S
sw85
Guest
I think you are saying that marriage is completely based on reproduction then - however, a woman or man could have a condition in which they cannot conceive. If that is true there are many marriages that are unlawful.
I know you have said “relevant” which means that there are some situations where reproduction does not have to be sole purpose of marriage? What are the other purposes outside of that? Love? Friendship?
I don’t want to stray too far into complicated issues of natural law you’re raising, so instead I will limit my observations to the purely-civil case I’ve outlined elsewhere. Let’s start with an illustrative example.I believe the only role gender has within marriage is sex towards reproducing, which would mean that a couple of the opposite gender who cannot have sex and/or reproduce would fall outside of this purpose as well?
The state prohibits people from drinking who are under the age of 21. Why does it do this? Because it doesn’t want alcohol getting (legally) into the hands of people who are not sufficiently mature to handle it, e.g., high schoolers.
But of course we know that there are some immature people who are 21 or older, and some people who are under 21 who are perfectly mature and capable of handling alcohol. Why the arbitrary dividing line, then?
Because the arbitrary dividing line is (a) roughly accurate, if imprecise in some rare cases, and (b) because of (a) it is a relatively easy and mostly reliable method of operationalizing “maturity.”
Let us suppose the state scrapped the 21-year-old age limit and instead instituted a “sufficient maturity” requirement. Such a requirement would be maddeningly vague. How would it be assessed and enforced? To what standards would individual vendors’ judgment be held? Might my good-faith judgment that Person X is mature get me sued for selling alcohol to an immature person?
Obviously, such an arrangement would be intolerable. We use age as a proxy for maturity because it enables us to make a bright line in the sand. It’s not perfectly reliable, but no such proxy would be, nor does it need to be.
In a similar way, we use “being of the same species, of the opposite sex, and sufficiently unrelated” as a proxy for “desirably fertile.” Because the only other way to assess it would be invasive, intrusive, and frustratingly vague and inefficient fertility tests. As above, this criterion is both (a) a reasonably accurate gauge of a couple’s fertility, infertility being nonnormative and (b) far less intrusive than the only other option for assessing it.
And why should the state care at all about a couple being “desirably fertile”? Because fertile sexual unions have a tendency to produce children – and because the care and disposition of children is absolutely a matter of public interest, in which the state is heavily invested.
Again, this is entirely different from the natural-law case, which is too subtle to go into here.