One final time: freedom of will does NOT logically lead to evil actions

[Spock]

And what if the “free” person fails to be manipulated? What if they choose the “unchoosable” alternative they have been presented with? Is this impossible?

Yes, it is impossible, by definition.

You see, manipulation removes the locus of causal control from the “chooser”. The magician is in control, that is why the “choice” is a “trick”, it only appears to be a choice, and the locus of causal control only appears to be the “chooser”.

Does it? Manipulations, suggestions, hints all influence the decisions, but only direct brain-control removes it. And even in the case of partial brain-control (Mary’s brain is only controlled, if she does not want to kill White), we call her decison making free. The magician is in control over the outcome, but he is not in control over the decision making process of the “chooser”. The “chooser” may even refuse to make a selection. This is why I keep asking, what does the “control” mean? The control over the decison making process, or the outcome?

Think of a marble rolling down a ramp to a forked-path - the marble must roll down one of the paths (like the volunteer must choose one of the cards). If I tilt the ramp or block off one of the paths, or use some other of a dozen methods to ensure which path the ball follows down the ramp, then the locus of causal control is I, even though the ball is following its natural inclination (analogous to desire).

The analogy is good, but not good enough. The path is not tilted, the undesired path has a pinball like “flipper”, which gets activated, only when the ball rolls down the “wrong” path.

The true test would be if the ball would follow the path I desire without my attempting to influence it. If it does so, then it maintains the locus of causal control, like Mary freely choosing and the device not activating. If the device is not activated, then blocking the alternate choice was unnecessary. The device only removes Mary from the locus of causal control upon the instant of her choosing against it, in which case she made her choice freely (demonstrating free will) and subsequently had her freedom removed before acting.

Yes, that is what I pointed out above.

Secondly, the presence of true freedom, as you have pointed out, is not dependent on the knowledge of the willing entity, it is dependent on logic.

I said the exact opposite. Mary’s ignorance of the implanted device is what makes her decision appear to be free.

If God were to give us free will or take it away (by means of coercion), it would not matter if we realized it or not, the truth of the situation remains, and it is truth with which we are concerned, not perception. Certainly God could make creatures who do exactly as He has programmed them, but then where is the locus of causal control? If a person “incorrectly” believes his decision to be un-coerced, then logically that decision is actually coerced.

Perception matters. (Never try to tie your shoelaces in your neighbor’s vegetable garden ). We must consider several factors.

1. What does the person in question want to do? (intent)
2. Is the person able to do that? (ability)
3. When both prerequisites are met, the “locus of control” (let’s call it LOC) says that the decison was free.

If the person would be prevented from doing what he wants (the implanted device), and he is unaware of this limitation, and attempts to do what he wants, then his action will be determined (not influenced!) by the device, and his lack of freedom would be obvious.

I keep asking one thing about LOC, the locus of control over what? The decison making process? Or the outcome? These are not the same. In the hypothetical blackmailing scenario, the brain activity of the blackmailed person is influenced, but not determined by the threat. He is not prevented (by some device) from disobeying the blackmailer’s demand, if he is willing to take the consequences. So, by the LOC, he was acting free. Yet, we don’t accept that his action was free. There is an unresolved question here, which must be investigated.

I urge you to revisit the “inverted Mary” hypothesis. The device is implated by some good scientist, who does not want White to be killed. As long as Mary does not attempt to kill White, the device stays inert. If she attempts to kill White, the device will activate, and prevent her action. Would you consider this a form of brain control?

 

[tdgesq]

I thoroughly enjoy this conversation.

I enjoy it too, but we have gotten a little bit sidetracked I think. Whether you believe the locus of causal control is “not sufficient” to make ones actions free, I and many other Catholics here do believe it is sufficient. It is certainly your prerogative to put forth arguments for why you think we are wrong. They may even be good arguments. But what you aren’t going to be able to (logically) deny is that under my definition of free will all possible persons may freely choose to perform at least one morally wrong act, and that it may be the case then that there are no possible persons that God can instantiate who freely always do what is right. Therefore, God can be omnipotent, omniscient, and all good; persons can have free will (under my definition); and evil can exist in the world. There is no logical contradiction here, no matter how much you might disagree with the definition of free will.

The trouble is that this definition makes the blackmailed person’s action also “free”, since he could have acted otherwise - with the stipulated consequences. Yet, neither of us calls this decison uncoerced. The decison is made by the agent, and his decision was influenced by the threat, but not determined by it.

I see no difference in the result whether we use locus of causal control (LCC) or the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP). As you note, even if the blackmailed person “could have done otherwise” (which is PAP) we might still call his actions free. The same would be true under LCC, since although the actions of the blackmailed person were influenced by the blackmail, it was not (under these circumstances) determined by outside causes.

So even in a coerced situation the person retains his will to act according to the threats, or disregard them, making his decision really “free”. And this is a contradiction. Which shows that the “locus of control” is extremely important, but insufficient. But the problem can be solved.

All you are pointing out here is that there can be ambiguity in how free a certain decision is depending on the circumstances. But that is true whether one uses PAP or LCC as the measure of free will. Under either definition, there will be circumstances where it is difficult to tell whether a person’s will was able to overcome the outside cause – in this case the blackmailer. Under PAP we would say that the person could have chosen otherwise. Under LCC we would say that the outside cause did not determine the agent’s decision.

Let’s revert the Mary Jones scenario and have the device work the opposite way. If she does not want to kill White, the device will stay inert. If she does want to kill him, the device will “kick in”, and prevent her from doing it. Yet, when I argued the same scenario in another thread, everyone was screaming “brain control”, and they asserted that such a device would rob us of our free will. I wish you had participated in that thread. I could have used your moral support.

