One final time: freedom of will does NOT logically lead to evil actions

[Spock]

I’m not sure what your point is. If you can show me how naïve PAP gives a solution to this scenario whereas the locus of causal control does not, then I will respond. It doesn’t appear to me that you’ve shown any such thing. The persons’ actions are being controlled by outside forces, so we would say that they are not exercising free will.

Are they really “controlled”? In my opinion, they are. Our ability to act is always curtailed by physical and psychological boundaries. The persons in those scenarios have no free will – by the PAP definition.

By the “locus of control” they may or may not, depending on what “control” means. The woman to be raped does have control, to “give in and enjoy” (just like Mary Jones, who has full control to commit the murder), but she has no control to avoid the act (just like Mary Jones, who has no control over changing her mind). Suppose that originally she has consented to the sexual act, and then changed her mind. If she is not allowed to change her mind, then the sex will be consensual, even if she does not want it any more. But that is not how we see it. By both common sense, and by the law, she is being raped.

The man subject to threat does have the control to go along with the demand, and also has control to refuse (at least physically) but the “price is just too high”. By your definition “locus of control” he has total freedom to do either one. By mine, he does not, since he lacks the control to avoid both “horns” of the dilemma.

It is contingently possible. You may not understand this, but it is well accepted in possible worlds analysis. Furthermore, there are people here who obviously do understand (Prodigal Son). You need to do some further research into contingently true and necessarily true propositions.

All propositions are contingent in one respect: namely that there must be someone who formulates the proposition. Propositions do not exist “on their own”. Some propositions will be always true, no matter what world they are applied to, like the “there can be no married bachelors”. I find it rather interesting that all such propositions are trivial.

Apparently the entire argument comes down to God is omniscient, therefore, nobody can do otherwise. That is silly.

Is it? I don’t think so. But, for the purposes of this discussion I stipulated that

1. God has omniscience in the traditional sense (knowing the past, present and future),
2. that God’s omniscience does not curtail our freedom of will (the definition of this is the current source of disagreement),
3. that God is omnipotent (in the sense that he can create any world which does not contain nor lead to a logical contradiction),
4. that God is omnibenevolent (that is God prefers moral over immoral acts) and
5. therefore God can create a world without evil, while allowing each being to act morally or immorally as they wish – but it just so happens that none of them wishes to act immorally (W4).

 

[Spock]

Don’t worry about it! You have been so accommodating with my time constraints. Have a great time with your grandson.

Thank you. I had a wonderful time with the little bugger… Of course I am “objective” (as any granddad would be), but he is one smart little fellow… and cute as a button (I never understood, what is so cute about a button. )

 

[JDaniel]

That leads to a logical contradiction. To say that the future does not exist for us, but it exists for God is logically contradictory. **Knowledge **about an event is contingent upon the observer; the **existence **of the event is not. Something either exists, or it does not.

Spockmeister:

I guess that you would consider anyone who uses the future perfect tense to be quite illogical, too? If a person says, I am arriving at the airport at 10:30 AM, and the plane will have already left. If God is, as we believe, outside of natural time, then the reality of the above is no problem and is quite logical. How do we know it’s logical? Because it happens every day, we intuit that it will happen again today, the tense is used by us quite often, and it has language rules.

By the same token, you might argue that God is outside our space (or totally spaceless) and that would enable God to occupy the spot which is to the north from the North Pole. I hope you agree that this would be nonsensical.

Of all the people who have left this absurd and childish analogy behind, I would have thought that you would, by now. Its’ stupidity is based upon nothing else but that it is a straw man. You, of all of the anti-theists debating herein debase yourself when you bring up something like this. At least think of something new!

 

[fhansen]

As far as I am concerned, yes. But it is the assumption that God’s foreknowledge allows freedom of actions.

To me the question comes down to whether or not the combination of creation + a brain + free will isn’t an automatic recipe for the fall. If so, then Gods’ decision would be whether or not to create such a combination at all-rather than deciding between the possible worlds you outlined- because W4 would present a logical contradiction.

