Phoenix Down

[Perplexity]

Hah. Funny reference. Anyways, this is the new Atheous thread. I’ll be providing a new argument for atheism complete with new definitions and sub-arguments. I hope this will foster as good a discussion as the last one did.

Atheous 2

Main Argument:

Definition:

D1: An instance of suffering, E, is inscrutable for S if and only if (i) S believes E has obtained, and (ii) after attempting to discern whether E is morally justified, S fails to know of any moral justification for E. (Note, this is compatible with a theist’s belief that God is morally justified in permitting E, it’d just mean the theist doesn’t know what that justification is).

Argument:

1. If inscrutable suffering occurs, atheism is probably true.
2. Inscrutable suffering occurs.
3. Therefore, atheism is probably true.

Motivation:

Before motivating my premises, I want to elaborate on the notion of probability premise (1) refers to. Probability, as I’m using it, refers to the amount or degree of confidence a cognizer has that a proposition bares a particular truth-value.

We numerically represent these degrees of confidence on a scale of 1.0-0.0. 1.0 represents our highest confidence, 0.5 represents our doxastic indifference and 0.0 represents our least amount. The idea of numerically representing our subjective states seems quite common. e.g., ‘How much pain do you feel on a scale of 1-10?’.

I understand (1) to mean that if inscrutable suffering occurs, our degree of confidence in atheism should be higher than doxastic indifference i.e., we should believe atheism is true. This leads me to my motivation of (1).

Premise (1):

I’ll use Bayes’ theorem for this premise and, for the sake of space, will have to assume the reader is able to follow.

I believe (1) will be accepted as true by most people, atheists and theists alike. I say most for reasons I’ll shortly get into.

Let T = Theism, ~T = the denial of T or Atheism, I = Inscrutable Suffering and K = our background knowledge.

My first goal in motivating (1) is to show that P(I|~T&K) is extremely high. My second goal is to show that P(I|T&K) is very low. The result will be that the only way P(T|I&K) > P(~T|I&K) is if P(T|K) is exceedingly high.

This is why I said most people will accept (1). There will of course be some theists who have such an impressive prior for theism that no argument could sway them. So, I wouldn’t consider their rejection of this premise particularly interesting anyways.

Motivation of (1) p1:

Definition:

D2: An instance of suffering, E, is morally gratuitous if there exists no moral good in virtue of which E is morally justified. In our Bayesian notation, let M represent (4)'s consequent.

Sub-Argument:

1. If atheism is true, then morally gratuitous suffering occurs.
2. If morally gratuitous suffering occurs, then inscrutable suffering occurs.
3. Therefore, if atheism is true, then inscrutable suffering occurs.

The Ramsey Test allows us to discern the probability of conditional statements of the form ‘if p, then q’ by translating them as ‘P(q|p&k)’. So, applying the Ramsey Test to (6) would result in the following conditional probability:

6’. P(I|~T&K)

A logically valid argument is one which if its premises are true, its conclusion must be true. This is why the probability of the conclusion of any sound deductive argument is 1.0. So, if (4)-(5) are true, then P(I|~T&K)=1.0.

My goal therefore is to first show that (4)-(5) are true, and then to drive a chasm between (6’)'s probability and P(I|T&K).

[continued…]

 

[Perplexity]

Premise (4):

(4) should be accepted because on atheism there is no entity which could be morally responsible for the occurrence of things like natural disasters, or non-sentient forces. So, the suffering wrought by these events isn’t the kind of thing which can be morally justified on atheism. Imagine you’re strolling through the park on a breezy day and an acorn falls and knocks you in the head. Would you ordinarily think of the suffering thereby caused as morally good or evil? No. Some would say naturally good or evil, but morality seems inappropriate. All the more if we’re in a godless universe.

Premise (5):

(5) is quite obviously true given the factivity of knowledge. In order for S to know that p, p must be true. So, if an instance of suffering, E, has no moral justification, then S cannot know that E has a moral justification.

