No cease fire for Hamas

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Matt,
To answer your question they probably put the wall where they felt it would do them the most good both militarily and economically. The Arabs started the 67 war and lost. When you lose a war you don’t always get back what you started with. Ask the Germans about that or the French for that matter. Before 48 there was no Palestine per se. It was always a part of some other country. For example Turkey or Jordan. The Palestinian identity is a rather new thing. They won’t be going back to Israel proper. No way will they let 4 million angry Arabs move in next to 6 million Israelis. That would be suicidal. Hopefully they will realize this and settle for what is possible. That wall would not be there right now if they had not started up the terrorism again. They have no one to blame, but themselves. Maybe Arafat too. If he had made the deal they would already be an independent nation with virtually all of the West Bank and all of Gaza.
 
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cestusdei:
Matt,
Before 48 there was no Palestine per se. It was always a part of some other country. For example Turkey or Jordan. The Palestinian identity is a rather new thing.
Scotland is part of the United Kingdom but that does not mean that it has no national idenity or does not exist per se.

Kosovo was part of Serbia for centuries but the US had no difficulty recognising its unique status.

Palestinian identity pre-dates the establishment of Israel al-awda.org/palestiniannonviolentresistance/

Khalidi (Rashid Khalidi, Palestinian Identity: The Construction of modern national consciousness. Columbia University Press, New York, 1997) discusses the attempts by Palestinians to modify Ottoman rule and laws to protect their land from the danger they saw inherent in the ideas of Zionism. The Ottoman Parliament discussion of 1897 are cited as examples of how such concerns were dismissed. Khalidi also cites an editorial in May 1914 published in the popular newspaper “Filastin” (Palestine) in which the editors of this fiercely nationalistic paper defend their position. The editors attacked the central Ottoman government for its attempts to shutdown this newspaper because the newspaper portrayed Zionism as a threat to the Palestinian nation (Al-Umma Al-Falastinia) (Khalidi, p155). But these small pro-Palestinian stirrings were no match for great power plays that were to completely redraw the Middle East landscape…

The middle and lower class members of the Palestinian society thus came under tremendous pressures and they rightly blamed the tripartite cause of their misery to: the Palestinian elite, the Jewish settlers, and the British overlords. Worsening economic situation across the globe in the early 1930s made this an even more volatile situation. Thus, was born the first truly grass-root rebellion/uprising by Palestinians in 1936. It originated from the young people who have by now established groups like the Young Men’s Muslim Association, scouting organizations, and Hizb Al-Istiqlal (the Party of Independence), a radical progressive organization. Flare-up of clashes with the British forces in 1934 and 1935 were small and contained. In November 1935, a leading figure in many of the radical movements was killed in a clash with British forces. This was Shaykh Izz Al-Din Al-Qassam ( a young preacher from Haifa). His death (martyrdom) was a rallying call to the masses. On April 19, 1936, a riot broke out in Jaffa in response to increased Zionist activity, British oppression, and unfair laws by the British Mandate government. the British immediately and violently put this down and imposed curfews and emergency regulations throughout the country. Palestinian leaders in response called for a general strike which lasted till October and essentially paralyzed economic life. The British underestimated the level of resentment at their policy and attempted to undercut the growing revolt by some statements that were not consistent with their actions on the ground (severe repression of the natives and increased support for the Zionist program between 1922-the late 1930s). At one point, the British proposed dividing the country to a small Jewish state and a larger segment of Palestine to be incorporated under Britain’s puppet government of Jordan. This proposal touched off more demonstrations and continued uprising, which the British were not able to completely suppress until 1939.

For the Palestinians, the results were devastating in losses. The British killed over 5000 Palestinians and, as collective punishment, demolished whole sections of Jaffa and many other places. The best fighting men were either killed or imprisoned (approximately 10% of adult males thus included). On the social and political level, the impact was also devastating. The Arab high Commission was now more divided than ever, the Mufti gained more power at the expense of the demolished progressive and grassroots organizations. The British were able to split the Palestinians further into factions squabbling over everything from remaining and dwindling resources to tactics to philosophy (Rashid Khalidi, “The Palestinians and 1948: the underlying causes of failure”, pp. 12-36 in “The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948”, E. L. Rogan and A. Schlaim, eds., Cambridge University Press. 2001)
 
palestinehistory.com/palst.htm#05

Aided by the Arabs, the British captured Palestine from the Ottoman Turks in 1917-18. The Arabs revolted against the Turks because the British had promised them, in correspondence (1915-16) with Shareef Husein ibn Ali of Mecca (1856-1931), the independence of their countries after the war . Britain , however, also made other, conflicting commitments in the secret Sykes -Picot agreement with France and Russia (1916), it promised to divide and rule the region with its allies . In a third agreement , the Balfour Declaration of 1917, Britain promised the Jews a Jewish “national home” in Palestine.