I’m not sure I could have helped you. It is brain control if the device kicks in. If it doesn’t kick in because she does not want to kill White in the first place, then there was no brain control. Maybe it was the latter proposition that folks were screaming about. If so, I would have been on your side.

She [Mary Jones] thinks that she could have acted otherwise. We know she could not have, but she thinks she does have the other option. This - erroneous - belief is what makes us decide that she acted freely, on her own volition.

Why do you assume that? Let’s instead assume that Mary Jones believes she couldn’t have acted otherwise. That’s what I assume, regardless of whether I might have knowledge of an evil genius potentially controlling my brain or not. At any given moment, I either choose X or not X. I can’t choose both, so the one I will choose is the one I do choose. It is silly to say that I could have chosen other than I did, particularly after the decision has been made and is past. What people really mean when they say “I could have done otherwise” is that if they could go back in time they could have done otherwise. And even I agree with that. Of course if you asked Mary whether it was she who chose to take the action, she would say “yes.” And she’s right. For all of these reasons, I categorically reject your conclusion that it is an “erroneous belief” that makes us somehow believe we act freely.

It is the knowledge or the lack of it what makes the difference. If Mary Jones were aware of the device in her brain, and she would freely decide that she does not want to kill White, and then the device would kick in, then we would agree that she was coerced, her decision was not free.

I do not see how this follows at all. What does the knowledge or lack of knowledge of the device in her brain have to do with anything? Maybe she knows about the device in her brain and decides not to kill White anyway. Everybody agrees that the moment she is about to decide to kill White the device will trigger and she will be deprived of free will. This is true whether she knows it or not.

 

[tdgesq]

. . . continued

A stage magician offers a deck of cards to someone from the audience, and tells him: “pick a card, any card”. (The deck is geniune). The person will exercise his free will, and picks out a card. Unbeknownst to him he will always pick the card that the magician wants him to pick. The magician, using his subtle “persuation” methods will make absolutely certain that a specific, predetermined card will be chosen.

This is not at all like the Mary Jones example. In that example, no one is causing her to choose not to kill White. It’s just that she can’t do otherwise because the device in her brain will prevent it. In the magician scenario, he is actually causing the person to pick a certain card.

Now, why do we agree, that this was a “free” decison, when we both know that it was not, not “really”.

We don’t agree it was a free decision. The actor was certainly free to pick a card. Nobody disagrees with that. The question is whether he was free to pick any card, and clearly he wasn’t because the magician caused him to pick one specific card. We would say that the person didn’t have free will whether we used a PAP or LCC analysis.

Because the selecting person does not know that he is being manipulated, and even if he suspected it, he has no way of knowing how he was being manipulated. The same trick would not work on another magician, by the way. He knows the tricks of the trade, and therefore he can make different selection.

I apologize, but I don’t see what this is meant to illustrate. Even another magician who knows the tricks of the trade might still decide to make the selection the performing magician wants him to make. So the selecting magician actually did perceive that he wasn’t bound to select only one card, yet he decided to select it anyway. In that scenario your hypothesis is wrong that free will is just a matter of the actor perceiving that he could have decided otherwise. It wasn’t perception that made him free. It was the reality of the situation. He was not caused by outside forces to pick the “right” card, yet he exercised his will to pick it anyway.

How do we apply this to the hypothetical question you highlighted? To me it is obvious. God creates the scenario, where everyone believes (incorrectly) that they could have chosen otherwise.

Well, I am living proof that not all people think that way. In fact, my experience is that most people don’t think that way once you clarify the proposition “I could have done otherwise” to mean that “if I went back in time I could choose to do otherwise.” But just for argument’s sake, let’s pretend that God does make everybody believe that they could have chosen otherwise. That does nothing to change the reality under LCC. Either some outside cause determined the actor’s decision, or it didn’t. Your hypothesis says nothing about LCC.

Therefore their decision is uncoerced (the lack of knowledge is unknown) so they would act freely in the hypothetical world - just like Mary Jones, who is unaware of the device.

As shown above, her decision isn’t coerced even if she knew of the device. Neither are my decisions coerced if I knew that God made everybody think they could choose otherwise. I could go around all day thinking I can choose otherwise and still in fact not be compelled by outside forces to choose X. Defining free will as the perception that the actor is uncoerced just doesn’t make sense, particularly since most of us are interested in reality. We (particularly me) would like to know what actually caused Mary Jones to make the choice she did, not whether she perceived she acted freely or not.

To repeat: if the person can carry out what he wants, we call that a free decsion (according to the locus of control) - regardless of the fact that he could not have acted otherwise.

That isn’t the definition of causal control. Causal control simply identifies what caused the decision or act – an outside cause or the agent. But let’s go ahead and pretend like your definition works. You’ve gotten yourself into a real pickle here Spock. According to your definition God could directly cause everybody to “want” to perform action X and could also cause action X to be carried out. Remember (according to you), causes don’t matter. All that matters is what the person “wants.” This of course would be predestinarian determinism. So apparently you claim that free will is the same thing as determinism.

But it is worse than that. You previously criticized LCC for not giving enough freedom to the agent. Now you claim that freedom is really an illusion? All that is required is that the agent subjectively believes that he is free – without regard to the cause of any given action!? Hell, PAP doesn’t even matter now! You’ve gone seriously awry here.

The free will defense defeats your claim that God could necessarily have created persons that always choose what is right. It’s up to the person to decide. Most people understand that.