I’ll content myself with P(I|~T&K)=1.0

Motivation of (1) p2:

What of P(I|T&K)?

I believe there are at least two reasons to think this probability is crazy low.

The first reason is as follows:

God’s act of creation is generally construed as follows in philosophy of religion:

God surveys the set of actualizable worlds, and freely selects exactly one for actualization on the basis of its axiological properties.

I say actualizable instead of possible because there are some possible worlds God would/could never actualize. By contrast, each world in this set is one which meets the minimum requirement of ‘goodness’ for God to select it and remain morally perfect. Axiological here simply refers to moral properties.

This set contains nearly an infinite amount of such worlds, some differing from each other only trivially.

So, imagine that each world was a car, of different kinds and color etc. Imagine standing with God (I’m picturing some old guy in a toga). As far as the eye can see there are different cars of all fantastical sorts, shape and color. You could never actually count them all.

Now, if you’re like me, you’d be pretty surprised that the greatest conceivable being creates anything at all. In the analogy then, you’re not expecting the guy to choose any car at all. So, if he selects any car, you’ll be crazy surprised.

If you’re not like me, you expect God to create something. In the analogy then, you believe God wants a car but don’t really know of what sort. So you’d still be very surprised he selects any particular one.

You might go further and expect God to create an animate universe, with creatures relevantly similar to us so he can enter into a loving relationship with them. In the analogy, you’re expect God to select a certain kind of car, perhaps of a certain color. Still, you wouldn’t expect him to select the one that he actually does.

I’ll stop here because I doubt anyone here expects anything more specifically.

On each of these, it’s still pretty surprising that God selects this world from among all the others.

Therefore, we can’t numerically represent our confidence in the relevant probability with anything greater than 0.5. I’d say the best representation is something very low like 0.2. If you think this is too low, I’d say reflect on the incredible immensity of worlds God could’ve chosen.

My second reason is as follows:

1. If God exists, then God causally explains the actual world @].
2. If God causally explains @, then God rationally selected @ from the set of actualizable worlds.
3. If God selected @ from the set of actualizable worlds, God had sufficient reason for the selection.

Now, this set of actualizable worlds is such that either there is no best actualizable world, or there is; but there’s not just one. There’s at least two (or more, perhaps infinitely) who differ only trivially. I exclude the option that there is a single best for obvious reasons (this obviously isn’t it, it’d be too easy a target for the atheist).

If the former, God can’t have sufficient reason for selecting any particular reason because there will always be a better choice he could’ve made. If the latter, God can’t have sufficient reason for selecting this world since the other(s) only differed trivially. So,

1. God doesn’t have sufficient reason for the selection.
2. Therefore, God doesn’t exist.

Now, I’m not advocating this argument. But, the most common response to it that I know if is to deny (3) and say God selected randomly. If this is your response (and it is quite a popular one), then the probability of inscrutable suffering given theism is astronomically low since worlds are selected randomly.

So, I think we have very good reason for regarding P(I|T&K) as very low, something like 0.2 or less.

Is there any inscrutable suffering?

Premise (2):

The atheist’s reply should immediately be yes. This is because on atheism, there is morally gratuitous suffering; therefore no one can know these sufferings are morally justified.

The theist should likewise say yes (as most do); because, God is the one who morally justifies much suffering and if he hasn’t revealed the specific reason for why the suffering is justified, all we can really do is more or less speculate. Most theist’s are skeptical theists which means they think we’re not in a sufficient epistemic position to know God’s moral justifications. Of course they’re down with inscrutable suffering. I don’t really think this point needs much attention, it seems quite uncontroversial.

I’ll be content then to conclude that premise (2) of my main argument is true, and therefore that for most theists and atheists, (3) must be true.

 

[Spencerian]

There is a temporary ban on all Atheism and Evolution threads in this forum.

 

[danserr]

I won’t be able to jump into this until later this evening at earliest, but would like to ask for a quick point of clarification.

Part of your argument is that “inscrutable suffering is highly improbable on Christian theism.”

