Myth of evolution and new drug discovery

[hecd2]

hecd2:

Well, I’m sorry, but your position here is exactly analogous to the ID argument. Some phenomenon (the emergence of life and the evolution of complex life in one case, the phenomenon of mind in another) is inexplicable by the methods of natural science because the phenomenon in question transcends the natural order - the only difference is that the ID guys are wrong, clumsy and ignorant and you are right because - well because you know what phenomena are amenable to the methods of natural science and they don’t. As I said, you should be careful with this argument, as looking from outside, you’re flirting with an argument you despise, and one could regard some points you make below as powerful science killers.

The differences between my logic and that of ID-ology are dramatic.

The logic is identical. Both you and IDers propose a limit to methodological naturalism in seeking natural answers to phenomological questions that you each propose are not amenable to natural science because they intersect your and their religious beliefs. In their case they propose that methodological naturalism cannot yield true answers to questions about the diversity of species because they think that a supernatural process is necessarily responsible for what we observe. You propose that methodological naturalism cannot yield true answers to questions about the mind, because you think that a immaterial ontology underlies mind. Scientists are right to reject both proposals and for the same reason.

ID assumes that certain natural systems are irreducibly complex. I deny that hypothesis on both scientific and philosophic grounds. An important point here is that IC is problematic both philosophically and scientifically.

Well, IC is certainly problematic scientifically, but I fail to see how it can be philosophically problematic. In any case, IC is not ID, it is merely one discredited atempt to show that the question cannot have a natural answer.

Second, extreme Darwinians assume that the biological continuum applies to man in the same way that it applies to other flora and fauna. I deny this assumption of both philosophical and scientific grounds. The Darwinian hypothesis about mind is problematic both scientifically and philosophically.

I should be fascinated to see what scientific argument you can produce to show that mind lies beyond scientific investigation.

In any case, whether or not you are right, your argument here is based on a philosophical determination of what phenomological questions can and cannot be addressed scientifically - exactly as ID argues.

Why should scientists pay any more attention to your attempts to limit their investigations of phenomena than to IDers’ attempts? Other than you say-so that you are right?

Darwin might or might not have based his insights into the nature of human cognition on philosophical naturalism, but once the door to the laboratory is closed, philosophical and methodological naturalism are indistinguishable. Scientists rightly assume that what they observe has natural explanations. That is what science is and without it science collapses.

Because I more properly recognize the scope, province and limits of natural science and when that boundary has been ignored does not make my logic analogous to ID theory by any stretch of the imagination

.
And what persuades us that *your *view of the scope, province and limits of natural science is correct other than your say-so?

My objection to certain interpretations of mind are based on my observation that an explanation or accounting of certain human experiences is beyond a scientific and hence material explanation. I can assert that any complete explanation of consciousness and intellect cannot be a material or physical one.

Indeed assertion as all that we see. Just as the claim that causes of species diversity lie beyond natural explanations is no more than bare assertion.

In short, there is absolutely no difference in logic or argument between your position here and that of Intelligent Design. Other than your assurance to us that you are right and they are wrong.

Alec
evolutionpages.com

 

[CosmicActor]

I’m seeing interesting axioms that I think are quiet unwarrented. The brain and mind function raises a serious problem. Many biologists and philosophers have come to deny freewill. Others accert that real being or absolute knowleged is unattainable.

 

[itinerant1]

The logic is identical. Both you and IDers propose a limit to methodological naturalism in seeking natural answers to phenomological questions that you each propose are not amenable to natural science because they intersect your and their religious beliefs. In their case they propose that methodological naturalism cannot yield true answers to questions about the diversity of species because they think that a supernatural process is necessarily responsible for what we observe. You propose that methodological naturalism cannot yield true answers to questions about the mind, because you think that a immaterial ontology underlies mind. Scientists are right to reject both proposals and for the same reason.

Your attempt to equate the logic of ID theory with my views fails to recognize certain critical distinctions. First, my position does not imply religious belief or a theological foundation. One need not have any religious belief to perceive the reality of metaphysical causality. Perhaps you are conflating first philosophy, or metaphysics with religion. Whatever the case may be, I am not sure why you brought religious belief into the mix, as it only confuses the issue at hand. I made a point of avoiding arguing from a position that necessarily implied a theological or religious background. Hence, you will need to clarify what you are talking about.

