Objective morality

[grannymh]

Well, hopefully that is not a problem this thread will suffer. To use your analogy, the opening arguments put the whole house (morality) in question, and consider whether we are discerning a ready-made objective house in the sky, or whether what we think we’ve found is actually an ongoing human construction project.

As you seem to say, reason guides us to the former conclusion.

In the past, I have encountered opposition to my avoidance of the former conclusion that there is a ready-made objective house in the sky. I prefer using reason to get at the foundation and stop before getting to any kind of a sky or God. When we try to discern moral actions, we need a base which *both *theists and non-theists can support.

I prefer to deal with an ongoing human construction project which is completed.

But what do you realise by the gift of reason?

By using the gift of reason, we are actually using an universal truth common to all people regardless of what they believe or do not believe. (For now, let us skip the exceptions regarding handicapped areas.)

You can reason and I can reason even though our worldviews could be miles apart. The ability to think is an objective quality of humankind. We may reason to different conclusions; however, it is our ability to reason which is an universal or objective truth.

What is an objective moral value and how is it consequent upon an empirical situation, without necessarily regarding subjective values?

For me, an objective moral value is nebulous. I want to know where does the value come from? Is the value solid? Will it exist after I die? Values can change–Is that what I can tolerate? What makes an action a moral value?

I rather begin with something universal like humans can reason better than my gold fish.

If you mean by an empirical situation that the base for moral actions can be examined. I see no problem since I start with the material/physical domain.

Re: subjective values. It is a bit hard for me to figure out how a particular individual uses values in subjective values because I never know whom is being referenced.

What I keep coming back to is the universal or objective base for moral actions. By the way, I like moral actions far better than moral values. It is easier to visualize moral actions like the man giving up his seat in the bus so I could sit down. This action was real so I can then figure out if it was good or bad morally.

Once I know the base for that action, which was me in the bus situation, I can analyze the action in terms of morality. His action had the moral value of goodness
because he was seeking something good for me.

Note: I have always liked the idea of random acts of kindness.

 

[Sair]

This is my opinion of the problems.

What is being overlooked is the foundation or base (universal truth) for a moral system. Once a valid base is named and recognized as such (universal or objective truth), then and only then can people describe morality.

There is one almost uniform characteristic amongst humans that provided the basis for moral behaviour of any kind - we are subjective, highly social beings, capable of empathy (unless psychopathic) who are dependent upon each other for the meeting of most of our needs. Moral behaviour is that which allows for effective and positive social interaction that achieves desirable results for all involved.

One may well question, “Why should I do something generous for my neighbour?” and the answer is, well, why not? What it will cost you in effort you will gain back - hopefully, anyway - in goodwill and a sense of satisfaction for having behaved towards your neighbour in a way that you yourself would like to be treated. There’s nothing to enforce this behaviour, of course, and I am inclined to think that this is the real sticking point for people who claim that without belief in gods, one cannot be moral. We can - we just don’t do it out of belief in an imaginary set of rules laid down by an imaginary being.

No, this sort of moral system cannot really be called objective or mind-independent, because it relies upon subjectivity for its very functioning. If we - that is, subjective social beings - ceased to exist, there would be no set of moral rules that remained in the universe, independent of our presence.

 

[grannymh]

There is one almost uniform characteristic amongst humans that provided the basis for moral behaviour of any kind - we are subjective, highly social beings, capable of empathy (unless psychopathic) who are dependent upon each other for the meeting of most of our needs. Moral behaviour is that which allows for effective and positive social interaction that achieves desirable results for all involved.

One may well question, “Why should I do something generous for my neighbour?” and the answer is, well, why not? What it will cost you in effort you will gain back - hopefully, anyway - in goodwill and a sense of satisfaction for having behaved towards your neighbour in a way that you yourself would like to be treated. There’s nothing to enforce this behaviour, of course, and I am inclined to think that this is the real sticking point for people who claim that without belief in gods, one cannot be moral. We can - we just don’t do it out of belief in an imaginary set of rules laid down by an imaginary being.

No, this sort of moral system cannot really be called objective or mind-independent, because it relies upon subjectivity for its very functioning. If we - that is, subjective social beings - ceased to exist, there would be no set of moral rules that remained in the universe, independent of our presence.