 

[Spock]

I see no difference in the result whether we use locus of causal control (LCC) or the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP). As you note, even if the blackmailed person “could have done otherwise” (which is PAP) we might still call his actions free. The same would be true under LCC, since although the actions of the blackmailed person were influenced by the blackmail, it was not (under these circumstances) determined by outside causes.

All you are pointing out here is that there can be ambiguity in how free a certain decision is depending on the circumstances. But that is true whether one uses PAP or LCC as the measure of free will. Under either definition, there will be circumstances where it is difficult to tell whether a person’s will was able to overcome the outside cause – in this case the blackmailer. Under PAP we would say that the person could have chosen otherwise. Under LCC we would say that the outside cause did not determine the agent’s decision.

I will return to the other parts later.

I agree with your analysis completely. Both LCC and PAP says the the blackmailed person acted “free” (though for different reasons). But in an actual situation like this, no one would blame the blackmailed person if he gave in to the demand. Everyone would say that his decision was not free. That means that both definitions are incorrect, and thus neither one is a proper way to decide just what free will is. Wouldn’t you agree with this? And since the concept of free will became the focus of this discussion, we need to find a correct definition.

 

[Hubriss]

I apologize for jumping in so late on page 15 of the thread, but I just read the original post. Also, I have only read about 20 of the later posts.

My 2 cents: Spock’s argument and position of non-belief can be simplified. He asserts correctly that an intelligent creator could create a world where there are no immoral actions. This can be done in several ways. It can be done in the way Spock seemed to have in mind with his original post, that immoral choices could be eliminated, for example, it could be impossible to commit murder or lie or steal, etc. But in a world where there is no moral vs. immoral, the concepts become meaningless because all actions are neutral instead of good or bad.

However, if there is an intelligent creator, morality would be solely determined by him, if he chooses to create it. But of course, he could philosophically not have any preference for morality, and there would be no moral or immoral choices in an objective sense (made by God). You could still steal, murder, and do all the things that we can do, yet it would only be wrong to us. There is nothing illogical about this. In fact, it makes the most sense and is most reflective of reality since we don’t have any actual evidense or reasoning to show that people are rewarded or punished after death.

Then there’s this other thing which might be off topic, but it looks like you guys have gotten into it a bit with the last few posts. In Catholicism, it’s logically impossible that there be free will for multiple reasons. One reason has to do with the claimed all-knowing nature of God, but the other has to do with Hell. In the relationship between God and man, free choice is not free because if you make an immoral one, the consequence is supposedly infinitely huge: eternal hellfire and separation from God (which, we are told, is a very unwanted thing).

Anyways, there ya go.

 

[Spock]

We don’t agree it was a free decision. The actor was certainly free to pick a card. Nobody disagrees with that. The question is whether he was free to pick any card, and clearly he wasn’t because the magician caused him to pick one specific card. We would say that the person didn’t have free will whether we used a PAP or LCC analysis.

But it was “any” card, in the sense that the chooser just picked one, without any desire to pick any specific one. The chooser’s brain was not interfered with. He had the control over the movement of his hand. He could reach out, and select any of the cards presented to him. So under both the LCC and PAP analysis, his decision was free. But you say it was not. And I agree. Therefore both the PAP and the LCC are wrong - just like in the case of the hypothetical blackmail case.

That isn’t the definition of causal control. Causal control simply identifies what caused the decision or act – an outside cause or the agent.

We still need to clarify: control over what? The decision process or the outcome? The decision process is always performed by agent - unless there is total brain control.

But let’s go ahead and pretend like your definition works. You’ve gotten yourself into a real pickle here Spock. According to your definition God could directly cause everybody to “want” to perform action X and could also cause action X to be carried out. Remember (according to you), causes don’t matter. All that matters is what the person “wants.” This of course would be predestinarian determinism. So apparently you claim that free will is the same thing as determinism.

No, it means that free will is still undefined. But let’s look at reality, which we both like to do.

A responsible parent attempts to limit his children’s future choices by instilling proper values in them. Ideally, the child will never even think about an “immoral” choice, never even ponder the possibility of (say) stealing from a blind man’s plate where he accumulated some money. And even if he thinks about it for a second, he will not do it, because he knows that such action is wrong. The child’s action is strongly influenced by the parent’s “brainwashing”, but it is no determined by it. The same applies to the “inverted” Mary scenario. As long as she decides that she will leave Wite alone, her actions are not curtailed. If she wants to kill White, however, the device steps in and prevents her from doing it. As long as the child does not want to steal from the blind man, his actions are left alone. If he decides to steal, then - hopefully! - the parent’s brainwashing will kick in, and prevents him from carrying out the act. There is no other difference - aside from the fact that the parent’s actions were imperfect, while the device is “foolproof”.

Is she free not to hurt White? Of course she is. If the parent had the ways and means to prevent the child from stealing, that would be exactly the same scenario. Unfortunately, the parent does not have the wherewithal to do that, he must resort to the next best thing: give a proper upbringing to the child. God can do better, he can instill the proper behavioral pattern at the time of creation, so the child will never commit an immoral act, though he can contemplate it.

You seem to say that this is total mind control. I say that it is partial mind control, which is allowed.

The free will defense defeats your claim that God could necessarily have created persons that always choose what is right. It’s up to the person to decide. Most people understand that.

Yes, and he can, by the method I delineated avove. To have free will (whatever that is, still undecided) it is enough if the people have the control to make selection of approximately equal choices, all of which are morally neutral or positive.

 

[Chiral]

…We agreed that…any action…presupposes time… Even if we suppose God’s omnipresence in our time… God cannot be omnipresent in his own time… Therefore it is possible that in GT1 (a specific instance of God’s time) a person is not created yet, but in a later GT2 (a future instance in God’s time) he will create that person. It is asserted by Catholics that God “creates” the soul of a new person at the moment of conception. That action subdivides God’s time into “present” (the instance of creation), past and future (the intervals before and after this action). (Side note: …with the act of conception we “force” God into action… another contradiction.)

