Objective morality

[Bobber90]

This is an argument I found against objective morality - it is not mine, but I struggle to see where I would disagree. Do you find it has bite, or enough to substantiate ‘teaching the controversy’ on the issue in religious education classes? It is from J. L. Mackie (1977), and the only reason I haven’t quoted the title is that on first glance it looks off-puttingly contrarian.

The author argues this: A belief in objective values is built into ordinary moral thought and language, but this belief is in error.

His case against objective morality follows several lines. Firstly, he explains how he thinks the belief in objective morality is false, then he explains why if it had the backing of common sense and experience it could be held in error. For us to accept his argument, we would have to agree that the problems with objective morality are too substantial, and accept that the case for making an error in thinking this way is plausible. On the falsity of the belief, he argues this:

1. There is a great range of moral values held across cultures and over time; similar moral values are not held universally. His argument is that the thesis that moral values depend on actual ways of life more plausibly explains the variability/relativity of values held than the consideration that they have an objective existence. He notes that the diversity not only of individual values but of entire perspectives and starting points would render any supposed underlying universality much vaguer than the belief in objective moral values holds.

2. Objective moral values are peculiar metaphysically and epistemologically.

a) There is nothing else in the universe like the entity or quality or relation that is an objective moral value.

b) If we were aware of these, it would have to be by a ‘moral perception’ or ‘moral intuition’ wholly different from any other perception. However, it seems we do not answer moral problems by having an ethical intuition, but by introspection, prediction, seeking explanations, conducting conceptual and logical analysis, and by making arguments that rely upon ordinary perceptions and attitudes.

c) Knowledge of an objective moral value would have to provide automatically a direction and an impulse of behaviour. The objective value would be intrinsically action-guiding and motivating, containing a persuasive to-be-doneness, or not-to-be-doneness.

3. Objective values would have to be consequential or supervenient upon natural features.

a) It is not known how the objective moral quality of a thing or action is linked with its other features. For example, what is the connection between the natural fact that an action is a piece of deliberate cruelty and the moral fact that it is wrong? It is not logically or semantically entailed, so what is this relation?

**4. We would have to be able to know of objective values and of their links with the natural features upon which they are supervenient or consequential.
**
a) Some faculty must see an action, the value, and the connection or correspondence between the two. (So what is that faculty and let us see its findings and workings. If it is merely cognition and perception as dealt with by the brain or mind, the argument needs to be made that it does not fall under the alternative suggestions of the next section.)

 

[Bobber90]

On how objective morality is erroneously believed:

1. It is subjective attitudes that are confused for objective morality.

a) Subjective attitudes that the person holds are taken to be objective values. For example, we read our feelings into their objects, and create an additional property. Fungus that causes disgust with a foul smell might make us attribute to the fungus the objective quality of foulness.

b) Instead of the detection of objective values by a moral faculty, subjective responses from the ordinary perceptions can provide a satisfactory account. That these responses relate directly and causally to the detection of the natural features of an action is sound.

2. Why confuse the two?

a) Moral attitudes are to a degree external in origin, but not objective. Moral attitudes are partly socially established and socially necessary; they put pressure on individuals to direct behaviour and they become internalised. For example, we tend to approve of (society-wide) things or idealised versions of things we participate in, hiding two possible causations: the belief that something is right arising from familiarity, or the performance of an action because it is right. This duality of possible dependence is similarly present in the attitude that something has the quality of ‘goodness’ because it satisfies desires, rather than that it satisfies desires because it is good. Again the problematic justification can be made that we are not detecting the ordinary qualities of a thing that we desire, but instead are detecting the objective good of it which causes our desire.

b) We seek authority for our moral attitudes because we want them to apply to other agents than ourselves. Objectification confers validity.

d) Objective comparisons can be made in everyday life. Given some criteria, objective judgements of action or behaviour can be made – we see it in sport or displays of display of skill, for example. In morality, it might be said that some action is objectively good for the goal of human wellbeing and satisfaction, which is a legitimate use of objectivity; but there is no corollary that this action is objectively imperative. Sam Harris apparently falls foul of this objection in his book on morality – so says William Lane Craig.