Next, I never stated as you assert, that “methodological naturalism cannot yield true answers to questions about the mind, because you think that a immaterial ontology underlies mind.” To get to the crux of the issue, “mind” has not been defined in this thread. Furthermore, “mind” in modern science has become a less than rigorous concept so as to include radically different things, from human sensations, images, to abstract concepts, consciousness, and animal “mind”. It is a bit sloppy use of the term.

When the proper distinctions are made, then my position is understood as distinguishing what activities are somatic, psychosomatic, and strictly psychic. Your underlying assumption appears to be that all human activities from sensation to conceptualization are ultimately biological, and only biological in cause. This is something that no scientists has proven. Hence, in the interest of objectivity, it would seem that your critique of my position as limiting methodological naturalism is unfounded.

There is no reason for me or anyone else to think that methodological naturalism will not continue to reveal new understandings about the brain and brain process. To play the Anti-Science card against my position is useless.

Your assumption that consciousness, thinking and so on are just one side of the coin, and biological processes the other, you attempt to justify by invoking the principle of parsimony. However, since the physiological activity of the brain is so utterly and radically different from the human experience of abstract thinking and willing, to invoke parsimony can only appear unnecessarily reductive at best.

Well, IC is certainly problematic scientifically, but I fail to see how it can be philosophically problematic. In any case, IC is not ID, it is merely one discredited atempt to show that the question cannot have a natural answer.

IC does have a number of philosophical problems of which you are not aware. One, it confuses design and finality. Two, it conflates ultimate and secondary causes.

I should be fascinated to see what scientific argument you can produce to show that mind lies beyond scientific investigation.

I wouldn’t attempt an argument, scientific or philosophical, involving “mind”, since it is an overused and misused term. The term is about as useful as “liberal” and “conservative”. The proper distinctions need to be made for any reasonable scientific argument.

In any case, whether or not you are right, your argument here is based on a philosophical determination of what phenomological questions can and cannot be addressed scientifically - exactly as ID argues.

Not so. My argument is based on what is phenomenological and what is not, either in itself, or as far as its causes are concerned.

Why should scientists pay any more attention to your attempts to limit their investigations of phenomena than to IDers’ attempts? Other than you say-so that you are right?

Again, I don’t accept your logic. It’s the same as asking someone whether or not he has stopped kicking his mother. The answer is not “yes” or “no” if he never kicked his mother. My position implies no limits whatsoever on scientific investigation of phenomenal reality.

Darwin might or might not have based his insights into the nature of human cognition on philosophical naturalism, but once the door to the laboratory is closed, philosophical and methodological naturalism are indistinguishable. Scientists rightly assume that what they observe has natural explanations. That is what science is and without it science collapses.

And what persuades us that *your *view of the scope, province and limits of natural science is correct other than your say-so?
Indeed assertion as all that we see. Just as the claim that causes of species diversity lie beyond natural explanations is no more than bare assertion.

In short, there is absolutely no difference in logic or argument between your position here and that of Intelligent Design. Other than your assurance to us that you are right and they are wrong.

I think I have given enough reasons here to show that your argument is a straw man fallacy.

 

[itinerant1]

I said it would be brief. What a person blind from birth, or a person suffering from red monochromacy, or from deuteranopia, or from anomalous trichromacy, or you or I mean by red are all different. It can mean the appearance of things that most of us agree to be red, or things that an individual perceives to be the same colour as other things he thinks are red or objects that he has been told are red or light between 625 and 675 nm. Is light at 600nm red or orange - some say one, some say the other. How about 700nm. When does light stop being red and become infrared (or black as we might call it). An object might look red to a person with normal colour vision, but might have its peak of emission in the IR. Is it red, or infrared? Most people would say it was red, but suppose humans had infrared sensitive light receptors. Do claret, crimson, pink, maroon, ruby, gules mean the same as red? Is a red face or is red gold actually red? What about an object with the potential to reflect red light fixed at 40m on the sea floor? The upshot of all this is that there is no such thing as universal redness that means the exactly the same to everyone. We classify things as red by convention and we often disagree if we have uncommon or defective vision or if we think about the definition in different ways or if the objects properties are borderline. Redness means nothing without vision - it lies in a minute slice - from 625 nanometres to 675 nanometres of the electromagnetic spectrum that extends from billions of light years down to a picometre. It means nothing without our senses or in the absence of matter-energy and its naming is a convention. We have decided, because most of us perceive light in a particular part of the EM spectrum differently from light in other parts of the spectrum, to call that particular part of the spectrum red, but it is neither universal nor divorced from our senses. The most that we can say is that redness is that property of objects (actually light) which appears to the vision of most of us with the qualia that we agree by conventioin to call red, which we have subsequently learned is a synonym for photons in a particular energy range. Redness is a category just as dogginess is a category and buildinghood is a category of objects or their properties, used linguistically by convention.