This promise was subsequently incorporated in the mandate conferred on Britain by the League of Nations in 1922 . During their mandate (1922-48) the British found their contradictory promises to the Jewish and Palestinian communities difficult to reconcile. The Zionists envisaged large-scale Jewish immigration , and some spoke of a Jewish state constituting all of Palestine . Palestinians , however, rejected Britain’s right to promise their country to a third party and feared dispossession by the Zionists; anti-Zionist attacks occurred in Jerusalem (1920) and Jaffa (1921).

A 1922 statement of British policy denied Zionist claims to all of Palestine and limited Jewish immigration , but reaffirmed support for a Jewish national home. British proposed establishing a legislative council, Palestinians rejected this council as discriminatory.

After 1928, when Jewish immigration increased somewhat, British policy on the subject seesawed under conflicting Arab-Jewish pressures . Immigration rose sharply after the installation (1933) of the Nazi regime in Germany; in 1935 nearly 62,000 Jews entered Palestine.

Fear of Jewish domination was the principal cause of the Arab revolt that broke out in 1936 and continued intermittently until 1939. By that time Britain had again restricted Jewish immigration and purchases of land.

ist-socrates.berkeley.edu/~mescha/bookrev/khalidi.html

Noting that “collective traumas and major obstacles” help to shape this identity the most, Khalidi still traces precursors to Palestinian identity during Ottoman times, which gives the book some of its originality. ** The local Arab elites’ relationship with the Ottoman central authority - especially the way in which their knowledge of Arabic proved to be to their advantage - were interesting to note, as was the metamorphosis of the court system from shari’a-based to secularly-oriented**. …Later, when he discusses the development of new social formations, classes, professional groups, and the impact of major institutions, we begin to see the semblance of present-day Palestinian makeup… the chapter about early peasant resistance to British colonialism, N-shaped colonial settlement, the impact of the Ottoman Land Code, and forcible seizure of Arab lands, did not reveal anything novel… . More than anything, his exploration of the refreshing Arabist elements of regional and transnational newspapers was consoling, even if he just traced and outlined the sentiments geographically instead of delving into their impact or ideological origins. More noteworthy is Khalidi’s finding that Zionism was often times not even mentioned in highly patriotic Palestinian editorials and papers in the early years. I also found the infiltration of Arab Jews’ in the newspapers’ editorial staffs quite prophetic in that the only accounts sympathetic to the Zionist movement were written by them. Palestinians still grapple with the problem of integrating these voices (now considered “leftist” although probably not during the time Khalidi explores) in the movement today.** Kudos to Khalidi for making note of the ridiculous error of attributing degree of nationalist ties to religious affiliation: some of the most anti-Zionists papers were run by Christian editors, he writes.**
 
The mentality that says, “We are poor Palestinians who need to be taken care of by someone” is what they have to give up. If they give up their support of Hamas and work on building their own country where they are not dependant on handouts from other countries or their government, they will find that their lives will improve and they can take care of themselves.QUOTE] They don’t have an economy to speak of, and they don’t have control over their own infrastructure. They don’t have control over any major water supplies, or any natural resources aside from their small amounts of farmland. This isn’t an example of a stable, established nation depending on foreign handouts. In fact, Israel fits that bill more than Palestine. Until Palestine has even an infrastructure to speak of, it will require outside aid to get off the ground.
The Arabs started the 67 war and lost. When you lose a war you don’t always get back what you started with. Ask the Germans about that or the French for that matter. Before 48 there was no Palestine per se. It was always a part of some other country. For example Turkey or Jordan. The Palestinian identity is a rather new thing.
Uh, no. Every source records that Israel started the '67 war, hence the term “preemptive strike”. There was hostility between the nations to be sure, but Israel made the first military attacks. Secondly, the war was between Israel and the other Arab nations, not Israel and Palestine (as in the Palestinian people). At that time the Palestinians were occupied by Jordan and Egypt, and were fighting vigorously against those two countries for independence. The people that formed the PLO cut their teeth fighting against Arab occupation of Palestinian land; there was never any kind of “Arab Unity” between the Palestinians and their neighbors. When Israel took the Palestinian lands from Egypt and Jordan, they simply inherited the problems that those two nations had been dealing with for almost 20 years. Even today there is muted hostility between Palestinian Jordanians and the “native” Arabs. If Palestinian identity didn’t exist prior to '67, why were they fighting so bitterly against Jordan trying to “take back their land”, even going so far as attempts to overthrow the monarchy?

