Nothing to something

[quaestio45]

Because, our experiences, knowledge, etc. (what you call externality) derive us yet we have control over them.

Okay, so we’re on the same page then. I’m glad to hear that.

So if essence does not totally dictate the manner by which we operate, or the state of our being entirely, and if we agree that we can indeed be effected by what is external to us in some way, would it be fair to ask the question “why is it that our essence does not completely dictate our entire manner of existence”? If so, is it also fair to say that only what is ontologically prior to us may be of any sufficient explanation to such a question?

 

[STT]

Okay, so we’re on the same page then. I’m glad to hear that.

So if essence does not totally dictate the manner by which we operate, or the state of our being entirely, and if we agree that we can indeed be effected by what is external to us in some way, would it be fair to ask the question “why is it that our essence does not completely dictate our entire manner of existence”?

Our essences are in full control of any situation since we are free. We experience, decide freely and finally cause.

If so, is it also fair to say that only what is ontologically prior to us may be of any sufficient explanation to such a question?

How could another agent sustains a free agent? The outcome of free decision is not known prior to decision. You could of course tell that God eternally knows our decisions. Where this knowledge come from? What if I ask God to tell me about my decision in a situation and do the opposite?

 

[quaestio45]

Our essences are in full control of any situation since we are free.

Could you elaborate what you mean by “essence in full control”? For, there seems to me two ways you can mean that statement; that either essence is in full control of our existence, and thus we have no accidental qualities (to which I doubt you mean), or that our essence is one of free control, and therefore we can explain the accidents through this principle.

We experience, decide freely and finally cause.

Yes, this would follow if we had an essence of free control; however, this doesn’t seem to answer the question of why there is a buffer between our essence and existence to allow for such freedom in the first place. Me having an essence of free control doesn’t explain to me through that fact alone why I ate pizza for dinner today, therefore something external caused it, therefore there is a buffer between essence and existence.

How could another agent sustains a free agent?

In the initial creation of being, fueling of being and keeping of it in existence. The initial creation of being cannot be explained without something prior to it; the fueling of being cannot be explained except by something which emanates being; and the keeping of its existence cannot be done without external sustenance.

The outcome of free decision is not known prior to decision. You could of course tell that God eternally knows our decisions. Where this knowledge come from? What if I ask God to tell me about my decision in a situation and do the opposite?

The knowledge would come from being a perfect, eternal, infinite and pure being of actuality, which isn’t confined temporally or spatially, and neither would it be confined in knowledge or wisdom. As for the scenario you told me of, it would be something to which may be expected, and whose inevitable results would be known as well.

 

[Hume]

Our essences are in full control of any situation since we are free. We experience, decide freely and finally cause.

Sam Harris has been doing some great research that suggests this may not be the case, FYI.

At any rate, it’s not difficult to argue that our wills are actually quite constrained.

What if I ask God to tell me about my decision in a situation and do the opposite?

In that case, the deity you asked probably just lied to you

“…told you exactly what you needed to hear.” Morpheus from The Matrix

 

[STT]

Could you elaborate what you mean by “essence in full control”? For, there seems to me two ways you can mean that statement; that either essence is in full control of our existence, and thus we have no accidental qualities (to which I doubt you mean), or that our essence is one of free control, and therefore we can explain the accidents through this principle.

By that I mean that essence which is free decides upon a situation.

Yes, this would follow if we had an essence of free control; however, this doesn’t seem to answer the question of why there is a buffer between our essence and existence to allow for such freedom in the first place. Me having an essence of free control doesn’t explain to me through that fact alone why I ate pizza for dinner today, therefore something external caused it, therefore there is a buffer between essence and existence.

Beings have essences. Their properties however subject to change.

In the initial creation of being, fueling of being and keeping of it in existence. The initial creation of being cannot be explained without something prior to it; the fueling of being cannot be explained except by something which emanates being; and the keeping of its existence cannot be done without external sustenance.

I another thread I am discussing that free-agent cannot be created.

The knowledge would come from being a perfect, eternal, infinite and pure being of actuality, which isn’t confined temporally or spatially, and neither would it be confined in knowledge or wisdom. As for the scenario you told me of, it would be something to which may be expected, and whose inevitable results would be known as well.