My reply will be brief as well.

If redness, as you say, lies “from 625 nanometres to 675 nanometres of the electromagnetic spectrum…”, and “is that property of objects (actually light) which appears to the vision of most of us with the qualia that we agree by conventioin to call red”, and “is a category of objects or their properties”, then that quality of things, existing independently of the knower is a quality shared by multiple things in nature. It is a quality which they have in common, and that quality exists independently of our perceptions.

That quality we call “redness” and is perceived by the senses, exists as a modification of particular objects, or in your words “that property of objects (actually light) which appears to the vision of most of us with the qualia that we agree by conventioin to call red”.

Many particular things manifest this same quality. It is something real they have in common. It could be an apples, roses, and blood that have that quality we perceive as “red” in common. The intellect forms a concept of “redness” that designates what any number of these particular things have in common. The quality that exists universally, that is, shared by many in nature but particularized (in all red things) is abstracted from our particular sense perception of those objects.

The word we associate with the concept of redness that has universal designation is of course, by convention. People of different languages will have their own words for the identical concept. This is what communication possible between individuals of the same and different languages. If humans did not possess universal concepts that referred to the same things, communication would not be possible.

My concept of “redness” applies to or designates whatever exists in nature possessing a specific quality. My concept is a universal as it an understanding and designation of any particular redness whatsoever, just as my concept of triangle refers to any three-sided enclosed geometric shape regardless of size, location, color, etc.

Perceptual abnormalities are recognized by intellectual judgment as just that, perceptual abnormalities. Hence, that is actually further evidence for universals. Intellect with its universal intentions, judges particular sense perceptions.

We can refine our understanding of colors by understanding hues, shades, and tones. An artist is more knowledgeable in this matter than the ordinary person. We have color palettes and color wheels that demonstrate deeper awareness and understanding of colors. So, if you are wondering whether “claret, crimson, pink, maroon, ruby, gules mean the same as red,” a person who has not learned the various terms for the color variations he perceives will not make the verbal distinctions that an artist could. Don’t you think there exists an objective, extra-mental difference between things in nature that we perceive as pink and as red?

 

[itinerant1]

I have nothing further to prove. I rest on the necessity of brain for mind and the absence of evidence or argument for its insufficiency. If you have such evidence or argument present it, but the repetition of the mantric assertion that matter-energy cannot do this or that without showing why it cannot, does not constitute an argument.

Nothing further to prove? I did not see where you proved anything. What did I miss? I have made it clear that I consider the necessity of brain for mind. Hence, your statement is misleading. It is our understanding of that necessity that differs.

Mantric assertion? I think that is your way of evading the issue.

Physics has made much progress in understanding the properties of matter and energy. In what physics text will I learn something about matter and energy that will even hint that that lifeless matter and energy can somehow become reflectively conscious, look around the universe, study itself, and write physics texts about it’s own properties?

 

[itinerant1]

It is your opinion, entirely unsupported, that modern philosophy is especially disordered. It is true that philosophy has always been a hopelessly inefficacious means to attain knowledge about reality, but your unbalanced attachment to scholasticism leads you into making rather silly claims like this. I’m interested, as an aside, why you think that relativirty and non-Euclidean geometry are problems for Kantian epistemology.

Your comments about philosophy are totally without merit. They are the kind of comments one would expect from an opinionated college freshman.

My judgments about modern philosophy come from years of studying the history of philosophy. Furthermore, the fact you do not know what problems relativity theory and non-Euclidean geometries pose for Kantian epistemology reveals your profound lack of understanding of modern philosophy and epistemology. Clearly, you are not in a position to make informed comments about philosophy. Your credibility appears to be waning with every post you make.

 

[hecd2]

Your attempt to equate the logic of ID theory with my views fails to recognize certain critical distinctions. First, my position does not imply religious belief or a theological foundation.

