Nothing to something

[Freddy]

nicholasG:

Dan123:

A taco is a sandwich.

I thought a taco was wet and water was a sandwich.
Oh well, back to the drawing board.

A Møøse once bit my sister…

I was once told that the difference between a moose is that one leg is both the same.

 

[quaestio45]

I think we agreed that once time exist then it doesn’t need a sustainer.

Mmmmm… not particularly. Sustainer in the sense that it needs an outside factor to operate in change and fulfill its inner most attributes? Well then no, it does not need one. Sustainer in the sense that without some entity ontologically prior to its existence it would have no eternal being (like a camper continually supplying wood to a fire)? In that case, yes, it does need a sustainer.

Moreover, we agreed that time cannot be created

Yes, in the sense that it does not begin to exist. That does not, however, properly explain why it exists at all. If something is of a given manner, say eternal or temporal, it is not beyond the bounds of reasonable question to ask why they are so. If time is eternal, why is it so? Is it so through its own powers? That would be the key attribute which would signify whether a being is noncontingent, for even if an entity were eternal, if it is not eternal through its own power it must be explained by another eternal entity which does explain his own existence perfectly, thus marking the former being contingent and the ladder as noncontingent.

So the conclusion is time is not contingent.

We should be careful in knowing our terms here, STT. For if contingency is whether or not something is temporal or eternal, then certainly the the temporal framework is noncontingent. If, however, it is whether or not an entities being is explained by external factors and not merely internal factors, then the eternality of the subject isn’t as relevant as we may be led to believe.

I hold myself firmly to the ladder determining of contigency over the former. If that be so, we therefore must ask how we may determine whether or not an entity is soley under the influence of internalities, or if externalities play a role in it. The best way to discover such is be asking whether or not a being changes, for if it did change in any way, then it maybe influenced by what is beyond merely itself, and thus we may deduce its contigency. The other factor, as I’ve argued before, is finitude and infinitude. And because time is both finite (in so far as we know) and can most definitely change, it therefore follows that time is contingent.

There was either nothing or something at the beginning of time.

Well yes, time itself. It doesn’t follow from such that anything else was there though other than the thing which may sustain time.

 

[quaestio45]

You have something in the second case so the ultimate question does not apply.

Sure it applies, STT. Even if there was always something, that doesn’t mean we can’t ask the question of why that is. And, further, the asking of the question doesn’t necessarily imply an external explanation, as theists would agree that there are entities which explain their existence properly without externality. Its only a question of if the entity meets the requirements for such (the requirements, the theists agree, are the principle of noncontingency).

 

[STT]

STT:

I think we agreed that once time exist then it doesn’t need a sustainer.

Mmmmm… not particularly. Sustainer in the sense that it needs an outside factor to operate in change and fulfill its inner most attributes? Well then no, it does not need one. Sustainer in the sense that without some entity ontologically prior to its existence it would have no eternal being (like a camper continually supplying wood to a fire)? In that case, yes, it does need a sustainer.

Moreover, we agreed that time cannot be created

Yes, in the sense that it does not begin to exist. That does not, however, properly explain why it exists at all. If something is of a given manner, say eternal or temporal, it is not beyond the bounds of reasonable question to ask why they are so.

So the conclusion is time is not contingent.

We should be careful in knowing our terms here, STT. For if contingency is whether or not something is temporal or eternal, then certainly the the temporal framework is noncontingent. If, however, it is whether or not an entities being is explained by external factors and not merely internal factors, then the eternality of the subject isn’t as relevant as we may be led to believe.

I hold myself firmly to the ladder determining of contigency over the former. If that be so, we therefore must ask how we may determine whether or not an entity is soley under the influence of internalities, or if externalities play a role in it. The best way to discover such is be asking whether or not a being changes, for if it did change in any way, then it maybe influenced by what is beyond merely itself, and thus we may deduce its contigency. The other factor, as I’ve argued before, is finitude and infinitude. And because time is both finite (in so far as we know) and can most definitely change, it therefore follows that time is contingent.