As for the wall, I have no problem with it per se, but it cuts into the Palestinian land quite a bit, “claiming” illegal settlements for Israel proper when they technically fall within the Occupied Territories (Palestine) according to international definition. The wall being built isn’t the problem, it’s WHERE it’s being built; if Israelies want a wall for protection, they should use their own land to build it. It’s no differen than me building a fence on your property and making part of it my yard. The '67 borders are very clearly defined, so there’s no argument for “wiggle room” in the building of the fence.

I really think the PA is ready to deal with Hamas, but they don’t have the physical means to do so. If Israel and Palestine are willing to work in a joint effort, I think Hamas could be broken very easily. The corruption that kept social construction funds from reaching the needs of the people may be mostly gone now along with Arafat, so it’s quite possible that only the military mopping up is necessary to eventually break Hamas.
 
I want to add that Sharon seems to have done a complete about-face which shocks and impresses me. He is adamant about pulling out of Gaza, even to the point of upsetting some in Israeli government. I never thought I’d say it, but Sharon seems to be a leading element in possible peace between Palestine and Israel. I’m not sure what has prompted the change in Sharon’s policies (though I guess it has a lot to do with Arafat being out of the picture) but my opinion of him has changed for the better by a large degree in the past few months. I honestly believe that he’s interested in letting go of the Occupied Territories, and I have to take back a lot of the nasty things I’ve said and thought about him.
 
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Matt25:
So who was Zahir Muhsein? middleeastreference.org.uk/palbiograph.html

Zuhayr Muhsin: Sec-Gen of Sa‘iqa from 1971 to 1979. b.1936, from Tulkarm. Trained as a teacher in Amman, but lost his job in Jordan due to Ba‘thist activism; then moved to Qatar, Kuwait & then Syria in 1967. As an Asad loyalist & Ba‘th party member, was appointed to head Sa‘iqa when the pro-Jadid leadership was purged. A member of the PLO-EC throughout his leadership of Sa‘iqa, he served as head of the military department. Was repeatedly promoted by Syria to become chairman of the PLO-EC whenever dissatisfied with ‘Arafat (esp during early76 clashes). Famously declared that the assertion of Palestinian identity was just a tactical manoeuvre in the struggle (Mar77 interview). **His family’s house in Tulkarm was picketed after gave support to Syria in 1976 Lebanon clashes with Palestinians. **Was assassinated in Cannes on 15Jul79.

And what is Sa iqa? globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/al-saiqa.htm

Syrian members of the Ba’athist party were among the original founders of al-Sa’iqa when it was established in 1966. Since its founding, al-Sa’iqa has backed the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), but** its Syrian origin has occasionally hindered its support of a Palestinian state .Al-Sa’iqa is sponsored by the state of Syria.
**

Syrian General Salah Jadid was the first to lead the al-Sa’iqa organization, but he was quickly removed when rival Hafez al-Asad came to power in Syria. Mahmud al-Ma’ayta and Yusuf Zu’ayyin were also among al-Sa’iqa’s primary leaders until Hafez al-Asad supporters replaced them in November 1970. In June 1971, Zuhayr Muhsin was appointed Secretary General of the organization, and his brother Majid Muhsin later became the head of operations in Lebanon. In July 1979, Zuhayr Muhsin was assasinated in Cannes and was soon replaced by 'Isam al-Qadi. In the same year, Muhammed Khalifah became Deputy Secretary General, who also served on the Executive Committee of the PLO.

In February 1979, al-Sa’iqa was suspected for a bombing of a Sheraton Hotel in Cairo, Egypt. In June of the same year, a suspected member of al-Sa’iqa was arrested in Cairo while carrying a suitcase full of explosives. In May 1984, a former member of al-Sa’iqa was found dead in Cyprus; three Syrians were questioned and stated that the man had joined Fatah, a rival faction within the PLO.

So a Syrian agent saw the Palestinian struggle as an opportunity to great a Greater Syria. what does that prove exactly?
To me it proves he had and spoke the truth that undermined the whole strategy of the anti-Isreale movement so he suffered persecution. How you miss the connection is beyond me, considering you have no history to back up a non-Jewish Palestinian people prior to the 1900s.
 
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