OK - although I believe that *your *motivations and that of IDers in making your separate arguments are religious, it is true that your motivation does not fundamentally affect what I have to say, so I will restate it:

Your logic and that of IDers with regard to proper limitation of natural science is identical. Both you and IDers propose a limit to methodological naturalism in seeking natural answers to phenomological questions that you each propose are not amenable to natural science. In their case they propose that methodological naturalism cannot yield true answers to questions about the diversity of species because they think that a supernatural process is necessarily responsible for what we observe. You propose that methodological naturalism cannot yield true answers to questions about the mind, because you think that a immaterial ontology underlies mind. Scientists are right to reject both proposals and for the same reason.

Next, I never stated as you assert, that “methodological naturalism cannot yield true answers to questions about the mind, because you think that a immaterial ontology underlies mind.” To get to the crux of the issue, “mind” has not been defined in this thread. Furthermore, “mind” in modern science has become a less than rigorous concept so as to include radically different things, from human sensations, images, to abstract concepts, consciousness, and animal “mind”.

Now this is obfuscation. We have spent many posts in this thread talking about whether functions of the human mind have a foundation in material brain, and your semantic wriggling here adds nothing to the discussion or to the strength of your case.

When the proper distinctions are made, then my position is understood as distinguishing what activities are somatic, psychosomatic, and strictly psychic. Your underlying assumption appears to be that all human activities from sensation to conceptualization are ultimately biological, and only biological in cause. This is something that no scientists has proven. Hence, in the interest of objectivity, it would seem that your critique of my position as limiting methodological naturalism is unfounded.

It is not at all unfounded. You have just demonstrated it. You have asserted that there are processes that we observe (in other words, phenomena), which you are now calling psychic, whose causes lie beyond the competence of natural science just as IDers assert that there are observations whose causes lie beyond the competence of natural science. There is no difference, except perhaps this: IDers present arguments (flawed though they are) to support their view, whereas you merely assert yours. You are right about one thing: methodological naturalism is based on an assumption which is that observations have natural causes. That assumption has proven extraordinarily efficacious and scientists are right to resist every a priori attempt to ring fence areas of experience and observation based on this or that metaphysical or religious rationale. And in this case the assumption seems very well founded given the intimate and correlative relationship between mind and brain phenomena.

There is no reason for me or anyone else to think that methodological naturalism will not continue to reveal new understandings about the brain and brain process.

The question is not whether natural science can reveal new understanding of brain processes - that is trivially obvious. The question is whether it can gain understanding of mind processes; you would deny it that competence, but I say not only has it done so and will continue to do so, but that to exclude it on the basis of the arguments you have presented here would be toxic to science.

IC does have a number of philosophical problems of which you are not aware. One, it confuses design and finality. Two, it conflates ultimate and secondary causes.

IC has those problems? It seems that you don’t understand IC and that you are conflating IC and ID. IC is a purely natural argument that certain complex biological structures are assembled from a number of components, all of which are necessary to the process. The argument is therefore that those components could not have been assembled in a gradual way as current evolutionary theory would suggest and are prohibited from instantaneous assembly for probabilistic reasons. The argument stands and falls (falls actually) on purely scientific grounds.

I wouldn’t attempt an argument, scientific or philosophical, involving “mind”, since it is an overused and misused term.

Really? Itinerant1: “The Darwinian hypothesis about mind is problematic both scientifically and philosophically.” I merely asked you to show what *scientific *objection you have to the hypothesis that mind processes have a biological foundation.

Not so. My argument is based on what is phenomenological and what is not, either in itself, or as far as its causes are concerned.

So are you saying that mind processes as we perceive them are not phenomena? If so, how do we know that they exist and how can we say anything at all about them?

My position implies no limits whatsoever on scientific investigation of phenomenal reality.

So that would include mental phenomena?

The fact is that you think that your argument differs from that of IDers because you think that you are right and they are wrong. But to an outsider your arguments are exactly analogous and scientists are right to ignore them both.

Alec
evolutionpages.com

 

[itinerant1]

You propose that methodological naturalism cannot yield true answers to questions about the mind, because you think that a immaterial ontology underlies mind.

Your reply, once again, begs the question. I have no where proposed that “methodological naturalism cannot yield true answers to questions about the mind”. The distinctions I make in discussing the topic continue to elude your grasp.

The existence of intellectual concepts, which are abstract and have universal denotation constitutes clear evidence that not everything about “mind” can be fully or sufficiently explained in material terms. This is what you must explain away at all costs, and so far you have not provided a compelling argument.