Alas, you would be helped to begin with the premise “omnipresence” and work from there to seek a contradiction - this path only leads you in circles.
The premise (which you needn’t accept, only allow for the sake of argument) is that God is omnipresent. Omnipresence does not entail a separate “god-time”, it in fact entails quite the opposite, which is why God is generally spoken of as “outside” of time, that is TIME altogether. There is no “GT” versus creation T, or rather if you think of creation-time as a line, “god-time” would (metaphorically) be that same line compressed to a single point. Does that help? From the perspective of universe-time God’s actions are separated out at various instances, T1, T2, etc. but from the perspective of metaphorical god-time, there is only one instant GT, i.e. all actions in creation-time occur simultaneously in metaphorical GT. That is part of the meaning of “omnipresent”; another part of the meaning is that God exists at all physical locations in the universe simultaneously - i.e. all points in creation-space are compressed to one single point in metaphorical “god-space”. Omnipresent - present at all points in time and space simultaneously.
So in your attempt above, GT1 & GT2 are simultaneous from God’s perspective. You may try to object that this means God both acts and not-acts simultaneously, which is logically impossible. On the contrary, it means that God only acts - God is never passive, not from the perspective of “god-time”.
As to God’s creation of souls and installation at conception, the separation of moments “before” and “after” is again part of “creation-time”, not “god-time”. And as to “forcing” God, He is the one who set up the conference of souls to progeny “principle” - He is free to not confer a soul. What would this look like? Failure of sexual partners to conceive viable offspring during an instant of intercourse. Does that ever happen? Yup.

 

[Chiral]

…Manipulations, suggestions, hints all influence the decisions, but only direct brain-control removes it… The magician is in control over the outcome, but he is not in control over the decision making process of the “chooser”… This is why I keep asking, what does the “control” mean? The control over the decision making process, or the outcome?

Aah, I see what you are getting at - the difference between free choice and free action.

I said the exact opposite. Mary’s ignorance of the implanted device is what makes her decision appear to be free.

Nono, her decision is actually free in that the decision-making process (will) is free, regardless of her awareness of the device. Once she actually makes the decision, then the device kicks-in to prevent the exercise of that free will into action.
So your problem is that people equate “Could not have chosen otherwise” with “Could not have done otherwise”?

Perception matters…

1. What does the person in question want to do? (intent)
2. Is the person able to do that? (ability)
3. When both prerequisites are met, the “locus of control” (let’s call it LOC) says that the decision was free.

Not at all, the LOC becomes divided between will and physical ability or power. LOC should not be separated from PAP. The points are as follows:

1. Is the agent confronted with at least 2 logical alternatives: X and not-X?
2. Is the agent the LOC with regard to choice between X and not-X.
3. Is the agent the LOC with regard to acting upon each choice, i.e. are both X and not-X able to be actualized by the agent?
   When 2 is satisfied, the agent’s decision is “free”. When 2&3 are satisfied, the agent’s action is “free”. This is based on logic, not perception. Perception enters at point (1) - are there really 2 possibilities? Does freedom of action impact the number of possibilities or only the LOC?
   Mary’s decision to kill or not kill White can be judged as free because as the LOC she is capable (potential as LOC) of making the choice and carrying out the choice - so far all 3 points are met. It is in the second phase, acting upon the choice, where she is displaced as LOC that judgment is removed from her.
   The situation can be summarized thus:
4. Mary is free to choose to not-kill White and free to act upon her decision (1,2,3) - she maintains LOC in both and so judgment for both falls upon her alone.
5. Mary is free to choose to kill white but is not free to act upon her decision - she maintains LOC and judgment for the free choice (1,2) but lacks LOC and judgment for the determined action (1,3).
   If Mary is not free to actually kill White, then is she also not free to repent her decision in the hypothetical moments prior to acting upon it (i.e. can she change her mind)? If not, it can be argued that even her freedom of choice was removed, the real LOC is the device, but only when Mary makes the wrong decision.

…In the hypothetical blackmailing scenario… …he is not prevented from disobeying the blackmailer’s demand, if he is willing to take the consequences. So, by the LOC, he was acting freely. Yet, we don’t accept that his action was free…

He is indeed free to accept or reject the blackmailer’s demands - his decision is his own, and the blackmailer’s response to that decision is the blackmailer’s own, neither is determined by the other.
So what is the decision the victim faces? It is not with regard to the blackmailer’s demands, it is with regard to the consequences (assuming the blackmailer is smart)! For the victim, the consequences of his choice is determined, i.e. necessary: if X then Y, if not-X then not-Y. The victim chooses from the decision carrying the most weight, so if he values Y over X, he is not choosing between X and not-X but between Y and not-Y. Since the LOC with regard to the consequences is someone else, he is not free with regard to them.
Eg:“Hand over the money: if you refuse, I kill your wife; if you agree i leave you in peace.”
The victim freely chooses to save his wife’s life. He does not freely choose to hand over the money, that is the choice of the blackmailer who set up the conditions (assuming he was free to set up other conditions).

 

[Hubriss]

Eg:“Hand over the money: if you refuse, I kill your wife; if you agree i leave you in peace.”
The victim freely chooses to save his wife’s life. He does not freely choose to hand over the money, that is the choice of the blackmailer who set up the conditions (assuming he was free to set up other conditions).