You have said a lot of good things. However, a characteristic is too nebulous to be a good base. Also described situations cannot serve as a base because they change.
I know non-theists and whatever else are moral people and very kind. I have experienced kindness.

Therefore, when we try to discern moral actions, we need a base which *both *theists and non-theists can support. I prefer using reason to get at the foundation and stop before making the leap to God. I realize that I will shortly have my head on a platter.

 

[Sair]

You have said a lot of good things. However, a characteristic is too nebulous to be a good base. Also described situations cannot serve as a base because they change.
I know non-theists and whatever else are moral people and very kind. I have experienced kindness.

Therefore, when we try to discern moral actions, we need a base which *both *theists and non-theists can support. I prefer using reason to get at the foundation and stop before making the leap to God. I realize that I will shortly have my head on a platter.

I wonder if moral foundationalism suffers from the same fundamental weakness as epistemic foundationalism - that is, the fact that finding a single solid basis for everything we claim to know is a) not how we actually construct knowledge and b) is susceptible to the danger that if the basis we choose is found lacking or proves to be erroneous, the entire edifice of our claimed knowledge falls apart. I believe it was Quine who formulated the web analogy, whereby knowledge is constructed from mutually supporting strands of facts, assumptions and concepts - leaving us free to question and test any one of these without endangering our body of knowledge in general. This seems to be a much better reflection of the actual process by which we construct knowledge, especially when we consider that from the time even before we are able to formulate rational thought, we already have a wealth of sensory information of which to make sense and out of which we construct our understanding of the world.

I’m coming to consider whether morality might operate in the same way, as part of our overall picture of the world. We are all conditioned, I believe - again, from the time before we can formulate rational thought - to comprehend that certain behaviours lead to certain results, and in particular certain reactions from other people; we also react to the behaviours of others towards us. In short, we develop what could be called moral principles and habits of behaviour before we can rationally explain why we might behave in certain ways - and this is a considerably more complex process than simply being told, “You must do X because Y”. Constant reinforcement in the form of consequences, both positive and negative, is what builds our moral awareness. The problem with foundationalism in this regard is, again, what if the foundation on which one purports to build a moral system is found lacking or actually erroneous? To use an example that has come up a few times in discussions on this forum, what if you believe God is the basis of your morality, and then you stop believing God exists? Does your whole edifice of moral behaviour come crashing down around your ears, as I’ve seen some people claim that it would? Or do you realise that there’s more than one reason to keep behaving in a moral manner towards one’s fellow beings, as I did?

 

[Bobber90]

In the past, I have encountered opposition to my avoidance of the former conclusion that there is a ready-made objective house in the sky. I prefer using reason to get at the foundation and stop before getting to any kind of a sky or God. When we try to discern moral actions, we need a base which *both *theists and non-theists can support.

I prefer to deal with an ongoing human construction project which is completed.

By using the gift of reason, we are actually using an universal truth common to all people regardless of what they believe or do not believe. (For now, let us skip the exceptions regarding handicapped areas.)

You can reason and I can reason even though our worldviews could be miles apart. The ability to think is an objective quality of humankind. We may reason to different conclusions; however, it is our ability to reason which is an universal or objective truth.

For me, an objective moral value is nebulous. I want to know where does the value come from? Is the value solid? Will it exist after I die? Values can change–Is that what I can tolerate? What makes an action a moral value?

I rather begin with something universal like humans can reason better than my gold fish.

If you mean by an empirical situation that the base for moral actions can be examined. I see no problem since I start with the material/physical domain.

Re: subjective values. It is a bit hard for me to figure out how a particular individual uses values in subjective values because I never know whom is being referenced.

What I keep coming back to is the universal or objective base for moral actions. By the way, I like moral actions far better than moral values. It is easier to visualize moral actions like the man giving up his seat in the bus so I could sit down. This action was real so I can then figure out if it was good or bad morally.

Once I know the base for that action, which was me in the bus situation, I can analyze the action in terms of morality. His action had the moral value of goodness
because he was seeking something good for me.

Note: I have always liked the idea of random acts of kindness.

I sympathise but I do not agree with the general thrust of what you’re saying, and I suspect that’s because you would rather argue to objective morality via God, than simply straight to objective morality. That would be why you find it better to look at moral actions than moral values, eg. It is easy to say that we all reason therefore we share some common basis for beliefs, but to me this does not bring us any closer to objective morality than it does to shared maths, science or even games and logical puzzles.

