And since polytropos says the argument doesn’t prove its unmoved mover is the creator of the universe, it appears to hold out the possibility that God is created by the unmoved mover and then goes on to create the universe! Or I guess the unmoved mover could create a whole pantheon of gods which go on to create the universe between them. As long as there’s only one unmoved mover, the argument doesn’t appear to rule out a whole range of options.
This is true. The argument proves that the Unmoved Mover is metaphysically ultimate. So in that sense, it does not rule out the
existence of Zeus, Hera, Thor, or any other “lesser god.” It would just mean that, even if they do exist, the Unmoved Mover still has existed eternally, unchangingly, and as the cause of any change.
I would identify the Unmoved Mover with the God revealed by the Judeo-Christian tradition because they share many qualities. If the Unmoved Mover is distinct from and created the Judeo-Christian God, it would mean that the Judeo-Christian God was lying when He said His name was “I AM HE WHO IS,” since such a name could only be attributed to a being identical to the Unmoved Mover, which is Pure Act.
This contradicts both the argument and the real world, casual sequences are not simultaneous: “Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it.”
I clarified this in post #78, (I think) before we even started debating. Somewhere in the course of our debate, I also referred you to that post, and you did not respond to it.
So the relevant distinction is between
per se and
per accidens causal series. I have used the term
per se causal series multiple times. This would only seem to demonstrate further that you don’t know how the argument actually goes because you read the text of the First Way out of the context of Aquinas’s metaphysics, which you take to be obviously wrong even though (as you demonstrate right here) you are not aware of what he argues.
Not to mention, the part of the argument that you’ve quoted doesn’t even dispute what I am saying. When I hold fire to wood and the wood burns, the burning of the wood is simultaneous to the fire’s action on it. When I throw a baseball at a window, the window’s breaking is simultaneous to the ball’s hitting it.
The whole discussion about whether the argument relies on the beginning of the universe in time was resolved by reference to simultaneous causal series.
This contradicts the argument, which says a mover puts another in motion, not that it sustains it: “whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another. If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs be put in motion by another, and that by another again.”
The quoted portion could be stated (for modern eyes): “whatever is changing must be changed by another. If that by which it is changed be itself changed, then this also must needs be changed by another, and that by another again.” Where, of course, change refers to a reduction from potency to act by something else in act.
So based on that, any change which is happening must be continually sustained by the Unmoved Mover
while it is changing. So whatever is put in motion is moved by another. But it must also be moved by another so long as it is in motion.
“Immaterial” rolls easily off the tongue but it’s supposed to be a rational argument, and any argument can be made to work by inventing an invisible undetectable magic genie. Also, if we allow such things in logic, there seems no reason why the thing moved could not also be immaterial, and what it moves and so on, so that the material world is then just a kind of pollution left behind at the end of the chain that never had it in mind

. Once you discard one rule of logic you cannot complain when further rules are discarded.
We seem to be sliding backwards here, since we covered why the argument would lead to an immaterial Unmoved Mover
waaay earlier. The argument shows that there must be a first mover to a
per se causal series (in which all causal power of secondary movers is derived and simultaneous). Because it is the first mover, it cannot be moved by another (otherwise it would not be the first mover, and would have only derived causal power as well). Since it is not moved by another, it does not move, so it must be an Unmoved Mover. This is only possible if it is
purely actual. Since any material thing could move/change, that which is Pure Act must be immaterial.
No rules of logic have been discarded. There is no invisible undetectable magic genie (unless you just rename the Unmoved Mover to be that).
But if the argument does not prove the unmoved mover is the creator, it’s pure assumption to connect it with God.
Let us reflect on what it would mean for a claim to be
pure assumption. That would surely mean
nothing but assumption. That would mean I would need to have no basis for associating the Unmoved Mover with the God of revelation. But it would seem that every quality which the Unmoved Mover of necessity shares with the God of revelation would give us more of a basis for associating it with the God of revelation. So to claim it is
pure assumption seems to be flatly wrong.
Now, if we had absolutely no metaphysical, philosophical reasons to believe that a being like the God of revelations existed… then maybe believing in the God of revelation would be closer to pure assumption.