Thus, he says, is an outline of a case against objective moral values. If you do not think that metaphysical peculiarity is an argument for non-existence, it is at least an argument that we do not know or understand what we claim exists, and in a matter as complex as this, that significantly affects the claim. He also says that morality as we know it is not substantially lost by this recognition, and although it is difficult to see how doing away with the notion of objective value leaves morality unchanged, if objective moral values do not exist, morality could never have been ‘lost’ anyway; it has always been made. Tantalising.

 

[healonzo]

A very thought provoking post. I do believe in objective morality and the easy answer for me about morality would be the ideas of a “well formed” conscience and super-ego.

Check this out:

youtube.com/watch?v=HYvbgOTGm7g

 

[JDaniel]

We might do well to truly understand what we are talking about, instead of considering all of that gobbledygook that passes for thinking. The following is excerpted from the book, Right and Reason, by Fr. Austin Fagothey, The C.F. Mosby Company, 1963, Chap. 4, p 44-45.

"Meaning of Morality

"Morality is the quality in human acts by which we call them right or wrong, good or evil. It is a common term covering the goodness or badness of a human act without specifying which of the two is meant. The opposite of moral is properly unmoral or nonmoral, terms which indicate that the act has no moral significance at all, that it is just simply unrelated to morals. The word amoral is also used in this sense but is more often applied to persons deficient in a sense of moral responsibility. Since the word immoral means morally bad, it indicates an act that has a definite moral quality (a bad one). When clearly opposed to immoral, the term moral means morally good. Thus moral and unmoral are contradictories, for everything either has or has not some reference to morals; moral and immoral are contraries, as marking the extremes of good and bad within the field of morals while excluding the morally neutral and irrelevant.

"In judging the morality of a human act, we may take into consideration the subjective peculiarities of the agent and look at the act as conditioned by his knowledge and consent, background, training, prejudices, emotional stability, and other personal traits. We ask whether this individual person did right or wrong in this particular case, whether this particular act was good or bad for him. Morality so considered is subjective morality and is determined by whether the act agrees or disagrees with the agent’s own conscience.

"But we may also abstract from such subjective conditions, which, though always present in any individual act, can be known directly only by the personal conscience of the doer. We can simply look at the kind of act performed and at the circumstances apparent to any observer. We ask not whether this individual is excused from responsibility for the act because of his ignorance or passion or any other modifier of responsibility, but whether any normal person with full command of his faculties is allowed deliberately to will that kind of act. We are judging the objective nature of the act done, not the subjective state of the doer. Morality so considered is objective morality.

"If we ask, “Is murder wrong?” “Is truthfulness right?” we are asking about objective morality. If we ask, “Did this man fully realize what he was doing when he killed that man?” “Did this man intend to tell the truth when he blurted out that remark?” we are asking about subjective morality.

“Morality in its completeness includes both its subjective and its objective aspects. It is futile to ask which is more important. Unless acts have a rightness or wrongness of their own with which the judgment of conscience should be in agreement, anybody’s judgment is as good as anybody else’s and ethics becomes a mere listing of opinions. Ethics as a study stresses objective morality. But each one [of us] has [his] own life to live, must account for his deeds as he saw them, and is rated good or bad on his sincerity in following his conscience even if his moral judgments have been objectively incorrect. In this sense subjective morality is paramount.”

Thus we consider morality from both sides, and, therefore, objective reality must exist.

God bless,
jd

 

[Bobber90]

We might do well to truly understand what we are talking about, instead of considering all of that gobbledygook that passes for thinking. The following is excerpted from the book, Right and Reason, by Fr. Austin Fagothey, The C.F. Mosby Company, 1963, Chap. 4, p 44-45.