 

[grannymh]

I sympathise but I do not agree with the general thrust of what you’re saying, and I suspect that’s because you would rather argue to objective morality via God, than simply straight to objective morality. That would be why you find it better to look at moral actions than moral values, eg. It is easy to say that we all reason therefore we share some common basis for beliefs, but to me this does not bring us any closer to objective morality than it does to shared maths, science or even games and logical puzzles.

Emphasis mine.

May I point out that my posts are not arguing to objective morality via God?

Post 40–"I prefer using reason to get at the foundation and stop before getting to any kind of a sky or God. **When we try to discern moral actions, we need a base which both theists and non-theists can support."

Obviously, I cannot prevent anyone from taking the leap to a belief in a transcendent pure spirit. My objective is simply to find a common base or foundation for determining if a particular action is moral or not. Step 3 is to examine and name the value of that action.

From what I have read on CAF, my own personal conclusion is that “objective morality” is a kind of intellectual construct which is great to discuss but doesn’t quite fit within the practical world where people hold different worldviews.

I totally agree that philosophical reasoning is a very important part of obtaining knowledge. However, in university which required a minor in philosophy, I preferred planning for a student union building. This is why I prefer addressing morality from the advantage of moral actions. (My memory of philosophy is slim.)

What I tried to say is that all humans have the ability to reason. This is basic but it does not imply that they always reason or that everyone agrees on conclusions from reasoning. It does imply that a lack of certain brain functions or dominance of outside influences can hinder or stop reasoning. Yet, the ability to reason comes with human nature.

The ability to think rationally is one of the reasons the human person is worthy of profound respect.

 

[grannymh]

I wonder if moral foundationalism suffers from the same fundamental weakness as epistemic foundationalism - that is, the fact that finding a single solid basis for everything we claim to know is a) not how we actually construct knowledge and b) is susceptible to the danger that if the basis we choose is found lacking or proves to be erroneous, the entire edifice of our claimed knowledge falls apart. I believe it was Quine who formulated the web analogy, whereby knowledge is constructed from mutually supporting strands of facts, assumptions and concepts - leaving us free to question and test any one of these without endangering our body of knowledge in general. This seems to be a much better reflection of the actual process by which we construct knowledge, especially when we consider that from the time even before we are able to formulate rational thought, we already have a wealth of sensory information of which to make sense and out of which we construct our understanding of the world.

I’m coming to consider whether morality might operate in the same way, as part of our overall picture of the world. We are all conditioned, I believe - again, from the time before we can formulate rational thought - to comprehend that certain behaviours lead to certain results, and in particular certain reactions from other people; we also react to the behaviours of others towards us. In short, we develop what could be called moral principles and habits of behaviour before we can rationally explain why we might behave in certain ways - and this is a considerably more complex process than simply being told, “You must do X because Y”. Constant reinforcement in the form of consequences, both positive and negative, is what builds our moral awareness. The problem with foundationalism in this regard is, again, what if the foundation on which one purports to build a moral system is found lacking or actually erroneous? To use an example that has come up a few times in discussions on this forum, what if you believe God is the basis of your morality, and then you stop believing God exists? Does your whole edifice of moral behaviour come crashing down around your ears, as I’ve seen some people claim that it would? Or do you realise that there’s more than one reason to keep behaving in a moral manner towards one’s fellow beings, as I did?

Emphasis mine.

I really like your post because I see the rational for it and can eventually use it – with a few additional ideas which may or may not align with your concepts.

I do not believe that the whole edifice of moral behavior comes crashing down around my ears when belief in an existing God stops. My reason is that the “whole edifice” bit seems to exclude the marvels of human nature. I do believe that when belief in an existing God stops, wide cracks do appear in the whole edifice of moral behavior. But the whole should not be considered as being the same as an individual part.

I may be wearing rose-colored glasses. But I will never underestimate the power of humans to act in a moral manner regardless of what happens around them and to them.

Because of commitments, I cannot, at this time, discuss everything in your post and Bobber90’s post. However, what I put in bold above is crucial to the way I am reasoning to a base for moral actions.