One of your arguments in favor of this seems to be:

1. It is so improbable that God would create any world and even more improbable that he would create this world. Hence the probability that inscrutable evil exist on theism is low because it is improbable than anything exist (or any specific world).

But by the same logic, why can’t I say:
“well on atheism it is highly improbable that anything at all exist, therefore the existence of anything at all, including inscrutable evil, is highly improbable on atheism.” As your example, on atheism, it is at least as improbable as on theism that any cars would exist at all, right?

If I misunderstand you, maybe you could just clarify.

Now, this set of actualizable worlds is such that either there is no best actualizable world, or there is; but there’s not just one. There’s at least two (or more, perhaps infinitely) who differ only trivially. I exclude the option that there is a single best for obvious reasons (this obviously isn’t it, it’d be too easy a target for the atheist).

If the former, God can’t have sufficient reason for selecting any particular reason because there will always be a better choice he could’ve made

Second point of clarification.

If there is not best possible world, then God is not morally blameworthy for selecting any world because there could always be one better world. In this case:

1. it is not possible for God to select the best possible world,
2. it is not possible for God to select a world such that there will not be a better one.
3. ought implies can
4. if God cannot select a world such that there will not be a better one, then he is not obligated to do so.
5. If there is no best possible world, then God is not morally blameworthy for the world he does actualize.

I’m not sure if this entails that he selected randomly, I doubt it (but need to consider it more), but if you claim it does and that this probability of this world is low, since it is improbable than any world exist, then I would refer you to the first point I made, that one could say the same on atheism, since on atheism it is surely highly improbable that anything at all, and especially sentient life, exist.

 

[Perplexity]

Hey danserr! Looking forward to your response.

1. It is so improbable that God would create any world and even more improbable that he would create this world. Hence the probability that inscrutable evil exist on theism is low because it is improbable than anything exist (or any specific world).

My argument is that whether we find it probable that God would create anything at all, or even a world teeming with sentient creatures capable of loving God freely, it would still be improbable that he selects any particular world, since there are infinitely others differing from each other only trivially. (Note, I also don’t reference evil, just suffering)

But by the same logic, why can’t I say:
“well on atheism it is highly improbable that anything at all exist, therefore the existence of anything at all, including inscrutable evil, is highly improbable on atheism.” As your example, on atheism, it is at least as improbable as on theism that any cars would exist at all, right?

Well, my sub-argument shows that the probability of inscrutable suffering given atheism is the highest: 1.0. This is because our background knowledge contains all our knowledge and beliefs minus the proposed evidence. So, K includes my knowledge that this universe exists, with all its natural disasters etc. If atheism is true, and this universe exists etc. (insert K), would we expect inscrutable suffering? Yes, as my sub-argument shows. We have good reason to think the opposite with theism.

If there is not best possible world, then God is not morally blameworthy for selecting any world because there could always be one better world. In this case:

1. it is not possible for God to select the best possible world,
2. it is not possible for God to select a world such that there will not be a better one.
3. ought implies can
4. if God cannot select a world such that there will not be a better one, then he is not obligated to do so.
5. If there is no best possible world, then God is not morally blameworthy for the world he does actualize.

(1)-(2) seem equivalent to me. But, yes I’d agree that God isn’t morally blameworthy for selecting the world he does. That’s what I mean about the worlds he can actualize being ‘actualizable’ as opposed to merely ‘possible’ since there are some possible worlds God’s moral perfection precludes him from being able to actualize.

The problem is that either there is no best possible world (any reason he cites for why he selected world W, he’d have far greater reason to select W*), or there are numerous best worlds (any reason he cites for selecting W will be just as good reason for selecting W*). So, either he doesn’t have sufficient reason for selecting and is irrational thereby, or doesn’t have sufficient reason for selecting but doesn’t need any, and chooses randomly.

