One final time: freedom of will does NOT logically lead to evil actions

[Prodigal_Son]

As long as free will means to have at least two available options, and it is the agent who makes the decision, it is mathematically certain that for any “n” (the overall number of morally singificant decisions) and for any “k” (the number of immoral outcomes) where “k” goes from “0” to “n” we can find a possible world where exactly “k” immoral (and thus “n - k” moral) decisons will be made.

From my view, I wonder where the assumption that k must go from “0” to “n” comes from. Why assume that there could possibly be zero immoral decisions, even in a one-decision world? Am I missing something? Isn’t this begging the question?

No, that is not correct. We are conducting a thought-experiment. The only consideration is that a possible world cannot contain or lead to a logical contradiction.

This is what my own fallible intellect can latch onto here:

There is no logical contradiction in W4. If that is what you were seeking to prove, it is proven.

The possible existence of W4 is contingent upon the decisions of free agents, other than God. It is possible that God cannot actuate W4. (My earlier objections, to the effect that if W4 could be actuated, it would be “cheating”, still apply.)

If God is not the locus of contingency for W4, then it follows that the definition of a God as a “being capable of effecting any state of events that is not logically contradictory” is in question. There are other limitations at play, as soon as the existence of other free wills are factored in. In effect, God makes all free will agents in existence co-creators.

Adjusted, we might say that: God, in cooperation with all other creators whom He endows with power of free will, is capable of effecting any state of events that is not logically contradictory". You

 

[Spock]

From my view, I wonder where the assumption that k must go from “0” to “n” comes from. Why assume that there could possibly be zero immoral decisions, even in a one-decision world? Am I missing something? Isn’t this begging the question?

Well, think about this. We all know that people are confronted by morally significant problems. We also know that sometimes they make morally proper and sometimes they make morally improper decisions. There is nothing “special” about either one. Why do you find it strange that someone consistently makes proper decisions? Do you have the same reservations about someone who consistently makes immoral decisions? Or do you find that acceptable?

This is what my own fallible intellect can latch onto here:

There is no logical contradiction in W4. If that is what you were seeking to prove, it is proven.

The possible existence of W4 is contingent upon the decisions of free agents, other than God. It is possible that God cannot actuate W4. (My earlier objections, to the effect that if W4 could be actuated, it would be “cheating”, still apply.)

If God is not the locus of contingency for W4, then it follows that the definition of a God as a “being capable of effecting any state of events that is not logically contradictory” is in question. There are other limitations at play, as soon as the existence of other free wills are factored in. In effect, God makes all free will agents in existence co-creators.

Adjusted, we might say that: God, in cooperation with all other creators whom He endows with power of free will, is capable of effecting any state of events that is not logically contradictory".

That brings up an interesting question: namely just what does “omnipotence” mean? We touched upon this before but it was deemed irrelevant to the question at hand. The truth is that even if we are “co-creators”, that does not let God “off the hook”. After all God is supposed to know in advance who will make what decision. Also God actively creates (not just passively allows it to happen) these persons (according to the Catholic doctrine) by creating their “souls” at conception. Also, there is no obligation on God’s part to create anyone. He can decide whom to create and whom not to create.

Therefore God can create a world without evil, without interfering with anyone’s free will, simply by not creating the “future offenders”. That is part of the constructive proof I offered in the previous posts. The number of possibly “creatable” persons will be probably smaller than it is today. That is not the point. You might wish to argue, that the number of creatable persons would be zero, that there is not one person who will consistently make morally upright decisions, but I don’t think that would hold any water.

The funny part is that according to human standards, if someone knows beforehand that a crime will be committed, and has the power to prevent it, and fails to do so, than that person is held fully liable for the deed - just like tha actual perpetrator. Would you agree that the same principle also applies to God? I would so stipulate.

In my view God has to bear full responsibility for all the evils ever happened because he knew in advance what will happen, could have prevented it without interfering with the free will of anyone akready in existence (by not creating the future perpetrators) and failed to do so. To say that the “respect for the free will” predates the creation of the persons would be total nonsense. Someone who does not exist, cannot have free will, and thus it cannot be respected.