"Meaning of Morality

"Morality is the quality in human acts by which we call them right or wrong, good or evil. It is a common term covering the goodness or badness of a human act without specifying which of the two is meant. The opposite of moral is properly unmoral or nonmoral, terms which indicate that the act has no moral significance at all, that it is just simply unrelated to morals. The word amoral is also used in this sense but is more often applied to persons deficient in a sense of moral responsibility. Since the word immoral means morally bad, it indicates an act that has a definite moral quality (a bad one). When clearly opposed to immoral, the term moral means morally good. Thus moral and unmoral are contradictories, for everything either has or has not some reference to morals; moral and immoral are contraries, as marking the extremes of good and bad within the field of morals while excluding the morally neutral and irrelevant.

"In judging the morality of a human act, we may take into consideration the subjective peculiarities of the agent and look at the act as conditioned by his knowledge and consent, background, training, prejudices, emotional stability, and other personal traits. We ask whether this individual person did right or wrong in this particular case, whether this particular act was good or bad for him. Morality so considered is subjective morality and is determined by whether the act agrees or disagrees with the agent’s own conscience.

"But we may also abstract from such subjective conditions, which, though always present in any individual act, can be known directly only by the personal conscience of the doer. We can simply look at the kind of act performed and at the circumstances apparent to any observer. We ask not whether this individual is excused from responsibility for the act because of his ignorance or passion or any other modifier of responsibility, but whether any normal person with full command of his faculties is allowed deliberately to will that kind of act. We are judging the objective nature of the act done, not the subjective state of the doer. Morality so considered is objective morality.

"If we ask, “Is murder wrong?” “Is truthfulness right?” we are asking about objective morality. If we ask, “Did this man fully realize what he was doing when he killed that man?” “Did this man intend to tell the truth when he blurted out that remark?” we are asking about subjective morality.

“Morality in its completeness includes both its subjective and its objective aspects. It is futile to ask which is more important. Unless acts have a rightness or wrongness of their own with which the judgment of conscience should be in agreement, anybody’s judgment is as good as anybody else’s and ethics becomes a mere listing of opinions. Ethics as a study stresses objective morality. But each one [of us] has [his] own life to live, must account for his deeds as he saw them, and is rated good or bad on his sincerity in following his conscience even if his moral judgments have been objectively incorrect. In this sense subjective morality is paramount.”

Thus we consider morality from both sides, and, therefore, objective reality must exist.

God bless,
jd

Objective morality is not considering a situation from all possible angles, or universalising the actions to ask “How would we judge it if any normal person did this”, it is morality backed up by reference to objectively existing values. One could say “Why ought we universalise our moral considerations as if any normal person is in the situation we are confronted with?” and answer “Because it is objectively good to do so.” That answer requires that there are objective moral values. I think the definition you stated is about the requirements of discourse if it is to be considered moral language. Moral language must be universalising, else it does not have the power over all agents, but this does not entail the actual existence of objective values.

 

[Bobber90]

A very thought provoking post. I do believe in objective morality and the easy answer for me about morality would be the ideas of a “well formed” conscience and super-ego.

Check this out:

youtube.com/watch?v=HYvbgOTGm7g

I think what he says is well put, but that it dovetails with the argument of J. L. Mackie, and does not strongly counter it.

He talks about the unique feeling of moral guilt or reward, and specifically says that it is fit to describe as a ‘voice’ because we associate it with the praise or blame from loved ones. He also says he recognises the arguments for the social origins or psychological conditioning of moral values (especially post-Freud thinking), but essentially chooses another explanation. As you can see, all these points are accounted for differently than through objective morality by J. L. Mackie, and while we might say they indicate a ‘moral intuition’, we would then have to deal with the metaphysical/epistemological problems and the objection of variability/relativity of values that Mackie raised.

 

[John21652]

This is an argument I found against objective morality - it is not mine, but I struggle to see where I would disagree. Do you find it has bite, or enough to substantiate ‘teaching the controversy’ on the issue in religious education classes? It is from J. L. Mackie (1977), and the only reason I haven’t quoted the title is that on first glance it looks off-puttingly contrarian.

