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Pattylt
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I’m retired so I’m only here for entertainment purposes!As an entertainment issue, it might be interesting. But don’t try to read more into it.
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STT
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More interesting than that is they think that essence, so called category, is a being.
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quaestio45
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So before getting into the question of “what is essence” I feel like it is wise that we look at the categories that essence follows from so we can avoid the egregious errors of falling into the pit of saying things like “animal is our essence, human is our accidents”.
So, there are a number of genuses which each hold species, yes? Bodies>Animate>Animal>Human, is one such chain of genuses and species. Now, if I am not mistaken (and I could very well be so, because unlike most users in this site, I am not actually a Thomist or an Aristotlean) the way in which we would understand essence is something like “most specific nature (genus) of a particular entity”. That in mind, we obviously need to know where on the placement of genuses the enitiy falls in order for us to determine its essence (because, although both a meteor and a man both have the commonality in holding the genus of “bodies”, neither of them fall under such as their most accurate essence because they both stem from a multitude of genuses beyond “bodies”; such as animal for man and inanimate for a meteor").
Now, a good question following up would be how do we denote a particulars essence from something such as accident. For surely, just because I have some specific difference from purely human, such as being a chef or being blond, doesn’t mean I hold a particularly different essence, right? Correct, for essence cannot merely be what is held by a particular entity (like having blond hair), nor can it be something which does not denote some nature of your physical being (such as being a chef), but instead it must be what is held that tells you what most specifically you are in terms of physical or metaphysical being.
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Gorgias
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That depends on what you mean by “category”. Are you talking about the Aristotelian concept of ‘category’, or some other designation?
Sure, but if you take that argument to its logical end, then you look at any physical entity and say “meh… it’s just a hodgepodge of sub-atomic particles”, no? And what does that get you?
It’s a philosophical description moreso than a scientific one, and that might be why you’re predisposed to reject it.
Not at all. But I get that you want that to be the case.
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quaestio45
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Simply on the basis of not being able to specifically identify a difference between two distinct subjects does not entail that the two subjects are not real in distinction (for example, it is darn near impossible to tell when yellow ends and orange starts in a rainbow, but it is undeniable that there are two colors there, even if you cannot find the exact line of demarcation). Further, both subjects you used as examples may be said with confidence that they hold characteristics of accidents in particular length, width, and weight, and, if I’m not mistaken, in the where and when (for such things are not determined due to the nature of the thing).The only way how one can approach is to take a specific example, and ask them to separate the “essential” and “accidental” features - and then sit back and enjoy the mumbling.
Try the “essence” of a table, or the “essence” of a cow. The result might be entertaining, but nothing more.
I don’t think any Thomists believe that. The most I heard which is similar to what you are saying is that the nature of a being can be being itself. That is, however, not at all to say essence is a being.
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Abrosz
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The designation of “yellow” and “orange” are pretty arbitrary, and they reflect the resolution of our eyes. Birds of prey have no color vision, so them this distinction does not exist. By point is that the collection of the different attributes are also arbitrarily subdivided into “essential” and “accidental” subgroups, dependent upon the “whim” of the subdivider.
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quaestio45
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I agree that any specific designation between yellow and orange would be quite arbitrary and will be seen differently dependent upon the eyes of the viewer. What I think, however, is that despite that, there are at least a difference between the color orange and yellow (and this we can verify even without our eyes, as colors are the effect of light wave length), and that just because we can’t completely tell when the effect of yellow begins and the effect of orange begins, we can at least say that there are two such colors.
Yes, that is true, I admit. I don’t think that because a boy may be blind, that therefore vision and the distinctions within vision aren’t objectively real though, wouldn’t you agree?
I would agree that there could be an arbitrariness in the division of such groups if done to a particular (like cow or table; as you pointed out, its not easy to determine what the exact essence of these two things, and as thus we could mistake some accidental qualities of such things as essential qualities), I think I would disagree - as previously said - that we can deny that there are essential and accidental qualities in any entity however; its just we can’t always deduce what they are all the time.
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STT
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They do. They say that God, His essence, His intellect, … are one.
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Gorgias
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So, hang on: “yellow” and “orange” are arbitrary and subjective, but are nevertheless valid distinctions, but “essential” and “accidental” attributes are not? Hmm… bias much?
Special case. God is a singleton. For all creatures, however, essence isn’t “being”.
(And, just to head off the inevitable cry of “special pleading!!!”: that’s only a fallacy if there isn’t actually a special case that’s being considered. God is a special case, and therefore, no special pleading applies.)
