Ok. I don’t want to get too much into this since it’s not my main point, but I can’t help observing one thing. In the examples you cited (putting down a horse or dog), there is generally a presumption
against doing this without a very good reason. In both you examples, you give such reasons. The simple fact that I own the horse or dog does not give me the moral right to put it down. In fact, I expect we would say that I have an obligation to protect the animal’s well-being and that putting it down may only be done for a compelling reason (the animal is suffering and will not heal).
Now, if you are comparing the case of the fetus to this, it seems you would have to agree that one does not have the ability to abort on demand, but only for a compelling reason. So, even if you are granting less than I would like, your examples still seem to imply that there is a strong presumption against aborting a fetus except for a compelling reason.
- Understood. I would simply say that I have given such a reason in my plausible claim that human dignity is an essential feature of myself. If we can show then that I was once a fetus, then it follows that the fetus that I was also had human dignity and can be wronged.
- Second, the same would follow if personhood is an essential feature of me. If I was once a fetus, then since I am a person, the the fetus that I was, was also a person.
So, obviously for the argument, I am making here, a lot depends on the claim that I was once a fetus. My argument was:
This strikes me as a plausible argument and you haven’t actually pointed to an error anywhere in the argument. You have only questioned whether it has an implausible consequence, substance dualism.
You objected:
Yes, I agree that I am arguing that something persists from the moment of conception, namely myself!
So what move can you make? You can either claim that the being that was the fetus still exists and is not I. Or you could claim that the being that was the fetus no longer exists. I read you as claiming that the being that was the fetus no longer exists and will respond under that assumption.
- If the being that was the fetus (F) no longer exists, what happened to it? When did it cease to exist. Every major organic part of F is still in organic existence (though transformed and developed). Every part of F has developed into me. All of me has developed from F. And by the basic metaphysical principle we are using, if a being has once existed and has never ceased to exist, it exists today. This seems to be the case with the being that was the fetus.
Now you are concerned that the view that I was once a fetus would commit you to substance dualism. You think this because of questions of personal identity. So my response follows:
- At most this would force you to choose between which is more warranted, the claim that I was once a fetus or the claim that souls do not exist. Given the strength of the argument that I was once a fetus, one might easily make that choice.
- But would it require even this? The problem with your objection is that it could work just as well against the claim that I am the same being I was 10 years ago, as the claim that I am the same being I was as a fetus.
For instance, you complain that there is no material continuity between myself and the fetus I was.
a). First, you are almost certainly wrong in you claim that there is no material continuity between the fetus and the infant. Is it really the case that an infant shortly after birth has no meaningful material continuity with the fetus it was shortly before birth? That seems highly implausible.
b). Even worse, this argument would work just as well in arguing that I am a wholly different person than I was 10 years ago. Human beings swap out all the particles in their bodies approximately every 7 years. Hence, there is no material continuity between me and the being called danserr 10 years ago. If your argument succeeds, then, I am a totally different being than I was 10 years ago. I cannot on pain of irrationality refer to myself has having graduated grade school.
- The brain does not help you any here, because on materialism, the brain itself is wholly made of matter. It too swapped out all its particles.
In short, it seems that if I accept your argument against the claim that I was once a fetus, I will also be forced to accept the absurd claim that I was never once a child.
I think, then, that you are forced to do one of two things:
- withdraw your argument against the claim that I was once a fetus
or
- admit the existence of a soul.
Now, I actually agree with some of your points about the metaphysics of personal identity. I haven’t fully decided but actually suspect that you have given a good argument for the existence of the soul (might be fun to try out on another thread). Since, I swap out all the particles in my body every 10 years, and still remain me, the existence of a soul does strike me as a good way of explaining the continuity of personal identity over time.