 

[fhansen]

If either one is ruled out as logically impossible, then the agent was “doomed” to make the “other” selection, and as such he has no free will. Therefore both scenarios are possible, and thus God can actualize either one of them - again, without “forcing” the decision. That is the proof for the presented scenario. Ready for the inductive part?

But presented this way, even if W1 or W2 are both possible, aren’t the agents just as “doomed” to make their decisions- based on whichever world God chooses to actualize? It seems the decision would be forced either way.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

Well, think about this. We all know that people are confronted by morally significant problems. We also know that sometimes they make morally proper and sometimes they make morally improper decisions. There is nothing “special” about either one. Why do you find it strange that someone consistently makes proper decisions? Do you have the same reservations about someone who consistently makes immoral decisions? Or do you find that acceptable?

These are speculative questions – interesting, but speculative. My question was a very specific question: why does the number 0 appear in your proof as a possibility? It does not, to my mind, have a right to appear in any proof until it has been proven that 0 is a possible answer. This particular proof seems to be proving something it assumes.

Since you haven’t clarified the issue, I will assume that there is nothing to clarify. It has nothing to do with me finding it strange that someone makes proper decisions – which would be a posteriori guess at the truth – it has to do with the way you set up your mathematical postulate.

The funny part is that according to human standards, if someone knows beforehand that a crime will be committed, and has the power to prevent it, and fails to do so, than that person is held fully liable for the deed - just like tha actual perpetrator. Would you agree that the same principle also applies to God? I would so stipulate.

The *first *responsibility for all experiences brought on by our existence is God’s. This is by no means the greatest responsibility, however, for the damages caused by sin: the greatest responsibility is in the hands of the sinners who freely chose to hurt others. God has the power to make up for sin, which we do not. I do not presume to know better than God, although I would not be a believer if I did not (to some degree, at least) understand why a world like our own is necessary if there is to be free will.

In my view God has to bear full responsibility for all the evils ever happened because he knew in advance what will happen, could have prevented it without interfering with the free will of anyone akready in existence (by not creating the future perpetrators) and failed to do so. To say that the “respect for the free will” predates the creation of the persons would be total nonsense. Someone who does not exist, cannot have free will, and thus it cannot be respected.

In my view, a world without free will would be a world without goodness. It could not be the expression of a good God.

 

[tdgesq]

Just because some philosophers accept or reject something it is not relevant. What is being said is important, who says it, is not.

It is certainly relevant to the vast majority of us who do not hold to a naïve notion of the principle of alternate possibilities. From now on, I will just call it naïve PAP. I don’t really care who says they reject naïve PAP. The point is: most of us libertarian theists (and almost all Catholics – you are on a Catholic forum after all) require a causal explanation. All determinists I know require a causal explanation.

I went and re-read this subject at plato.stanford.edu/entries/freewill/, just for the fun of it and to refresh my memory.

Then you read the wrong article. Here is the one that applies to this discussion, at least now that you’ve made the definition of free will an issue: plato.stanford.edu/entries/free-will-foreknowledge/
After all, your entire argument rests on the fact the God foresees all events.

First, the actual existence of free will is something that cannot be confirmed or disproven. It is a fundamental assumption. One either accepts it, or denies it.

The same is true of determinisim. One either accepts it or denies it. It cannot be confirmed or disproven by the non-theist. Efficient causation is a principle derived from induction. Yet the non-theist has no way of proving induction, and therefore cannot prove that there is such a thing as efficient causation. Under my worldview, efficient causation and free will have a rational basis. Under your worldveiw, neither do.

We assume in this conversation that free will exists. We may differ on the importance of it, but that is not a problem. Just “what” is free will, is the point of difference.

So you will use the naïve definition of free will that nobody else on this forum uses? Argue against a strawman if you wish. Of course it is worse than that. If we accept your definition, then this entire exercise was a waste of time. All you needed to do from the outset is show that there is no such thing as free will because God foresees all, such that nobody could “choose otherwise.” You didn’t do that. Why not? I think you understood quite well that most here do not believe in naïve PAP.