Then our response is really whether or not we prefer existence-even in a world like this-to non-existence.

 

[Spock]

Spockmeister:

I guess that you would consider anyone who uses the future perfect tense to be quite illogical, too? If a person says, I am arriving at the airport at 10:30 AM, and the plane will have already left. If God is, as we believe, outside of natural time, then the reality of the above is no problem and is quite logical. How do we know it’s logical? Because it happens every day, we intuit that it will happen again today, the tense is used by us quite often, and it has language rules.

We must differentiate between “intuiting” something from having actual knowledge about the subject. Using your example: “the plane will have left” is only a very strong probabilty, not something one actually knows. After all the pilot of the plane might have found a problem, and then the departure time will be postponed. The very strong probability of something happening is not the same as having already happened. Do you agree that the difference is significant? The everyday language does make such fine distinction. But here we are dealing with concepts and their actual meanings.

We can develop all sorts of hypothetical scenarios. When you observe two cars on a head-on collision course, as long as the drivers have time to swerve, the collision is not certain. Even, when the two vehicles are so close that avoidance is impossible, we still cannot be certain that the collision will happen. It is extremely unlikely, but not impossible that some space alien craft will intervene and lift one into the air, to allow the other one to go on. Yes, the probability is next to zero, but it is not zero.

Only when the freedom of any other possibilities disappears, can we talk about “knowledge”. Knowledge, as information about something is impossible as long as any freedom still remains. It can be a very strong probability that the “foreseen” event will occur, but that probability is still less than one.

To “foresee” an event is not the same as having “foreknowledge” of it. And God’s existence outside our time does not help. As long as the event is “up in the air” (so to speak) it did not happen yet. To say that the event did not happen from our point of view, but it already happened from God’s point of view is simply a logical contradiction.

 

[Spock]

To me the question comes down to whether or not the combination of creation + a brain + free will isn’t an automatic recipe for the fall.

That is the point of this thread.

If so, then Gods’ decision would be whether or not to create such a combination at all-rather than deciding between the possible worlds you outlined- because W4 would present a logical contradiction.

The “If so” is the cruical question. If it is the case, then there would not be even one human who would not commit some actual atrocities.

Then our response is really whether or not we prefer existence-even in a world like this-to non-existence.

Most of us would wish to live if given the option and the information about our future existence. Assuredly some would not. But we are not given the option to exercise any kind of “free will” before we are conceived, and even if we were, there would be no information on which we could base a decision.

 

[fhansen]

Most of us would wish to live if given the option and the information about our future existence. Assuredly some would not. But we are not given the option to exercise any kind of “free will” before we are conceived, and even if we were, there would be no information on which we could base a decision.

That’s not the question. The question is whether or not we would agree with God that the world we find ourselves in-this world-is worth it.

 

[fhansen]

The “If so” is the cruical question. If it is the case, then there would not be even one human who would not commit some actual atrocities.

According to Catholic theology, for Adam and Eve the decision came down to a conscious choice of whether or not to disobey-or act outside of-the will of God. For the rest of us, according to this teaching, mankind is already outside of the will of God and must consciously decide whether or not to renter it. There are many ways to identify this separation-sin (defined as the more obvious immoral acts) being one of them. But again according to Catholic teaching, anything out of sync with or inconsistent with love of God, self, or neighbor, is sin because man was made to love while having the freedom to reject it as being the highest or most valuable good. This is summed up by the Sermon on the Mount, Jesus stating that mans’ heart, let alone his actions, is already in the wrong place. Looked at this way it may be easier to see why one could conclude that all might fall short of perfection. The question becomes, “is there anything inherently off-based/broken/different from originally intended, with man?” That evil exists, to my mind, is irrefutable. That it makes no sense-that the evil people commit is beyond reason, or should not be-is also true IMO.

