Aquinas recognizes that God is not a genus because he concludes that God is identical to the act of existence. The act of existence is not a genus regardless of the question of God.
Being or existence is not a genus, that is why it is said of everything that exists analogically, as Thomas demonstrates. So your objection does not hold.
No it does not. When we say that created things exist, one cannot rationally say that they are species or kinds of the act of existence.
And I do not say that and neither does Thomas. Creatures are beings which
have existence, they are never identified as
existence
Neither can one say that they are identical to the act of existence since their nature is something distinct from the act of existence which is evident in the fact that their natures begin to exist.
Indeed, that is what I and Thomas have insisted upon. Neither ever said anything contrary.
Therefore the act of existence as it relates to creature is clearly a thing in and of itself and is identical to itself regardless of whats participating in it.
Yes, their act of existence is distinct from their Natures but is conjoined to their Natures in such a way that it has no reality unless so conjoined. But their act of existence is not identicle with their substance for it suffusses their entire essence - their nature and matter, if any.
Thats why we can only use the word existence analogically in reference to creatures. And if we use the term being analogically in reference to both God and creatures it does not and cannot rationally mean that God is not identical to the act of existence and is thus attributed to him analogical, but rather it is to understand that God and creatures are analogical in reference to each other in how they exist; and calling them both beings is simply a way of simplifying a complicated matter since they are both “being” in some sense, just not in the same respect.
You are confused here. We say being and existence by the analogy of proportionate attribution ( I’m impressed that you knew this ) of both God and creatures. And by this we mean that God is Pure Existence and creatures are beings which
have existence. So creatures are not identical to their existence but are beings which have existence.
Regardless; it makes no sense to say that the act of existence begins to be what it is intrinsically, which is precisely why it is irrational to divide it ontologically.
On the contrary, it is most appropriate. It is how we distinguish God from His creatures. And we have not divided creatures ontologically, we, in fact, insist that the act of existence, while distinct from the essence of a creature, is composed with it so as to make a being or substance that exists.
The act of existence does not begin to be a car or a house or a child or a hippo; such uses of the idea of existence as you presented it are clearly irrational for reasons i have already presented and you have ignored with your infallible senses.
And I never said it meant existence was a car or a house or any other creature. I have always said it is what makes a created essence an actual being or substance, it makes its
what a
this or a
that.
… Nowhere does Aquinas mention this elusive esoteric “esse” that is according to you and prodigalson not actual in itself but is that which gives actuality and yet requires God to give esse actuality. That is pure nonsense.
And there you are wrong. First of all he clearly says that God is Pure Existence ( Purus Esse Subsistens ) S.T., Part 1, ques 3, art 1, on God’s simplicity. God, Who is Pure Existence definitely exists.
And in S.T., Part 1, Ques 45, " I Respond…, " Thomas says, " Illi enim proprie convenit esse quod habet esse, et quod es subsistnes in suo esse. " " For that is properly known as a being which has existence and which subsists in its own existence. He is speaking here of created beings. So if it
has existence, its existence does not exist alone. And it is clearly the act which makes creatures actual.
And I have already shown you above ( post # 317 above ), " In order to make this point clear… Now the first of all effects is being, which is presupposed to all other effects, and does not presuppose any other effect: wherefore to give being as such must be the effect of the first cause alone by its own power…"
( Disputed Questions on the Power of God, Q III, Art IV, Is the Creative Power or Act Communicable to a Creature?
dhspriory.org/thomas/QDdePotentia.htm#1:1
You can of course reject Thomas’ thinking, or mine, on any of this ( which you have ). But I think people who are able to comprehend the arguments will agree with Thomas.
Linus2nd