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The only example I saw that you gave is of the latter, so I assumed that you weren’t making a distinction. I’m glad we have some agreement on the first part so we can advance.how can that be when i explicitly distinguished the two?
And this is what I believe you have not established. I want to understand where you are going with this, so I have quoted from your previous post so I can keep it all in mind:Ani’s original question was whether it was possible to imagine something that was logically impossible; intentionally elliding “imagining” and “conceiving”, i said, yes, it is possible
the historical example is frege: as the second volume of frege’s Grundgesetze der Arithmetik (The Basic Laws of Arithmetic) was being printed, russell famously wrote frege revealing a self-contradiction in the principles frege was using to formalize his logic (namely, Rule V); he pointed out that frege’s set theory entailed that there could be a set of all sets that do not contain themselves, but that such a set could only be a member of itself if it was not a member of itself.
What I can’t understand is how Frege could have imagined anything about this since he is dealing in abstract concepts. He made a logical error. So be it. What was it that you claim he was imagining here that is impossible?until russell made this observation to frege (burali-forti and cantor himself made an earlier and similar observation about naive set-theory concerning sets of ordinals), frege believed his theory to be true; following the revelation of the paradox, however, it became clear that the theory, as stated by frege, was in fact logically impossible, despite his belief in its truth.
Or maybe you are saying that Ani (and all the rest of us) can imagine someone making a logical error by looking at this example. But imagining someone making a logical error is not to imagine the logically impossible. If so, demonstrate how. If I’m on the wrong track, let me know.