Orthodox accept artificial contraception?

[Marybeloved]

This is a very interesting accusation, Dear Dandy Jim

If you are correct, and I’d be happy to say that you are, then the Catholic Church also give permission to sin in the case of artificial birth control.

There are many, and I’d say egregious, permissions to sin recommended for pastoral practice in the following:

vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/family/documents/rc_pc_family_doc_12021997_vademecum_en.html

Elijahmaria, perhaps I’m missing something. I see nowhere where a Priest is given authority to authorize use of contraceptives to control births by the penitent in that document. PS:- Contraceptives can be used as medicine for some illness in the body but never for the intention of preventing conception. For that, the couple abstains from relations where there are good reasons to avoid pregnancy.

In that document, only two issues come close: In one, where the priest judges that it’s better to allow the penitent to remain in good faith, ie. ignorant (therefore does not reveal to them the sin) since he sees they will enter immediately into formal sin. Here it’s a matter of prudence and refraining from information, never saying that it’s OK to do so merely because of the difficult circumstances of the couple. The other is when the other spouse is the one engaging in the use of contraceptives and the other cannot really stop them. So I’m not really following.

 

[Marybeloved]

Elijahmaria, perhaps I’m missing something. I see nowhere where a Priest is given authority to authorize use of contraceptives to control births by the penitent in that document. PS:- Contraceptives can be used as medicine for some illness in the body but never for the intention of preventing conception.

Just to clarify, abortifacent pills cannot be legitimately used by sexually active women even for purely medical reasons due to the risk of aborting babies conceived while the mother is using these pills.

 

[Newsy]

If you are correct, and I’d be happy to say that you are, then the Catholic Church also give permission to sin in the case of artificial birth control

So where does the Catholic Church say that ABC’s are ok? The Church’s stance has always been that ABC’s are wrong, the accepted alternative is NFP, which is not an ABC. The problem with artificial birth control, besides the destruction of a conceived life, is that it inhibits the sexual act. In order to fully give oneself to your partner, you cannot withhold any aspect of yourself, say your fertility. Using ABC’s is seeking all of the pleasure, while withholding part of yourself, and bypassing any responsibility.

This is a slippery slope, we have seen how it worked in the Episcopalian Church. First it was limited use inside of marriage, next stop relativism. This happened with all denominations, they quickly followed suit. To wit, now several denominations allow for abortion as a woman’s right.

 

[L_piperatus]

If I may say myself, (not that I agree with him, please note) I think he means that the spiritual death of the spouse kills the marriage when it occurs, not that the spouse remains spiritually dead for good. So that even if the spouse is resurrected later on, the marriage will not.

What I find problematic about this is that there’s lots of ways of dying spiritually, beyond adultery. If that was all that was required, then the marriage would die for many more reasons than adultery. Perhaps he means that a mortal sin that directly contravenes the marriage vow is what makes the marriage itself die. But I again, would wonder about spouses that do not choose to split after adultery- Is their marriage dead upon adultery? Do they live in a non-marital status if they forgive each other and continue on in their normal relations without conducting a fresh marriage?

I think I understand your logic, i.e. the hypothesis that some may regard mortal sin as a temporary rather than permanent spiritual death. Indeed, if that would kill a marriage, then the marriage would die for many more reasons than adultery. Let’s consider the husband who chooses to attend the football game instead of satisfying his Sunday obligation for Holy Mass, or the wife who misses Sunday Mass without a good reason - perhaps she went to the beauty salon and spa instead of attending Mass. If these people have committed mortal sins, one would need to say that they are spiritually dead and their marriages are dead as well. Then, such people would need to not only go to sacramental confession, but also contract a fresh marriage with their spouses, since the old marriage is dead. Also, what about the person who kills another one out of hatred, or family vendetta? If he committed a mortal sin, is his marriage dead now?

But I still struggle with this: can we, including the person’s confessor or spiritual father, say for sure that they committed a mortal sin? Perhaps there were extenuating circumstances? And if the sin was mortal, does that mean that the person is spiritually dead? Is there such a thing as temporary or reversible spiritual death, which can be reversed by repentance and sacramental confession?

I bet these questions came up during the first few centuries’ heresies, and I bet the Church answered them a long time ago - but I’m not educated enough to know how to search, and where to search for the answers.