This is what mathematicians call a “necessary but not sufficient” definition. What you say is true, and trivial, almost to the point of being meaningless. As long as there is no total brain control, the locus of decision always lies with the agent.

I have heard logicians refer to necessary cause and sufficient cause, but never mathematicians. I do know what you mean, so let’s see where it leads.

If we would stop here, and disregard everything else, some very strange propositions would occur. For example, someone argued before that when a woman is being raped, her free will is not violated, she can “will” not to be raped, and the fact that she is unable to carry out her “will” is of no consequence. Her “free will” is not impaired, even though she is physically unable act? Another example would be when someone’s family is held hostage and he is demanded to perform some illegal act. He is physically able to refuse, though psychologically he is not. Is his “free will” still intact?

I’m not sure what your point is. If you can show me how naïve PAP gives a solution to this scenario whereas the locus of causal control does not, then I will respond. It doesn’t appear to me that you’ve shown any such thing. The persons’ actions are being controlled by outside forces, so we would say that they are not exercising free will.

Now you add another scenario, and say, that even if there is no hypothetical possibility to act otherwise, the person still has free will. Sorry, my friend, that is unacceptable.

Then show me what naïve PAP offers that an analysis of the source of causal control doesn’t. These scenarios are just as easily dealt with from a causal standpoint. In fact, it explains why the agent in those circumstances lacks free will better than PAP of any kind.

If we cannot to come to an agreement on this point, you will stick to your guns and assert that “free will” and evil are compatible, while I will say the opposite. We shall just have to agree to disagree.

It doesn’t have anything to do with whether we “can come to an agreement or not” on the definition of free will. Your definition of free will is one that most Catholics won’t accept, nor most modern libertarian philosphers. Perhaps you didn’t understand that at the outset, but that isn’t my problem. If you want to prove your own argument to yourself, then go ahead. If you want to offer a silly definition of free will that people here don’t accept, then it is your prerogative to assert that you argued a definition that nobody here would have accepted in the first place.

One more observation: since we mutually agreed that your W4 world is contingently possible, that flatly contradicts that there is necessarily one person who has free will and will always perform at least one immoral act.

I never asserted that there is necessarily one person who has free will and will always perform one immoral act, and there isn’t any need for me to. You fail to discern that the burden of proof is on you – not me or anybody else.

And finally, if you agree that there is at least one person (maybe more) who will freely (in my meaning) always act morally, and God can foresee that (omnisicence), then God can create a state of affairs without evil.

It is contingently possible. You may not understand this, but it is well accepted in possible worlds analysis. Furthermore, there are people here who obviously do understand (Prodigal Son). You need to do some further research into contingently true and necessarily true propositions.

Moreover, this a constructive proof (in the mathematical sense) not just an existential proof (also mathematically speaking).

Well, I’m still waiting for the the mathematical proof. Every time I ask for it I am told to ignore it because the one person one event scenario is so much clearer. Apparently the entire argument comes down to God is omniscient, therefore, nobody can do otherwise. That is silly.

 

[Betterave]

For one final time I am going to show that it is possible to have a world, where there is free will and there are no evil choices. I am tired of seeing the nonsensical argument that there are only two possibilities, either having free will and actual evil choices, or dummies (or robots) who are preprogrammed to do everything “right”. The proof will be a mathematical one, unquestionable.
…

Forgive me, I’m jumping in here without having read all of the foregoing discussion. Has anyone mentioned the fact that Spock’s proof is obviously not a “mathematical proof”? Obviously those who are not mathematicians and who have never seen a mathematical proof before might think that any “proof” that invokes numbers or algebraic formulae must be a “mathematical proof” but surely a mathematician couldn’t believe such a thing?