There was either nothing or something at the beginning of time.

Well yes, time itself. It doesn’t follow from such that anything else was there though other than the thing which may sustain time.

Well, I think that something which didn’t have a creator does not need a creator now. You argued that its change is an internal property. And I accept this argument to let the discussion follows (I didn’t accept your argument yet). It is clear for me that something which doesn’t need a creator in the past, now and future does need a sustainer.

I also haven’t seen your argument for the fact that contingent thing changes or anything which changes is contingent. I also didn’t receive an argument for infinity being noncontingent.

 

[STT]

Sure it applies, STT. Even if there was always something, that doesn’t mean we can’t ask the question of why that is. And, further, the asking of the question doesn’t necessarily imply an external explanation, as theists would agree that there are entities which explain their existence properly without externality. Its only a question of if the entity meets the requirements for such (the requirements, the theists agree, are the principle of noncontingency).

I don’t understand why you are looking for God. Time for example is not subjected to God since its very substance cannot be created (therefore it does not need a sustainer).

 

[quaestio45]

I also haven’t seen your argument for the fact that contingent thing changes or anything which changes is contingent. I also didn’t receive an argument for infinity being noncontingent.

My assertion for the immutability of any non-contingent being stems from the fact of its definition being “that whose essence completely explains their existence”, for, were that to be so, then it must not be subject to external influence and change. This is such because if it was to be either influenced or changed by an externailty then the beings state of existence would not be completely explained by its essence, and thus, it would contradict the definition of non-contingency. Now, if it is so that a being must not be subject to external influence or change at all, then it must be without the conditions for change, specifically, potentiality. But because potentiality is infinite, it must therefore be infinite actuality which allows for anything to be truly immutable. Thus, a non-contingent being must be both infinite and immutable.

I don’t understand why you are looking for God. Time for example is not subjected to God since its very substance cannot be created (therefore it does not need a sustainer).

Well, I don’t think I’d need to search for God if it was evident to me that time was existent on the basis of its own essence. But, such is not made evident to me, for only what is non-contingent explains their existence by their essence, and it is does not seem to me that time is non-contingent for the reasons I already stated (non-infinitude, mutablility). If that be so, only some externality can explain why such an entity is existent (even if it is existent eternally), for what cannot be explained internally must have an explanation externally. Now, I firmly hold that a chain of contingency must inevitably end at what is ultimately non-contingent; that be so, time, being of a contingent existence, must be explained - in my estimate - by that which is non-contingent. Thus, we arrive at God.

It is not necessarily so that I search for God in my reasoning, but more that we necessarily arrive at him for lack of any possible alternative, and because it seems to me that reason sides with him.

 

[STT]

My assertion for the immutability of any non-contingent being stems from the fact of its definition being “that whose essence completely explains their existence”, for, were that to be so, then it must not be subject to external influence and change. This is such because if it was to be either influenced or changed by an externailty then the beings state of existence would not be completely explained by its essence, and thus, it would contradict the definition of non-contingency.

That doesn’t follow for something to be non-contingent it is necessary to have an essence which independent of anything else. Any non-contingent being/thing could be under influence of something and change its properties otherwise we are dealing with a changeless thing which cannot be affected and therefore cannot affect.

Now, if it is so that a being must not be subject to external influence or change at all, then it must be without the conditions for change, specifically, potentiality. But because potentiality is infinite, it must therefore be infinite actuality which allows for anything to be truly immutable. Thus, a non-contingent being must be both infinite and immutable.

Again, I think you are talking about property of non-contingent being/thing when you say it has to be infinite since existence cannot have any measure and it is not property of non-contingent being.

 

[quaestio45]

That doesn’t follow for something to be non-contingent it is necessary to have an essence which independent of anything else.

Well good sir, it does certainly depend on what you define as non-contingent.