Finally, it seems like the Catholic Church does not teach that one spouse committing a mortal sin will put an end to the marriage. The Catholic Church teaches that the physical death of one spouse ends the marriage, but says nothing about a spouse’s mortal sin ending the marriage.

 

[L_piperatus]

Regarding valid reasons for ecclesiastical divorce in the EOC, someone posted a document about the Russian EOC’s policy, in an earlier thread. What surprised me is that the Russian EOC allows ecclesiastical divorce for such reasons as one spouse contracting incurable sexually transmitted disease, leprosy, mental disease, and for reason of prolonged absence or jailment of one spouse. Thus, for example, if one spouse contracted leprosy, the other spouse could apply for ecclesiastical divorce, and I suppose they would be allowed to marry someone else with the Russian EOC’s approval, while their former spouse suffering of leprosy was still alive. I also wonder what do they regard as a legitimate mental disease for ecclesiastical divorce. Perhaps a severe case of schizophrenia, or manic-depressive disease? How about degenerative diseases affecting the brain, e.g. senile dementia, Alzheimer’s disease, or progressive spongiform encephalopathy (which is what young people contracted in Great Britain in the 1990s, after consuming beef products tainted with mad cow disease)? I guess if a spouse contracts HIV/AIDS and perhaps HIV-related dementia as well, that would fit pretty neatly because of the incurable STD component, and also the mental disease component.

 

[manualman]

I guess if a spouse contracts HIV/AIDS and perhaps HIV-related dementia as well, that would fit pretty neatly because of the incurable STD component, and also the mental disease component.

Wha? AIDS has a mental disease component? You sure about that???

 

[L_piperatus]

Here are some interesting comparisons regarding the Catholic, Oriental Orthodox, and Eastern Orthodox practice and doctrine regarding divorce and remarriage, plus quotes from the Early Church Fathers - all quotes from the Catholic Encyclopedia’s entry on divorce at newadvent.org/cathen/05054c.htm .

Quote:

(b) Tradition and the Historical Development in Doctrine and Practice — The doctrine of Scripture about the illicitness of divorce is fully confirmed by the constant tradition of the Church. The testimonies of the Fathers and the councils leave us no room for doubt. In numerous places they lay down the teaching that not even in the case of adultery can the marriage bond be dissolved or the innocent party proceed to a new marriage. They insist rather that the innocent party must remain unmarried after the dismissal of the guilty one, and can only enter upon new marriage in case death intervenes.

We read in Hermas (about the year 150), “Pastor”, mand. IV, I, 6: "Let him put her (the adulterous wife) away and let the husband abide alone; but if after putting away his wife he shall marry another, he likewise committeth adultery (ed. Funk, 1901). The expression in verse 8, “For the sake of her repentance, therefore, the husband ought not to marry”, does not weaken the absolute command, but it gives the supposed reason of this great command. St. Justine Martyr (d. 176) says (Apolog., I, xv, P.G., VI, 349), plainly and without exception: “He that marrieth her that has been put away by another man committeth adultery.” In like manner Athenagoras (about 177) in his Plea for the Christians 33: “For whosoever shall put away his wife and shall marry another, committed adultery”; Tertullian (d. 247), “De monogamiâ”, c, ix (P.L., II, 991): “They enter into adulterous unions even when they do not put away their wives, we are not allowed to even marry although we put our wives away”; Clement of Alexandria (d. 217) (Stromata II.23) mentions the ordinance of Holy Scripture in the following words; “You shall not put away your wife except for fornication, and [Holy Scripture] considers as adultery a remarriage while the other of the separated persons survives.” Similar expressions are found in the course of the following centuries both in the Latin and in the Greek Fathers, e.g. St. Basil of Cæsarea, “Epist. can.”, ii, “Ad Amphilochium”, can. xlviii (P.G., XXXII, 732); St. John Chrysostom, “De libello repud.” (P.G., LI, 218); Theodoretus, on I Cor., vii, 39, 40 (P.G., LXXXII, 275); St. Ambrose, “in Luc.”, VIII, v, 18 sqq. (P.L., XV, 1855); St. Jerome, Epist. lx (ad Amand.), n. 3 (P.L., XXII, 562); St. Augustine, “De adulterinis conjugiis”, II, iv (P.L., XL, 473), etc., etc. The occurrences of passages in some Fathers, even among those just quoted, which treat the husband more mildly in case of adultery, or seem to allow him a new marriage after the infidelity of his spouse, does not prove that these expressions are to be understood of the permissibility of a new marriage, but of the lesser canonical penance and of exemption from punishment by civil law. Or if they refer to a command on the part of the Church, the new marriage is supposed to take place after the death of the wife who was dismissed. This permission was mentioned, not without reason, as a concession for the innocent party, because at some periods the Church’s laws in regard to the guilty party forbade forever any further marriage (cf. can. vii of the Council of Compiègne, 757). It is well known that the civil law, even of the Christian emperors, permitted in several cases a new marriage after the separation of the wife. Hence, without contradicting himself, St. Basil could say of the husband, “He is not condemned”, and “He is considered excusable” (ep. clxxxviii, can. ix, and Ep. cxcix, can. xxi, in P.G., XXXII, 678, 721), because he is speaking distinctly of the milder treatment of the husband than of the wife with regard to the canonical penance imposed for adultery. St. Epiphanius, who is especially reproached with teaching that the husband who had put away his wife because of adultery or another crime was allowed by Divine law to marry another (Hæres, lix, 4, in P.G., XLI, 1024), is speaking in reality of a second marriage after the death of the divorced wife, and whilst he declares in general that such a second marriage is allowed, but is less honourable, still he makes the exception in regard to this last part in favour of one who had long been separate from his first wife. The other Fathers of the following centuries, in whose works ambiguous or obscure expressions may be found, are to be explained in like manner.