The author argues this: A belief in objective values is built into ordinary moral thought and language, but this belief is in error.

Actually it isn’t “built into ordinary moral thought” at all. The adoption and acceptance of an objective moral belief system requires a process of discernment, which, in turn, requires what has been termed “right reason”. On this stement, Mackie was just plain wrong.

1. There is a great range of moral values held across cultures and over time; similar moral values are not held universally.

He was wrong here also. he is merely stating an anthropological opinion and not discussing the existence of any moral order. The fact is, universally held moral precepts have indeed been discerned across cultures. The fact that differing cultural practices exist does not negate the universalisability of certain moral behaviours.

2. Objective moral values are peculiar metaphysically and epistemologically.

a) There is nothing else in the universe like the entity or quality or relation that is an objective moral value.

So what? Objectivity is nothing more than the human mind discerning an order in things and those things are both an ideal that is universalisable and mind independent. That is, once pointed out to someone, that someone can recognise its existence.

b) If we were aware of these, it would have to be by a ‘moral perception’ or ‘moral intuition’ wholly different from any other perception. However, it seems we do not answer moral problems by having an ethical intuition, but by introspection, prediction, seeking explanations, conducting conceptual and logical analysis, and by making arguments that rely upon ordinary perceptions and attitudes.

We do indeed have moral intuitions and perceptions. A walk down the street observing human behaviour will demonstrate that.

c) Knowledge of an objective moral value would have to provide automatically a direction and an impulse of behaviour. The objective value would be intrinsically action-guiding and motivating, containing a persuasive to-be-doneness, or not-to-be-doneness.

They don’t always impell behaviour. In mkany cases they constrain behaviour to that objective standard. Standards like the objective moral edict “don’t lie!”, or the objective moral edict “don’t kill!”

3. Objective values would have to be consequential or supervenient upon natural features.

a) It is not known how the objective moral quality of a thing or action is linked with its other features. For example, what is the connection between the natural fact that an action is a piece of deliberate cruelty and the moral fact that it is wrong? It is not logically or semantically entailed, so what is this relation?

It is logically entailed! Just as the natural fact that gravity makes things fall and the fact that stepping off a high building will result in your death! Morals, objective or otherwise, only pertain to human behaviour and human interactions. Nothing else.

**

1. We would have to be able to know of objective values and of their links with the natural features upon which they are supervenient or consequential.

**

a) Some faculty must see an action, the value, and the connection or correspondence between the two. (So what is that faculty and let us see its findings and workings. If it is merely cognition and perception as dealt with by the brain or mind, the argument needs to be made that it does not fall under the alternative suggestions of the next section.)

Right reason! Or, as some would suggest, a well formed conscience. The acknowledgement of objective morality is a process of reasoning and discernment, just as when scientists test hypotheses and arrive at definitive conclusions.

 

[Bobber90]

The acknowledgement of objective morality is a process of reasoning and discernment, just as when scientists test hypotheses and arrive at definitive conclusions.

Can you expand upon an example of this reasoning/discernment? As far as I can tell, it is his assertion that such reasoning would rely partly upon subjective considerations as well as explicitly resort to an undefined and thoroughly unusual ‘moral intuition’, for which ordinary perceptions and contingent social attitudes could be substituted.

 

[Bobber90]

Actually it isn’t “built into ordinary moral thought” at all. The adoption and acceptance of an objective moral belief system requires a process of discernment, which, in turn, requires what has been termed “right reason”. On this stement, Mackie was just plain wrong.

The acceptance of objective morality is pretty much implicit in language from a young age. If a child protests and asks why they should share, or why they should not fight their sibling for something, the` answer is “Because it is good to share and being selfish is bad.” (Perhaps the answer is “Sharing is fair.”, but we can safely assume a young child will not force our hand by asking “Why should I do what is fair?” to which we would reply either with an explanation appealing to prudence or with “No, you have to share! Sharing is good!”).