When I look for a foundation for morality, I do not consider that it would become a basis for everything that we claim to know or a basis for any kind of everything. That is not practical in the real world in which knowledge is constantly growing. We have come a long way since the wheel was invented. Yet, in my observation, the foundation for discerning actions is the same today as it was when the new wheel made “breaking news.”

Perhaps I am seeing moral actions as part of the web of life?

Once human nature entered the history of the universe, it has remained essentially the same. Of course, through time, human anatomies have adapted to envionments and “brain power” certainly has changed for the better. Yet, the fact that our species is still both rational *and *material remains.

 

[JDaniel]

Objective morality is not considering a situation from all possible angles,

And that is not what the good Father said. What he said was that morality is essentially disjunctive. Acts are either good or bad - or, morally neutral (which is to say, “irrelevant”). It is the attempt to relativize morality that allows men to say that the rapes of the women, in a conquered village, is a (kind of) good. (As it would [perhaps] prevent future difficulties with the future men of that village.) But, even in this case, any rational person understands that what we have here is not just one immoral act, but rather, two of them.

or universalising the actions to ask “How would we judge it if any normal person did this”

Is this not a way of recognizing that something exists? Morality is not something that can be seen or heard, for example. Instead it is that which can be thought. But, “objective” comes from the Latin, ob-jectum, which means that which confronts a sense, i.e., that which is somatic. Neither bad nor good are somatic. They are predicated of acts which are somatic. The normal, i.e., non-aberrated human views a plethora of acts throughout his or her lifetime and continuously judges them. But on what basis does he judge them? Does he judge them wholly on the basis of what he believes to be right or good? Can we go into Court with personal convictions and win? Or, do the members of a society make generalized judgments concerning particular acts or actions? Furthermore, is it possible that some men choose to regard all of morality, as it pertains to the other, as not obtaining? Is there such selfishness, or disregard, in the world?

I think the definition you stated is about the requirements of discourse if it is to be considered moral language. Moral language must be universalising, else it does not have the power over all agents, but this does not entail the actual existence of objective values.

So, you believe that unless it can be an ob-jectum you are unwilling to call it “objective.”

God bless,
jd

 

[JDaniel]

Can you expand upon an example of this reasoning/discernment? As far as I can tell, it is his assertion that such reasoning would rely partly upon subjective considerations as well as explicitly resort to an undefined and thoroughly unusual ‘moral intuition’, for which ordinary perceptions and contingent social attitudes could be substituted.

Bobber:

What exactly is a “social attitude?”

God bless,
jd

 

[JDaniel]

The acceptance of objective morality is pretty much implicit in language from a young age. If a child protests and asks why they should share, or why they should not fight their sibling for something, the` answer is “Because it is good to share and being selfish is bad.” (Perhaps the answer is “Sharing is fair.”, but we can safely assume a young child will not force our hand by asking “Why should I do what is fair?” to which we would reply either with an explanation appealing to prudence or with “No, you have to share! Sharing is good!”).

Bobber:

You are extrapolating. Even at a young age, I can remember considering that there was a difference between a good or bad act and good or bad food. Even at a young age I knew that there was an analogy at work here - even though I had no idea what an “analogy” was. I knew there was a difference. And, I’ll bet most non-aberrated people would, too.

We quickly learn and use moral language which refers to one good and one bad, in the sense that sharing, making an effort, empathising etc etc are all just good, rather than individually good for this/good for that. The opposite is not convincing – that children tend to accept and think from moral scepticism. They do not ask “What societal conventions and motives are there for me to internalise feelings of guilt and shame for intending to steal from my brother?”. At least superficially then, people tend to think objectively about morality.

It can be so easy to make a rationale, i.e., a “spin.”

It is more than a) moral systems exist universally and b) cultural practices differ. The assertion is that moral systems and cultural practices differ together.

I assume you mean, “simultaneously?”