Here’s a “sproof” to illustrate:
I will prove “mathematically” that dollars can be used to buy gold: Suppose you have one person with one dollar - that person will be able to buy one dollar’s worth of gold at the going rate. … Now suppose there are N people each with one dollar - each person will be able to buy one dollar’s worth of gold at whatever the going rate, for a combined purchasing power of N dollars at the going rate (are you starting to get impressed yet?). Now suppose there are N persons each with M dollars - each person will be able to purchase M dollars’ worth of gold, at the going rate, for a combined purchasing power of (N x M) dollars’ worth of gold at the current rate. Therefore, as I have just “mathematically” demonstrated, dollars can be used to buy gold. (Of course, had I been in earnest I would have also demonstrated that I don’t know what a mathematical proof is - or at least I’m hoping others don’t know but will nonetheless be impressed by my oh-so-rigorous “mathematicality”).

C’est juste ou non?

 

[Chiral]

That brings up an interesting question: namely just what does “omnipotence” mean? We touched upon this before but it was deemed irrelevant to the question at hand. The truth is that even if we are “co-creators”, that does not let God “off the hook”. After all God is supposed to know in advance who will make what decision. Also God actively creates (not just passively allows it to happen) these persons (according to the Catholic doctrine) by creating their “souls” at conception. Also, there is no obligation on God’s part to create anyone. He can decide whom to create and whom not to create…
Therefore God can create a world without evil, without interfering with anyone’s free will, simply by not creating the “future offenders”…
…The funny part is that according to human standards, if someone knows beforehand that a crime will be committed, and has the power to prevent it, and fails to do so, than that person is held fully liable for the deed - just like the actual perpetrator…
…In my view God has to bear full responsibility for all the evils ever happened because he knew in advance what will happen, could have prevented it without interfering with the free will of anyone already in existence (by not creating the future perpetrators) and failed to do so. To say that the “respect for the free will” predates the creation of the persons would be total nonsense. Someone who does not exist, cannot have free will, and thus it cannot be respected.

Ahem, jumping in here without reading entire thread, but Spock is touching on one of my favorite subjects, that of omnificence - God actively enabling the means to sin, but that is a tangent.
Concerning human standards with regard to culpability, Spock is incorrect - foreknowledge and power to act do not a perpetrator make, the person is not held fully liable for the deed - they must actively participate in the crime itself. For the passive agent to share guilt, it must be proved that they actively participated by deliberately neglecting a duty to prevent what they knew would happen, and here motive comes into play. With regard to sin (not part of the human justice system), judgment falls upon the “willing” agent who freely chose to sin. To make God share culpability for the choice, one must prove that He had a duty (read “obligation”) which He actively neglected. Does God have a duty to prevent the occasion of sin?

Second, “respect for free will predating the creation” of a free being is not nonsense - God Himself is free, so His respect for freedom can predate the creation of anything at all. Also, “respect for free will” may entail what many Christians believe to be true about God, namely that He is omnibenevolent and that this entails Unconditional Love - a love that does not demand that His creations always choose good over evil. IF God were to create only those creatures He knew would choose good, could His love be considered “unconditional”?

So while logic proves that free will does not necessarily lead to evil, free will does provide a logical openning for evil; and I am not sure that it is logically consistent with God’s nature to create only beings who freely choose good forever, omitting those who do not from existence - this may portend a limit to God’s love or a logical contradiction.

 

[Spock]

To all participants: thanks for the interesting comments. I did not neglect the thread, but I have the wonderful opportunity to spend a lot of time with my grandson, and thus little time to participate. Nevertheless, I am composing the replies off-line, whenever I can, and will duly post them when they are complete. I can foresee a lot of interesting conversations.

Just one point to chew on in my absence: the concept of foreknowledge came up. Usually philosophers define knowledge as “true belief”, or “justified true belief”. This definition is lacking one important part: “belief about what”? I define “knowledge” as “correct information about something (an object or event)”. To say that one may have information about something that does not exist (“a non-existent book, which was never written and will never be written because the author was never born”) is as absurd as they come. To have information about something presupposes that the object exists (or existed and the information about it was gathered and preserved) or the event occurred. Since the future does not “exist” in any sense of the word, information about it is impossible. Therefore “foreknowledge” is exactly as nonsensical as describing the geographical point which resides to the north from the North Pole. Think about it! This may be a great topic for a new thread, once this one is concluded.