We quickly learn and use moral language which refers to one good and one bad, in the sense that sharing, making an effort, empathising etc etc are all just good, rather than individually good for this/good for that. The opposite is not convincing – that children tend to accept and think from moral scepticism. They do not ask “What societal conventions and motives are there for me to internalise feelings of guilt and shame for intending to steal from my brother?”. At least superficially then, people tend to think objectively about morality.

He was wrong here also. he is merely stating an anthropological opinion and not discussing the existence of any moral order. The fact is, universally held moral precepts have indeed been discerned across cultures. The fact that differing cultural practices exist does not negate the universalisability of certain moral behaviours.

It is more than a) moral systems exist universally and b) cultural practices differ. The assertion is that moral systems and cultural practices differ together. Yes this is a point requiring anthropological evidence, which we can all think about, but it also brings up another issue.

If moral attitudes were shown to differ within our respective societies over time, a theistic answer would be simply that what people think is their moral attitude is actually a mistaken belief, and there is only one true set of moral attitudes – these have never changed, merely the dominant variety of sin has altered. Mackie accepts that there is a theological approach to objective morality, but indicates that the problems of objective values persists. For example, if it is maintained that God is good in nature, so this is why He only does what is objectively good (I think that’s what Lane Craig says regarding the Euthyphro dilemma), then objective values are not completely subsumed into divine being, but perhaps exist in relation to God in the same way that Jesus is both fully man and fully God. God is fully omniscient will, but also fully good. Perhaps not, perhaps there is no legitimate distinction between God and objective values, in which case detecting objective values is none other than detecting all of God. Nevertheless, the issue is whether it is possible to accept objective morality with reason rather than faith. How can we explain the ‘moral intuition’ that either pertains to objective values or pertains to God, independently of arguing for God by the other traditional means. One reason to take this question seriously is that my conscience feels the same when I am thinking of something I believe is right that agrees with Christian teaching as with something that disagrees with Christian teaching.

So what? Objectivity is nothing more than the human mind discerning an order in things and those things are both an ideal that is universalisable and mind independent. That is, once pointed out to someone, that someone can recognise its existence.

Mackie would say that to ‘recognise its existence’ is instead to endorse a moral value.

We do indeed have moral intuitions and perceptions. A walk down the street observing human behaviour will demonstrate that.

The specific claim is that moral intuition/perception is different from other perceptions, yet using our ordinary perceptions to detect ordinary features of an action is philosophically sound and sufficient to evoke an ordinary (non-objective) moral attitude that functions in exactly the same way as objective moral values are supposed to work. How would one know the difference? They are quite similar, but Mackie appears to demonstrate problems with believing in objectivity.

It is logically entailed! Just as the natural fact that gravity makes things fall and the fact that stepping off a high building will result in your death! Morals, objective or otherwise, only pertain to human behaviour and human interactions. Nothing else.

From an act of causing pain for fun the objective value of wrongness does not logically follow. It is no ‘Socrates is a man’ moment.

****Right reason! Or, as some would suggest, a well formed conscience. The acknowledgement of objective morality is a process of reasoning and discernment, just as when scientists test hypotheses and arrive at definitive conclusions.

The scientific method is inductive, yet objective morality carries the assumption of absolute certainty. Is acting morally purely a case of reasoning? If it is, I would like to see some example steps.

 

[grannymh]

Moral or immoral actions are based on the universal, objective truth that the human person is worthy of profound respect.

 

[Bobber90]

Moral or immoral actions are based on the universal, objective truth that the human person is worthy of profound respect.

Ok, so you reiterate a belief in objective values, but do you engage with the argument against them?

 

[John21652]

The acceptance of objective morality is pretty much implicit in language from a young age. …“No, you have to share! Sharing is good!”).