If I understand you and others right, your concept of free will is pretty watered down. Your idea would be better tanslated into freedom of “want.” The man wants to save his wife’s life, but he is certainly not free to do so because of the choices he is presented with, he must give up his money for her. Because will pertains to action. He does not choose to save his wife’s life, he chooses to give his money to the robberer which has the affect of saving his wife. He cannot magically choose to save her and be done with it.

Not at all, the LOC becomes divided between will and physical ability or power.

I think I am understanding you right. LOC does not become divided between will and physical ability or power simply because if the ability or power to act is not a reality or present then there is no choice. The range of possibilites shrinks from the very instant the dilema is presented. The man cannot save his wife by shooting lazer beams out of his eyes, so the question of if he is “free” to do so is meaningless.

Reality, power, and ability are effective limiters of choices, otherwise there would always be an infinite number of choices. They have nothing to do with the choose, act, or will (all synonyms) step.

 

[Spock]

Alas, you would be helped to begin with the premise “omnipresence” and work from there to seek a contradiction - this path only leads you in circles.
The premise (which you needn’t accept, only allow for the sake of argument) is that God is omnipresent. Omnipresence does not entail a separate “god-time”, it in fact entails quite the opposite, which is why God is generally spoken of as “outside” of time, that is TIME altogether. There is no “GT” versus creation T, or rather if you think of creation-time as a line, “god-time” would (metaphorically) be that same line compressed to a single point. Does that help? From the perspective of universe-time God’s actions are separated out at various instances, T1, T2, etc. but from the perspective of metaphorical god-time, there is only one instant GT, i.e. all actions in creation-time occur simultaneously in metaphorical GT. That is part of the meaning of “omnipresent”; another part of the meaning is that God exists at all physical locations in the universe simultaneously - i.e. all points in creation-space are compressed to one single point in metaphorical “god-space”. Omnipresent - present at all points in time and space simultaneously.
So in your attempt above, GT1 & GT2 are simultaneous from God’s perspective. You may try to object that this means God both acts and not-acts simultaneously, which is logically impossible. On the contrary, it means that God only acts - God is never passive, not from the perspective of “god-time”.
As to God’s creation of souls and installation at conception, the separation of moments “before” and “after” is again part of “creation-time”, not “god-time”. And as to “forcing” God, He is the one who set up the conference of souls to progeny “principle” - He is free to not confer a soul. What would this look like? Failure of sexual partners to conceive viable offspring during an instant of intercourse. Does that ever happen? Yup.

Well, then, omipresence is just a huge conglomerate of self-contradictions. As you presented, God is a walking “married bachelor”.

God exists out of time, there is not “time” where he dwells. Yet, God is present (even omni-present) in our time. God dwells in no space, yet he is present (omni-present) in our space. God acts, and act presupposes a before and an after, but this before an after are simultaneous. God is not a physical being, but he manifested himself as a physical being in the form of Jesus, and was subject to our space and time constraints. Jesus is both divine and human - at the same actual time. God is both one and three. Jesus will sit on the right hand of himself (God).

Please, don’t try to “sell” this product. These are not “mysteries”, these are plain, old fashioned contradictions. If God is “omnipresent”, he is exactly like a square circle, or a married bachelor, someone who has self-contradictory attributes.

 

[Spock]

Aah, I see what you are getting at - the difference between free choice and free action.

What is a choice without action? Who cares what anyone wants to “choose”, if he is unable to carry out that choice?

Not at all, the LOC becomes divided between will and physical ability or power. LOC should not be separated from PAP. The points are as follows:

1. Is the agent confronted with at least 2 logical alternatives: X and not-X?
2. Is the agent the LOC with regard to choice between X and not-X.
3. Is the agent the LOC with regard to acting upon each choice, i.e. are both X and not-X able to be actualized by the agent?
   When 2 is satisfied, the agent’s decision is “free”. When 2&3 are satisfied, the agent’s action is “free”. This is based on logic, not perception.

This distinction makes the “free will” meaningless. If (2) is the only measure of free will, then it is irrelevant if one has it or not. Only if both (2) and (3) are satisfied, can we speak of freedom to choose.

I will give you another example. In the old communist regimes the election process went like this (and I am not kidding you): there was one candidate for each position. There was only the option “yes” on the ballot. If you did not cast a ballot (meaning you did not mark the option), it was counted as “yes”. Also participation was mandatory. if you did not show up, the committee came to your residence. No wonder, the result was always 99.6% “yes”. (I could never figure our what the 0.4% was… presumably the “vote” of those who were eligible to vote, but died before they could actually vote.)

Is that a “free” election? If you happened to agree with the person presented as the only candidate, then you were not “forced”, your selection was “free”, but it was not a “choice”. If you disagreed with the preson presented, and did not cast your vote, it was taken as “yes”. This is an exact parallel to the Mary Jones scenario. We call this “election” a bogus. Why shy away and declare that the Mary Jones scenario is also bogus?

Your #1 criterion needs to amended:

1. Is the agent confronted with at least 2 actual alternatives: X and not-X?

As a matter of fact, even the amended 1), 2) and 3) are deficient. The agent must have some purpose, some aim that the agent wants to achieve. So the zeroth prerequisite must be added:

1. The agent must have some aim, that he wants to achieve (X).
2. The agent must have at least 2 actual alternatives: X and not-X? Or, the agent must have at least 2 actual choices of how to achieve X (say A1 or A2).
3. The agent must have the actual ability to carry out either X or non-X, or A1 or A2 (depending on the situation).
4. The agent must be the one who makes the decison, without any outside coersion, or determination.