If you are so concerned that this position posits an underlying “immaterial ontology” I can only go with what the evidence reveals. I cannot arbitrarily deny the implications of common human experience as you are prone to do, because you “want” everything to have a natural cause. That is what T.H. Huxley called “a sort of philosophic faith”. Under the guise of “Science” you arbitrarily deny certain explanations. That is not philosophic naturalism. That is a religion, a sort of inverted act of faith in metaphysical materialism coated with a scientific veneer and parading about as if it were merely an adherence to methodological naturalism. The emperor has not clothes.

BTW, If labeling my position in the same category as ID helps you, then do so. In my philosophic understanding of nature, all material things have a non-material component. Only by understanding my philosophy of nature will one see how my arguments about the mind-body problem differ radically from ID logic.

Now this is obfuscation. We have spent many posts in this thread talking about whether functions of the human mind have a foundation in material brain, and your semantic wriggling here adds nothing to the discussion or to the strength of your case.

I can see how it might appear as “semantic wriggling” to one who is not used to making the necessary distinctions revealed by common experience and philosophic analysis

You are right about one thing: methodological naturalism is based on an assumption which is that observations have natural causes. That assumption has proven extraordinarily efficacious and scientists are right to resist every a priori attempt to ring fence areas of experience and observation based on this or that metaphysical or religious rationale.

“Methodological naturalism is based on an assumption which is that observations have natural causes.” Agreed. But what about that which has not been observed and the experience of which strongly indicates that it is not observable, even in principle, by the methods of science? Furthermore, philosophical analysis shows exactly why certain realities are not observable.

And in this case the assumption seems very well founded given the intimate and correlative relationship between mind and brain phenomena.

And this is where science does not prove your position. Correlation and relation, even necessary, do not prove an identity between brain and “mind.” You gladly make a logical leap. But there is still no scientific evidence that compels us to identify abstracts concepts with brain processes. The most we can say from the evidence is that brain processes are indirectly involved in ideogenesis and that thinking never occurs without the brain. Assuming an identity of brain process and conceptual thinking is unwarranted, for one reason, by the utter and radical difference in our observation of brain activity and experience of thinking.

The question is whether it [science] can gain understanding of mind processes; you would deny it that competence, but I say not only has it done so and will continue to do so, but that to exclude it on the basis of the arguments you have presented here would be toxic to science.

When science observes human abstract thinking under the microscope, I’ll reconsider.

IC has those problems? It seems that you don’t understand IC and that you are conflating IC and ID. IC is a purely natural argument that certain complex biological structures are assembled from a number of components, all of which are necessary to the process. The argument is therefore that those components could not have been assembled in a gradual way as current evolutionary theory would suggest and are prohibited from instantaneous assembly for probabilistic reasons. The argument stands and falls (falls actually) on purely scientific grounds.

The argument also has philosophic implications. What I said about IC applies also to ID theory generally. However, since you do not recognize the kind of knowledge gained through philosophical analysis, then you must limit yourself to a scientific critique of ID theory and its various components. I do not possess that type of self-imposed limitation. “Blame de pint! I reck’n I knows what I knows.”

So are you saying that mind processes as we perceive them are not phenomena? If so, how do we know that they exist and how can we say anything at all about them? So that would include mental phenomena?

I was hoping you could put up a serious argument for your position. Do you think scientists have observed anyone’s mind working out a math problem. And no, I am not referring to the concomitant physiological processes in the brain. I am referring to the subject’s mathematical ideas, and not even to the images correlated with those ideas. What does your “faith” say about this question?

 

[edwest2]

The concern about ID, for some, is strictly political and strictly ideological. Pope John Paul II stated the answer to what caused the “ontological leap” to man cannot be found within science.

Finally, let me be clear. Those who prefer this to become the Non-Catholic Answers Only forum have access to miraculous artifacts, including the tilma with the image of Our Lady of Guadalupe, and records of miracles examined by the Congregation for Saints’ Causes. But no. Materialism, man’s five senses and some specialized instruments, are the only sources of truth for them. The Catholic knows, or should know, that this is not true.

May all Praise the Living God,
Ed

 

[reggieM]

Your logic and that of IDers with regard to proper limitation of natural science is identical … You have asserted that there are processes that we observe (in other words, phenomena), which you are now calling psychic, whose causes lie beyond the competence of natural science just as IDers assert that there are observations whose causes lie beyond the competence of natural science. There is no difference, except perhaps this: IDers present arguments (flawed though they are) to support their view, whereas you merely assert yours.

