothesis can be strengthened or weakened, but never disproven as such (some atheists complain about this, of course ). There could always be a hidden cause, no matter how accurate our scientific take on things. I would agree, however, that some events might make one tempted to think “If God exists, He cannot be good.”

I am convinced that virtue is the key to a balanced life, and I have ample evidence of this from my observations. The virtuous man or woman has staked his life on God, but in a sense, you might say that he has something to fall back on if God did not exist: his virtue. Now perhaps the world is utterly cruel, and virtuous people will always be chewed up and spit out, but that view seems false, to me at least.

At any rate, I don’t think it’s an either/or. Biochemical understanding and theological understanding of the human person do not contradict each other. Thus, when you agree that the whole is more than the sum of its parts, I want to say that this “more than the sum” aspect is the real dignity of being made in the image of God. This truth is most powerful, however – as poets have noticed – when juxtaposed with the very “earthy” biochemical realities of human activity. The spiritual supervenes on the material.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

I am only reading this thread now but this is a good place to have started the thread. Essentially it is the standard challenge to moral relativism put in your own words. How do you argue your moral point against someone who has equal arguments for their contrary one is what you are asking.

I will answer this without appealing to your example because I think it is worth noting the example you choose is entirely fantasy as no one here or that I am aware of HAS any good arguments at this time to argue for slavery.

My response however is a very simple one. Morality is merely a subjective set of rules we work on in which to help us live with Each Other. It is therefore “Each other” that I present to you as an answer to breaking the above dilemma. Plain and simple democracy.

If someone thinks they have good arguments against my moral position (on slavery or anything) then let him go out and campaign for it and educate people, including me, on his arguments. I will do the same.

So might makes right? Do you really have this much faith in majority opinions?

 

[Touchstone]

For your edification I yahooed (that’s right, I didn’t use google) “emergent property” and here’s some basic criteria for you, which you seem not to understand:
An emergent property is one which arises from the interaction of “lower-level” entities, none of which show it; the new property could not be predicted from a knowledge of the lower-level properties. (Now do you understand what surprise has to do with it?)

Can I recommend Google Scholar?

“Emergence” is on of those terms like “information” that is always getting overloaded and confused between casual meanings and technical/applied definitions.

I think the definition you have cited (source?) is not too far off, but is off by enough to get the wrong conclusion when applying it here. Water, for example, has “wetness”, a feature we consider an emergent property, manifest in water-as-liquid where neither hydrogen or oxygen exhibit that feature.

As it turns out, and has been discussed here previously, “wetness” isn’t magic, and while we are just nominally informed now on the mechanics that arise from the physics of combining a hydrogen atom with two oxygen, we can indeed predict and anticipate the feature we call ‘wetness’ in water.

There’s a response to this, then, that says that “wetness” is and was not an emergent property after all. There’s merit in that, but only as a matter of finality, and “in principle” epistemics. Emergence is not, contra the claims of many (and some here), analogous to ‘magic’, or some kind of animist voodoo science for some reason has taken a shine to. Rather, as in the example of ‘wetness’, the mechanics are assumed to be as discoverable in principle as any other natural mechanism or process.

We use “emergent”, as a reflection of the feature’s epistemic status. Particularly, we are interested in using the term when the higher order phenomenon is more readily predictable and modeled on its own terms than by reduction and “bottom up predictions”. That is, we can predict and model thrermodynamics on its own terms more readily than we can derive it from the underlying statistical mechanics (that is, the physical dynamics we refer to by ‘statistical mechanics’).

This means that emergent properties are predictable, or more precisely, derivable by lower level physics in principle, but in practice, we come to understand the higher-level dynamics far earlier and more readily than through derivation. We assimilate “wetness”, then, into our knowledge base, into our empirical repository, far earlier than we come to know the physics of hydrogen and oxygen bonds. This we call “emergence”.

We could not, in practice, have begun with our knowledge of hydrogen and oxygen and predicted “wetness”. But “wetness” isn’t magic, and the mechanics required for emergent property explanations lagged far behind the knowledge and experience of hydrogen/oxygen and wetness as first order phenomena.

That’s an admitted subtle, but profound distinction, and one that the brief blurb found by Yahoo! for you missed.

