Omniscience leads to pure fatalism

[Bahman]

1. God has omniscience
2. God is cognitively open to free will (since otherwise couldn’t create a being with free will)
3. God knows the decision we perform in a situation as a result being cognitively open to free will and situation, in another word God is cognitively open to creation
4. Creation was performed by first cause and God was cognitively open to first cause
5. We act and God was aware the source of each act in first cause since it was cognitively open to it
6. Free will is an illusion

This means if (6) is right (2) is wrong namely free will can not be real if omniscience is real since God cannot be cognitively open to illusion. In another word omniscience leads to pure fatalism since the source of each action was already known in first cause.

This is really puzzling since God cannot perform creation in one hand if it is not cognitively open to creation in another hand being cognitively open leads to pure fatalism.

The only way to resolve the problem is to reject (5) which requires a proper definition of first cause and redefinition of omniscience in order to preserve free will.

What is the first cause? First cause is the act of creation with the sole knowledge that the act creation leads to free will. God in this picture cannot implement any further constrains in first cause in order to acquire any knowledge of our actions since we have to reject (5) hence God does not know the act we perform since it couldn’t know it at the time of creation. Omniscience in this framework, in what related to creation, is the sole knowledge that the act creation leads to free will.

 

[polytropos]

Can you clarify the term “cognitively open”? Can you also clarify premise 4)? Traditionally God and “first cause” designate the same entity (cause being a term that refers to a concrete entity), and creation is God’s act. Premise 4) seems to be saying that God and the “first cause” are distinct. (Granting that, one might also wonder why the premise cites a first cause to account for creation, but also states that “God was cognitively open to first cause,” which seems to imply that the first cause was in some way contingent on God’s “cognitive openness,” which seems to contradict with its being the first cause–please clarify if you meant something else).

Otherwise, 6) does not seem to follow from 5). From the fact that we act and God knows that we act/how we will act, it does not follow that we must act in such and such a way. As James Ross put it, “It does not follow from the fact that ‘sWp entails p’ is a necessary truth that p is not a contingent state of affairs. There is absolutely no justification for transferring the modal operator from the conditional to the consequent of the conditional. (The same rule applies to sKp where ‘K’ means ‘knows that.’)” God knowing that we will act in a certain way is consistent with the possibility that we should act otherwise.

 

[Bahman]

Can you clarify the term “cognitively open”?

It means that any action of an agent in macro and micro level is understandable in any given situation. By macro-level, I meant what we call behaviour which is outcome facing with a situation being in given mental state, and by micro level, I meant whatever we and situation are constructed from which leads to a mental state and defines a situation. For example consider we touch something very hot which defines the situation in macro level, and we go to a mental state, recognizing that the we touch a hot object and then act accordingly. By micro I meant movement molecules which define an object as hot and all neurons activity which alert the mind and then mind through another neurons process recognizes that something hot was touched.

Can you also clarify premise 4)? Traditionally God and “first cause” designate the same entity (cause being a term that refers to a concrete entity), and creation is God’s act. Premise 4) seems to be saying that God and the “first cause” are distinct. (Granting that, one might also wonder why the premise cites a first cause to account for creation, but also states that “God was cognitively open to first cause,” which seems to imply that the first cause was in some way contingent on God’s “cognitive openness,” which seems to contradict with its being the first cause–please clarify if you meant something else).

I consider God and first cause as two separate entities. God should have the liberty to perform creation/first cause otherwise the act creation and existence of God are identical which is an ambiguous thing for me.

Otherwise, 6) does not seem to follow from 5). From the fact that we act and God knows that we act/how we will act, it does not follow that we must act in such and such a way. As James Ross put it, “It does not follow from the fact that ‘sWp entails p’ is a necessary truth that p is not a contingent state of affairs. There is absolutely no justification for transferring the modal operator from the conditional to the consequent of the conditional. (The same rule applies to sKp where ‘K’ means ‘knows that.’)” God knowing that we will act in a certain way is consistent with the possibility that we should act otherwise.