I agree with this and I tried to make the same point earlier. The logic is identical. The differences are that ID seeks to give scientific and logical arguments about the improbability of certain biological functions arising from neo-Darwinian processes. Beyond that, ID tries to offer the products of human-intelligence as an model for “designed structures” which might be seen in nature. Whereas, itinerant1 has merely asserted that certain things are beyond the reach of science. This might be fine if science itself didn’t claim the opposite, since there wouldn’t be a debate. But once science proposes that all aspects of nature can be understood through a naturalistic methodology, then it’s not enough to merely deny this with the assertion that some things (in this case, the mind) are not accessible to science.

itinerant1 went on to argue this (in a later post):

Do you think scientists have observed anyone’s mind working out a math problem. And no, I am not referring to the concomitant physiological processes in the brain. I am referring to the subject’s mathematical ideas, and not even to the images correlated with those ideas.

This again is the ID view, but this time he adds a bit more (and necessary) argumentation by pointing to some aspect of human nature which science cannot (or has not thus far) been able to reduce to physical properties alone. This is merely saying that “a mind working out a math problem” is Irreducibly Complex. It’s the same thing. This process, which we can observe in its effects (working on a math problem) is not reducible. That’s the ID position. It’s not even the Theistic Evolution position – which would gladly claim that there is nothing in human nature which is not reducible to biology.

So, while it appears that this argument will continue to go in circles and itinerant1’s personal animosity to ID will prevent him from recognizing his own embrace of the ID position (which he also misrepresented as necessarily “religious”), the more he argues the more he’ll end up sounding just like Michael Behe and William Dembski.

To his credit, it is his Catholic Faith which has caused him to be trapped between these two worlds – fearing to be considered sympathetic-to-ID on one side, and rightly opposing evolutionary-materialism on the other side. Theistic evolution will give him no consolation here because it surrenders entirely to naturalism as the only reliable means available to understand nature. There is no interface between the natural and supernatural in that view.

ID proposes that there was intelligence of some kind (some IDers even propose a natural intelligence – e.g. alien life) was involved in the origin and development of life (and nature and the universe). The Catholic view necessarily must adopt that position since we know that effects of the human soul can be seen in nature.

 

[reggieM]

You are right about one thing: methodological naturalism is based on an assumption which is that observations have natural causes. **That assumption has proven extraordinarily efficacious **and scientists are right to resist every a priori attempt to ring fence areas of experience and observation based on this or that metaphysical or religious rationale.

As I see it, that’s the most important point of departure here (where emphasis was added above). Methodological naturalism is an assumption which is used for the foundation of all research, interpretation and explanations of nature. It assumes that “nature is all that exists” – and thus proceeds to evaluate everything as a product of matter and physical laws. So, the starting point for this kind of science is monism – nature alone.

The support for this assumption comes from the idea that it has already proven to be efficacious. In other words, “it works”.

The proposal is that science has shown that it is the best and most reliable method for understanding all of reality. It has shown this because it has been successful thus far. Therefore, it’s a reasonable assumption to conclude that science will continue to be successful on all other unresolved questions regarding the orgin and development of nature and human life and the universe.

The first point I’d offer is that this approach (by itself) can be (and has been ) used to support proposals like “wizards are important in society”. Why? “Because when the wizzard waves his wand, things happen. Wizardy works”.

Actually, we could take it farther and use the argument to justify any assumption because it depends on what one means by “it works” or “it is efficacious”.

The question is “efficacious for what”? The claim is, “for understanding all of reality”.

Well, even that could be questioned. Why is “understanding reality” something good or necessary to do? Again, when we say that “it works” – the question is “works for what”?

It depends what you think the goal and purpose and meaning of life is, doesn’t it?

Why do we need science to do anything for us? We can claim that “science works”. But if what we want to have “work” or be “efficacious” is perhaps an evil plan to destroy everything – then science is pretty much unnecessary.

Then the next question is: What about when science doesn’t work? What about when methodological naturalism alone is not efficacious?

There’s a two volume work scholarly work published in 2007, The Encyclopedia of Religion and Nature, for example – written cover-to-cover from a materialist-evolutionary perspective. That book exists, in part, to answer this question about philosophical-naturalism (religion is a product of evolution in the view of this reference work).

