Nevertheless I think that, in a certain sense, one can speak of a "ius ad coniugalem amorem". Matrimonial consent creates no right to emotive love, nor to other desirable qualities more or less connected with love [8]. No one can give a right to what does not lie under the power of his will, and it does not necessarily lie under the power of the will of one spouse to make the other feel good or loved. One cannot give a right to affective love; but one can give a right to conjugality, for conjugality does lie under the power of one's will. The conferring of the right to conjugality - the right to be object of an exclusive and permanent sexual self-donation - does show a unique appreciation of each spouse by the other. It shows, independently of all feelings, a unique determination of the will of each in relation to the other; and in this sense it is an act of love.
As we have seen, the essential features which make that conjugal acceptance of another unique, are precisely its exclusiveness, its permanence and its procreative orientation. To determine to establish such a conjugal relationship with another person, accepting the obligations towards him or her which it implies, is to make that person the object of a privileged choice of predilection, in which one can find all the minimum (but, in themselves, very considerable) and essential elements of conjugal love [9]. The choice (the "e-lectio") proves the love (the "di-lectio").
What is essentially and distinctively conjugal is what can and ought to be given to one's spouse, and cannot or rather must not be given to anyone else. One could here usefully recall the words with which Pius XI in Casti connubii expressed the essence of the «bonum fidei»: "what belongs to one of the parties by reason of the marriage contract... may not be denied to him or permitted to any third person" (AAS 22 (1930) 546). Mere kindness or patience or respect, therefore, are not essentially or uniquely conjugal, for these modes of behavior can and indeed ought to be observed towards everyone. In other words, only those elements that characterize conjugality, and not those that characterize mere friendship, enter into the essence of the matrimonial relationship, and are to be considered as integrating the essential object of marital consent.
It seems possible therefore to distinguish three positions regarding the juridic relevance of love to the establishment of marriage. The first, rejected by Paul VI, proposed a "ius ad amorem" (love understood in an affective sense), as an essential juridic component of marital consent. The second maintains that love does not enter juridic field at all. A third can be suggested, insofar precisely as the self-donation involved in matrimonial consent is taken to be an act of love. Given this as premiss, one can posit a right to those aspects of conjugal self-donation - conjugal love - essentially and necessarily contained in genuine consent: exclusivity, procreativity and permanence.
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I honestly can say, I don’t know if I would have been as patient as my husband.
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;… Nevertheless we may forget to specify that in front of our audience… or even have forgotten it in 20 years’time, when this year will just have blent with the other in a beautiful memory. 