 

[davidv]

To all participants: thanks for the interesting comments. I did not neglect the thread, but I have the wonderful opportunity to spend a lot of time with my grandson, and thus little time to participate. Nevertheless, I am composing the replies off-line, whenever I can, and will duly post them when they are complete. I can foresee a lot of interesting conversations.

Just one point to chew on in my absence: the concept of foreknowledge came up. Usually philosophers define knowledge as “true belief”, or “justified true belief”. This definition is lacking one important part: “belief about what”? I define “knowledge” as “correct information about something (an object or event)”. To say that one may have information about something that does not exist (“a non-existent book, which was never written and will never be written because the author was never born”) is as absurd as they come. To have information about something presupposes that the object exists (or existed and the information about it was gathered and preserved) or the event occurred. Since the future does not “exist” in any sense of the word, information about it is impossible. Therefore “foreknowledge” is exactly as nonsensical as describing the geographical point which resides to the north from the North Pole. Think about it! This may be a great topic for a new thread, once this one is concluded.

Are ideas and concepts “objects” in this revised definition?

 

[Sarpedon]

namely that God is not omniscient in the traditional sense.

I think it has been pretty well established in the Catholic intellectual tradition that God does not have unlimited omnipotence (i.,e. no square triangles).

So, would you consider your original argument an argument against the validity of the Catholic faith?

 

[Spock]

That’s not the question. The question is whether or not we would agree with God that the world we find ourselves in-this world-is worth it.

That question cannot be decided in general. Everyone must decide it for himself. But the real question is something different: “is this world as good as it can be?”. Is is impossible even for God (whose powers are beyond our wildest imagination) to create something that is better - in the sense that there is less evil or no evil in it? That is the true question of this thread. Why settle for something sub-optimal, if a better one is possible to achieve?

 

[Spock]

Are ideas and concepts “objects” in this revised definition?

What do you have in mind? Please elaborate.

 

[fhansen]

That question cannot be decided in general. Everyone must decide it for himself. But the real question is something different: “is this world as good as it can be?”. Is is impossible even for God (whose powers are beyond our wildest imagination) to create something that is better - in the sense that there is less evil or no evil in it? That is the true question of this thread. Why settle for something sub-optimal, if a better one is possible to achieve?

Unless this world is the best possible for the purposes of a creator with perfect wisdom.

 

[Spock]

I think it has been pretty well established in the Catholic intellectual tradition that God does not have unlimited omnipotence (i.,e. no square triangles).

Agreed. But by “traditional” view I meant that omnipotence is supposed to have the power to create anything that does not contain nor lead to a logical contradiction.

So, would you consider your original argument an argument against the validity of the Catholic faith?

I don’t know what the RCC teaches about the question whether this is the “best possible” world. “Best possible” means that it does not have evil if it can be avoided.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

Hi Spock,

I am apparently bordering on mathematically illiterate – I thought I had had a very interesting insight, but I do believe I simply failed to comprehend your statement of the situation. Here it is, one more time:

We do not know what the actual agents will do. We do not have to know it. As long as free will means to have at least two available options, and it is the agent who makes the decision, it is mathematically certain that for any “n” (the overall number of morally singificant decisions) and for any “k” (the number of immoral outcomes) where “k” goes from “0” to “n” we can find a possible world where exactly “k” immoral (and thus “n - k” moral) decisons will be made.

Yes, the actual outcome one specific “experiment” is unknown (for us, but not unknown for God) until the decisions are actually made. But we know that one of the outcomes must be true. There will be either 0, or 1, or 2, or 3, or… “n” immoral decisions. Now can we rule out any one these outcomes? For example can we ascertain that exactly “103” immoral decisons are possible, but “104” immoral decisons are not? (I just made up these numbers.) On what ground? All those numbers are identical.

But I will take another stab here. You say that we do not need to know what the actual agents will do, but I can think of manifold situations where we would need to know such a thing. Consider an infinite number of human beings, who have just been created and are fully rational, given a free choice of either a) eating a tasty sandwich, or b) being eaten by ravenous lions. No rational person would ever choose option b, I’m sure you would agree.