Tim Crane’s book Physicalism and its Discontents is a good resource to consult here – this page link will jump you right to a discussion on just this point:

books.google.com/books?id=oG7J1fQMwzEC&pg=PA216&lpg=PA216&source=bl&ots=X6FyDCeCj3&sig=EFMdzhF868-fDeWj5eyhf_VuTAs&hl=en&ei=m2YxS7zTN42sngf4-6jyCA&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=2&ved=0CBEQ6AEwATgK#v=onepage&q=&f=false

Just a paragraph here, for the large majority that can’t be bothered to click through:
Tim Crane:

It turns out, then that neither predictability in principle nor unpredictability in practice can distinguish emergent properties from non-emergent properties. For insofar as emergentism is committed to the supervenience thesis – fix the base properties and the laws, and the emergent properties emerge – then emergent properties are as predictable “in principle” as non-emergent or reducible properties are. But insofar as bridge laws are required for prediction, then emergent properties are as unpredictable in practice as reducible properties are.

Read beyond that, it’s a quality treatment of the subject.

-TS

 

[sidbrown]

So might makes right? Do you really have this much faith in majority opinions?

To some extent might does make right. Take for example the question of the morality of torture. At one point in time it was taught that it was right, but at another point in time it is taught that it is wrong.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

To some extent might does make right. Take for example the question of the morality of torture. At one point in time it was taught that it was right, but at another point in time it is taught that it is wrong.

At one point in time it was taught that the earth was flat; now it is taught that the earth is round. Are we to conclude that the shape of the earth changed?

 

[tonyrey]

What I will say - and hopefully not blot my copybook - is that I don’t think it is a diminishment to say that moral concepts are human concepts, with their origins in human minds.

All concepts are in a mind, human or not. The question is whether they refer to “anything”. The same applies to a principle, a fact or a relation. Is a concept itself subjective?! Surely not… I think it is simplistic and arbitrary to divide reality into two classes: that which is mental and intangible as opposed to that which is physical and tangible. Equality, proportion, harmony, symmetry, identity, regularity, freedom, purpose are all intangible but as real as specific objects.

I would have said that such intangibles are qualities of objects or circumstances, which can’t be defined independently of said objects or circumstances. Let’s take a certain object, say a sculpture, which we can say has symmetry and proportion, for example. Do you think it is possible to refer to ‘symmetry’ and ‘proportion’ as things in themselves as opposed to qualities that exist in relation to the sculpture? It’s possible to explain what symmetry and proportion mean, but only in relation to metaphysically objective entities. By the same token, I think it’s possible to say that a person has or exhibits morality, but how does one explain this except through reference to the way that person behaves?

‘symmetry’ and ‘proportion’ are not things in themselves but they are indeed related to physical objects. But they are not necessarily attributes or qualities of one object. They are objective facts which exist even if we don’t know they exist and - even more significantly - they are facts about what two or millions of objects have in common. So we cannot write them off as concepts in our minds. We can have a concept of a concept! (But that is as far as we can go. I don’t think we can have a concept of a concept of a concept! ) A concept may or may not refer to “something” which is beyond the mind. I shall develop this point with regard to opportunities.

This also raises the interesting question of whether the above-mentioned intangibles are qualities possessed by the objects we perceive, or if they are qualities we ourselves ascribe to objects. What you call the third realm of knowledge - although I’ve not spent much time considering this way of thinking about it - seems to me to be the interface by which we interact with our surroundings and build useful knowledge of the world. A lot of scientific research, especially when we get into the realms of molecular structures and even - gasp - quantum physics, seems counterintuitive to our regular sensory perception - we don’t feel as though we consist largely of empty space, but that is what experiments examining atomic structure tell us. Part of the purpose of scientific research, indeed, is to attempt to break down the interface. Our brains work to accumulate useful knowledge, and what constitutes a useful perception for us may not be precisely correct in terms of the way things really are.

If the qualities possessed by the objects do not belong to the objects how would we able to manipulate them? The success of science demonstrates that on the whole our ascriptions are correct and qualities as well as quantities are generally objective. Different odours have different effects so our reaction to them is predictable especially when they are noxious!

Having established that concepts (which are not false) have counterparts it is undeniable that their efficacy is due to their relation to reality. Moral concepts are no exception because they lead to harmony and self-fulfilment. What they refer to must exist outside the mind if it is more than an illusion. Freedom, for example, refers to certain states of affairs. Justice refers, amongst other things, to certain ways in which wealth and opportunities are distributed. So what is intangible cannot always be equated with what is subjective. BTW Opportunities are intangible “goods” - in the original sense of the word, i.e they are valuable and their value is not conferred by us! It exists whether we recognise it or not - like the opportunities themselves.