 

[L_piperatus]

Quote from Catholic Encyclopedia - continued:

The practice of the faithful was not indeed always in perfect accord with the doctrine of the Church. On account of defective morality, there are to be found regulations of particular synods which permitted unjustifiable concessions. However, the synods of all centuries, and more clearly still the decrees of the popes, have constantly declared that divorce which annulled the marriage and permitted remarriage was never allowed. The Synod of Elvira (A.D. 300) maintains without the least ambiguity the permanence of the marriage bond, even in the case of adultery. Canon ix decreed: “A faithful woman who has left an adulterous husband and is marrying another who is faithful, let her be prohibited from marrying; if she has married, let her not receive communion until the man she has left shall have departed this life, unless illness should make this an imperative necessity” (Labbe, “Concilia”, II, 7). The Synod of Arles (314) speaks indeed of counseling as far as possible, that the young men who had dismissed their wives for adultery should take no second wife" (ut, in quantum possil, consilium eis detur); but it declares at the same time the illicit character of such a second marriage, because it says of these husbands, “They are forbidden to marry” (prohibentur nubere, Labbe, II, 472). The same declaration is to be found in the Second Council of Mileve (416), canon xvii (Labbe, IV, 331); the Council of Hereford (673), canon x (Labbe, VII, 554); the Council of Friuli (Forum Julii), in northern Italy (791), canon x (Labbe, IX, 46); all of these teach distinctly that the marriage bond remains even in case of dismissal for adultery, and that new marriage is therefore forbidden.

The following decisions of the popes on this subject deserve special mention: Innocent I, “Epist. ad Exsuper.”, c. vi, n. 12 (P.L., XX, 500): “Your diligence has asked concerning those, also, who, by means of a deed of separation, have contracted another marriage. It is manifest that they are adulterers on both sides.” Compare also with “Epist. ad Vict. Rothom.”, xiii, 15, (P.L., XX, 479): “In respect to all cases the rule is kept that whoever marries another man, while her husband is still alive, must be held to be an adulteress, and must be granted no leave to do penance unless one of the men shall have died.” The impossibility of absolute divorce during the entire life of married people could not be expressed more forcibly than by declaring that the permission to perform public penance must be refused to women who remarried, as to a public sinner, because this penance presupposed the cessation of sin, and to remain in a second marriage was to continue in sin.