This is not like our present situation, you will say. But that is not a mathematical observation. You think you know certain facts about the what decisions human beings actually do make, which causes you to anticipate the answer to a question which is ultimately not mathematical. This brings me to your question…

We also know that sometimes they make morally proper and sometimes they make morally improper decisions. There is nothing “special” about either one. Why do you find it strange that someone consistently makes proper decisions?

Now the question is one of ethics, and we must choose what system of ethics is most accurate in determining what is moral. For the sake of argument, let’s choose Kantian ethics. In Kant’s ethics, the right thing must be done out of reverence for a moral law with no hope or expectation that a person will be rewarded (you can do something and get a reward, but you must not do it because of the reward).

Kant admits that very few decisions are made for the right reason, in this sense – in fact, he admits the possibility that **no **decisions are made in accordance with the moral law. In Kant’s world, 1 in 10,000 decisions have moral worth, or 1 in 1,000,000, or 1 in infinity. Can you prove that Kant was wrong? In Kant’s world, it is *inconceivably *unlikely that any single person would do only right things.

Can you prove, given Kant’s assumptions, that freedom of will does not lead to evil actions? Or, alternately, can you prove that Kant’s assumptions are *necessarily *false?

 

[Spock]

Unless this world is the best possible for the purposes of a creator with perfect wisdom.

How do you plan to substantiate that even one minor decrease of the available evil is somehow detrimental? It is supposed to be God’s wish that everyone would be with him - freely and uncoerced. Does this world provide the optimum? Would a little decrease of the existing evil somehow lower the number of people who wish to join God in heaven?

 

[davidv]

What do you have in mind? Please elaborate.

Your definition seemed imply that the only things we can have knowledge of are physically existing things. This suggested to me a limitation that we cannot know anything about ideas and concepts.

 

[davidv]

How do you plan to substantiate that even one minor decrease of the available evil is somehow detrimental? It is supposed to be God’s wish that everyone would be with him - freely and uncoerced. Does this world provide the optimum? Would a little decrease of the existing evil somehow lower the number of people who wish to join God in heaven?

How would we know if more or less evil would actually be better for the overall good? I don’t think either of has means to know that.

 

[fhansen]

How would we know if more or less evil would actually be better for the overall good? I don’t think either of has means to know that.

I would agree with this and add that perhaps the degree of evil in the world is not related so much directly to Gods will-as in His tweaking it, a little more, a little less- as it is to the degree of freedom He allows us to possess. And that the greater ones freedom the greater ones potential for “greatness” himself-or for its’ opposite.

 

[Chiral]

I think someone already has defended the logic I presented, but I will extrapolate.

That leads to a logical contradiction. To say that the future does not exist for us, but it exists for God is logically contradictory. **Knowledge **about an event is contingent upon the observer; the **existence **of the event is not. Something either exists, or it does not…