I’m not sure what you mean by the phrase “concepts have counterparts”.The concept of a table has the counterpart of a physical table. The concept of a thought has the counterpart of a real thought. Not all concepts have counterparts, of course, because many refer to nothing in reality, e.g. the concept of an ant with a million legs!

However, I have already and will again readily agree that moral concepts have effects upon the reality outside our minds, via the agency of our actions. I still think that concepts such as freedom and justice are metaphysically subjective - in that they must be experienced in order to have any existence or meaning.

Everything is meaningless if we choose to regard it as meaningless! That does not mean everything is equally meaningful or meaningless. Some things are intrinsically meaningless. Weinberg thinks the entire universe is but he is mistaken.

Since we are not solipsists, we can accept that others have experience of certain concepts, even if we ourselves do not. That makes the concepts epistemologically objective, but I don’t see that it establishes their existence in any manner other than the experiential.

Opportunities, as I understand them, are not objects as such, but particular combinations of circumstances in which we can act to our benefit, or to accomplish a certain goal.So opportunities do not exist solely in the mind. Opportunities in a broader sense of the term even exist without sentient beings. A certain combination of events gave life the opportunity to exist! That opportunity is not just a concept because without it life would not have existed.

 

[tonyrey]

Sair I think there is an appreciable difference between potential value and realised value - whereby an opportunity that is not taken may have had some potential value to the person who could have taken it, but if missed, it has no actual value. Again, I think the value in this case is felt by the person, rather than being an inherent characteristic of the opportunity.

The value of something may not be recognised but that does not mean it ceases to be valuable. The source of a value too is valuable because it is the necessary condition of that value. It exists independently of a person or animal although it does imply the existence of a (potential) beneficiary. So values are necessarily related to life but not to concepts. Oxygen has always been valuable because it is essential for life even when no one was aware of the fact. Slavery has always been evil regardless of whether it was recognised as evil because it prevents human beings from fulfilling their potential. Don’t you think it is impossible to separate value from purpose?
The division between that which is potential and that which is actual is arbitrary because reality is a continuum. This is where analysis obscures the significance of the whole. A world without opportunities for life to exist is obviously not designed whereas one with those opportunities very probably is. Similarly a person’s talents may remain dormant and unused but that person has an advantage over another who is less gifted. From a practical point of view an employer would consider the first applicant a better bet, i.e. more valuable (even if it is only potentially), because the latter is obviously unsuitable. So an unused talent may well be valuable!

 

[Sair]

Good question. I can try:

Sair grants the “epistemological objectivity” of morality while acknowledging that it is “metaphysically subjective” and denying that it is “metaphysically objective.” But calling something “metaphysically subjective” isn’t very informative unless we can get clear about what such an ascription actually means. The “emergentism” debate is about trying to get clear about the so-called “emergence” (or not) of “metaphysical subjectivity” from a “metaphysically objective” substrate.

Well, gosh darn it to heck if you haven’t summed up the discussion better than I ever could have. I’m still in the process of reading through all the posts that have been made since my last one, and it’s given me a lot to think about already.

Will post more when I’m not about to go out for some frenzied last-minute Christmas shopping!

 

[sidbrown]

At one point in time it was taught that the earth was flat; now it is taught that the earth is round. Are we to conclude that the shape of the earth changed?

No.to say that the earth is flat or was flat is an error. The earth is actually round and that is correct.
Similarly the teaching of the Church on the morality of torture has changed. So morality is subjective inasmuch as it was not wrong from the point of view of the Church to torture someone in order to extract a confession, but now it is wrong to do so.

 

[tonyrey]

Don’t you believe truth is a concept? After all it is intangible… It is a concept but it is also the correspondence of a proposition to an aspect of reality, i.e. an objective fact.

If truth is not a fact it must be an illusion! Is it not a fact that truth exists, bearing in mind truth is preferable to falsehood, falsity or the absence of truth?

Only propositions can be factual.

I did not state that truth is factual! Although (the) truth is composed of facts. What else? If we are not careful we can get ourselves tied up in linguistic knots.

