But isn’t the point Tdgesq is making about knowledge, not possibility? We do not *know *that there is a theoretically possible world (w/free will) without evil, because this proposition can only be verified by empirical considerations – the actual free decisions of agents.
We do know that, *if *such a contingency is met, W4 is logically possible. We do not know that such a contingency can possibly be met.
Yes, we can and we do. I am sorry, but math is impossible to avoid. There are mathematical theorems, which show the existence of a specific number, and unable to p(name removed by moderator)oint just what that number might be.
Let’s take a very simple example. You know the game tic-tac-toe. The original game withe 3*3 grid, where the aim is to place 3 “x”-s or 3 “o”-s onto the squares between the grid lines, and try to put then onto one row, or column of diagonal (the outcome, when both players play the best strategy is always a draw). If we generalize the game and play it on an “infinite” (or sufficiently large) board, the result is that the starting player always wins. If we play it with 4 “x”-s, and 4 “o”-s, the starting player also always wins (when playing the best strategy). When the game is to put 9 “x”-s and 9 “o”-s onto the board, the game is always a draw. For 5, 6, 7 or 8 pieces we don’t know, if the starting player wins, or the game results in a draw. Yet, we know that somewhere between 4 and 9, there is a divinding line. Under that line the starting player wins, above that line it is draw.
Even without having the precise number, we
know, with absolute certainty, that such a dividing line exists. (This is called an “existential” proof, as opposed to a “constructive” proof, where not only the existence of something can be proven but also its exact value. The constructive proofs are more elegant and held in higher esteem, but sometimes we have to be content with an existential one.)
The same kind of problem we are contemplating here. We do not know what the actual agents will do. We do not have to know it. As long as
free will means to have at least two available options, and it is the agent who makes the decision, it is mathematically certain that for any “n” (the overall number of morally singificant decisions) and for any “k” (the number of immoral outcomes) where “k” goes from “0” to “n” we
can find a possible world where exactly “k” immoral (and thus “n - k” moral) decisons will be made.
Yes, the actual outcome
one specific “experiment” is unknown (for us, but not unknown for God) until the decisions are actually made. But we know that
one of the outcomes must be true. There will be either 0, or 1, or 2, or 3, or… “n” immoral decisions. Now can we rule out any one these outcomes? For example can we ascertain that exactly “103” immoral decisons are possible, but “104” immoral decisons are not? (I just made up these numbers.) On what ground? All those numbers are identical.
Suppose, however, there is one person who will do good, in the one-person, one-decision scenario. What sort of world is this? If such a situation is possible (which, arguably, Catholic dogma might imply), then freedom of will does not logically lead to evil actions. But neither does it lead to a satisfactory world. Anyone who enjoys his existence (even his sinful existence) would not prefer nonexistence to existence. So I think this, if it is allowed, is a hollow conclusion.
Well, we are getting somewhere. First, I said nothing about whether the world is “satisfactory”, or not. It is simple, that is true. Second, what constitues a “satisfactory” world is highly subjective. However, this is where the inductive part will come to the rescue. If we ever get there
. From this starting point it can be proven that for any “n” (the number of morally significant decisions) there is at least one posible world where k = 0 (that is no immoral outcomes will occur).
Let me tell you a nifty old story.
Jack and Mike are having a conversation. Jack tell Mike the following setup: “there is a gas-stove, an empty pot, a water faucet and a box of matches”. The problem is to have hot water, and asks Mike to set up the algorithm to make hot water. (I played this little game many times, and the result was always the same). Mike will answer (very hesitantly, since he suspects that the question is tricky): “well, I will place the pot under the faucet, open up the faucet, fill up the pot. Then I will place the filled pot onto the stove, strike a match, light up the gas, and wait for the water to become hot”. Jack says: “excellent algorithm!”. Now what would you do, if the pot would already be filled? The answer always comes up with full confidence this time: "I would place the pot on the stove, strike the match, light up the gas, and wait for the hot water. (And he usually smiles knowing that he gave a correct answer.)
Now Jack says: “well, this is how a physicist would act”. The mathematician says: “I would pour out the water, and thus reduce it to the previous, already solved problem”. I hope you see the point (and maybe had a chuckle). The point is that we do not have to examine each and every scenario. If we find a general solution (without specifying the “n” and “k”, then for any “n” and "any “k” we shall know that the problem is solved.
But if free will decisions cannot be known, nor estimated, a priori, then we do not *know *that there is a second person that could exist that would make such a decision. It is an empirical exercise, not a rational one.
No, that is not correct. We are conducting a thought-experiment. The only consideration is that a possible world cannot contain or lead to a logical contradiction.