Can you please clarify what do you mean with ‘sWp, p’, sKp and K’. They are not defined so I cannot follow.

 

[polytropos]

It means that any action of an agent in macro and micro level is understandable in any given situation. By macro-level, I meant what we call behaviour which is outcome facing with a situation being in given mental state, and by micro level, I meant whatever we and situation are constructed from which leads to a mental state and defines a situation. For example consider we touch something very hot which defines the situation in macro level, and we go to a mental state, recognizing that the we touch a hot object and then act accordingly. By micro I meant movement molecules which define an object as hot and all neurons activity which alert the mind and then mind through another neurons process recognizes that something hot was touched.

So the main thing you are getting at with the term “cognitively open” is that it is understandable?

It seems like the “micro” level would not apply to God, who is immaterial and metaphysically simple.

I consider God and first cause as two separate entities. God should have the liberty to perform creation/first cause otherwise the act creation and existence of God are identical which is an ambiguous thing for me.

Suppose that you throw a baseball, and then someone says that you are the cause of the baseball’s being thrown. That is what it means to call God the first cause. To call God the first cause does not identify God with the act of creation–that would be like saying that you and the throwing of the baseball are the same. The first cause is not an act; it is an entity. (You do say that you “consider God and first cause as two separate entities,” but by distinguishing them and calling the first cause an “entity,” you seem to be saying that the first cause is God’s act of creation, which seems to conflict. Acts are not entities. The act of creation is not an entity, although the Creator is an entity, and creation, ie. the sum of created entities, is an entity.)

Can you please clarify what do you mean with ‘sWp, p’, sKp and K’. They are not defined so I cannot follow.

As the parenthetical part of Ross’s quote states, ‘K’ means ‘knows that’ (‘W’ means ‘wills that’, but that is not quite relevant to our discusion since we are worried about omniscience and we are concerned with the logical structure of the claim). s is a variable for an arbitrary omniscient, omnipotent being, and p is a variable for an arbitrary proposition.

So s is omniscient means that for any contingent proposition p, sKp entails p (ie. necessarily, if s knows that p, then p). But what s is omniscient does not mean is that sKp implies necessarily p. It is necessarily true that s knowing p implies p, but it is not necessarily true that s knowing p implies that p is necessarily true. From which it follows that omniscience does not determine the truth values of contingent propositions, and is consistent with free will of created beings.

 

[Bahman]

So the main thing you are getting at with the term “cognitively open” is that it is understandable?

Understandable is very close but slightly ambiguous in given the full meaning unless we exactly say what do we mean with understandable. Being cognitively open to a system means that the necessary condition to understand a system is available but we might not understand the system unless we put effort and accumulate all the elements which is sufficient to understand the system. Being cognitively close means that we cannot possibly understand the system no matter how hard we try. As an example, fish is cognitively close to algebra but human not, but human does not understand algebra unless he put effort on understand it.

After having a definition of micro and macro we can ask the following question whether God performed full micro design at the time creation or not. That is what I meant with (5) premise, namely knowing the source of future agents’ actions at time of creation. Doing full micro design don’t leave any room for agents to act free leading to pure fatalism hence to grant freedom to agents a minimal level of micro design is needed. How? This is a question which bothers my mind as well and it is subject of discussion of other thread. Namely the act creation should be based on minimal number of counterfactuals and creation should be able to evolve independently and freely after time creation such that at the end we have creatures with free will. What are those counterfactuals? We should be close to them and that is another claim of another thread as well.

It seems like the “micro” level would not apply to God, who is immaterial and metaphysically simple.

That is an faith dogma and subject of discussion. I cannot understand a God metaphysically simple at the same time in charge all complicated thing which involves in sustaining the creation.