“True” is a word used to characterize assertions as in the sentence “‘the cat is on the mat’ is true if and only if the cat is on the mat.”

I agree but we are dealing with “truth” and not “true”. Truth is an abstract noun which refers to that which corresponds to reality rather than an adjective which describes a proposition. We do not know propositions. They state what we know (if we are lucky (!). We link words, i.e. symbols, to describe situations, events and other features of reality. It is when we link words correctly that the truth emerges or is revealed. BTW We don’t create or invent truth. We discover it, just as we discover information.

You may argue that “truth” and “fact” are reifications or just words. All right but what happens when you try to dispense with them? You are left with the problem of what knowledge entails. You would the first to agree that we don’t know “things in themselves”. So what exactly do we know? Obviously not propositions. I leave the ball in your court…

 

[R_Daneel]

But I’m guessing that what RD wants to say (it’s not super clear) is that all qualitative changes entail the existence of emergent properties and that just seems incredibly naive.

Your guess was incorrect.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

No.to say that the earth is flat or was flat is an error. The earth is actually round and that is correct.
Similarly the teaching of the Church on the morality of torture has changed. So morality is subjective inasmuch as it was not wrong from the point of view of the Church to torture someone in order to extract a confession, but now it is wrong to do so.

That just means that the Church can be wrong.

 

[Leela]

If truth is not a fact it must be an illusion! Is it not a fact that truth exists, bearing in mind truth is preferable to falsehood, falsity or the absence of truth?
I did not state that truth is factual! Although (the) truth is composed of facts. What else? If we are not careful we can get ourselves tied up in linguistic knots.
I agree but we are dealing with “truth” and not “true”. Truth is an abstract noun which refers to that which corresponds to reality rather than an adjective which describes a proposition. We do not know propositions. They state what we know (if we are lucky (!). We link words, i.e. symbols, to describe situations, events and other features of reality. It is when we link words correctly that the truth emerges or is revealed. BTW We don’t create or invent truth. We discover it, just as we discover information.

You may argue that “truth” and “fact” are reifications or just words. All right but what happens when you try to dispense with them? You are left with the problem of what knowledge entails. You would the first to agree that we don’t know “things in themselves”. So what exactly do we know? Obviously not propositions. I leave the ball in your court…

Truth is simply the property that all true sentences have in common. I don’t think there is anything more that needs to be said about truth to apply the term.

 

[tonyrey]

Truth is simply the property that all true sentences have in common. I don’t think there is anything more that needs to be said about truth to apply the term.

And what do all true sentences have in common?

 

[tonyrey]

Truth is simply the property that all true sentences have in common. I don’t think there is anything more that needs to be said about truth to apply the term.

And what do all true sentences have in common? What is its nature? Objective or subjective?

 

[Leela]

And what do all true sentences have in common?

Truth, of course. I already said that.

What no one has ever come up with is a theory of truth that distinguishes for us which of our sentences are true and which ones are false, which is the whole reason for being interested in finding a theory of truth to begin with. So I think we learn all we need to know about truth but considerring how the word “true” is used in sentences. I don’t see any value of viewing Truth as an essence that exists “out there.”

 

[Leela]

And what do all true sentences have in common? What is its nature? Objective or subjective?

I saw that you added “objective or subjective?” asked about the nature of truth. The point is that truth doesn’t have a “nature” (which I realize is a problem for anyone who wants to identify Truth with God). It is simply the compliment we pay to sentences that are true.

Now certain truths may be objective and certain truths may be subjective. It is objectively true that I live outside of Philadelphia. That fact can be verified by anyone at any time. It is subjectively true that I do not have a headache right now. While this is a fact, it cannot be verified publically. It is a subjective truth.

It seems like people in this thread are making a general judgment that objective is good or real and subjective is bad or not really real. The distinction is about our epistemic context and is neither a good or bad thing in general. Also, I see no reason to think of subjective truths as any less true than objective truths. Subjective and objective are not so much different ways of being true (truth is truth), they are just different contexts in which we can confidently apply the same concept.

In other words, when I say that it is true that I don’t have a headache and it is true that I live outside of Philadelphia, the word “true” is functioning in the same way in both assertions, truth itself does not have a subjective or objective nature. It can be applied in both sorts of contexts where “true” means the same thing in either case.

Best,
Leela