 

[Chiral]

Looking forward to your posts.

…the concept of foreknowledge came up… I define “knowledge” as “correct information about something (an object or event)”… To have information about something presupposes that the object exists (or existed and the information about it was gathered and preserved) or the event occurred. Since the future does not “exist” in any sense of the word, information about it is impossible.

Indeed this is off-topic. Your understanding of “knowledge” is correct; your understanding of time, namely the “future”, is incorrect in regard to God - the “future” does “exist” to God as present actualized reality. The term “future” concerns only those whose experience is limited by time, but to God there is no “future”. When we speak of “divine foreknowledge” we anthropomorphize concerning God’s present knowledge of a time (T2) that we at a prior moment (T1) have yet to experience.
Logical statements regarding events should always have a time-stamp. “X occurs at Tn” is either true or false contingent on the parts of the statement. If the statement is true (i.e. an omniscient being has knowledge of it), then the existence of Tn is certain, regardless of where it stands in relation to our “present”. This is all logically sound, but whether you accept the premise regarding time is a matter of personal belief.

 

[Sarpedon]

1. Let’s start with a very simple world, where there is one moral agent, who makes one decision. In that case there are two possible worlds, one, where the agent makes a moral choice (regardless of how moral is defined) and another one, where the agent makes an immoral choice. God can actualize either one of these worlds.

I have not read the whole thread, so ignore this post if it has already been addressed.

I think the fundamental problem with your argument is the above quote. You assume that God could actualize a world in which all free decisions are a certain thing. This would mean that God could know the actions of nonexistent people.

Such an approach is not necessarily correct. Perhaps God cannot know that X imaginary person choose Y in a certain situation. Since the person never existed, there would be no way for God to know what that person would choose (since the choice would have to originate in the mind of the person, which God has no access to, since it does not exist).

In other words, a person must originate a choice within their mind before there is anything for God to know. Once that is originated and thus knowable to God, the action has already come into existence, thus shooting your argument in the foot.

Your whole argument is built around the idea that God knows what X person does in A imaginary world and what he does in B imaginary world. Since both worlds are imaginary, and a human free choice must originate in a mind outside of God, there is no way for there to be any object of knowledge in this situation. In an imaginary world there are no self-autonomous human minds to originate decisions, and thus there is nothing for God to know. God can know His own ideas- such as what sort of animals could live in X imaginary world- but He cannot know what A person would choose in such a world, since that knowledge would require A person to originate the knowable thing, which he cannot do, since he is only imaginary and does not exist.

 

[fhansen]

To all participants: thanks for the interesting comments. I did not neglect the thread, but I have the wonderful opportunity to spend a lot of time with my grandson, and thus little time to participate. Nevertheless, I am composing the replies off-line, whenever I can, and will duly post them when they are complete. I can foresee a lot of interesting conversations.

Just one point to chew on in my absence: the concept of foreknowledge came up. Usually philosophers define knowledge as “true belief”, or “justified true belief”. This definition is lacking one important part: “belief about what”? I define “knowledge” as “correct information about something (an object or event)”. To say that one may have information about something that does not exist (“a non-existent book, which was never written and will never be written because the author was never born”) is as absurd as they come. To have information about something presupposes that the object exists (or existed and the information about it was gathered and preserved) or the event occurred. Since the future does not “exist” in any sense of the word, information about it is impossible. Therefore “foreknowledge” is exactly as nonsensical as describing the geographical point which resides to the north from the North Pole. Think about it! This may be a great topic for a new thread, once this one is concluded.

But even if it’s granted that foreknowledge is impossible, then God would in no way be culpable for sin resulting from free will-He’d have no opportunity to choose between W1 thru W4, human free will would be possible, and it could still logically lead to evil.

 

[tdgesq]

To all participants: thanks for the interesting comments. I did not neglect the thread, but I have the wonderful opportunity to spend a lot of time with my grandson, and thus little time to participate. Nevertheless, I am composing the replies off-line, whenever I can, and will duly post them when they are complete. I can foresee a lot of interesting conversations.

