The arguments that are being used to counter the intrinsic purpose concept are classic logical fallacies. Yours is a fallacy known as the “thin edge of a wedge” fallacy, meaning that we cannot have distinct entities if there is a series of small steps that distinguish them. Since there is no exact point to establish the difference does not entail there is no difference. (Slippery slope, thin edge of the wedge or camel’s nose fallacy)
I am Buddhist, and I do not accept the existence of “entities” in the same way that I suspect you do. Here is a quote, not Buddhist, which illustrates the issue:
Not only was it difficult for him to comprehend that the generic symbol
dog embraces so many unlike individuals of diverse size and form; it bothered him that the dog at three fourteen (seen from the side) should have the same name as the dog at three fifteen (seen from the front).
- Jorge Luis Borges, “Funes the Memorious”.
Are those dogs the same? No they are not, one is older than the other. Some cells have died while other cells have grown. There are changes between the two dogs, and we are in principle able to distinguish between them. Buddhism emphasises change over continuity. What appears to be a continuous dog, is in face a series of different dogs, linked in a chain of causation. A bit like the series of still images in a film gives the illusion of motion. The motion is an illusion, nothing in any of the images is actually moving. Similarly the unchanging dog is an illusion, there is only a series if brief instantaneous dogs, all different.
The fixed unchanging dog is the model in our brain. It is a reasonable working approximation of reality, but it is only an approximation. Properties of the model may or may not apply to the real world. Both have four legs, but only one does not change.
You are, in principle, denying that your internal world corresponds in any way with the external one. We have no reason to deny any of the reality of the external world just because we have an internal concept of it. Our concept may in fact correspond quite nicely with the external reality. You haven’t shown that it necessarily doesn’t, except as an assumption.
Our internal model is a reasonably good approximation of reality. It is not exact. There are things present in reality that are absent from our model, and
vice versa. For example, we cannot smell the dog as well as it can smell itself. Our model of the smell of the dog must be lacking. Because we are limited by our senses, our models of reality have to be imperfect and limited.
Think about the process of seeing the dog. Light reflects from the dog and enters our eyes. There some of the light (we cannot sense ultra-violet or infra-red) is converted into electrical impulses in our optic nerve. Those impulses reach the brain, where they are matched with previously observed patterns of impulses and our brain recognises a match to the “dog” model. Also to the “quadruped”, “mammal”, “animal” etc. models. It may also recognise a model like “spaniel” within the general “dog” model. Our brain constructs a great many models in multiple hierarchies. The sensory process maps external reality onto our internal models. However, it is always a mapping between two different things. We do not have real dogs inside our brain. The real dog is unknowable because we cannot sense the real dog. Our imperfect senses give rise to imperfect models. We cannot actually observe the differences between the dog at three fourteen and the dog at three fifteen.
Your assumption is that our internal world can have no correspondence with the external world and that any concept we have cannot correspond with the external reality of what is. That is just a flat out assumption.
I do not assume that. Our internal models have an approximate correspondence with external reality; close enough to enable us to function and survive in the real world. It is an error to think that the models are exact, because our senses only give us imperfect information. Eagles would probably see a fuzzy blur if they looked through our eyes. Our sense of smell is grossly inferior to that of dogs. Bees can see ultra-violet while we cannot. Our models have to be approximate, they cannot be otherwise.
You have no way of knowing the external world is not comprised of universals.
I can observe change in the external world. Do universals change? Do the “universal hammer” or the “universal dog” change? Real dogs change. Real hammers change. As I said above, Buddhism emphasises change. Since the real world changes, then any correct analysis of the real world must include change. It seems to me that a lot of Western philosophy sees the world as fundamentally unchanging with a veneer of apparent change overlaid on top. Buddhism reverses that. Change is fundamental, while any apparent stasis is mere appearance. For convenience, our internal models of slowly changing things tend to be static, rather than changing, which is I suspect the source of the error. We handle slow change by using different static models: “puppy”, “adult dog”, “old dog”. As I said, our models are an approximation to reality, which is continuously changing.
One function of Buddhist meditation is to work at distinguishing between what is actually coming in through our senses, and what is being overlaid onto the raw sense data by our brains and their internal models.
rossum