Besides the adultery of one of the married parties, the laws of the empire recognized other reasons for which marriage might be dissolved, and remarriage permitted, for instance, protracted absence as a prisoner of war, or the choice of religious life by one of the spouses. In these cases, also, the popes pronounced decidedly for the indissolubility of marriage, e.g. Innocent I, “Epist. ad Probum”, in P.L. XX, 602; Leo I, “Epist. ad Nicetam Aquil.”, in P.L., LIV, 1136; Gregory I, “Epist. ad Urbicum Abb.”, in P.L., LXXVII, 833, and “Epist. ad Hadrian. notar.”, in P.L., LXXVII, 1169. This last passage, which is found in the “Decretum” of Gratian (C. xxvii, Q, ii, c. xxii), is as follows: “Although the civil law provides that, for the sake of conversion (i.e., for the purpose of choosing the religious life), a marriage may be dissolved, though either of parties be unwilling, yet the Divine law does not permit it to be done.” That the indissolubility of marriage admits of no exception is indicated by Pope Zacharias in his letter of 5 January, 747, to Pepin and the Frankish bishops, for in chapter vii he ordains “by Apostolic authority”, in answer to the questions that had been proposed to him: “If any layman shall put away his own wife and marry another, or if he shall marry a woman who has been put away by another man, let him be deprived of communion” [Monum. Germ. Hist.: Epist., III:Epist. Merovingici et Karolini ævi, I (Berlin, 1892), 482]

 

[L_piperatus]

Wha? AIDS has a mental disease component? You sure about that???

What I meant is simply this - sometimes people who are infected with HIV/AIDS, develop a form of dementia several years into the disease as the virus enters the brain and causes brain damage. But not always. Maybe I should have stayed away from such complicated scenarios. HIV/AIDS, even without a mental dementia component, is an incurable STD.

I’ve heard that historically, it was syphilis that was regarded as a valid reason for ecclesiastical divorce in the Russian Eastern Orthodox Church - it was a nasty incurable disease that caused, among other things, dementia and insanity. However, now that syphilis is curable with antibiotics, but HIV/AIDS is still incurable, I wonder whether the Russian EOC regards HIV/AIDS as a valid reason for ecclesiastical divorce and Church-approved second marriage.

 

[manualman]

… Maybe I should have stayed away from such complicated scenarios…

Yeah I think we have enough to do finding catholic / EO common ground on contraception without delving into medical details too.

Any EO folks have thoughts on my understanding of oikonomia (above)? I’ve wanted to hear a good EO explanation on the topic as it applies to contraception.

 

[L_piperatus]

Further quote from the same Catholic Encyclopedia entry - this one deals with Oriental and Eastern Orthodoxy in section (e):

In all cases, whether the cause be criminal plotting, adultery, loss of faith, or anything else, the bond of marriage is regarded as absolutely indissoluble and entrance upon a second marriage as impossible.

(d) Dogmatic Decision on the Indissolubility of Marriage — The Council of Trent was the first to make a dogmatic decision on this question. This took place in Session XXIV, canon v: “If anyone shall say that the bond of matrimony can be dissolved for the cause of heresy, or of injury due to cohabitation, or of wilful desertion; let him be anathema”, and in canon vii: “If anyone shall say that the Church has erred in having taught, and in teaching that, according to the teaching of the Gospel and the Apostles, the bond of matrimony cannot be dissolved, and that neither party — not even the innocent, who has given no cause by adultery — can contract another marriage while the other lives, and that he, or she, commits adultery who puts away an adulterous wife, or husband, and marries another; let him be anathema.” The decree defines directly the infallibility of the church doctrine in regard to indissolubility of marriage, even in the case of adultery, but indirectly the decree defines the indissolubility of marriage. Doubts have been expressed here and there about the dogmatic character of this definition (cf. Sasse, “De Sacramentis”, II, 426). But Leo XIII, in his Encyclical “Arcanum”, 10 February, 1880; calls the doctrine on divorce condemned by the Council of Trent “the baneful heresy” (hoeresim deterrimam). The acceptance of this indissolubility of marriage as an article of faith defined by the Council of Trent is demanded in the creed by which Orientals must make their profession of faith when reunited to the Roman Church. The formula prescribed by Urban VIII contains the following section: “Also, that the bond of the Sacrament of Matrimony is indissoluble; and that, although a separation tori et cohabitationis can be made between the parties, for adultery, heresy, or other causes, yet it is not lawful for them to contract another marriage.” Exactly the same declaration in regard to marriage was made in the short profession of faith aproved by the Holy Office in the year 1890 (Collectanea S. Congr. de Prop. Fide, Rome, 1893, pp. 639, 640). The milder indirect form in which the Council of Trent pronounced its anathema was chosen expressly out of regard for the Greeks of that period, who would have been very much offended, according to the testimony of the Venetian ambassadors, if the anathema had been directed against them, whereas they would find it easier to accept the decree that the Roman Church was not guilty of error in her stricter interpretation of the law (Pallavicini, “Hist. Conc. Trid.”, XXII, iv).