Don’t worry about it! You have been so accommodating with my time constraints. Have a great time with your grandson.

 

[Spock]

But even if it’s granted that foreknowledge is impossible, then God would in no way be culpable for sin resulting from free will-He’d have no opportunity to choose between W1 thru W4, human free will would be possible, and it could still logically lead to evil.

Agreed. If foreknowledge is impossible, then God is not culpable. One should always grant the benefit of the doubt. If God could not have foreknown the outcome of his actions, and acted in good faith, then he does not share the blame.

 

[Spock]

I have not read the whole thread, so ignore this post if it has already been addressed.

I think the fundamental problem with your argument is the above quote. You assume that God could actualize a world in which all free decisions are a certain thing. This would mean that God could know the actions of nonexistent people.

Such an approach is not necessarily correct. Perhaps God cannot know that X imaginary person choose Y in a certain situation. Since the person never existed, there would be no way for God to know what that person would choose (since the choice would have to originate in the mind of the person, which God has no access to, since it does not exist).

In other words, a person must originate a choice within their mind before there is anything for God to know. Once that is originated and thus knowable to God, the action has already come into existence, thus shooting your argument in the foot.

Your whole argument is built around the idea that God knows what X person does in A imaginary world and what he does in B imaginary world. Since both worlds are imaginary, and a human free choice must originate in a mind outside of God, there is no way for there to be any object of knowledge in this situation. In an imaginary world there are no self-autonomous human minds to originate decisions, and thus there is nothing for God to know. God can know His own ideas- such as what sort of animals could live in X imaginary world- but He cannot know what A person would choose in such a world, since that knowledge would require A person to originate the knowable thing, which he cannot do, since he is only imaginary and does not exist.

I agree. If God cannot know the hypothetical outcome of never-happened decision of a nonexistent person, in a surmised scenario, then all bets are off. Yours is one of the possible logical solutions for the so-called problem of evil (the collection of omniscience, omnipotence, omnibenevolence and the existence of evil – at least some evils – are incompatible with each other), namely that God is not omniscient in the traditional sense. By the way, the other logical solution (that I am aware of) was presented by Rabbi Kuschner (in his book: “When bad things happen to good people”) where he suggested that God is omniscient, but not omnipotent. God would like to eliminate all the evils, but unable to do so.

 

[Spock]

Indeed this is off-topic. Your understanding of “knowledge” is correct; your understanding of time, namely the “future”, is incorrect in regard to God - the “future” does “exist” to God as present actualized reality. The term “future” concerns only those whose experience is limited by time, but to God there is no “future”. When we speak of “divine foreknowledge” we anthropomorphize concerning God’s present knowledge of a time (T2) that we at a prior moment (T1) have yet to experience.
Logical statements regarding events should always have a time-stamp. “X occurs at Tn” is either true or false contingent on the parts of the statement. If the statement is true (i.e. an omniscient being has knowledge of it), then the existence of Tn is certain, regardless of where it stands in relation to our “present”. This is all logically sound, but whether you accept the premise regarding time is a matter of personal belief.

That leads to a logical contradiction. To say that the future does not exist for us, but it exists for God is logically contradictory. **Knowledge **about an event is contingent upon the observer; the **existence **of the event is not. Something either exists, or it does not.

Usually, there is an analogy presented, that of a movie and the spectator. The spectator is “outside” the time of the movie, yet he is unaware of the outcome until it actually happens (at least the first time).

By the same token, you might argue that God is outside our space (or totally spaceless) and that would enable God to occupy the spot which is to the north from the North Pole. I hope you agree that this would be nonsensical.

 

[Spock]

Concerning human standards with regard to culpability, Spock is incorrect - foreknowledge and power to act do not a perpetrator make, the person is not held fully liable for the deed - they must actively participate in the crime itself. For the passive agent to share guilt, it must be proved that they actively participated by deliberately neglecting a duty to prevent what they knew would happen, and here motive comes into play. With regard to sin (not part of the human justice system), judgment falls upon the “willing” agent who freely chose to sin. To make God share culpability for the choice, one must prove that He had a duty (read “obligation”) which He actively neglected. Does God have a duty to prevent the occasion of sin?