Only if all criteria are met, can we speak of a meaningful free will. One more addendum: where the aim in (0) comes from is irrelevant. Whether the agent himself came up with it, or it was instilled in him via soem external agent, or if the agent cannot even imagine any other “aim”, these are all the same. None is pertinent to the actual selection between the actual choices. If a parent instills a good behavioral pattern in the child during the formative years, so that the child will only wish to perform morally upright choices, that in no way would detract from the freedom of these choices.

As a corollary to this stipulation, God could instill the “correct behavioral pattern” in everyone, and their behavior was left alone from that moment onwards, we would have free beings, who make the correct choice in every scenario.

 

[Chiral]

Well, then, omipresence is just a huge conglomerate of self-contradictions…
God exists out of time, there is not “time” where he dwells. Yet, God is present … in our time. God dwells in no space, yet he is present … in our space. God acts, … presupposes a before and an after, but this before and after are simultaneous. God is not a physical being, but he manifested himself as a physical being in the form of Jesus, and was subject to our space and time constraints. Jesus is both divine and human - at the same actual time. God is both one and three. Jesus will sit on the right hand of himself (God).
…These are not “mysteries”, these are plain, old fashioned contradictions. If God is “omnipresent”, he … has self-contradictory attributes.

:blushid you even read the post? Why do you keep positing a “place”, i.e. a time&space, where God dwells that is separate from “creation-time/space”?? That is incorrect and should only be spoken of metaphorically (repeating myself now). God does not dwell in “no space” or no time, He exists in all space at all times - this is where the notion of “all reality exists in the mind of God” comes from. Please go back and read the previous posts, especially where I talk about consciousness restricted to a single point in time vs. multiple points in time, then apply this concept to space as well. There is no contradiction present in the concept of omnipresence - the concept is not a “mystery”, it is the ability that is a mystery. How does God accomplish this? That is the mystery. Generals use cameras and microphones to extend their consciousness beyond their own immediate surroundings to that of their soldiers so that their power of perception is not limited by location. I personally have trouble focusing my consciousness on a few things at a time in one place, but I know others more capable than I, and I have no difficulty conceptualizing an entity capable of extending that consciousness even further, even beyond the present moment to “past” and “future” moments. There is no contradiction, only the limitations of the mind.
You cannot grasp the metaphor of compressing a line to a single point? Just draw a line and step back until the line appears as a point to you. How about this: imagine (or construct) a hollow sphere whose surface is supported by bars extending radially from a central point. Look at a point on the surface of the sphere - the central point exerts force acting upon that surface point. Now rotate the sphere and examine a new spot - the central point also acts here but has not ceased to act on the previous point, and it is also acting on a point you haven’t examined (experienced) yet, all simultaneously. You are limited by what your mind is capable of perceiving – a limited area of time and space – but have you never met someone less limited? For a person, simultaneous awareness of multiple points in time and space seems physically impossible, but it is not logically inconceivable. You wish to apply rules to prove a contradiction. One may be that “no two entities can occupy precisely the same point in space at precisely the same time in precisely the same way, else the entities are identical”. This is satisfied. Another is “an entity cannot possess simultaneous antithetical attributes”, e.g. a man cannot be both married and a bachelor at the same moment in time. This is satisfied.
Then you get even further off topic discussing Jesus - God as both spirit and body… these are not antithetical, are they? God is three in one - St. Patrick used a shamrock as a simple visual explanation of three in one, but one more to your liking may be presentations of the number 1. What do I mean? The next numbers (?)>1<(?) are also 1, namely 0.99999999…=1=1.000000…1? These infinitely repeating decimals are not mathematical nonsense, they are a logical necessity… or am I way off? (I’m not a mathematician)
Anyway, the philosophical/theological concept of “omnipresence” has remained logically cogent for millenia. Keep thinking about it. Start another thread if you like. The main point to take was simply the (supposed) reality of God’s foreknowledge - that he could not know what a free being would choose (in a fair situation) without first creating said being. So now I’ll get back to what constitutes true freedom of choice now…

 

[Chiral]

What is a choice without action? Who cares what anyone wants to “choose”, if he is unable to carry out that choice?
This distinction makes the “free will” meaningless. If (2) is the only measure of free will, then it is irrelevant if one has it or not. Only if both (2) and (3) are satisfied, can we speak of freedom to choose.
…In the old communist regimes the election process went like this: there was one candidate for each position. There was only the option “yes” on the ballot. If you did not cast a ballot (meaning you did not mark the option), it was counted as “yes”. Also participation was mandatory. if you did not show up, the committee came to your residence…
Is that a “free” election? If you happened to agree with the person presented as the only candidate, then you were not “forced”, your selection was “free”, but it was not a “choice”. If you disagreed with the person presented, and did not cast your vote, it was taken as “yes”. This is an exact parallel to the Mary Jones scenario. We call this “election” a bogus. Why shy away and declare that the Mary Jones scenario is also bogus?

Sadly, that is not a parallel to Mary’s case for she was presented with the choice “Kill white” vs “Do not kill white”, 2 logical candidates if you like, and she was free to choose. What the Russian people were free to choose was whether to mark the ballot or not - this had no relevance to the outcome, but it was the choice they had. Those who chose “not-mark” could truthfully answer “I did not vote for him” whereas those that did could truthfully admit to it - (2) & (3). Neither group had any power over what was done with the ballots however (loss of LOC), so no the election itself, i.e. the vote to select 1 from among >1 candidates, was not free - (1). See? Free people, free choice, not-free election. Piece of cake. What you need to recognize is what the real alternatives (PAP) are presented to each LOC.