(e) Development of the Doctrine on Divorce outside of the Catholic Church — In the Greek Church, and the other Oriental Churches in general, the practice, and finally even the doctrine, of the indissolubility of the marriage bond became more and more lax. Zhishman (Das Eberecht der orientalischen Kirchen, 729 sqq.) testifies that the Greek and Oriental Churches separated from Rome permit in their official ecclesiastical documents the dissolution of marriage, not merely on account of adultery, but also “of those occasions and actions the effect of which on married life might be regarded as similar to natural death or to adultery, or which justify the dissolution of the marriage bond in consequence of a well-founded supposition of death or adultery”. Such reasons are, first, high treason; second, criminal attacks on life; third, frivolous conduct giving rise to suspicion of adultery; fourth, intentional abortion; fifth, acting as sponsor for one’s own child in baptism; sixth, prolonged disappearance; seventh, incurable lunacy rendering cohabitation impossible; eight, entrance of one party into a religious order with the permission of the other party.

 

[manualman]

Jesus said remarriage after a valid marriage recognized by God, i.e., a sacramental marriage, which I presume all Orthodox marriages to be, is adultery. Mt 5:32 NAB - 'But I say to you, whoever divorces his wife (unless the marriage is unlawful) causes her to commit adultery, and whoever marries a divorced woman commits adultery." Some other translations (including the Orthodox Study Bible) say the exception is granted for “adultery,” but, as Marybeloved pointed out, the Greek word used here (porneia) does not mean being sexually unfaithful to one’s spouse. Not that I read Greek, but this is explained in the NAB footnote, which I’ll be glad to post if anyone wishes. Other NT Scriptures regarding divorce and remarriage do not mention this “exceptive clause.”

To follow up on this poster’s question, can any EO posters cite EFs that understood porneia literally as adultery? This priest, a former seminary professor of biblical languages asserts that porneia does NOT equate to plain old adultuery, but to more a relationship in the putative marriage that is inherently wrong (i.e. incest or perhaps something like David and Bathsheba had). rev-know-it-all.com/2010/2010—02-07.html He further asserts that the translation of porneia as adultery is an invention of English protestants! Surely there are some EF citations that can clear up the matter? If not…

 

[mardukm]

Dear all,

I’m going back and forth between threads, and I have recently spent my available time on threads in other forums. Next time I come back, I will focus on this thread. Thank you for all the responses so far.

It’s inevitable that our discussions take tangents. But before moving on, I just want to make sure about one thing. For now, I just want to ask my Latin Catholic brethren if you understand that Orthodox oikonomia is not about giving someone “permission to sin.” I want to settle this matter first before moving on to the specifics about the Oriental Orthodox understanding of divorce.

Blessings,
Marduk

 

[Elijahmaria]

Elijahmaria, perhaps I’m missing something. I see nowhere where a Priest is given authority to authorize use of contraceptives to control births by the penitent in that document. PS:- Contraceptives can be used as medicine for some illness in the body but never for the intention of preventing conception. For that, the couple abstains from relations where there are good reasons to avoid pregnancy.

I do not see how this is anything but a mitigation of sin guilt…or permission to sin.

---

1. Special difficulties are presented by cases of cooperation in the sin of a spouse who voluntarily renders the unitive act infecund. In the first place, it is necessary to distinguish cooperation in the proper sense, from violence or unjust imposition on the part of one of the spouses, which the other spouse in fact cannot resist.46, 561).] This cooperation can be licit when the three following conditions are jointly met:
   
   when the action of the cooperating spouse is not already illicit in itself;47
   when proportionally grave reasons exist for cooperating in the sin of the other spouse;
   when one is seeking to help the other spouse to desist from such conduct (patiently, with prayer, charity and dialogue; although not necessarily in that moment, nor on every single occasion).
2. Furthermore, it is necessary to carefully evaluate the question of cooperation in evil when recourse is made to means which can have an abortifacient effect.48

 

[Marybeloved]

I do not see how this is anything but a mitigation of sin guilt…or permission to sin.