If moral attitudes were shown to differ within our respective societies over time, a theistic answer would be simply that what people think is their moral attitude is actually a mistaken belief, and there is only one true set of moral attitudes – these have never changed, merely the dominant variety of sin has altered. Mackie accepts that there is a theological approach to objective morality, but indicates that the problems of objective values persists. For example, if it is maintained that God is good in nature, so this is why He only does what is objectively good (I think that’s what Lane Craig says regarding the Euthyphro dilemma), then objective values are not completely subsumed into divine being, but perhaps exist in relation to God in the same way that Jesus is both fully man and fully God. God is fully omniscient will, but also fully good. Perhaps not, perhaps there is no legitimate distinction between God and objective values, in which case detecting objective values is none other than detecting all of God. Nevertheless, the issue is whether it is possible to accept objective morality with reason rather than faith. How can we explain the ‘moral intuition’ that either pertains to objective values or pertains to God, independently of arguing for God by the other traditional means. One reason to take this question seriously is that my conscience feels the same when I am thinking of something I believe is right that agrees with Christian teaching as with something that disagrees with Christian teaching.

The problem with this thinking is that God and “good” are not always very clearly thought through - especially when taken in tandem. It is impossible for anyone not to understand that anything that has super-eminent power (over another, or others) has only three ways of acting: good, bad, or indifferent (which may be good or bad as well!). That which has super-eminent power and can thus create creatures to toy with, e.g., torture at will, or confer pleasure at will, keep its toys alive for as long as it wants to add to the torture or pleasure. The average human (who understands a Christian concept of God) can grasp this as soon as s/he can discern.

As a kid, I had a playmate that lived on the street behind me. At certain times of the year, our area of the country would be plagued with extraordinarily large grasshoppers. I remember that he would catch one of these fellows, hang it to our clothesline, and burn it’s antennae or legs off with matches. Instantly, I recognized that this was an act of badness. I recognized that I wanted to refrain from such actrivities and chose to do just that. Now, I had no idea precisely why that fellow’s acts were evil, I just sensed that they were. I sensed, perhaps, that I would not want what he did done to me: not because of the loss of an appendage, but because of the pain that I was sure the act entailed.

Now, if I could come to that conclusion, I knew that he should have as well. My question then was, “Why hadn’t he?” The conclusion I came to was that he was a bad boy and that I wanted to distance myself from him. Did I confer that feeling from knowing that spinach tasted “bad?” No. I intuitively recognized a difference.

From an act of causing pain for fun the objective value of wrongness does not logically follow. It is no ‘Socrates is a man’ moment.

Of course it is: unless the man is a moron, or bovine.

The scientific method is inductive, yet objective morality carries the assumption of absolute certainty. Is acting morally purely a case of reasoning? If it is, I would like to see some example steps.

In some cases, yes, in some cases it is virtually intuitive. We cannot know the pain of a fire until we insert our fingers into one. At once, we recognize fire’s torture value, or, its cooking value.

God bless,
jd

 

[JDaniel]

They’re not necessarily wrong if they feel like a coyote, the problem comes when they get specific. If they say they perceive like one, we can test their senses; if they said they think like one, we can examine knowledge of coyote thought patterns; if they say they have the body of a coyote, we can examine that too. All of this can be done subjectively, and we can conclude on balance whether they are being honest.

How? If there’s no norm, no objective criteria, as you suggest, then how can we tell that a person is a liar?

Nothing follows from the claim that someone thinks they are a coyote that is of any interest, I believe, to subjectivism. Why would we need some extra way of telling someone that they are not a coyote?

Do you mean, other than anyone’s exquisite interiority? What we otherwise call, “opinion?”

God bless,
jd

 

[JDaniel]

We can say that objective morality is actually mistaken subjective morality, and that features such as universal precepts and self-evidentness are instead composed by instinct (inherited or culturally inculcated) plus utility. That would explain the subjective importance in a way that faces fewer metaphysical problems. Do you have a way of disagreeing with that?

Bobber:

Doesn’t this presuppose that men were always able to use language? I wonder, “How were those things communicated before language?” After the fact, we can ask, “Shouldn’t we, as a society, strive to flourish?” But, prior to language and retrospection, do you think mankind was just lucky?

God bless,
jd

 

[JDaniel]

It is fine for a subjective morality to require that rules are universal - they have to apply to everyone - but is it also necessary for people to believe in objective groundings for it to function?

Bobber:

We must recognize “objective” criteria, otherwise we could easily have 3.5 billion opinions on specific (moral) acts.

I think the subjective feelings of guilt and shame at having let family/friends/contacts down are strong enough to impel behaviour even when we know that calm thinking in a quiet moment would have it that there is no absolute force that insists this.

And, you must believe that all of mankind participates in them equally and universally. Do we? Or, is there evidence that we don’t?