That would be the logical corollary of benevolence. Why allow something that one “abhors” and which does not benefit anyone?

Second, “respect for free will predating the creation” of a free being is not nonsense - God Himself is free, so His respect for freedom can predate the creation of anything at all.

In a generic sense, sure, but in not in a specific instance. One may enjoy books in general, but it would be nonsensical to say that one enjoys a book which one has not read yet. Don’t you agree?

Also, “respect for free will” may entail what many Christians believe to be true about God, namely that He is omnibenevolent and that this entails Unconditional Love - a love that does not demand that His creations always choose good over evil. IF God were to create only those creatures He knew would choose good, could His love be considered “unconditional”?

To extend the prerequisites (God’s alleged unconditional love) is changing the goalposts. We can surmise God’s nature from the observed facts, and that would make God’s unconditional love highly improbable. The observed facts do not point to any kind of love, much less unconditional. More like total indifference.

So while logic proves that free will does not necessarily lead to evil, free will does provide a logical openning for evil; and I am not sure that it is logically consistent with God’s nature to create only beings who freely choose good forever, omitting those who do not from existence - this may portend a limit to God’s love or a logical contradiction.

I see no logical contradiction here. Can you point it out?

 

[Spock]

Forgive me, I’m jumping in here without having read all of the foregoing discussion. Has anyone mentioned the fact that Spock’s proof is obviously not a “mathematical proof”? Obviously those who are not mathematicians and who have never seen a mathematical proof before might think that any “proof” that invokes numbers or algebraic formulae must be a “mathematical proof” but surely a mathematician couldn’t believe such a thing?

Here’s a “sproof” to illustrate:
I will prove “mathematically” that dollars can be used to buy gold: Suppose you have one person with one dollar - that person will be able to buy one dollar’s worth of gold at the going rate. … Now suppose there are N people each with one dollar - each person will be able to buy one dollar’s worth of gold at whatever the going rate, for a combined purchasing power of N dollars at the going rate (are you starting to get impressed yet?). Now suppose there are N persons each with M dollars - each person will be able to purchase M dollars’ worth of gold, at the going rate, for a combined purchasing power of (N x M) dollars’ worth of gold at the current rate. Therefore, as I have just “mathematically” demonstrated, dollars can be used to buy gold. (Of course, had I been in earnest I would have also demonstrated that I don’t know what a mathematical proof is - or at least I’m hoping others don’t know but will nonetheless be impressed by my oh-so-rigorous “mathematicality”).

Mathematics does not deal with absolutes, only conditionals. Every theorem has the form: “If A, then B, else C”. Your sproof presupposes that gold is available for free trade.

 

[Spock]

These are speculative questions – interesting, but speculative. My question was a very specific question: why does the number 0 appear in your proof as a possibility? It does not, to my mind, have a right to appear in any proof until it has been proven that 0 is a possible answer. This particular proof seems to be proving something it assumes.

The same would apply to any “k” (the number of immoral actions). Why single out one of them?

The *first *responsibility for all experiences brought on by our existence is God’s. This is by no means the greatest responsibility, however, for the damages caused by sin: the greatest responsibility is in the hands of the sinners who freely chose to hurt others.

It is the fundamental act, and everything else is contingent upon it.

In my view, a world without free will would be a world without goodness. It could not be the expression of a good God.

That does not follow. Goodness is not contingent upon “badness”.

 

[Spock]

But presented this way, even if W1 or W2 are both possible, aren’t the agents just as “doomed” to make their decisions- based on whichever world God chooses to actualize? It seems the decision would be forced either way.

As far as I am concerned, yes. But it is the assumption that God’s foreknowledge allows freedom of actions.

 

[Spock]

It is certainly relevant to the vast majority of us who do not hold to a naïve notion of the principle of alternate possibilities. From now on, I will just call it naïve PAP. I don’t really care who says they reject naïve PAP. The point is: most of us libertarian theists (and almost all Catholics – you are on a Catholic forum after all) require a causal explanation. All determinists I know require a causal explanation.