If we define non-contingency the way I have, then it certainly does follow necessarily, it seems to me, that immutability and infinitude be attributes of all entities under that category. But, I do admit that there are other ways you could define it; one such way is to deny that essence must explain the entirety of a beings existence, and must, instead, simply explain why the being exists. I, however, deny such definition out right.

For, were that be so, it is safe to say that there would be distinctions between the essence and existence of the given being. However, if there be such distinction, a reasonable question to ask is why there is a distinction between its essence and existence, the answer to which clearly cannot be answered by the being itself, otherwise the solution would be found in its essence, and thus, the essence of the being does explain the existence of the being entirely. Instead, we’d have to look towards an externality for an explanation which must either be ontologically prior or subsequent of it. Now, it is obvious that the answer cannot come from what is ontologically subsequent to it, for it comes to late in the causal chain to bear sufficient explanation; therefore, we must look to what is ontologically prior to it. Were we to do this with all beings that follow such pattern, we’d reach an inevitable end which follows much more closely with what I would define as non-contingent: a being whose essence wholly explains their existence.

Any non-contingent being/thing could be under influence of something and change its properties otherwise we are dealing with a changeless thing which cannot be affected and therefore cannot affect.

A changeless thing that cannot be effected indeed. However, I must admit, I do not understand how from such it would follow that the being cannot affect anything… could you perhaps give me your rational for such conclusion?

 

[quaestio45]

Again, I think you are talking about property of non-contingent being/thing when you say it has to be infinite since existence cannot have any measure and it is not property of non-contingent being.

I should probably clarify my usage of the phrase infinite being, ay? My apologies

When I mean to say a being is “infinite”, I simply mean to say that the entity is complete in being, to which I call “infinite” because there are an infinite number of ways by which a being may have being (that is why non-being holds infinite potentiality), so to be complete in being is to be in possession of all possibilities of being, which, again, are infinite. And, as one could imagine, to be infinite in being would dually mean to be without the restrictions of lacking in being (temporal, spacial, knowledge), and so I also mean to say, by usage of the phrase infinite being, is that such an entity of devoid of all such limits entirely.

 

[Gorgias]

That doesn’t follow for something to be non-contingent it is necessary to have an essence which independent of anything else.

Actually, it does. If it depends on anything else for its existence, it’s contingent on that other thing for its existence. Therefore, a necessary being cannot depend on anything else for its existence.

 

[lelinator]

Therefore, a necessary being cannot depend on anything else for its existence.

But this leaves open the possibility that there’s more than one necessary being.

 

[quaestio45]

@lelinator, If you define a necessary being as a being who must exist, and you also say that only a noncontingent being may be of such an existence, then there cannot be more than one noncontingent being.

This is because, were a noncontingent being to be an entity whose essence completely explains their existence, and if only a being of infinite actuality can be of such a nature, then we must conclude that the esssnce of the being is pure actuality. Now, if anything which is completely indistinct in existence are the same (in the manner that, if A=2, then 2 is A in an algebraic expression. They have no difference and therefore are the same), and if two noncontingent beings share the exact same essence (of actus purus) then they must have the exact same existence. Now, there cannot be distinction in their existence otherwise they either must be distinct in essence, or distinct from their essence, neither of which is possible.

That be so, they must be nondistinct in every way and thus, one and the same.

 

[STT]

Well good sir, it does certainly depend on what you define as non-contingent.

If we define non-contingency the way I have, then it certainly does follow necessarily, it seems to me, that immutability and infinitude be attributes of all entities under that category. But, I do admit that there are other ways you could define it; one such way is to deny that essence must explain the entirety of a beings existence, and must, instead, simply explain why the being exists. I, however, deny such definition out right.