All you are showing here is that moral inculcations begin at a young age. It doesn’t demonstrate that morality is “objective”. In fact, may who are taught as you describe even go on to deny the existence of an objective morality! Your examples also show that morality is, in part, a taught thing. There are many examples where children naturally share and care for one another, but other feelings may overide their natural instincts, like, “I want that toy”!

We quickly learn and use moral language which refers to one good and one bad, in the sense that sharing, making an effort, empathising etc etc are all just good, rather than individually good for this/good for that. … At least superficially then, people tend to think objectively about morality.

Thinking about something doesn’t make it an objective reality. If it is to be objctive, then it has to be a way of thinking and behaving which is universal and recognised by all other minds. If it can be demonstrated that most people think and behave in a certain way, then we are on the way to having an objective standard. However, just because most people do a certain thing doesn’t mean it is ‘right’. But, that’s another aspect to be explored another day.

It is more than a) moral systems exist universally and b) cultural practices differ. The assertion is that moral systems and cultural practices differ together. Yes this is a point requiring anthropological evidence, which we can all think about, but it also brings up another issue.

You missed an important point here. I wrote of “moral precepts”, not moral systems. A precept is a rule, or a law.

We know moral ‘sytems’ exist across cultures and we know cultural practices differ. The point is, to find those moral precepts which are universal and mind independent that exist across cultures. There are many of them, as anthropological enquiry has demonstrated. These moral precepts are common to human societies that flourish, so we can then infer that there are certain moral precepts which are required for human flourishing. They exist objectively.

If moral attitudes were shown to differ within our respective societies over time, … Mackie accepts that there is a theological approach to objective morality, but indicates that the problems of objective values persists. …

Moral attitudes don’t alter the rightness and wrongness of objective moral truths. If the moral attitudes of a society change and drift, then the enquiry must demonstrate the validity, or otherwise, of previously held moral precepts. This is where reason is important and the use of reason in discerning what is right and wrong. If moral precepts are objectively right, cultural attitudinal shifts wont alter the rightness and/or wrongness of the precepts. It will simply make the society more, or less, moral!

For the theist, the relationship between God and objective good, without writing an essay on it, isn’t it the case that God’s purpose is the flourishing of mankind? If that is the case, then God’s stated goal is objectively good and can’t be seperated from His nature. However, even with God out of the equation, are we not then left with objective criteria which encourage the flourishing of mankind and are we not capable of discerning these objective criteria ourselves?

Mackie would say that to ‘recognise its existence’ is instead to endorse a moral value.

Like recognising gravity and acknowledging its effects?

The specific claim is that moral intuition/perception is different from other perceptions, yet using our ordinary perceptions to detect ordinary features of an action is philosophically sound and sufficient to evoke an ordinary (non-objective) moral attitude that functions in exactly the same way as objective moral values are supposed to work. How would one know the difference? They are quite similar, but Mackie appears to demonstrate problems with believing in objectivity.

Even Aquinas wrote that Reason and not faith is what is required to discern moral law.
English Jesuit and Philosopher Frederick Copleston wrote that Aquinas, like Aristotle, believed reason distinguished man from the animals and that reson enables man to act deliberately in view of consciously apprehended ends, thus raising him above the level of purely instinctive behavior. This is where Mackie was just plain wrong.

From an act of causing pain for fun the objective value of wrongness does not logically follow. It is no ‘Socrates is a man’ moment.

Does it aid human flourishing? Does man have an intrinsic right to be free of pain?

The scientific method is inductive, yet objective morality carries the assumption of absolute certainty.

The pursuit of moral truth is a science, which uses the human facutly of reason. Induction, as it is in the scientific method, is a big part of this science. As you would be well aware, induction never proves anything absolutely. What it does do is to prove something with as much certainty as we can ever have. Arriving at objective moral values requires a fairly good understanding of human nature and, surely, we have had enough experience and enough to observe to make some fairly strong inferences?! You asked for examples; how about the moral precept “don’t murder”? Doesn’t inductive thinking cause one to realise that murder is not a good thing to encourage in society? Do we really need a commandment from God to figure that one out?