Your #1 criterion needs to amended:

1. Is the agent confronted with at least 2 actual alternatives: X and not-X?
   As a matter of fact, even the amended 1), 2) and 3) are deficient. The agent must have some purpose, some aim that the agent wants to achieve. So the zeroth prerequisite must be added:
2. The agent must have some aim, that he wants to achieve (X).
3. The agent must have at least 2 actual alternatives: X and not-X? Or, the agent must have at least 2 actual choices of how to achieve X (say A1 or A2).
4. The agent must have the actual ability to carry out either X or non-X, or A1 or A2 (depending on the situation).
5. The agent must be the one who makes the decision, without any outside coercion, or determination.
   Only if all criteria are met, can we speak of a meaningful free will. One more addendum: where the aim in (0) comes from is irrelevant. Whether the agent himself came up with it, or it was instilled in him via soem external agent, or if the agent cannot even imagine any other “aim”, these are all the same. None is pertinent to the actual selection between the actual choices. If a parent instills a good behavioral pattern in the child during the formative years, so that the child will only wish to perform morally upright choices, that in no way would detract from the freedom of these choices.

I assume you institute actual to differentiate from perceived? I would counter that actual and perceived have more bearing on the LOC, but we’ll get there.
Your #0 is irrelevant if the agent is the LOC – aim only matters with respect to moral judgment. Ability to follow a particular path is also irrelevant if the agent is the LOC – you cannot be the LOC if you are unable to effect your choice. If I choose to kill someone by pulling the trigger of a gun, but the firing pin has been removed, I am not the LOC with regard to ability to effect that choice. But, I am able to not-kill the person by not pulling the trigger, thus I remain the LOC and the firing-pin is irrelevant to the scenario. The same is true for Mary. You can’t play “fast&loose” with LOC, which causes your “amended” 1&2 to crumble. 3 remains intact.
As to your addendum, it mistakes the meaning of agent as LOC – the agent is the arbiter between the alternatives presented, meaning the force behind her decision must ultimately reside within herself. I had this discussion on another thread recently, regarding “desires” as the ultimate force behind all decisions and whether desires instilled from sources not identical with the arbiter could be considered her desires. The conclusion was that desires in-and-of-themselves do not constitute the sole driving force behind decision making, another force is present to weigh and choose between desires. To conclude, instillation of compulsory, irresistible desires does indeed constitute removal of LOC from the agent. Your addendum is a failure. And by the way, no parent I know has ever succeeded at instilling a fool-proof behavioral pattern short of hypnosis, and hypnosis is readily accepted as a removal of LOC from the agent under it. If God were to instill such a fool-proof mechanism, his creature would be little more than a puppet.
One more thing – some would argue that God has instilled in us “natural” desires to seek truth, goodness, beauty, and love. Just thought I’d mention that, given your addendum.
Again, sorry for the delayed reply.

 

[praise_Jesus_1]

I read the proof at the beginning. I’ll have to admit that claiming the OP’s original proof is mathematical might be a bit of a stretch. This is a philosophical argument using induction.

I’m sure this has been pointed out but the problem with this argument is that right from the base case with one moral agent either performing an immoral act in one world or a moral act in another world. This dichotomy of two possible worlds that God creates seems logical but I would argue that if this was possible it would violate free will from the start. God creating a world with one moral agent who chooses an immoral act is predestination - a world was created where the person would be immoral or moral but had no choice.

In a nutshell the OP assumes that moral choices are decided upon before the world is created.

You can prove almost anything with induction as long as you select a cleverly absurd base case.

Now I realize this opens the door to issues with foreknowledge and free will, but I thought I’d just point this out.

 

[fhansen]

One more thing – some would argue that God has instilled in us “natural” desires to seek truth, goodness, beauty, and love. Just thought I’d mention that, given your addendum.
Again, sorry for the delayed reply.

And one definition of free will, in terms of moral choices, might be the ability of an agent to choose to do other than that which his nature would dictate, rather than simply being the arbiter between competing alternative values, wherever they come from, which may possess varying degrees of goodness.

 

[Chiral]

(To tdgesq)
"Spock:

To have free will (whatever that is, still undecided) it is enough if the people have the control to make selection of approximately equal choices, all of which are morally neutral or positive.

(Repeat as response)

…A choice between morally equivalent options has to do with an absence of morality. The choice “to love or not-love” is what matters, and if these were morally equivalent then there would be no sin, no good and bad, but they are not equivalent. To be free to love God, we must necessarily be free to not-love Him. The very nature of God establishes “love” as good and “not-love” as bad, so morality precedes creation. Thus “true” free will with regard to love, our telos, necessarily entails a “bad” option.

Your are not arguing free will but simply freedom from morality, freedom from responsibility, indeed freedom from freedom.
Could God have made man free from moral judgment? Yes - he could have made us like the other animals, assuming that they have no telos other than to give glory to God by their very existence. We too give glory to God by our existence, and we have no freedom in the matter (lack of LOC with regard to PAP existence and non-existence).
But we have another purpose, a mandate from Heaven - Love - and that is the pith of our freedom and the entire reason we can even talk about “morality” with reference to humanity and God. Without this freedom, we are equivalent to the rest of Animalia, and how free are they? With regard to purpose, they are not. Does purpose matter?

 

[Hubriss]

(To tdgesq)

(Repeat as response)

Your are not arguing free will but simply freedom from morality, freedom from responsibility, indeed freedom from freedom.
Could God have made man free from moral judgment? Yes - he could have made us like the other animals, assuming that they have no telos other than to give glory to God by their very existence. We too give glory to God by our existence, and we have no freedom in the matter (lack of LOC with regard to PAP existence and non-existence).
But we have another purpose, a mandate from Heaven - Love - and that is the pith of our freedom and the entire reason we can even talk about “morality” with reference to humanity and God. Without this freedom, we are equivalent to the rest of Animalia, and how free are they? With regard to purpose, they are not. Does purpose matter?