 

[Oreoracle]

So s is omniscient means that for any contingent proposition p, sKp entails p (ie. necessarily, if s knows that p, then p). But what s is omniscient does not mean is that sKp implies necessarily p. It is necessarily true that s knowing p implies p, but it is not necessarily true that s knowing p implies that p is necessarily true. From which it follows that omniscience does not determine the truth values of contingent propositions, and is consistent with free will of created beings.

Okay, so without the symbolic fluff, what you’re saying is that just because God knows of an event doesn’t mean that it would be logically contradictory to have a universe in which that event didn’t occur, correct? Well I could agree with that. If the universe is indeed deterministic, it is because of our laws of physics. Since the laws of physics of our universe aren’t necessary (or so we think), you are correct in asserting that future events could be different.

But if we take our laws of physics for granted and treat them as logical axioms, then clearly every future event is also logically necessary. But we do not have the power to change the laws of physics–only God could do so. So the free will is really his and his alone. Once God made up his mind to impose certain laws of physics, he effectively predetermined everything. That is what the average person means when they doubt free will.

 

[polytropos]

Understandable is very close but slightly ambiguous in given the full meaning unless we exactly say what do we mean with understandable. Being cognitively open to a system means that the necessary condition to understand a system is available but we might not understand the system unless we put effort and accumulate all the elements which is sufficient to understand the system. Being cognitively close means that we cannot possibly understand the system no matter how hard we try. As an example, fish is cognitively close to algebra but human not, but human does not understand algebra unless he put effort on understand it.

All right. I dispute, however, the requirement that we understand “all the elements” in order to understand the system. (Or, I dispute that “all the elements which is sufficient” should constitute a set of propositions governing every circumstance–less knowledge than that should be “sufficient” to understand a system.) The example of algebra makes this evident: one does not need to know solutions to all of the (infinite) algebra problems that could be contrived if they are to “understand” algebra.

If the difference between “understanding” and “cognitive openness” is that to be cognitively open one must understand, for example, all conceivable algebra problems, then I think “cognitive openness” becomes a meaningless term such that no humans are cognitively open to any system.

In short, I view knowing large sets of propositions as largely irrelevant to human cognition… and I think our experience shows this.

After having a definition of micro and macro we can ask the following question whether God performed full micro design at the time creation or not. That is what I meant with (5) premise, namely knowing the source of future agents’ actions at time of creation. Doing full micro design don’t leave any room for agents to act free leading to pure fatalism hence to grant freedom to agents a minimal level of micro design is needed. How? This is a question which bothers my mind as well and it is subject of discussion of other thread. Namely the act creation should be based on minimal number of counterfactuals and creation should be able to evolve independently and freely after time creation such that at the end we have creatures with free will. What are those counterfactuals? We should be close to them and that is another claim of another thread as well.

So… are you saying that in order for God to know what our free actions are (and, hence, to be omniscient), he would have to know the exact “micro” state of the universe at the beginning of time, so that he could “project” (omnisciently) what its future state would be when we came about, using some set of law-like propositions?

The issue I see is that that model of creation is a far cry from the Catholic understanding, in which creation was not an event that took 13.8 billion years ago, but is a “continuous” act of willing on God’s part, ie. we exist now because God is “still” creating. His omniscience stems from the facts that he is causally fundamental for all that is happening at all times. He does not create at some time in the past and then use a vast intellect to reason through what the future state of the universe will be; he doesn’t need to, since he will be sustaining the universe at every future point as well as the present.

That is an faith dogma and subject of discussion. I cannot understand a God metaphysically simple at the same time in charge all complicated thing which involves in sustaining the creation.

Well, metaphysical simplicity is one point, but I also said that God is immaterial, and it seems like any serious argument would have to concede that. But it’s hard to make sense of a “micro” and “macro” distinction for immaterial things.