You are confused with regard to time. I am sure you have heard of “transcendence”, yes? Try to imagine an entity who transcends time - to this entity “past”, “present”, and “future” are all “present”. God’s knowledge of future events is contingent on the existence of those future events - you yourself said one cannot have “knowledge” of something that does not exist, knowledge requires an existing object. Well, if God has ever delivered a prophecy, this means He has knowledge of future events, "foreknowledge. This means that the “future” does exist! How? It exists as a present moment, but we who are constrained to time have not experienced that moment yet. I explained this on another thread but will repeat it here.
“S chooses X at T2” is a sentence concerning subject (S), action (chooses), object (X), and time (T2). If this sentence is “true” with regard to reality, then it is true at all times both before and after T2 - Truth is immutable and eternal. Now, you will object that any statement regarding T2 made prior to the actual moment T2 cannot be “true” because all events at T2 are inherently undetermined since the future exists only as a potentiality… It exists only as a potentiality to us at T1, but to God it exists as actualized reality! The truth of the sentence hinges on its 4 parts - subject, object, action, time - for the sentence to be true, each of these parts must be an existing reality at the moment T2 - the existence of an observer is not required. If the sentence is true, then for us at T1 S will choose X at T2 - logic demands it, it cannot be otherwise. Even if there exists no S or X or free will to “choose” at T1, we can be certain that these things will exist and so will T2 because the sentence is true.
How can the future exist as “present” for God and not for me? My experience does not transcend time - I no longer see what I saw a moment ago, and I do not see yet what I will see a moment from now. But God sees at all moments presently. The movie analogy isn’t quite complete. You can imagine life as a movie that you are part of and watching on a screen for the first time - you know what already happened as a memory but don’t “know” what will happen in the future. God is watching the same movie but on infinitely many screens each set exactly 1 “moment” apart so that He sees every moment of the movie simultaneously! He knows what happens “later” and so do we at that “later” moment, but our experience is constrained to this moment.
Here is another analogy - Imagine you are an early astronomer aware of only three planets in our solar system: Mercury, Venus, and Earth. What is the largest planet in our solar system? Jupiter. Just because you haven’t experienced it at this moment doesn’t mean you won’t later.
Another sentence: God knows Y, which is that I know X at T2 - God’s knowledge of Y is contingent on my knowledge of X at T2, which is contingent on the existence of me, X, and T2. The future does exist for me, just not until T2. Has this helped or only confused you more?

That would be the logical corollary of benevolence. Why allow something that one “abhors” and which does not benefit anyone?

Wow, major assumptions in that question! Does God “abhor” the occasion of sin?? I do not believe so nor have I ever been presented with evidence suggesting it. Does the occasion of sin “not benefit anyone”? On the contrary, it may benefit every free being and give glory to God in the process - you will wonder about that, so I’ll wait to explain. Your assumption is not a logical corollary.

In a generic sense, sure, but in not in a specific instance. One may enjoy books in general, but it would be nonsensical to say that one enjoys a book which one has not read yet. Don’t you agree?

I would agree, but I would also say that the notion of a book God “has not read yet” is silly and the general statement is sufficient in this case.

To extend the prerequisites (God’s alleged unconditional love) is changing the goalposts. We can surmise God’s nature from the observed facts, and that would make God’s unconditional love highly improbable. The observed facts do not point to any kind of love, much less unconditional. More like total indifference.

We have Scripture and revelation which together with empiricism lead me to counter your conclusion with regard to God’s love. I think the facts point to quite the opposite.

I see no logical contradiction here. Can you point it out?

To reach an agreement, we require an understanding of the term “omnibenevolent”. Let’s suppose it means “desiring the greatest good for each and every individual specifically and unconditionally”.
Then we must reach an understanding “greatest good…” Teleologically, the greatest good would be the persistent achievement of the ultimate purpose for which we were created. Well, what is that? I look to the Gospels, specifically the completion of God’s “Law” to humanity - Matt22: 36"Teacher, which is the greatest commandment in the Law?" 37Jesus replied: " ‘Love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your mind.’* 38This is the first and greatest commandment. 39And the second is like it: ‘Love your neighbor as yourself.’[c] 40All the Law and the Prophets hang on these two commandments."**
There are many verses which the other forum members could present, extrapolating on the notion of “Love” and how it leads to the answer of “What is our ultimate purpose?”
So what is required for a subject to love? Clearly freedom of will, for love is a persistent choice. Thus God desires that we be free, and freedom entails the logical possibility of choosing not-love. If God knew that a non-existent being would choose not-love (a logical contradiction with regard to knowledge) and so chose not to create said being, wouldn’t that make God’s love for His creations conditional and thus also contradict His nature? It would be like the parent who swears to love her child unconditionally but aborts her in utero when discovering that the fetus (child) has Down’s Syndrome The notion is untenable.*