For, were that be so, it is safe to say that there would be distinctions between the essence and existence of the given being. However, if there be such distinction, a reasonable question to ask is why there is a distinction between its essence and existence, the answer to which clearly cannot be answered by the being itself, otherwise the solution would be found in its essence, and thus, the essence of the being does explain the existence of the being entirely. Instead, we’d have to look towards an externality for an explanation which must either be ontologically prior or subsequent of it. Now, it is obvious that the answer cannot come from what is ontologically subsequent to it, for it comes to late in the causal chain to bear sufficient explanation; therefore, we must look to what is ontologically prior to it. Were we to do this with all beings that follow such pattern, we’d reach an inevitable end which follows much more closely with what I would define as non-contingent: a being whose essence wholly explains their existence.

Existence is not a thing. Something which has essence simply exists. You cannot simply personify mental phenomenon. Such as God is Love.

A changeless thing that cannot be effected indeed. However, I must admit, I do not understand how from such it would follow that the being cannot affect anything… could you perhaps give me your rational for such conclusion?

That is a property of changeless being since decision is compulsory for any act. You go from state of doing nothing to do something after making a decision.

 

[STT]

I should probably clarify my usage of the phrase infinite being, ay? My apologies

When I mean to say a being is “infinite”, I simply mean to say that the entity is complete in being, to which I call “infinite” because there are an infinite number of ways by which a being may have being (that is why non-being holds infinite potentiality), so to be complete in being is to be in possession of all possibilities of being, which, again, are infinite. And, as one could imagine, to be infinite in being would dually mean to be without the restrictions of lacking in being (temporal, spacial, knowledge), and so I also mean to say, by usage of the phrase infinite being, is that such an entity of devoid of all such limits entirely.

Even, contingent things have infinite form.

 

[lelinator]

This is because, were a noncontingent being to be an entity whose essence completely explains their existence, and if only a being of infinite actuality can be of such a nature, then we must conclude that the esssnce of the being is pure actuality. Now, if anything which is completely indistinct in existence are the same (in the manner that, if A=2, then 2 is A in an algebraic expression. They have no difference and therefore are the same), and if two noncontingent beings share the exact same essence (of actus purus) then they must have the exact same existence. Now, there cannot be distinction in their existence otherwise they either must be distinct in essence, or distinct from their essence, neither of which is possible.

The only stipulation Gorgias laid out was that a necessary being isn’t dependent upon anything else for its existence. If those are the only criteria, then more than one necessary being can exist. All that’s necessary is that their existence not be contingent upon anything else.

Correct?

 

[quaestio45]

Existence is not a thing.

What a remarkable claim STT! Existence is not a “thing”!? Well, perhaps I misinterpret you, but do you mean to say that existence is illusory? Or that existence is not something to which can be grasped the same way you can grasp some item in reality? Whichever it may be, you truly need to elaborate, my friend, for such a claim is not something to which can simply be asserted without explanation.

Something which has essence simply exists.

Well I’d assume so, for you need an existent in order for something to be held. However, the point I mean to make is that their existence (in so far as you exist and in so far as the state of your existence) needs explanation, and there are only two places it can stem from: their own internal power (essence) or some external power. Would you content with such assertion?

You cannot simply personify mental phenomenon. Such as God is Love.

I’m… rather confused STT. Was I personifying mental phenomenon? Because it certainly doesn’t seem that way to me. I’d rather not say such things, but you sincerely need to add a little more substance to your objections and assertions, otherwise it ends up being that nothing is meaningfully communicated and it just ends in confusion.

That is a property of changeless being since decision is compulsory for any act. You go from state of doing nothing to do something after making a decision.

Yes, if you were to be temporal and thus making it so that you are first exposed to potential choices which are then actualized by a conscious mind. An eternal being is not of that nature, however, for whatever is willed is willed eternally. As such, it may still affect, but eternally.

Even, contingent things have infinite form.

Infinite in the manner I described? I strongly disagree STT.

 

[quaestio45]

The only stipulation Gorgias laid out was that a necessary being isn’t dependent upon anything else for its existence. If those are the only criteria, then more than one necessary being can exist. All that’s necessary is that their existence not be contingent upon anything else.

Correct?