 

[polytropos]

Okay, so without the symbolic fluff, what you’re saying is that just because God knows of an event doesn’t mean that it would be logically contradictory to have a universe in which that event didn’t occur, correct? Well I could agree with that. If the universe is indeed deterministic, it is because of our laws of physics. Since the laws of physics of our universe aren’t necessary (or so we think), you are correct in asserting that future events could be different.

I was making a basic point about what omniscience amounts to, since it is frequently asserted that there is a prima facie difficulty between God’s knowing what is the case and the case being freely determined (say, the case that ‘Oreoracle chooses x’).

But if we take our laws of physics for granted and treat them as logical axioms, then clearly every future event is also logically necessary. But we do not have the power to change the laws of physics–only God could do so. So the free will is really his and his alone. Once God made up his mind to impose certain laws of physics, he effectively predetermined everything. That is what the average person means when they doubt free will.

I don’t treat laws of physics as logical axioms. I’d hold that the laws of physics are ceteris paribus laws. They are rather general abstractions from relatively universal powers in the material world (where powers are just characteristic dispositions of the way that natural substances can act). So God does not create by designating his preferred laws of physics and applying them to a pile of matter. He creates substances that have characteristic powers, and we consequently make generalizations about the nature of those powers.

So I am willing to regard free will as a primitive power of human substances, based on my other commitments in philosophy of mind.

 

[Bahman]

All right. I dispute, however, the requirement that we understand “all the elements” in order to understand the system. (Or, I dispute that “all the elements which is sufficient” should constitute a set of propositions governing every circumstance–less knowledge than that should be “sufficient” to understand a system.) The example of algebra makes this evident: one does not need to know solutions to all of the (infinite) algebra problems that could be contrived if they are to “understand” algebra.

By elements I meant the set of axioms which are required as base for understanding the subject matter and solving problem.

If the difference between “understanding” and “cognitive openness” is that to be cognitively open one must understand, for example, all conceivable algebra problems, then I think “cognitive openness” becomes a meaningless term such that no humans are cognitively open to any system.

I don’t understand your argument here. We are able to understand any system that we are cognitively open to it.

In short, I view knowing large sets of propositions as largely irrelevant to human cognition… and I think our experience shows this.

Contrary, I think the prepositions are the basic foundation of human cognition.

So… are you saying that in order for God to know what our free actions are (and, hence, to be omniscient), he would have to know the exact “micro” state of the universe at the beginning of time, so that he could “project” (omnisciently) what its future state would be when we came about, using some set of law-like propositions?

Yes and no. To be clear I have remark a few points. First, what omniscience is we exactly don’t know because we are not omniscient. We are cognitively open to semantic hence we can build and understand prepositions which are base foundation of our cognition. Second, I would like to argue, that omniscience is different from semantic but is either equal or larger than semantic. We can claim that there is one to one mapping between omniscience and semantic if and only if omniscience is equal to semantic. In this case, I can argue that doing full micro design (in our language, namely semantic) is equal to pure fatalism hence the system has not longer any degree of freedom to act upon it. In another word, to grant freedom. one needs a set of minimal number prepositions (in our language) which are necessary for act creation in order to grant freedom to system. That is necessary condition. The sufficient condition is related to what all those prepositions are which unfortunately we are close to understand them.

The issue I see is that that model of creation is a far cry from the Catholic understanding, in which creation was not an event that took 13.8 billion years ago, but is a “continuous” act of willing on God’s part, ie. we exist now because God is “still” creating. His omniscience stems from the facts that he is causally fundamental for all that is happening at all times. He does not create at some time in the past and then use a vast intellect to reason through what the future state of the universe will be; he doesn’t need to, since he will be sustaining the universe at every future point as well as the present.

I do have another opinion for act creation which is different from what you mentioned. To my understanding the creation is continuous act along forms rather than time.

Well, metaphysical simplicity is one point, but I also said that God is immaterial, and it seems like any serious argument would have to concede that. But it’s hard to make sense of a “micro” and “macro” distinction for immaterial things.

This is slightly different topic, so lets leave it for another thread.