You are missing the whole point of this post. That entire quote was also totally baseless btw.

Case closed. The argument that freedom of action inevitably leads to immoral choices is null and void. Please do not use it again.

This is Spock’s conclusion from the OP. Free will does not depend on the existence of moral or immoral choices defined by an ultimate arbiter of good and bad. The non-existence of this ultimate morality does not preclude human morality nor its meaningfulness. It might make it less meaningful, but it is still vastly significant as we develop our codes ourselves as guides to how we live our lives together.

Good and Evil is not necessary for the existence of Free Will. Period.

 

[Chiral]

You are missing the whole point of this post…

Hubriss Have you read this entire thread? We are way beyond the OP. No one still posting thinks that free will necessarily leads to evil. What we are discussing is whether or not the supposed Christian God can create a world with free beings who necessarily never sin. Catch up - you will find the basis of my repetition by clicking the link in the quote.

…Good and Evil is not necessary for the existence of Free Will. Period…

That is not the position we are currently debating. We are establishing a working understanding of free will. Your posts so far indicate a lack of understanding with regard to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities and Locus of Causal Control? I’ve ignored them out of courtesy (no offense intended, just not wanting to repeat what others have already written). Since we are discussing whether God could create a world without sin, we are presuming objective morality. Get it?
So what we’re really getting at is “Why do we have free will?”

 

[Spock]

Sadly, that is not a parallel to Mary’s case for she was presented with the choice “Kill white” vs “Do not kill white”, 2 logical candidates if you like, and she was free to choose. What the Russian people were free to choose was whether to mark the ballot or not - this had no relevance to the outcome, but it was the choice they had. Those who chose “not-mark” could truthfully answer “I did not vote for him” whereas those that did could truthfully admit to it - (2) & (3). Neither group had any power over what was done with the ballots however (loss of LOC), so no the election itself, i.e. the vote to select 1 from among >1 candidates, was not free - (1). See? Free people, free choice, not-free election. Piece of cake. What you need to recognize is what the real alternatives (PAP) are presented to each LOC.

I differ. Here is the analysis cut to the bare bones:

1. Mary has the ability to decide to kill White.
2. Mary has the ability to actually kill White.
3. Mary has the ability to decide not to kill White.
4. As soon as she attempts to put her “will” into action, she is prevented from doing it.

1a) The voter has the ability to vote for the candidate.
2a) The voter has the ability to actually vote for the candidate.
3a) The voter has the ability decide not to vote for the candidate.
4a) As soon as he attempts to his “will” into action, he is prevented from doing it.

Where is the difference? The only difference is that Mary’s device directly tampers with her decision making process, while the voter’s brain is not tampered with, rather he is physically unable to put his wish into action. In a sense, the voter’s locus of control is less “influenced”, yet the result is the same.

I assume you institute actual to differentiate from perceived? I would counter that actual and perceived have more bearing on the LOC, but we’ll get there.

If one is able to imagine (or perceive) a specific goal, but is unable to obtain it, then the situation is irrelevant.

Your #0 is irrelevant if the agent is the LOC – aim only matters with respect to moral judgment. Ability to follow a particular path is also irrelevant if the agent is the LOC – you cannot be the LOC if you are unable to effect your choice.

So, if you cannot carry out your “will”, then you do not have the control over it. Acceptable. The #0 is somewhat “superfluous”, but still necessary. If one has no aim, no desire, then one cannot strive to achieve it. In that sense, trivial it may be, but #0 is important to mention.

Your addendum is a failure. And by the way, no parent I know has ever succeeded at instilling a fool-proof behavioral pattern short of hypnosis, and hypnosis is readily accepted as a removal of LOC from the agent under it.

Of course the parent is unable to make the “brainwashing” process “foolproof”. So you say that this “failure” is what keeps free will around? Do you assert that a genuinely good person, whose upbringing makes it “impossible” to perform an evil act (say: murdering someone) is just a “puppet” of his upbringing?

He is still the locus of decison, he knows that murdering someone is one of his options, he even has the wherewhital to carry it out, but he simply does not want to do it. Does this makes him a “puppet”? I don’t think so.

As to your addendum, it mistakes the meaning of agent as LOC – the agent is the arbiter between the alternatives presented, meaning the force behind her decision must ultimately reside within herself.

Yes, and I never said otherwise.

 

[Hubriss]

Hubriss Have you read this entire thread? We are way beyond the OP. No one still posting thinks that free will necessarily leads to evil. What we are discussing is whether or not the supposed Christian God can create a world with free beings who necessarily never sin. Catch up - you will find the basis of my repetition by clicking the link in the quote.

That is not the position we are currently debating. We are establishing a working understanding of free will. Your posts so far indicate a lack of understanding with regard to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities and Locus of Causal Control? I’ve ignored them out of courtesy (no offense intended, just not wanting to repeat what others have already written). Since we are discussing whether God could create a world without sin, we are presuming objective morality. Get it?
So what we’re really getting at is “Why do we have free will?”

So you’re discussing what the nature of free will would be if there is objective morality, but God could create a world without sin. I may still be wrong. “Why do we have free will?” is a pointless question because if you’re assuming God in this scenario, we can’t possibly know why.

But I did cover this in an earlier post. God creating objective morality, and at the same time creating a world without sin is basically a contradiction, because if you do not have objective morality, you do not have sin, because objective morality is a pre-requisite of sin. Likewise, if you do not have sin, a standard to judge, then the morality created by God is meaningless and pointless (as far as God is concerned). As I’ll mention again, it does not make our human morality insignificant.