These scholars have bumped into the difficult problems surrounding the preservation of nature and the environment – strictly from a naturalistic-evolutionary perspective.

To say that the logic is convoluted and self-refuting is to understate the problem.

More people are recognizing that the reductionist view of nature really doesn’t “work” – it’s not efficacious at all and has caused extreme harm to the environment (the great Pacific garbage patch as one example).

This is especially important because the assumption that materialism is the only method that one should use to understand reality only “works” for certain final outcomes and purposes. What are those purposes? Has science told us what it thinks it’s trying to do for us? Why does science have the right to experiment in any way it wants?

Science grants itself that right because it claims “it has worked in the past, thus nobody can fence us in”. That’s what the Nazi scientists said. Their methods were very efficacious – science served the purpose. Thus it should go forward.

You made the same thing clear:

… scientists are right to resist every a priori attempt to ring fence areas of experience and observation based on this or that metaphysical or religious rationale.

That is certainly a clear and accurate view of how the scientific consensus views its own work. It alone has the right to determine its scope of activity. But I think more people are going to reject that assumption. Many already have the sense that science doesn’t work in many areas – and that philosophical naturalism is not the best foundation for understanding life.

I don’t think this will necessarily bring people to traditional Catholic belief, or even religious belief as such. But we’ll see more people interested in “spirituality” of the New Age variety and in other things like paranormal activity and “connectedness with the earth” and things like that.

 

[edwest2]

Having done some research into other forms of spirituality and the New Age, all I can say is that it opens up the individual to demonic forces and confusion. God did not appear on earth just as a sacrifice but as the way, the truth and the light. I’ve known one individual who went from one belief system to another, and ended, last I heard, as a Methodist.

Evolution has become the central idea of a new belief system. Let me define evolution: You came from nothing. You’re a bunch of chemicals. And here’s the important part: You are obligated to nobody for anything. According to a poster on a forum I moderate, “consent” is his favorite word. Anybody can do whatever they want to anybody else as long as there is consent. Let me define consent: anarchy.

Now, a poster here provided a link to show how useful evolution is to the outside world. One example was modifying an environment either by man or natural forces. Cutting down too many trees or the now disproven “climate change” affecting it. This was described as evolution because the organisms in the area would have to react in some adaptive way to the changes in their environment, leave to find a more suitable environment or die. Evolution in action? Baloney in action.

There are only two types of evolution:

Old, dead things evolution, which supposedly took millions of years.
Bacteria, virus evolution, which, after billions of generations, produces bacteria and viruses. The premise is that these microorganisms evolve. Really? If every human being on earth were given a piece of wood to live on, would we end up like termites and be able to digest it?

Evolution is little more than a storytelling device propping up an anti-theist ideology. That is its primary function. I have no idea who is financing scientists flying in to Zimbabwe, digging some holes, giving them food, water and shelter, and bringing back some bones which, in some cases, may take years to properly prepare for analysis, which means another group of humans that need food, drink and some type of laboratory/work environment.

We are led to believe we are just another animal in a long line of animals. That’s why people have gone to court in Europe to get “rights” for chimps. This proves that a fantasy world exists for these people that just by force of their own will, they can walk into a courtroom and try to get “rights” for our “evolutionary cousins.”

Now just as there is a basic similarity between the frame of a car and a truck, so are there similarities between land dwelling creatures. The story being fed to the public is that little, itty bitty changes over a long period of time got organisms to leave the water and live on land. Design is the better answer. Four limbs are needed. Lungs are needed. All creatures live under one earth gravity, get a certain amount of sunlight, and have access to certain things that they can eat.

We are asked to believe in the Great Coincidence that made us. Look. Animals know what is food and what is not. What does the Koala Bear eat? Eucalyptus leaves. Fortunately, there just happen to be Eucalyptus trees in his environment. What a lucky break.

And bees and flowers? What accident or series of accidents allowed bees to recognize flowers, know what to do when they spotted one and how to build hives? A series of coincidences?

Oh yes, the science lab has become the new place of worship. Here, the mind of man, in all its glory, invents things to give to the people. The scientist-priests will give you things to heal you, things to improve your life and save you time and new, and more efficient ways to kill other human beings.

At the end of World War II, thousands of German scientists were appropriated by the Allies. These scientists gave us the cruise missile, the ballistic rocket and those fun nerve gases, sarin, soman and tabun. Strangely, all of the German atomic scientists were scooped even though they supposedly knew very little and did very little.