 

[balto]

I’ll give it a shot if you don’t mind.

1. God has omniscience
2. God is cognitively open to free will (since otherwise couldn’t create a being with free will)
3. God knows the decision we perform in a situation as a result being cognitively open to free will and situation, in another word God is cognitively open to creation
4. Creation was performed by first cause and God was cognitively open to first cause
5. We act and God was aware the source of each act in first cause since it was cognitively open to it
6. Free will is an illusion

This means if (6) is right (2) is wrong namely free will can not be real if omniscience is real since God cannot be cognitively open to illusion. In another word omniscience leads to pure fatalism since the source of each action was already known in first cause.

I agree with polytropos that 6 does not necessarily follow from 5. Could this be true: God causes us to have genuine free will (I think this is consistent with 1-4) and then our actions are caused completely by us through our free will (which satisfies 5 because God knows the source of our acts is free will), but 6 would be false because free will is real. If free will is false then something else is making it false. Keep in mind that God is timeless and is therefore present to every moment of the timeline. It’s not correct to say that God knows that I will perform X (from God’s point of view) because God is not in the timeline as a sort of seer or oracle. Instead, He knows that I am doing X because that moment, although in the future for me, is present to Him. That He knows that I am doing X in my future doesn’t mean that my doing X was caused by His knowledge and not my free will.

 

[Bahman]

I’ll give it a shot if you don’t mind.

I agree with polytropos that 6 does not necessarily follow from 5. Could this be true: God causes us to have genuine free will (I think this is consistent with 1-4) and then our actions are caused completely by us through our free will (which satisfies 5 because God knows the source of our acts is free will), but 6 would be false because free will is real. If free will is false then something else is making it false. Keep in mind that God is timeless and is therefore present to every moment of the timeline. It’s not correct to say that God knows that I will perform X (from God’s point of view) because God is not in the timeline as a sort of seer or oracle. Instead, He knows that I am doing X because that moment, although in the future for me, is present to Him. That He knows that I am doing X in my future doesn’t mean that my doing X was caused by His knowledge and not my free will.

(6) is the direct consequence of (5).

 

[balto]

(6) is the direct consequence of (5).

Maybe it’s just me, but I’m not seeing the step from 5 to 6. See here:

balto:

Could this be true: God causes us to have genuine free will (I think this is consistent with 1-4) and then our actions are caused completely by us through our free will (which satisfies 5 because God knows the source of our acts is free will), but 6 would be false because free will is real.

Maybe we have different understandings of free will. Human free will is not a solely a material process in my view. I don’t know if your understanding differs from that.

 

[polytropos]

By elements I meant the set of axioms which are required as base for understanding the subject matter and solving problem.

I don’t understand your argument here. We are able to understand any system that we are cognitively open to it.

Contrary, I think the prepositions are the basic foundation of human cognition.

The point I am making is not that knowledge is not propositional. I am saying that knowing a full set of counterfactuals describing my behavior is too strong of a criterion for being “cognitively open” to my free will. You say that by elements you mean “axioms.” I can sympathize with that to an extent. There might be, for instance, alternative “axioms” that “govern” my free will (which would seem to be the case if, say, free will is a largely primitive quality consequence of the process of intellection and not reducible to your “micro”).

Yes and no. To be clear I have remark a few points. First, what omniscience is we exactly don’t know because we are not omniscient.

Agreed, although I don’t think it could be said that we know nothing of omniscience.

We are cognitively open to semantic hence we can build and understand prepositions which are base foundation of our cognition.

I agree that we are open to semantics, which is the study of meaning of propositions. But I think your usage of the term below is problematic:

Second, I would like to argue, that omniscience is different from semantic but is either equal or larger than semantic.

Here, do you mean that omniscience does not consist in semantic content? What does it mean for something to be equal or larger than semantics? (How can omniscience be different than semantics and equal or largeer, ie. comparable to, semantics? What do you mean by “different”?)