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lelinator
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If I may interrupt, you can’t just arbitrarily designate God as being a special case without explaining why God is a special case. Otherwise it actually is special pleading.
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Gorgias
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I already did.
“Singleton.”
He’s literally the only example of his ‘type of being’. So, yeah… “special case”.
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lelinator
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How does that make Him exempt from the rules that govern everything else?
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Abrosz
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Simple - Might makes Right
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quaestio45
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Yes; as in his essence is being and his existence is therefore being, and thus attributes of being such as intelect must be his essence as well. That is not to say he is essence itself because essense is something of an empty box filled by the particular nature of any being. Its like trying to catch existence without any attributes; its nothing, ultimately. That is, unless we say pure essence is pure existence as well… which could be the case…
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quaestio45
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Hmmm… actually… lets see… if essence is something like “the immutable necessary nature of a being”, then pure being I’d assume would merely remove its applicability to any particular… therefore, given the definition, pure essence may be “the immutable necessary nature of being itself”. But because it is pure nature, no perfection of the whole of being itself may be ommited… therefore, from pure essence follows necessarily the purity of existence as well… maybe? I don’t know. Feel free to evaluate this train of thought @lelinator
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STT
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And given the definition intellect and essence, which they are different, then how essence could be intellect?
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lelinator
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Evaluating…
A couple of initial thoughts.
I’m not sure what “being itself” means. Am I to understand it to mean that “being” is something that can exist in and of itself, and that it’s not merely an attribute that existing things possess? Why should I believe that absent those existing things, there would be any existence all?
And why should I believe that it’s immutable? If I look around me I’ll notice two seemingly inescapable truths…things exist…and things change. Yet metaphysicists would have us believe that only one of these two attributes is necessary, while the other one isn’t. Why don’t I simply accept that both of these attributes…existence and change…are equally necessary? Where you have one, you will always and inevitably have the other, and immutability is simply a metaphysical construct that doesn’t actually exist.
If I asked you what caused God, you might think it a nonsensical question, likewise, what caused change, might also be a nonsensical question.
Sometimes you just never know where a train of thought will take you.
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Gorgias
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lelinator:
Simple - Might makes Right
He is very literally completely different than all other beings. To keep it simple, He is the creator and all other beings are creatures. That alone should suffice to demonstrate that He is very different than everything else!
Let’s try a thought experiment:
Imagine that there are no birds in the universe. None. Zero. Zip. Except… there’s one, solitary eagle. Just one.
And so, we might say things like “no animals can fly”, but then we’d have to add “…except for the eagle.”
By your standard, you would then reply, “A-ha! Special pleading! Logical fallacy!”, but chances are, you’d get exasperated expressions as a response: “@lelinator, he’s very literally a ‘special case’! There’s only one of him, anywhere! Very literally, this is exactly what ‘special pleading’ does not describe!”
So… yeah. God is such a singleton. He is different than any other being in or out of the universe. So… no ‘special pleading’, even though you’d really like to be able to make that claim…
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quaestio45
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I usually think of it as “existence itself”, or, more accurately, “pure existence”.
Well purest existence must be something which is existent in and of itself, I would think; otherwise, the “existence” part of it wouldn’t be complete, contrary to definition. As for being being an attribute, I would say that thought may be thinking of being wrong. For none of us hold being, but rather are being (not purely, of course, but partially). But if we are a being in imperfection, then we can logically think of being itself without the imperfections. Thus, we arrive at being itself.
Because being itself would have no attribute to change into because it possesses all perfections already; thus, because it has no potentiality to a trait, it therefore cannot change by necessity.
True, but two things: one, when we look around and observe these things we must remember that we are observing a very different kind of being then the one we are pondering; therefore, why should we think that what necessarily applies to the one appies to the second? Especially when we have reason not to velieve it applies? Second, simple observation can put is in belief of many ideas which we now know definitively are incorrect: such as the Earth being a flat plane and the sun revolving around the Earth. As such, we should not prioritize our limited perception as a vetoing agent for what is quite beyond perceptions reach.
Yes, but not on a whim. Further, I hold that change is necessary, however it is only necessary for what is both finite and in time.
You can make that case, though you may need more than perception in order to have it taken seriously.
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quaestio45
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I don’t think so; for God is pure actuality and thus cannot change or be created, while change itself has no such trait (for it is only a process of reduction from potency to act) which would eliminate it from a need for beginning (in fact, the positive proof for the contigency of change would be that it relies on a dimension of change which itself must be sustained by another; therefore, change is caused).
Indeed, I must agree
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