Actually, maybe we did, for the crime of murder didn’t even exist until well into the Middle Ages and citizens relied on the notion of ‘The King’s Peace’. When the King died, look out!!

 

[grannymh]

Ok, so you reiterate a belief in objective values, but do you engage with the argument against them?

I only engage in an argument when both of us have a clear understanding of the difference between subjective reasoning and objective reasoning and how both can work independently and how both can work together.

I tend to avoid discussions about objective values because many posters consider the observer as the one who determines objective values. In my humble opinion, that is an understandable, acceptable misuse of the word objective which is certainly all right in the discussion arena. While those kinds of discussions are great; they can be out of my league.

When I think about morality, I like to start with the human person because the majority of people believe that the human person exists and in their heart of hearts they consider themselves worthy of profound respect.

In other words, I tend to simplify the discussion whereas many posters like to extend the discussion which is certainly all right.

And yes, I am open to discussions even if it is only the beginning of a discussion.

 

[Bobber90]

We know moral ‘sytems’ exist across cultures and we know cultural practices differ. The point is, to find those moral precepts which are universal and mind independent that exist across cultures. There are many of them, as anthropological enquiry has demonstrated. These moral precepts are common to human societies that flourish, so we can then infer that there are certain moral precepts which are required for human flourishing. They exist objectively.

…

For the theist, the relationship between God and objective good, without writing an essay on it, isn’t it the case that God’s purpose is the flourishing of mankind? If that is the case, then God’s stated goal is objectively good and can’t be seperated from His nature. However, even with God out of the equation, are we not then left with objective criteria which encourage the flourishing of mankind and are we not capable of discerning these objective criteria ourselves?

In these two emboldened quotes I think I can see the nature of your belief in objective moral values. I agree there are likely to be some moral precepts that are common across the majority of societies, and you add in particular, societies that flourish. I also agree that these precepts might be held valuable because they are necessary for that flourishing. But this is precisely the point Mackie made - that objective comparisons can be made with regard to a set of criteria which is given. In this case, the realities of life such as the need for cooperation/food/periods of peace etc etc compose the criteria for flourishing. However, you then go on to suppose that these objective criteria encourage our behaviour (and in my opinion, you beg the question that God intends for us to flourish). This combines the legitimate use of objective criteria with a normative force which they do not have; we could insert a question between these two assertions and ask “Why ought we do what is good for flourishing?”. There is no answer without another appeal to objective values, saying “It is good to flourish.”

I am almost in agreement with you in general, and also find it compelling to think of ethics along the lines of achieving human flourishing. However, I find it sufficient to back up the objective criteria with subjective normative force, and was stopped in my tracks by Mackie’s discussion of what objective value entities would have to be if they were true. They seem metaphysically difficult to evidence over and above a subjective basis, and easy to confuse, which is his argument for error. For objective morality, we would have to be aware of the values themselves as well as the actions they were consequent upon, yet for a subjective basis, we only need to understand the actions. As you put it, we require

‘a fairly good understanding of human nature and, surely, we have had enough experience and enough to observe to make some fairly strong inferences?!’ and yet you made no mention of the values we would have to sense.

 

[Sair]

In these two emboldened quotes I think I can see the nature of your belief in objective moral values. I agree there are likely to be some moral precepts that are common across the majority of societies, and you add in particular, societies that flourish. I also agree that these precepts might be held valuable because they are necessary for that flourishing. But this is precisely the point Mackie made - that objective comparisons can be made with regard to a set of criteria which is given. In this case, the realities of life such as the need for cooperation/food/periods of peace etc etc compose the criteria for flourishing. However, you then go on to suppose that these objective criteria encourage our behaviour (and in my opinion, you beg the question that God intends for us to flourish). This combines the legitimate use of objective criteria with a normative force which they do not have; we could insert a question between these two assertions and ask “Why ought we do what is good for flourishing?”. There is no answer without another appeal to objective values, saying “It is good to flourish.”