In the place of objective values, we have subjective values which are no less important to us simply because we cannot necessarily require others to agree. As a general ground and focal point for subjective values, we could say “We ought to be moral because, on balance, we would be happier in this state of affairs.” Sure, there is plenty to disagree on, but also plenty of common ground.

Are you so sure that my playmate (from my earlier post) is not hanging people by their legs and burning off there appendages? Why do you think that we all conform to subjective values, like human society is a kind of collective Borg?

*I’m not saying that guilt alone would be enough to restrain people, we would probably need a state, but any such institution could rest on subjective emotions as strong as guilt

Of course it does, for some. Others recognize that intuitively. Now, one can say, “I don’t care about such feelings! Such feelings are a sign of weakness - and that is not me!”

I don’t know of any accounts of Hitler actually killing other humans - himself. Others did the killing - at his imperial command. So, by his own account, he is not an evil person. He was merely doing what was expedient for the betterment of the society as he subjectively saw it. Right?

God bless,
jd

 

[JDaniel]

I’m almost with you on that, because what does subjectivism offer except solipsism, you may ask. But I think there are many ways to avoid solipsism, or at least to avoid total egocentrism, along the lines of accepting that we’ll all take our perceptions seriously, because we want to. It is also not possible to claim that all we have is perception and perception is illusory, because to do so would rely upon that which is claimed to be illusory - ie be self-defeating. If we say that we think there is a reality partly accessible via perceptions, then we get all the benefits of science and are able to use our perceptions to predict what our perceptions will later tell us, which is helpful even if ‘illusory’.

Well, it may not be that simple. You’ve heard the expression, “Like falling down stairs.” Sometimes humans do things for no good reason. At the time, and in the circumstance, they were merely falling down stairs.

There is, unfortunately, for such thoughtless individuals, an ending to the “fall!” At that ending, the actor can then compare his action to his conception of right and wrong. And, so with the rest of us. What we find is “consensus.” (I’m not trying to say that consensus is a perfect “truth test,” by any means. But, that’s for another thread.)

 

[preferanonymous]

This is an argument I found against objective morality - it is not mine, but I struggle to see where I would disagree. Do you find it has bite, or enough to substantiate ‘teaching the controversy’ on the issue in religious education classes? It is from J. L. Mackie (1977), and the only reason I haven’t quoted the title is that on first glance it looks off-puttingly contrarian.

The author argues this: A belief in objective values is built into ordinary moral thought and language, but this belief is in error.

His case against objective morality follows several lines. Firstly, he explains how he thinks the belief in objective morality is false, then he explains why if it had the backing of common sense and experience it could be held in error. For us to accept his argument, we would have to agree that the problems with objective morality are too substantial, and accept that the case for making an error in thinking this way is plausible. On the falsity of the belief, he argues this:

1. There is a great range of moral values held across cultures and over time; similar moral values are not held universally. His argument is that the thesis that moral values depend on actual ways of life more plausibly explains the variability/relativity of values held than the consideration that they have an objective existence. He notes that the diversity not only of individual values but of entire perspectives and starting points would render any supposed underlying universality much vaguer than the belief in objective moral values holds.

2. Objective moral values are peculiar metaphysically and epistemologically.

a) There is nothing else in the universe like the entity or quality or relation that is an objective moral value.

b) If we were aware of these, it would have to be by a ‘moral perception’ or ‘moral intuition’ wholly different from any other perception. However, it seems we do not answer moral problems by having an ethical intuition, but by introspection, prediction, seeking explanations, conducting conceptual and logical analysis, and by making arguments that rely upon ordinary perceptions and attitudes.

c) Knowledge of an objective moral value would have to provide automatically a direction and an impulse of behaviour. The objective value would be intrinsically action-guiding and motivating, containing a persuasive to-be-doneness, or not-to-be-doneness.

3. Objective values would have to be consequential or supervenient upon natural features.

a) It is not known how the objective moral quality of a thing or action is linked with its other features. For example, what is the connection between the natural fact that an action is a piece of deliberate cruelty and the moral fact that it is wrong? It is not logically or semantically entailed, so what is this relation?

