P
polytropos
Guest
I believe you are underspecifying the problem. You need to articulate what the counterfactuals in your analysis look like. In my opinion, the bolded statement is not necessarily the case (if free will is a primitive/irreducible property of human beings). Here are some of the problems with what I take to be your analysis (I have to make some assumptions here).What I am saying is that if the set of counterfacuals is finite we can be cognitively open to a concept but free will is an illusion if the set of couterfactuals defining it is finite. Why? Because it exist a set Q which leads to P for each state in q it exists a definable state p which completely define the action of an agent governed with this set. This define the behaviour the agent under any given situation hence the agent is not free.
A counterfactual is a conditional of the form “if p, then q” where the antecedent p is some state of affairs, and the consequent q is some action on the part of an agent. You are saying that if the set of counterfactuals governing a decision in some circumstance is finite, then free will is an illusion. (By this, I suppose you mean that we are not genuinely free, but we believe that we are free.)
But let us apply this model to an actual decision: I am in the store and I am thinking about buying a red t-shirt or a green t-shirt. There are two possible courses of action here, depending on which shirt I choose to buy (perhaps we could let a third be that I buy no t-shirt at all). Let these options, respectively, be q1, q2, q3. What you seem to be arguing is that if my decision is governed by a finite set of counterfactual, then I am not free. I have a few contentions:
(1) It does not seem that the number of counterfactuals would have anything to do with whether or not I am free. If there are just 3 counterfactuals (one for each possibility), then I would not be free (assuming they are of the form “if p1, then q1”, “if p2, then q2”, “if p3, then q3”). In such a case my actions are completely determined by the state of affairs. But we could obviously let the number of counterfactuals go to infinity and I remain unfree (assuming the counterfactuals remain of the same form), for assume that there are counterfactuals “if p1, then q1”, “if p2, then q2”, “if p3, then q3”, “if p4, then q3”, “if p5, then q3”,… In short, assume that there q3 is realizable by an infinite number of states of affairs. That in itself would not change the fact that my actions are determined.
(2) To abbreviate the above point, the reason free will would be an illusion has nothing to do with the quantity of counterfactuals, but with their form.
(3) I do not believe that another possibility is ruled out. There might be a counterfactual “if p1, then (q1 or q2 or q3)” in which free will is preserved, because the assumption that the counterfactuals need to completely govern the action of the agent is false. I think that our intuitions about the nature of decision making favor this sort of analysis.
(4) There also seems to be a projection of the logic of counterfactual possibilities onto the metaphysics of decision making. Take the first case above in (1) where we just have three basic counterfactuals of the form “if p1, then q1”. p1, p2, and p3 are mutually exclusive, ie. they are inconsistent states of affairs (under the assumption that the person can only choose one of q1, q2, q3), and so cannot all be true. That is to say, they occur in separate possible worlds. To say that there are counterfactuals describing my actions in all possible worlds is not to establish that the consequents are determined by the antecedents. (“If I win the lottery, I would donate some money to charity” seems to be a true counterfactual. But would not follow that my donating the money to charity is determined by winning the lottery.)
(5) There is also the more technical issue that there does not exist a satisfying analysis for counterfactuals.
It seems to me like the analysis runs into several problems.Any state of affair in nature call it X goes to another state affair Y as result of governing a system of laws that can be explained semantically in term of a set of counterfacuals. We cannot even think of a lawless nature unless you claim otherwise. Can we agree on this?
I believe that one could of course describe what has happened or could happen with a set of propositions, but as I’ve laid out above, I see few reasons for believing that that has substantial implications for free will.In another hand any state of affair in nature should be explicable in term of a set of prepositions unless you claim that any state of affair in nature is not reducible in term of a set of prepositions, but there is no room left for free will if we accept later claim. Can we agree on this?
But the limitation is on our side and the fact that humans are the ones who have developed semantics. Semantics, as a human creation, are inadequate, not God’s omniscience.Oppositely I think God should be able to explain its knowledge in term of semantic otherwise omniscience is not complete.
(I believe we can have a limited understanding of omniscience, even on our own. So I naturally believe that God could convey an understanding of omniscience to us which is even less limited. But I do not think we can fully understand omniscience, full stop.)
I think when we reason about free will and omniscience we are using semantics. But as I’ve argued, it seems to me like it is wrong to say that the semantics needed to understand free will and omniscience involve large sets of counterfactuals.First, I believe that the only door we have to understand free will and omniscience is through semantic,