Science has clearly replaced God for some people.

Peace,
Ed

 

[itinerant1]

FYI: The Pontifical Academy of Science has made available online its publication Scientific Insights into the Evolution of the Universe and of Life. Scroll down the page to Acta, under which you will see the links to pdf files at, “020 Scientific Insights into the Evolution of the Universe and of Life. Plenary Session, 31 October - 4 November 2008, Vatican City, 2009, pp. LXVII-622, ISBN 978-88-7761-097-3.”

This is a good online source about evolution, which includes a presentation on the Intelligent Design challenge to evolution theory. Enjoy!

 

[reggieM]

FYI: The Pontifical Academy of Science has made available online its publication Scientific Insights into the Evolution of the Universe and of Life. Scroll down the page to Acta, under which you will see the links to pdf files at, “020 Scientific Insights into the Evolution of the Universe and of Life. Plenary Session, 31 October - 4 November 2008, Vatican City, 2009, pp. LXVII-622, ISBN 978-88-7761-097-3.”

This is a good online source about evolution, which includes a presentation on the Intelligent Design challenge to evolution theory. Enjoy!

Author of the text on the challenge of Intelligent Design:

Maxine F Singer
watchdog.net/contrib/20015/maxine_f_singer
$240 to Naral Pro-Choice America Pac on March 19, 1992

I just gave the paper itself a quick read. In my opinion it offers nothing to the discussion. It will be shredded by people who know something about ID (and it’s obvious she really doesn’t know the topic). She spends a few pages talking about creationism and then about politics.

Her voting record in the U.S. presidential elections is available in the link above also.

 

[DAMIENTHEGREAT]

Yes, I know. But that is why a certain comedian looked at the camera recently and said, “Hey Creationists. Viruses evolve.”

As I’ve pointed out in the past, viruses have the built-in ability to modify their outer protein coat.

viruses > ----------------- > billions of generations >------------------------- > still viruses

Hopefully, someone reading this will notice that this is true and is observed.

Peace,
Ed

You do realize that the whole theory of evolution is based on the simple fact that any living organism strives to find its own niche as high up on the food chain as possible, meaning, that the reason why viruses do not change dramatically… is the fact that the species have reached the desired place on the food chain and therefore do not need to evolve into any other organism, and focus on perfecting their current form. Viruses are ones of the only living things that are above us in the food chain…

 

[rossum]

We are asked to believe in the Great Coincidence that made us. Look. Animals know what is food and what is not. What does the Koala Bear eat? Eucalyptus leaves. Fortunately, there just happen to be Eucalyptus trees in his environment. What a lucky break.

Come on ed, even you can work this one out. All the Koala Bears that were not living near Eucalyptus trees starved to death which is why they are not around any more. Only the Koala Bears with enough Eucalyptus leaves to eat managed to avoid starvation and lived long enough to breed.

rossum

 

[itinerant1]

Author of the text on the challenge of Intelligent Design:

Maxine F Singer
watchdog.net/contrib/20015/maxine_f_singer
$240 to Naral Pro-Choice America Pac on March 19, 1992

I just gave the paper itself a quick read. In my opinion it offers nothing to the discussion. It will be shredded by people who know something about ID (and it’s obvious she really doesn’t know the topic). She spends a few pages talking about creationism and then about politics.

Her voting record in the U.S. presidential elections is available in the link above also.

Her views on ID are independent of her rank positions on social and moral problems. There is no basis for judging one by the other. Her brief presentation on ID stands or falls on its own.

It seems however, you have missed the forest for the tree. The Pontifical Academy of Sciences did not invite any ID theorists to participate. What significance do you think that has?

 

[buffalo]

Her views on ID are independent of her rank positions on social and moral problems. There is no basis for judging one by the other. Her brief presentation on ID stands or falls on its own.

It seems however, you have missed the forest for the tree. The Pontifical Academy of Sciences did not invite any ID theorists to participate. What significance do you think that has?

It could be the fact that the PAS is made up of atheists. Check it out.

 

[itinerant1]

It could be the fact that the PAS is made up of atheists. Check it out.

Trying to buffalo me with that idea won’t get you very far.

 

[buffalo]

Trying to buffalo me with that idea won’t get you very far.

Proof the Pontifical Academy of Science is Run by Atheists