Didn’t you get the conflict in the knowledge of God about my decision and I decide the opposite of that knowledge. God needs the knowledge of things in eternity which is unchangeable and unique. God therefore cannot sustain me in such a situation.

 

[STT]

Sam Harris has been doing some great research that suggests this may not be the case, FYI.

At any rate, it’s not difficult to argue that our wills are actually quite constrained.

Harris says “the idea of free will “cannot be mapped on to any conceivable reality” and is incoherent.[2] Harris writes in Free Will that neuroscience “reveals you to be a biochemical puppet.”[50]”.
How an non-free agent can resolves a situation which contains two equally liked options?Free will also is needed for situation when the outcome of decision is not well known.

In that case, the deity you asked probably just lied to you

“…told you exactly what you needed to hear.” Morpheus from The Matrix

Yes.

 

[Hume]

How an non-free agent can resolves a situation which contains two equally liked options?

Oh, the classic Buridan’s Donkey.

The options are either not perfectly equally liked, a choice is made out of bias (a preference for things “right”), or the choice is made for the donkey.

Friendly reminder; our ability to create a for-instance has no bearing on reality. I can imagine dragons, yet they’ve never existed.

Yes.

 

[quaestio45]

By that I mean that essence which is free decides upon a situation.

Beings have essences. Their properties however subject to change.

Both of these I addressed in the other thread. Maybe we can continue this conversation there.

Didn’t you get the conflict in the knowledge of God about my decision and I decide the opposite of that knowledge.

Yes, indeed I understood it. Perhaps I should elaborate in my answer that I gave you. If you were to ask a being outside of time what you would do in exactly five seconds from the time asking, and they knew you would do the opposite, they could easily answer, without it being in anyway contridictive to what was asked, “you will do the opposite of anything I tell you you will do”. If they knew you wouldn’t do the opposite, they would say. That be the case, what I’m trying to say is that everything is anticipated perfectly (the way Peter was told he would renounce Christ thrice before the crows, and he said he wouldn’t, and then ultimately did do it). So there would be, in my estimate, no paradox.

 

[STT]

Yes, indeed I understood it. Perhaps I should elaborate in my answer that I gave you. If you were to ask a being outside of time what you would do in exactly five seconds from the time asking, and they knew you would do the opposite, they could easily answer, without it being in anyway contridictive to what was asked, “you will do the opposite of anything I tell you you will do”. If they knew you wouldn’t do the opposite, they would say. That be the case, what I’m trying to say is that everything is anticipated perfectly (the way Peter was told he would renounce Christ thrice before the crows, and he said he wouldn’t, and then ultimately did do it). So there would be, in my estimate, no paradox.

No, you didn’t get it my friend. The foreknowledge of God is unique so it cannot change upon my decision which is against God’s unique knowledge.

 

[STT]

Oh, the classic Buridan’s Donkey.

Yes.

The options are either not perfectly equally liked, a choice is made out of bias (a preference for things “right”),

So you mean that the experience that we have that we want two things equally is false? How about when we are not sure of the outcome of our decisions? I can even pick up the option I don’t like.

or the choice is made for the donkey.

Who makes the decision?

 

[quaestio45]

The foreknowledge of God is unique so it cannot change upon my decision which is against God’s unique knowledge

So, a couple of things here to point out; this is, of course, dependent upon the assumption that any action could ever be in contridction to the knowledge of a being out of time.

Consider how the past operates for us; at the time, we may have chosen a given route A, but we instead chose a given route B. It is not in any way a contridiction to say that one may have acted differently, and had a freedom of choice in the past, yet now cannot and is immutably known that you have chosen route B.

In that same way, a being who sits outside of time and observes with perfect eyes all the actions of the internals of a temporal framework (from beginning to end; all of it), sees everything as already done, and thus has perfect knowledge of all the actions commited (or, going to be commited, by our perspective) without compromising the freedom of the entities within the given framework of time. That be so, perfect foreknowledge seems to still compatible with personal freedom.