---

1. Special difficulties are presented by cases of cooperation in the sin of a spouse who voluntarily renders the unitive act infecund. In the first place, it is necessary to distinguish cooperation in the proper sense, from violence or unjust imposition on the part of one of the spouses, which the other spouse in fact cannot resist.46, 561).] This cooperation can be licit when the three following conditions are jointly met:
   
   when the action of the cooperating spouse is not already illicit in itself;47
   when proportionally grave reasons exist for cooperating in the sin of the other spouse;
   when one is seeking to help the other spouse to desist from such conduct (patiently, with prayer, charity and dialogue; although not necessarily in that moment, nor on every single occasion).
2. Furthermore, it is necessary to carefully evaluate the question of cooperation in evil when recourse is made to means which can have an abortifacient effect.48

I don’t see how that is permission to sin. The question had been discussed since the earlier times about what the responsibilities of a spouse are when their partner is contracepting and the other is unable to convince them not to? Should they refuse marital relations? Apparently, there’s a pope who answered but vaguely in the 1930s. So two opinions prevailed in Catholicism about the responsibility of the non-contracepting spouse. Some thought that as long as the spouse engaged in contracepting continued to do so, the non-contracepting spouse could not engage in marital relations. Another view held that they could engage in marital relations as long as they did nothing sinful themselves and let their spouses know the wrongfulness of contracepting.

In 1997, the church issued that document you cited expressing basically the latter view- A spouse could have relations knowing their partner is contracepting as long as they did nothing sinful (illicit) themselves, considered the risks of not yielding their conjugal marital obligations to their partner as risking worse evil such as divorce, or adultery by their spouse and let them know the truth. This is plain common sense.

That is a far cry from the church saying to any penitent at confession that they are permitted the use of ABCs due to some grave need to avoid pregnancy or a second “marriage” due to the difficulties of single life. It’s not permission to sin, the penitent to whom this refers is not the one engaging in the sin. He/she is in fact doing his/her best to convince his/her spouse not tto do what they’re doing. Please note that the first condition of this supposed “permission to sin” is that the penitent does not himself do anything that is illicit.

It’s simply clarifying a spouse’s responsibility with regards to sex with a contracepting spouse who refuses to stop- which is called co-operating in the evil of the contracepting spouse. There are two duties being considered- The duty to fulfill conjugal obligations per marriage vows and not cause the spouse to sin by failing in this duty (Some letter of st. Paul + the church says so) and the duty to discourage a spouse from sinning by not co-operating with the evil they commit by engaging in relations when they persist in sinning. There’s no permission to sin, the non-contracepting spouse is being told they can fulfill their marital obligations without themselves doing anything wrong or failing to discourage the wrong (by other means outside sex- like talking) in their spouse.

PS:- Due to the risk of abortion, a husband must refuse relations with a wife who refuses to go off the abortifacent pills. Ho

 

[Bezant]

It can be harmful. Not all are called to such a life. The same is true of being a cenobitic monk or an eremitic monk. At Orthodox monasteries, for example, novices are very often expelled because they do not possess the strength for monastic life. Nobody wants relativism, but on the other side of the coin is total objectivism which is just as great an evil. This ties into a discussion of the truth which is probably beyond the scope of this thread, but suffice to say that neither absolute objectivism nor absolute relativism is preferable.

Well-said.

 

[Marybeloved]

Dear all,

I’m going back and forth between threads, and I have recently spent my available time on threads in other forums. Next time I come back, I will focus on this thread. Thank you for all the responses so far.

It’s inevitable that our discussions take tangents. But before moving on, I just want to make sure about one thing. For now, I just want to ask my Latin Catholic brethren if you understand that Orthodox oikonomia is not about giving someone “permission to sin.” I want to settle this matter first before moving on to the specifics about the Oriental Orthodox understanding of divorce.

Blessings,
Marduk

Dear Mardukm,

I can see some basis for the concept of oikonomia regarding this issues (marriage after divorce) in some of what our Lord said in that crucial passage in St. Matthew’s Gospel. I personally do not understand oikonomia or its implications fully (don’t think it’s just me) which obviously is why many of us see it as permission to enter a permanent state of adultery.

The possible basis I can see for it is in that Gospel cited here below, where Our Lord said that the Jews had been permitted divorce (despite it being wrong from the beginning) by Moses due to their hardness of heart. I can see some “oikonomia” by Moses working there, but I don’t understand it’s full implications or the implications of that verse regarding Christian sacramental marriage. Our Lord also implies to the disciples that the teaching on no-divorce is not a teaching that all are able to accept, when they are taken aback by the hard teaching. I’m not sure of the full implications of those two things: Moses’ practice of oikonomia to the Jews and the Lord’s intimation when the disciples complain. I also am considering the fact that the Fathers interpreted the NT passages in that same strict sense we are reading it in. So a good explanation from you and others about this concept of Oikonomia would be most welcome. I can see some possible Biblical basis for it, but I’m not sure- I could possibly be misinterpreting the Bible especially regarding the Lord’s words after the disciples complained- that seems more of a stretch than the Moses deal.