We can claim that there is one to one mapping between omniscience and semantic if and only if omniscience is equal to semantic. In this case, I can argue that doing full micro design (in our language, namely semantic) is equal to pure fatalism hence the system has not longer any degree of freedom to act upon it. In another word, to grant freedom. one needs a set of minimal number prepositions (in our language) which are necessary for act creation in order to grant freedom to system. That is necessary condition. The sufficient condition is related to what all those prepositions are which unfortunately we are close to understand them.

This part of the argument is not clear to me. If we construe semantics as the study of meaning of propositions, then it seems to be a category mistake to speak of it being “equal” to omniscience. I also do not see how semantics and “full micro design” is “namely semantic,” so perhaps you are using the term in some other way.

 

[Bahman]

Maybe it’s just me, but I’m not seeing the step from 5 to 6. See here:

The main question is whether an action based on what we call free will is expressible in term of a set of counterfactuals? This is the main claim of (5) since by source we mean that an action can be explained in term of a set of counterfactuals. If this claim is true then free will is an illusion unless the set is infinite.

 

[Bahman]

The point I am making is not that knowledge is not propositional. I am saying that knowing a full set of counterfactuals describing my behavior is too strong of a criterion for being “cognitively open” to my free will.

I don’t understand what you are claiming here. Are you saying that we cannot find a full set of couterfactuals describing a behaviour since if this set exist hence we could be cognitively open to our action?

You say that by elements you mean “axioms.” I can sympathize with that to an extent. There might be, for instance, alternative “axioms” that “govern” my free will (which would seem to be the case if, say, free will is a largely primitive quality consequence of the process of intellection and not reducible to your “micro”).

That is exactly the question, namely what is the price we have to pay to explain irreducibility of free will in term of a set of counterfactuals? Does that mean that the set should be infinite? This is the trick we use to argue the existence of God when it comes to creation, namely arguing the existence something infinite to resolve the infinite regression in chain of causality. The problem which we have with free will seems to be same.

Here, do you mean that omniscience does not consist in semantic content? What does it mean for something to be equal or larger than semantics? (How can omniscience be different than semantics and equal or largeer, ie. comparable to, semantics? What do you mean by “different”?)

I meant if the omniscience can be explain in term of a set of preposition no matter how large, probably infinite. The existence of this set is important to us. In another word could God explain its knowledge in term of semantic or it is logically impossible?

This part of the argument is not clear to me. If we construe semantics as the study of meaning of propositions, then it seems to be a category mistake to speak of it being “equal” to omniscience. I also do not see how semantics and “full micro design” is “namely semantic,” so perhaps you are using the term in some other way.

You exactly catch my point. My first question is whether the set of prepositions, probably infinite, can exhaust omniscience? And the second question, whether the set of counterfacuals explaining a behaviour, probably infinite, can exhaust free will? If the answer to both question is yes then problem is solved namely omniscience does not lead to pure fatalism since the set of counterfacuals needed to explain free will is infinite.

 

[balto]

The main question is whether an action based on what we call free will is expressible in term of a set of counterfactuals? This is the main claim of (5) since by source we mean that an action can be explained in term of a set of counterfactuals. If this claim is true then free will is an illusion unless the set is infinite.

Are you making the claim that in order for free will to be meaningful, we need to understand the set of counterfactuals (which I take to mean every possible decision we didn’t make but could have made) in order to make an informed and free decision? But this set would be infinite so since we cannot comprehend an infinite set then our decisions are not free.

I think polytropos gave a satisfactory answer when he wrote this:

polytropos:

All right. I dispute, however, the requirement that we understand “all the elements” in order to understand the system. (Or, I dispute that “all the elements which is sufficient” should constitute a set of propositions governing every circumstance–less knowledge than that should be “sufficient” to understand a system.) The example of algebra makes this evident: one does not need to know solutions to all of the (infinite) algebra problems that could be contrived if they are to “understand” algebra.

