P
Perplexity
Guest
I want to outline some reasons for thinking that Jesus probably did not rise from the dead.
So, when someone proposes a piece of information as evidence for some position, what are they doing? Or, rather, what are they intending to do? Well, simply put, they’re trying to raise the amount of confidence that the position is true than was there prior to considering the information. This is how evidence is able to be good or bad. Good evidence (whether a single piece of information, or a collection) raises our confidence in a position (or its negation) to at least belief. If it manages to do this, we call it ‘persuasive’ or ‘convincing’. That’s what I’m interested in. Should the information that apologists present as evidence for the resurrection do this? Should it move us to belief? If not, we may rest content to say Jesus probably did not resurrect.
Before assessing the evidential force of this information, we need to get clear on what the information is.
More often than not, apologists present something like the following two pieces of information as evidence that Jesus resurrected:
I’ll examine each in turn.
1:
What if we conceded 1? How would doing such raise our confidence in the position that Jesus resurrected?
Well, the idea here is basically that the rational thing to do is to take their experiences as veridical. That is, we shouldn’t understand their experiences as hallucinations, delusions, or anything else that would mean the object of their experiences wasn’t really the resurrected Jesus.
To motivate this, apologists like to go over how astronomically improbable it is that a group of people, over a succession of time and in different places should have the same hallucination. Think about it, it’d be like 10 people all falling asleep and having the exact same dream, successively! We’d probably consider that a miracle since dreams (and hallucination) are entirely private things, not shared by others like this. They have similar arguments against delusions as well. Let’s just concede these points.
Having discounted the other available options, the apologist at this point would be happy to conclude that their experiences were veridical. But, the reality is, the claim that their experiences were veridical is no less improbable than that they weren’t.
Typically, when someone says they see dead people, what they’re saying is false. This is entirely apart from how sincerely they believe this. There is no good a priori reason to treat the apostle’s claims differently. They’re claiming they saw a dead person (albeit resurrected, not that this makes their claim any more plausible) talking to them, walking around and eating food etc.
The apologists are asking us to think this is significantly more likely than that they hallucinated or were deluded etc.
If someone told you they saw, talked with, and ate with a relative of theirs whom you both knew had recently died, you’d sooner think they weren’t coping with their grief healthily or some such than that they really did this. You’d need a lot more evidence than their testimony to believe them. And this brief example would provide you with much stronger testimony than we have for the 1. Other than Paul, there were no contemporary eyewitnesses to the “post-resurrection” appearances of Jesus, in all the other cases of post-resurrection appearances we have at best second- or perhaps third-hand reports of what eyewitnesses claimed to see, recorded decades after the crucifixion.
So, my conclusion is that if we grant 1, we’re committed to some highly implausible thesis, be that hallucination, delusion, or veridicality. Therefore, we shouldn’t grant that they had these experiences until we have good reason to independent of their testimony.
How about 2?
2:
I think the same kind of reasoning applies. What are we committed to if we grant 2? Well, we’d have to say either Jesus’ body was stolen, relocated by pious Jews, that Jesus didn’t actually die, that the apostles staged a hoax, that his followers went to the wrong tomb, or that he really resurrected (there are other options).
As the apologists have amply demonstrated, the other options to resurrection will not do here. They’re not good explanations for why the tomb was discovered empty at all. But, is resurrection really all that better? No. Typically, when someone claims God has intervened in some law-suspending manner, their claims are false, quite apart from their sincerity. So, there is an immense initial improbability attached to the claim that God intervened in a law-suspending manner here in resurrecting Jesus. (Note, if miracles weren’t so rare, they wouldn’t be miracles)
So, look at what you have to commit to if you concede 2. It’s crazy to me, I can’t accept any of these options, yet at least. So, I shouldn’t concede 2.
You should agree with me on my conclusions about 1 and 2 unless you have independent reason to think otherwise. But, that just bolsters my point. 1 and 2 do not constitute good evidence for the resurrection.