Like I said before, these things are not well understood (as regards the E & O. Orthodox) by me, and I want more than anything that the churches unite. Common ground is most appreciated where it can be gained.

Peace.

(St. Matthew’s 19: 1-12)

*And it came to pass when Jesus had ended these words, he departed from Galilee, and came into the coasts of Judea, beyond Jordan. And great multitudes followed him: and he healed them there. And there came to him the Pharisees tempting him, and saying: Is it lawful for a man to put away his wife for every cause? Who answering, said to them: Have ye not read, that he who made man from the beginning, Made them male and female? And he said: For this cause shall a man leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife, and they two shall be in one flesh. Therefore now they are not two, but one flesh. What therefore God hath joined together, let no man put asunder. They say to him: Why then did Moses command to give a bill of divorce, and to put away? He saith to them: Because Moses by reason of the hardness of your heart permitted you to put away your wives: but from the beginning it was not so. And I say to you, that whosoever shall put away his wife, except it be for fornication, and shall marry another, committeth adultery: and he that shall marry her that is put away, committeth adultery.

His disciples say unto him: If the case of a man with his wife be so, it is not expedient to marry. Who said to them: All men take not this word, but they to whom it is given. For there are eunuchs, who were born so from their mother’s womb: and there are eunuchs, who were made so by men: and there are eunuchs, who have made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven. He that can take, let him take it. *

 

[GraceSofia]

Getting back to the contraception topic, the Orthodox Church in Cyprus is indirectly responsible for an extremely high abortion rate. Abortion is not even an issue, it is so accepted in the Orthodox country; there are no Right to Life groups and abortion is not a national debate as in other countries.

What happened was that the Orthodox Church gave their support for premarital screening and genetic counselling (which includes information on prenatal testing and abortion) in an attempt to prevent people being born with thalassaemia. However, most couples married anyway, but used abortion as a way of eliminating the disease in their family, and of course once people are convinced that abortion is acceptable to prevent thalassaemia, it quickly becomes acceptable to prevent any incovenience. It was the old slippery slope…

ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2927788/

“Once prenatal diagnosis became possible for thalassemia, it was made available within the Cypriot health service. Soon after, confidential premarital screening was made mandatory among Greek Cypriots by the Greek Orthodox Church and among Turkish Cypriots by the civil authorities. It was then found that 98% of at-risk couples detected just prior to marriage proceed to marry. Nevertheless, the annual number of new births of children with thalassaemia major has decreased almost to zero in Cyprus, because couples use the information on genetic risk in a variety of ways to obtain a healthy family. Less than 5% of the decrease in thalassaemia major births is due to separation of engaged couples.”

 

[manualman]

…
I can see some basis for the concept of oikonomia regarding this issues (marriage after divorce) in some of what our Lord said in that crucial passage in St. Matthew’s Gospel. …
The possible basis I can see for it is in that Gospel cited here below, where Our Lord said that the Jews had been permitted divorce (despite it being wrong from the beginning) by Moses due to their hardness of heart. I can see some “oikonomia” by Moses working there, but I don’t understand it’s full implications or the implications of that verse regarding Christian sacramental marriage. Our Lord also implies to the disciples that the teaching on no-divorce is not a teaching that all are able to accept, when they are taken aback by the hard teaching.

It has always seemed to me that Jesus is quite CRITICAL of Moses’ decision to allow divorce and the hardness of heart of the people that prompted it. If you are right, it would seem that oikonomia does not in any way reduce the sinfulness of the act committed, but merely is a sort of moral triage approach to presenting the gospel to sinners (which, lets face it is all of us). But I’m still concerned that I might be barking up the wrong tree here. Do EO folks see oikonomia as something westerners might call moral relativism or is it more like the triage perspective described above?

 

[Hesychios]

… Do EO folks see oikonomia as something westerners might call moral relativism or is it more like the triage perspective described above?

Economy has the equivalent in what Roman Catholics would call a dispensation.

The main difference here (I think) is that most dispensations are reserved to the Pope, while Economy is practiced by all bishops within the context of their synods.