I am almost in agreement with you in general, and also find it compelling to think of ethics along the lines of achieving human flourishing. However, I find it sufficient to back up the objective criteria with subjective normative force, and was stopped in my tracks by Mackie’s discussion of what objective value entities would have to be if they were true. They seem metaphysically difficult to evidence over and above a subjective basis, and easy to confuse, which is his argument for error. For objective morality, we would have to be aware of the values themselves as well as the actions they were consequent upon, yet for a subjective basis, we only need to understand the actions. As you put it, we require

‘a fairly good understanding of human nature and, surely, we have had enough experience and enough to observe to make some fairly strong inferences?!’ and yet you made no mention of the values we would have to sense.

I think this cuts to the heart of the difference between subjective and objective approaches to morality. Yes, there are certain measurable, mind-independent criteria that allow for human flourishing in a general sense; however, when it comes to nailing down precise principles that we are somehow compelled to follow, the objectivity breaks down. There is no compelling, mind-independent reason that we should not take a “might=right” approach - many other animals do it, and many of these are highly successful. Human societies in general might well flourish on this approach, but individuals would undoubtedly suffer.

The thing about morality is that it can’t be mind-independent - our decisions must be made under the conditions in which we find ourselves, and expediency dictates our actions as often as any other consideration. Our decisions are not mind-independent, and I doubt that believers in objective morality would wish them so. The only thing that compels us towards what we believe to be moral actions is our subjective awareness that acting morally is somehow better than acting unscrupulously, no matter how much the latter may be to our objective benefit.

 

[grannymh]

As long as people continue to ignore the human person as an objective fact, subjective morality will continue its damage.

 

[John21652]

I think this cuts to the heart of the difference between subjective and objective approaches to morality. Yes, there are certain measurable, mind-independent criteria that allow for human flourishing in a general sense; however, when it comes to nailing down precise principles that we are somehow compelled to follow, the objectivity breaks down. There is no compelling, mind-independent reason that we should not take a “might=right” approach - many other animals do it, and many of these are highly successful. Human societies in general might well flourish on this approach, but individuals would undoubtedly suffer.

The thing about morality is that it can’t be mind-independent - our decisions must be made under the conditions in which we find ourselves, and expediency dictates our actions as often as any other consideration. Our decisions are not mind-independent, and I doubt that believers in objective morality would wish them so. The only thing that compels us towards what we believe to be moral actions is our subjective awareness that acting morally is somehow better than acting unscrupulously, no matter how much the latter may be to our objective benefit.

The most successful male lions are the ones who drive away the males of a pride, killing them if necessary and then they set about killing off the cubs of the vanquished males. Would you have us emulate that behaviour?

Or perhaps it would be better if we didn’t behave like animals and, instead, observed a moral code which has its foundations in observable characteristics of human nature? Some of them are described in various documents around the world as “self evident truths”. You know, sort of set a standard for ourselves so we don’t behave like animals?

 

[tonyrey]

The most successful male lions are the ones who drive away the males of a pride, killing them if necessary and then they set about killing off the cubs of the vanquished males. Would you have us emulate that behaviour?

Or perhaps it would be better if we didn’t behave like animals and, instead, observed a moral code which has its foundations in observable characteristics of human nature? Some of them are described in various documents around the world as “self evident truths”. You know, sort of set a standard for ourselves so we don’t behave like animals?

Curiously enough my reply a minute ago to your last post on another thread makes the same point from a different angle!

 

[tonyrey]

As long as people continue to ignore the human person as an objective fact, subjective morality will continue its damage.

Subjects are never regarded as objects but as a (moral) law unto themselves!

 

[grannymh]

Subjects are never regarded as objects but as a (moral) law unto themselves!

My apology. I was looking at the teachings of the Catholic Church regarding human nature as an objective reality. That is probably off topic.