**4. We would have to be able to know of objective values and of their links with the natural features upon which they are supervenient or consequential.
**
a) Some faculty must see an action, the value, and the connection or correspondence between the two. (So what is that faculty and let us see its findings and workings. If it is merely cognition and perception as dealt with by the brain or mind, the argument needs to be made that it does not fall under the alternative suggestions of the next section.)

Hey Bobber90,

I think Mackie admits that his argument from queerness assumes the untenability of theism- namely that God’s existence can be demonstrated. This however, is precisely, I think, what the Catholic accepts. I think the tensions might be said to run rather deep between Mackie and the Catholic moral philosopher. For the atheist, like Mackie I think, objective values are quite queer but for the theist, the notion might not seem to be as queer given the existence of a being like God. Mackie would, I think, be quite right to point out that categorical imperatives are quite queer relative to the universe. That they don’t exist however would require a move like a rejection of theism and this I do not think he is entitled to at least without further argument. Much of modern philosophy might be said to be odd, at least to some, because it talks past the theist as though his position is untenable and comes to conclusions, which might seem quite radical, based on these sorts of assumptions. I think Mackie’s denial of objective values might be an example of just this.

 

[CTuck]

Hey Bobber90,

I think Mackie admits that his argument from queerness assumes the untenability of theism- namely that God’s existence can be demonstrated. This however, is precisely, I think, what the Catholic accepts. I think the tensions might be said to run rather deep between Mackie and the Catholic moral philosopher. For the atheist, like Mackie I think, objective values are quite queer but for the theist, the notion might not seem to be as queer given the existence of a being like God. Mackie would, I think, be quite right to point out that categorical imperatives are quite queer relative to the universe. That they don’t exist however would require a move like a rejection of theism and this I do not think he is entitled to at least without further argument. Much of modern philosophy might be said to be odd, at least to some, because it talks past the theist as though his position is untenable and comes to conclusions, which might seem quite radical, based on these sorts of assumptions. I think Mackie’s denial of objective values might be an example of just this.

You know, I was going to reply a few days ago to this thread when writing out my response I recognized this very point. If you reject the prospect of something that objectifes all morality, you have obniously ruled out God. “If God does not exist, what could objectify it?” is the loaded question at hand, and I would say that nothing could, with some explaination. But yes, it should be taken back to the question of God… Good point.

 

[grannymh]

In my humble opinion, it looks like the conversation is still on a bunch of values without a subject. Oh well.

 

[grannymh]

In my humble opinion, it looks like the conversation is still on a bunch of values without a subject. Oh well.

As long as it is relatively quiet, may I introduce the idea that there is something more to the issue of objective morality than discussing values either objective or subjective.

In practical life, one should be paying attention to the subject or object of moral values which is the human person.

Blessings,
granny

“The shepherds sing; and shall I silent be?”
From the poem “Christmas” by George Herbert

 

[Charlemagne_II]

CTuck

**You know, I was going to reply a few days ago to this thread when writing out my response I recognized this very point. If you reject the prospect of something that objectifes all morality, you have obniously ruled out God. “If God does not exist, what could objectify it?” is the loaded question at hand, and I would say that nothing could, with some explaination. But yes, it should be taken back to the question of God… Good point. **

I agree with reservations. The atheist Ayn Rand said there could be objective morality only if it was founded on Reason (her God, it seems). That concept is built into Catholic theology with the notion of natural law morality. Those who live without the revelation of God can still know, and be judged, for obeying or disobeying the natural law, which is evident to all human beings even if they find irrational ways to deny it.

The problem with Rand, however, is that when opposing moralities come to exist and a consensus is being sought, the most rational one does not always prevail (because each one thinks it is the most rational one and there is no yielding of one to the other). With God factored into the equation, there is an absolute reference point for deciding which morality is the objective one. But this reference point only exists when all people agree to the existence of God, and to the same God rather than different ones.

For example, Christian morality will necessarily differ from Islamic morality because their moral traditions, while similar in some way, are different in others. Neither will yield to the other.

 

[grannymh]

With God factored into the equation, there is an absolute reference point for deciding which morality is the objective one. But this reference point only exists when all people agree to the existence of God, and to the same God rather than different ones.

For example, Christian morality will necessarily differ from Islamic morality because their moral traditions, while similar in some way, are different in others. Neither will yield to the other.

Perhaps you missed post 57. I did post it and post 56 quietly.