 

[danserr]

Well, my sub-argument shows that the probability of inscrutable suffering given atheism is the highest: 1.0. This is because our background knowledge contains all our knowledge and beliefs minus the proposed evidence. So, K includes my knowledge that this universe exists, with all its natural disasters etc.** If atheism is true, and this universe exists etc. (insert K), would we expect inscrutable suffering? Yes**, as my sub-argument shows. We have good reason to think the opposite with theism.

I agree with the bolded section. If atheism is true and this universe exists, then we should expect inscrutable suffering.

I think though, a Christian could plausibly launch an attack on your argument by claiming that the existence of inscrutable suffering is actually not at all improbable on Christian theism. If this universe exists, and the Christian God exists, one possible line of attack might be to claim that it is not at all improbable that inscrutable suffering should exist.

Now, you tried to pre-empt this by arguing that inscrutable suffering is highly improbable on Christian theism, because on Christian theism, it is highly improbable that God would have created this world (ie. on Christian theism, it is highly improbable that this world exist). Since it is highly improbable that this world exist, it is highly improbable that inscrutable suffering exist on Christian theism.

My question was that it still seems like atheism is open to the same problem. This world exists, but it is highly improbable on atheism that this world would exist, hence highly improbable that inscrutable suffering would exist. (at least by the same logic you use to try to argue that inscrutable suffering is improbable on theism). Likewise with Christianity, the world exists, but it is highly improbable that this world would exist, therefore inscrutable suffering is improbable. It seems to me like the cases are parallel.

In short, am I following you correctly in thinking that your argument that inscrutable suffering is improbable on theism is based on the fact that any world is improbable on theism?

If this world exists, though, and theism is true, then a Christian could give reasons for thinking that the existence of inscrutable suffering is not at all improbable. This seems to me like a promising line of attack.

 

[prodigalson2011]

My qualms with this argument:

1. Scrutability is entirely relative to the intellect apprehending the information at hand. Quantum theory is inscrutable to me, not necessarily so to a physicist. Furthermore, any philosophically minded person in the Judeo-Christian tradition would probably immediately point out that, viewed from their particular theistic perspective, the issue of seemingly inscrutable suffering is addressed thoroughly in our theological tradition.
2. You cannot label something morally gratuitous without a logical, and more importantly definite, ground for morality itself. Atheists themselves will concede that, by the very nature of their philosophy, no absolute morality can be deduced from it. If morality is not absolute, you have no point of reference by which to gauge the moral gratuity of anything.

In summary, your theory is predicated on entirely subjective grounds and is thus invalidated.

 

[empther]

Another atheist thread by Perplexity, the King of Quibblers :banghead::banghead:

Where are the moderators?

 

[Perplexity]

I agree with the bolded section. If atheism is true and this universe exists, then we should expect inscrutable suffering.

I think though, a Christian could plausibly launch an attack on your argument by claiming that the existence of inscrutable suffering is actually not at all improbable on Christian theism. If this universe exists, and the Christian God exists, one possible line of attack might be to claim that it is not at all improbable that inscrutable suffering should exist.

Now, you tried to pre-empt this by arguing that inscrutable suffering is highly improbable on Christian theism, because on Christian theism, it is highly improbable that God would have created this world (ie. on Christian theism, it is highly improbable that this world exist). Since it is highly improbable that this world exist, it is highly improbable that inscrutable suffering exist on Christian theism.

My question was that it still seems like atheism is open to the same problem. This world exists, but it is highly improbable on atheism that this world would exist, hence highly improbable that inscrutable suffering would exist. (at least by the same logic you use to try to argue that inscrutable suffering is improbable on theism). Likewise with Christianity, the world exists, but it is highly improbable that this world would exist, therefore inscrutable suffering is improbable. It seems to me like the cases are parallel.

In short, am I following you correctly in thinking that your argument that inscrutable suffering is improbable on theism is based on the fact that any world is improbable on theism?

If this world exists, though, and theism is true, then a Christian could give reasons for thinking that the existence of inscrutable suffering is not at all improbable. This seems to me like a promising line of attack.

