L
levinas12
Guest
“Soul” is often confused with “person”. The Aristotelian “soul” is the human nature (the “form”) as principle of operation. As such, individual human beings participate in the same human “soul” (the same human nature). Because Aristotelian “soul” is what we have in common, it cannot explain our individuation.According to Thomas a human person is a particular existing, living human being, composed of body and soul. Person is not identified with nature as such, rather it is the particular instantiation of a human nature in this or that real human being. As such, person would include all accompanying accidents proper to a living human being ( i.e. whether potential or actual like conscience ) as well as a the accidents incidental to different individuals, races, etc.
“Matter” is often cited as the source of our “individuation”. While it is true that “matter” individuates beings other than persons, in the case of human beings, it is the “person” which “individuates”.
You mention “accidents”. But, like “matter”, “accidents” cannot be the basis of human individuation because they do not possess the ontological excellence of “person”. Perhaps one should say that “person” accounts for the peculiar individuality of the “accidents”.
It should be noted that “person” is not added externally to a human primary substance. Rather “person” is the new reality , the new excellence, that is “expressed”, “manifested” over and above the “form” and the “matter”. And this novel “event” is a singularity which is “incommunicable”, i.e., cannot be shared or “participated” in by any other being. I am unique and radically unrepeatable.
Digression: a forceful way of putting all of this is Heidegger’s description of the “person” as the “da”, the “there”, which is “inmost mine” (no one else can die my death, or live my life).