The fact that we have the potential to understand any finite set of the infinite set of counterfactuals is sufficient for free will to be meaningful in my opinion. So I think we are at an impasse because we’re all using different definitions of free will.

 

[polytropos]

I don’t understand what you are claiming here. Are you saying that we cannot find a full set of couterfactuals describing a behaviour since if this set exist hence we could be cognitively open to our action?

I am saying that a full set of counterfactuals describing a person’s behavior should not be a necessary condition for cognitive openness to free will. (As I’ve indicated in other posts, I think that interpreting human action/free will in terms of counterfactuals is a limited approach.) When I look at a person in the process of making a decision, I can understand his freedom in terms other than a set of propositions governing all possible actions he could take.

That is exactly the question, namely what is the price we have to pay to explain irreducibility of free will in term of a set of counterfactuals? Does that mean that the set should be infinite?

Well, I don’t think free will is reducible to a set of counterfactuals, or that knowledge of a set is necessary (perhaps not even sufficient) for understanding of free will.

This is the trick we use to argue the existence of God when it comes to creation, namely arguing the existence something infinite to resolve the infinite regression in chain of causality. The problem which we have with free will seems to be same.

Not exactly. I would qualify:

• It is not “the existence of something infinite” per se that resolves an ungrounded causal chain, but the existence of something purely actual. It is true that pure actuality entails God’s infinitude, but it is the lack of potentiality that is the relevant aspect invoked in terminating such a causal chain.
• The reason we reach the conclusion that God exists has to do with the instrumental, essentially ordered nature of such series. I don’t see any instrumental relationship obtaining between separate counterfactuals that govern the actions of a free person.
  So I don’t think the analogy holds.

I meant if the omniscience can be explain in term of a set of preposition no matter how large, probably infinite. The existence of this set is important to us. In another word could God explain its knowledge in term of semantic or it is logically impossible?

I don’t think that God could explain his knowledge to us. Semantics are dialectical and rational “tools” that we use aid our own reasoning processes (and communication). God does not have need for such aids. I do not think we could necessarily reach a full understanding of omniscience semantically. (The other issue is that semantics is parasitic on our other conceptual knowledge. We do not have direct conceptual knowledge of God; our conceptual knowledge of God is mediated by reasoning and limited by analogy.)

You exactly catch my point. My first question is whether the set of prepositions, probably infinite, can exhaust omniscience? And the second question, whether the set of counterfacuals explaining a behaviour, probably infinite, can exhaust free will? If the answer to both question is yes then problem is solved namely omniscience does not lead to pure fatalism since the set of counterfacuals needed to explain free will is infinite.

As I point out in the other topic, it depends on how you are using “exhaust.” I do not believe that either omniscience or free will are constituted by sets of counterfactuals, so if that is what you mean, then I am inclined to answer “no,” to both questions. I don’t believe doing so entails fatalism, however, since I don’t think having some infinite set of counterfactuals is necessary for free will.

 

[Bahman]

Are you making the claim that in order for free will to be meaningful, we need to understand the set of counterfactuals (which I take to mean every possible decision we didn’t make but could have made) in order to make an informed and free decision? But this set would be infinite so since we cannot comprehend an infinite set then our decisions are not free.

I am making opposite claim, namely we are free if the set of counterfactual governing free will is infinite. In another word, a set of finite counterfactuals make an agent unfree since this set define the action of an agent in a situation hence the agent is not free. Undefinability granted by infinity grants freedom.

I think polytropos gave a satisfactory answer when he wrote this:

I don’t understand how this answer could apply when the set is infinite. Please read previous comment.

The fact that we have the potential to understand any finite set of the infinite set of counterfactuals is sufficient for free will to be meaningful in my opinion. So I think we are at an impasse because we’re all using different definitions of free will.

Can you define free will in term of a set of finite counterfacuals and set an agent free? What is your definition of free will?