Would you also say that any questioning of Catholic beliefs is also inadmissible – for the same reason, namely being on a Catholic board? If that were the case, then my whole presence here should not be allowed. Would you say that your definition is the only one which is correct, or are you open to the possibility that it might be incorrect, and consider alternatives?

Then you read the wrong article. Here is the one that applies to this discussion, at least now that you’ve made the definition of free will an issue: plato.stanford.edu/entries/free-will-foreknowledge/
After all, your entire argument rests on the fact the God foresees all events.

Very interesting article. The example, which should be reason to discard PAP merits attention. In it Mary Jones has the full control to commit the act, but she has no control over avoiding it. So, even by your definition (the locus of control resides with the agent) she does not have full control, she only has partial control. So she has no true “control” over her actions – she has no “true” free will.

Free will is never “absolute”; it can only be analyzed in a specific scenario, in regards to a specific aim. Let’s consider another hypothetical scenario: “Someone is trapped in a burning high-rise. In the room there is a lot of food. He has full control over eating anything that is available. In that regard he has full control. Being trapped, he has two choices in regards to his close future. He can stay put and burn to death, or he can jump and gets crushed to death.” He has no option to survive the incident. What does your definition say about this scenario? He has two options; he has full control which one to choose. By your definition, he has unabridged free will.

By my definition he has no freedom to survive. The options available are insufficient. It is possible that Mary Jones (in the example) may change her mind, and she does not want to kill White any more. Does she have the freedom to avoid it? She does not. If she does not change her mind, she has full control; she may even choose what method to use to kill White. But that is not sufficient to have “true” free will.

As a matter of fact, this reminds me of an old sign on the boss’s desk, which says:

Rule #1: The boss is always right.
Rule #2: In the event to the contrary, refer to Rule #1!

So for free will to have any meaning, it is essential that one has the significant control to achieve what one wants, or it’s opposite. That is the only problem with the “locus of control” definition, it does not specify: “control over what?”.

In a moral dilemma-type of scenario, the only true dilemma is to act morally (which can be done in many ways), or to act immorally (which can also be done in many ways). According to the “naïve” locus of control (yes, imitation is the highest form of flattery… and I mean it!) it is supposed to be enough to have many options to carry out one “horn” of the dilemma, and it is supposed to be irrelevant to be unable to act according to the other “horn”. In such a case it would not be a moral dilemma any longer, would it? And that is exactly what we are contemplating in this discussion: the moral choice (to act morally or immorally).

Of course, deep down, I totally agree with the locus of control. As far as I am concerned, those humans who are able to act morally in many (or at least 2) ways have “enough” free will – and they are not “robots” in any sense of the word. By the same token, those humans, who are only able to act immorally (also in many ways, but at least 2 ways) are also not “robots”. (To have at least two options is essential; otherwise we cannot even speak of “choice”.) However, that was the unanimous objection in my other threads, where it was stipulated that only being able to act either morally or immorally is the “freedom” to avoid “robotness” (if there is such a word). I find it highly amusing that we exchanged roles (if you will) and now you argue my position, and I argue yours (not personally yours, but the Catholic stance - as expressed by the posters around here, which might be incorrect). Generally speaking, you are correct. However, in this case we talk about a “moral dilemma”. Without having the option to act either morally or immorally one cannot speak of significant free will in this regard.

So you will use the naïve definition of free will that nobody else on this forum uses? Argue against a strawman if you wish. Of course it is worse than that. If we accept your definition, then this entire exercise was a waste of time. All you needed to do from the outset is show that there is no such thing as free will because God foresees all, such that nobody could “choose otherwise.” You didn’t do that. Why not? I think you understood quite well that most here do not believe in naïve PAP.

If disagreement would automatically mean “strawman” argument, then what am I doing here?

I have heard logicians refer to necessary cause and sufficient cause, but never mathematicians. I do know what you mean, so let’s see where it leads.

I am talking about necessary and sufficient prerequisites.

… continued in the next post.