 

[STT]

So, a couple of things here to point out; this is, of course, dependent upon the assumption that any action could ever be in contridction to the knowledge of a being out of time.

Consider how the past operates for us; at the time, we may have chosen a given route A, but we instead chose a given route B. It is not in any way a contridiction to say that one may have acted differently, and had a freedom of choice in the past, yet now cannot and is immutably known that you have chosen route B.

In that same way, a being who sits outside of time and observes with perfect eyes all the actions of the internals of a temporal framework (from beginning to end; all of it), sees everything as already done, and thus has perfect knowledge of all the actions commited (or, going to be commited, by our perspective) without compromising the freedom of the entities within the given framework of time. That be so, perfect foreknowledge seems to still compatible with personal freedom.

My action could be A or B. But God only aware of one of them. He doesn’t see my other action in His eternal knowledge yet I commit it.

 

[quaestio45]

My action could be A or B. But God only aware of one of them.

Yes, the one you commit to.

He doesn’t see my other action in His eternal knowledge

Because you won’t do it, the same way you don’t remember choosing route A in the past because you chose route B ultimately.

yet I commit it.

I don’t think you would, on the same basis that the past had many routes of action yet you came to the one route, and now the past is unchangeable. If the actions of eternity are something like permanent, then the question of doing opposite of what you did in order to induce a paradox becomes similar to saying your actions of the past are subject to change after the fact.

 

[STT]

Yes, the one you commit to.

No. God is aware of his foreknowledge not my action.

Because you won’t do it, the same way you don’t remember choosing route A in the past because you chose route B ultimately.

No. I would do it.

 

[quaestio45]

God is aware of his foreknowledge not my action.

Well the foreknowledge would necessarily encompass your actions as well however, would you not say? Besides, we cannot call it certain knowledge if the thing its knowledgeable about is uncertain. Now a reality such as God must be certain in all respects including knowledge, as we both know presumably, which therefore means that what he is knowledgeable of must be certain as well. So if he certainly know you’ll commit act A, and you ask him and he tells you you will commit act A (which, it is not a given that such could ever be possible) you are going to commit act A inspite of thinking you’ll commit to act B (oncemore, the story of Peters renouncing of Jesus seems a perfect example of this).

 

[STT]

Well the foreknowledge would necessarily encompass your actions as well however, would you not say?

No. Foreknowledge of God is what He declares me. I do opposite of that.

 

[Hume]

So you mean that the experience that we have that we want two things equally is false?

Yeah, events like Buridan’s donkey don’t actually happen. The world is much too dynamic. If nothing else, the water will evaporate and they hay will rot. Tick tock.

Who makes the decision?

The donkey, in the face of dynamic circumstance.

The hay and the water are equally appealing so the donkey is stuck. But in the distance approaches a thirsty horse. If the water is still around when the horse shows up, the donkey won’t get a drink.

The water is observed with a newer, greater scarcity than before. The donkey drinks.

 

[Jedothek]

I think you will find in Augustine and Aquinas ( I do not have the passages in front of me ) that

1. In the world, creation is not a process that requires time. the moment of creation is the first moment of time. no process leads up to it.
2. Frorn the divine point of view creation is not a process. God is of course timeless. For God the whole expanse of time ( imagine seeing it all at once) is his creation in the sense that it relies on him for its being.

 

[quaestio45]

No. Foreknowledge of God is what He declares me. I do opposite of that.

But if clear knowledge is the conscious holding of what is, and someone knows an apple is three-dimensional, that is to say that an apple is of three dimensions. If a being is outside of time an has clear knowledge of what is (and within time, we would call what was and what will be), then such must be. Even the interaction between atemporal and temporal being would be taken into acount of a result, and is observed as already done even before you (in a temporal light) do so.

 

[quaestio45]

In the world, creation is not a process that requires time. the moment of creation is the first moment of time. no process leads up to it.

Yes, thus we call it eternal creation.

Frorn the divine point of view creation is not a process. God is of course timeless. For God the whole expanse of time ( imagine seeing it all at once) is his creation in the sense that it relies on him for its being.

Exactly