 

[Bahman]

I am saying that a full set of counterfactuals describing a person’s behavior should not be a necessary condition for cognitive openness to free will. (As I’ve indicated in other posts, I think that interpreting human action/free will in terms of counterfactuals is a limited approach.) When I look at a person in the process of making a decision, I can understand his freedom in terms other than a set of propositions governing all possible actions he could take.

What I am saying is that if the set of counterfacuals is finite we can be cognitively open to a concept but free will is an illusion if the set of couterfactuals defining it is finite. Why? Because it exist a set Q which leads to P for each state in q it exists a definable state p which completely define the action of an agent governed with this set. This define the behaviour the agent under any given situation hence the agent is not free.

Well, I don’t think free will is reducible to a set of counterfactuals, or that knowledge of a set is necessary (perhaps not even sufficient) for understanding of free will.

There is no way to resolve this problem other way around. Any state of affair in nature call it X goes to another state affair Y as result of governing a system of laws that can be explained semantically in term of a set of counterfacuals. We cannot even think of a lawless nature unless you claim otherwise. Can we agree on this? In another hand any state of affair in nature should be explicable in term of a set of prepositions unless you claim that any state of affair in nature is not reducible in term of a set of prepositions, but there is no room left for free will if we accept later claim. Can we agree on this?

I don’t think that God could explain his knowledge to us. Semantics are dialectical and rational “tools” that we use aid our own reasoning processes (and communication). God does not have need for such aids. I do not think we could necessarily reach a full understanding of omniscience semantically. (The other issue is that semantics is parasitic on our other conceptual knowledge. We do not have direct conceptual knowledge of God; our conceptual knowledge of God is mediated by reasoning and limited by analogy.)

Oppositely I think God should be able to explain its knowledge in term of semantic otherwise omniscience is not complete.

As I point out in the other topic, it depends on how you are using “exhaust.” I do not believe that either omniscience or free will are constituted by sets of counterfactuals, so if that is what you mean, then I am inclined to answer “no,” to both questions. I don’t believe doing so entails fatalism, however, since I don’t think having some infinite set of counterfactuals is necessary for free will.

First, I believe that the only door we have to understand free will and omniscience is through semantic, second, God’s omniscience is not complete if God could not explain omniscience in term of semantic hence the only way to escape pure fatalism is to accept that the sets of prepositions needed to explain free will and omniscience have to be infinite.

 

[balto]

I am making opposite claim, namely we are free if the set of counterfactual governing free will is infinite. In another word, a set of finite counterfactuals make an agent unfree since this set define the action of an agent in a situation hence the agent is not free. Undefinability granted by infinity grants freedom.

This is what I thought your view was. I apologize, I must have worded my response poorly.

I don’t understand how this answer could apply when the set is infinite. Please read previous comment.

Can you define free will in term of a set of finite counterfacuals and set an agent free? What is your definition of free will?

Yes, I think you can and here’s why. It is not the case that I am given a pre-defined finite set of options whenever I make a decision. That’s the way a robot would presumably function. Rather, I can determine what is in the set and how large the set is myself by my choosing to understand what options are available to me. Although the set is still finite, it was freely determined by me and could have potentially contained any of the options available in the infinite set covering all possible decisions. Does this make sense?

I think the algebra example given by polytropos is a good analogy. I only need to understand a finite set of algebra problems in order to understand algebra. I understand algebra if I have the potential to answer any conceivable algebra problem. However I get to choose which algebra problems I will work out and put in my “finite algebra set.”

Here’s another example to illustrate the point. I would say that I am a free speaker of the English language. Over the years I have accumulated a finite set of English sentences from which I have abstracted the meaning of words and conventions of English sentence structure and syntax. Using these understandings I am able to formulate any meaningful English sentence of my choosing. It is not the case that every time I decide to speak I am doing a search on an infinite database of sentences and finding the one I want, which is obviously impossible.