What he meant by “existence” (correct me if I’m @Gorgias) is not only the fact that it exists but also the state of its existence (for both can be and usually are put under the heading of “existence”). Therefore, to say that somethings existence must not be effected by anything (the way a noncontingent beings nature would operate) is to say that its whole existence - from the fact that it exists to the fact of its existences state - must not be effected by anything.

 

[STT]

What a remarkable claim STT! Existence is not a “thing”!? Well, perhaps I misinterpret you, but do you mean to say that existence is illusory? Or that existence is not something to which can be grasped the same way you can grasp some item in reality? Whichever it may be, you truly need to elaborate, my friend, for such a claim is not something to which can simply be asserted without explanation.

Existence is a mental phenomena that we use to imply that something exist, has an essence.

Well I’d assume so, for you need an existent in order for something to be held. However, the point I mean to make is that their existence (in so far as you exist and in so far as the state of your existence) needs explanation, and there are only two places it can stem from: their own internal power (essence) or some external power. Would you content with such assertion?

Existence of beings does need any explanation. Beings, like me, you, etc. are collection of minds and simply exist.

I’m… rather confused STT. Was I personifying mental phenomenon? Because it certainly doesn’t seem that way to me. I’d rather not say such things, but you sincerely need to add a little more substance to your objections and assertions, otherwise it ends up being that nothing is meaningfully communicated and it just ends in confusion.

Well, isn’t existence a thing?

Yes, if you were to be temporal and thus making it so that you are first exposed to potential choices which are then actualized by a conscious mind. An eternal being is not of that nature, however, for whatever is willed is willed eternally. As such, it may still affect, but eternally.

That applies only if your eternal entity is not free.

Infinite in the manner I described? I strongly disagree STT.

I have an argument that states that the universe is infinite. Why? Because otherwise the universe is bounded by something. It is easy to show that this leads to a regress.

 

[quaestio45]

Existence is a mental phenomena that we use to imply that something exist, has an essence.

So… correct me if I’m wrong, but are you saying existence is some mental construct and has no real objective basis?

Existence of beings does need any explanation. Beings, like me, you, etc. are collection of minds and simply exist.

A collection of minds that “simply exist”? Well… I’m not sure if I follow… are you saying that we, as minds, have always been existent? That we never began to exist or shall ever stop existing? If that be so, I must be frank, that sounds a little absurd. For there certainly seems as if there was a time when my mind was not around, and therefore, nonexistent.

Well, isn’t existence a thing?

Well it depends on what you mean by “thing”. I simply hold that there are things which hold actuality, and those things are existent, and then there are things which are only potentiality, to which I would say hold no existence.

That applies only if your eternal entity is not free.

How so?

I have an argument that states that the universe is infinite. Why? Because otherwise the universe is bounded by something. It is easy to show that this leads to a regress.

I would like to hear such argument. My interest has certainly been piqued.

 

[STT]

So… correct me if I’m wrong, but are you saying existence is some mental construct and has no real objective basis?

It is not objective in the sense it has no essence.

A collection of minds that “simply exist”? Well… I’m not sure if I follow… are you saying that we, as minds, have always been existent? That we never began to exist or shall ever stop existing? If that be so, I must be frank, that sounds a little absurd. For there certainly seems as if there was a time when my mind was not around, and therefore, nonexistent.

No, it is not absurd. You were not just in human form so could’t interact with reality as it is.

Well it depends on what you mean by “thing”. I simply hold that there are things which hold actuality, and those things are existent, and then there are things which are only potentiality, to which I would say hold no existence.

Things are divided into two categories, minds which have essence so they exist and mental which is due to mind. Otherwise we are dealing with nothing.

How so?

State of decision is a state of potentiality.

I would like to hear such argument. My interest has certainly been piqued.

The universe is either bounded (finite) or not bounded (infinite). If it is bounded it is bounded by something else. Now lets call the universe and what bounds it as a new universe. The new universe is either bounded or not. Etc. Therefore, the universe is infinite.