So, when someone proposes a piece of information as evidence for some position, what are they doing? Or, rather, what are they intending to do? Well, simply put, they’re trying to raise the amount of confidence that the position is true than was there prior to considering the information. This is how evidence is able to be good or bad. Good evidence (whether a single piece of information, or a collection) raises our confidence in a position (or its negation) to at least belief. If it manages to do this, we call it ‘persuasive’ or ‘convincing’. That’s what I’m interested in. Should the information that apologists present as evidence for the resurrection do this? Should it move us to belief? If not, we may rest content to say Jesus probably did not resurrect.
Before assessing the evidential force of this information, we need to get clear on what the information is.
More often than not, apologists present something like the following two pieces of information as evidence that Jesus resurrected:
- Jesus’ apostles, individually and collectively, had experiences which they took to be perceptions of the resurrected Jesus.
- Jesus’ tomb was discovered empty by his (women) followers shortly after his burial therein.
I’ll examine each in turn.
1:
What if we conceded 1? How would doing such raise our confidence in the position that Jesus resurrected?
Well, the idea here is basically that the rational thing to do is to take their experiences as veridical. That is, we shouldn’t understand their experiences as hallucinations, delusions, or anything else that would mean the object of their experiences wasn’t really the resurrected Jesus.
To motivate this, apologists like to go over how astronomically improbable it is that a group of people, over a succession of time and in different places should have the same hallucination. Think about it, it’d be like 10 people all falling asleep and having the exact same dream, successively! We’d probably consider that a miracle since dreams (and hallucination) are entirely private things, not shared by others like this. They have similar arguments against delusions as well. Let’s just concede these points.
Having discounted the other available options, the apologist at this point would be happy to conclude that their experiences were veridical. But, the reality is, the claim that their experiences were veridical is no less improbable than that they weren’t.
Typically, when someone says they see dead people, what they’re saying is false. This is entirely apart from how sincerely they believe this. There is no good a priori reason to treat the apostle’s claims differently. They’re claiming they saw a dead person (albeit resurrected, not that this makes their claim any more plausible) talking to them, walking around and eating food etc.
The apologists are asking us to think this is significantly more likely than that they hallucinated or were deluded etc.
If someone told you they saw, talked with, and ate with a relative of theirs whom you both knew had recently died, you’d sooner think they weren’t coping with their grief healthily or some such than that they really did this. You’d need a lot more evidence than their testimony to believe them. And this brief example would provide you with much stronger testimony than we have for the 1. Other than Paul, there were no contemporary eyewitnesses to the “post-resurrection” appearances of Jesus, in all the other cases of post-resurrection appearances we have at best second- or perhaps third-hand reports of what eyewitnesses claimed to see, recorded decades after the crucifixion.
So, my conclusion is that if we grant 1, we’re committed to some highly implausible thesis, be that hallucination, delusion, or veridicality. Therefore, we shouldn’t grant that they had these experiences until we have good reason to independent of their testimony.
How about 2?
2:
I think the same kind of reasoning applies. What are we committed to if we grant 2? Well, we’d have to say either Jesus’ body was stolen, relocated by pious Jews, that Jesus didn’t actually die, that the apostles staged a hoax, that his followers went to the wrong tomb, or that he really resurrected (there are other options).
As the apologists have amply demonstrated, the other options to resurrection will not do here. They’re not good explanations for why the tomb was discovered empty at all. But, is resurrection really all that better? No. Typically, when someone claims God has intervened in some law-suspending manner, their claims are false, quite apart from their sincerity. So, there is an immense initial improbability attached to the claim that God intervened in a law-suspending manner here in resurrecting Jesus. (Note, if miracles weren’t so rare, they wouldn’t be miracles)
So, look at what you have to commit to if you concede 2. It’s crazy to me, I can’t accept any of these options, yet at least. So, I shouldn’t concede 2.
You should agree with me on my conclusions about 1 and 2 unless you have independent reason to think otherwise. But, that just bolsters my point. 1 and 2 do not constitute good evidence for the resurrection.