…NOW!
Explanations:
(1) If nothing which is in motion can be, in that particular respect, its own mover, then there must be a mover prior to it which causes that particular motion. Since there could be no mover that’s prior to the absolute first, then the first mover must not be in motion, in any respect whatsoever. For that to be the case, it would have to be self-moved, which is impossible, or else it would have to be moved by a mover “before the first” (which would render it not truly the first).
(2) Because it is purely motionless, it does not in any sense pass from a state of potency into actuality. It is changeless through and through. This is because, were it to contain any potency – which is only truly a potency of the thing iff it might be in act, if it’s possibly actualized – then such a potency could only come about through motion of some kind, from a transition from potency to act. Since it could not move itself in that regard, it could not be moved by another toward such actualization, meaning the “potency” would could not possibly be actualized, could never be in act. Except, a potency is, by definition, a thing at least possibly actualized. Any “potency” in the first mover couldn’t ever be actual, which is nonsense, so there is no (non-actualized) potency in the first mover.
(3) Since there’s no potency in the first mover, there is no existence or mode of existence that is at all non-actualized, or potential, to it. Existence is the act of a thing, an essential being (i.e., a being w/some definite nature or other, w/“whatness” – as indeed nothing lacking essence could be distinctly known or described). Any essential being is merely in potency to actual existence as such, per se, unless existence is included within or identical to its very own essence; in other words, unless its essence is to exist, then it cannot account for its own existence as such-and-such a being, its individual motion from potentially existing as an x to actually existing as an x. Any being whose essence is to exist must exist of necessity, for asserting its non-existence would fall prey to contradiction. And so the first mover’s essence is to necessarily exist, to most fully and completely be.
(4) For there to be more than one being whose essence is existence itself, there would have to be some property by which they differ, by which we could conceive of them as individually distinct from one another. But any such property would, for one, be or regard an act (and an existence of some form) of the one and not the other; one would thus have an existence or actuality that the other does not. However, that’s impossible, given that each of their essences is simply existence, pure act, and as such couldn’t exclude any actuality.
(5) ‘Goodness’, defined in terms of completion/fullness and perfection in act, as describing the complete actualization of a potency, is accordingly a word most properly predicated, in its most primary sense, of the first mover. That’s because the highest good will thereby be that which is most fully actual (that is, actual in the widest and most fundamental way).
(6) Any being which contains absolutely no division between actual existence and omnipotent essence must permit of no parts or composition. Any composition, be it of diverse traits or just existence and essence, necessarily requires a unifier, a composer (at least if such constituent parts are not themselves united by one common nature). It is nonsense to speak of a whole’s parts as working together in some sort of unity prior to their possessing any real unity. For a whole’s parts to all come together and unite themselves, as parts, under itself-as-a-whole would be for the whole to precede its own existence. (And for any parts that just accidentally combine, no essential whole, that is, no essence, no truly real, individual, substantial being, is made. The result would be just an internally diverse mixture of still-individual things, all maintaining their own essential identities, happening to react w/each other and bring about various accidental effects. No unified teleology; no more a really essential individual than two kids cooperatively standing on each other’s shoulders in a trench coat with the requisite hat and sunglasses.)
(7) Embodied entails composition; matter is by nature divisible and compositional. Plus, it would be a composite of its essence and body (what it is & what it inhabits). Finally, everything that isn’t the first mover is therefore at least potentially in some motion, since it must lack a possible act; it’s in that fashion constituted w/unity as both act and potency. Its potency is rooted in what it is by nature, its essence, which must be distinct from its existence, lest it be the first mover. Since anything with any inherent division, for present purposes between “what it is” and “that it is”, must either account for its divided parts’ union by itself (internally) or by another (externally), we conclude that nothing in the S-T universe (i.e., nothing that isn’t absolutely simple/actual) is the first mover. (On the other hand, w/theoretical physics growing more and more fond of speculating beyond S-T material bodies, the line between “the universe” and “the supernatural” gets less clear. I mean, what sort of existence does a law of physics have? Strictly abstract? “Emergent”? No matter; still composite.)
Most of that is, in effect, just about how Aquinas goes on to elaborate on his proofs. I didn’t check his work precisely, though, so I can’t vouch for how closely his steps resemble “mine”. Plus, I hardly “checked my work” so I won’t claim all of that is absolutely airtight yet. Now to cut to the chase w/a risk-free prediction, which terms do you dispute/misinterpret my employment and definition of, and over which specific inferences do you hesitate? And of course, why?
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