Well, the first thing I want to say is that I’m concerned with theism, not necessarily Christian theism. I see Christian-theism as a theological elaboration of theism, telling us more about who God is, what he desires and what he’s done etc. Theism is a core-belief of Christian-theism. I say this because while a Christian-theistic response might be available in response to this argument, if there is no bare-theistic response, Christian-theism is undermined in the same way the weakening of a foundation effects the building.

The second point is that we must remove the proposed evidence from our background knowledge when we discern the probability of inscrutable suffering given theism. Inscrutable suffering is the conjunction of (i) and (ii) in D1. When the proposed evidence is a conjunction, each of its conjuncts must also be removed from our background knowledge. So, we must remove (i), namely that S believes that E obtains.

This means, while the universe etc. is in K, no person’s knowledge of suffering is. So, the theist needs to show that theism predicts suffering, reflection on suffering, and failed acquisition of certain moral knowledge apropos suffering all without being able to refer to any real instances of these. What about theism itself implies these?

I believe you’ve understood that section of my argument correctly: because any particular world is improbable given theism, we can’t say a world with inscrutable suffering is likely on theism. This fosters doubt that ‘theism’ implies inscrutable suffering.

You propose we can use this reasoning against atheism to obtain the same result. But, I’ve provided independent reason for thinking inscrutable suffering is probable on atheism: a sound deductive argument. The only way your counter-argument could affect that assessment is if it cast doubt upon, or falsified one of the argument’s premises. I can’t see how it could accomplish this so I guess what I’d say in response is we have independent reason to think otherwise in atheism’s case.

 

[Perplexity]

Another atheist thread by Perplexity, the King of Quibblers :banghead::banghead:

Where are the moderators?

I’m not sure why following the rules matters to you now

1. Messages posted to this board must be polite and free of personal attacks

 

[danserr]

I believe you’ve understood that section of my argument correctly: because any particular world is improbable given theism, we can’t say a world with inscrutable suffering is likely on theism. This fosters doubt that ‘theism’ implies inscrutable suffering.

You propose we can use this reasoning against atheism to obtain the same result. But, I’ve provided independent reason for thinking inscrutable suffering is probable on atheism: a sound deductive argument. The only way your counter-argument could affect that assessment is if it cast doubt upon, or falsified one of the argument’s premises. I can’t see how it could accomplish this so I guess what I’d say in response is we have independent reason to think otherwise in atheism’s case.

Ok, I wanted to clarify this part, so I’m glad I follow you at least this far.

To lay my cards on the table more, I am not sure I think your argument that inscrutable suffering is improbable on theism is a good one. Normally people argue for this based on some version of “well God is supposed to be powerful and loving, so it seems really improbable that this amount of suffering would occur.” You seem to be trying to find another way to argue this. But arguing that inscrutable suffering is improbable on theism because any world is improbable on theism doesn’t seem persuasive. By the same logic, any world is improbable on atheism, so inscrutable suffering is just as improbable on atheism. Hence, if atheism is true, I should not expect to find inscrutable suffering.

You propose to get around this by offering an argument supporting the claim that inscrutable suffering is highly probable on atheism.

1. If atheism is true, then morally gratuitous suffering occurs.
2. If morally gratuitous suffering occurs, then inscrutable suffering occurs.
3. Therefore, if atheism is true, then inscrutable suffering occurs.

But you cannot show 4 to be probable. This is because it runs into the difficulty cited above, that on atheism gratuitous suffering is highly improbable because any world is highly improbable.

Maybe you mean: granted that the present world exists, if atheism if true, then morally gratuitous suffering occurs.

But then a possible theistic reply is: granted that the present world exists, if Christianity is true, then inscrutable suffering occurs.

It seems that you are assuming the existence of the present world, but that would again just as easily lead to the conclusion that inscrutable suffering exists on Christian theism.

I think your argument has to mean, though, that given atheism, it is probable that inscrutable suffering would occur (hence not assuming the existence of the present world). But then this takes you to the problem, I suggested above. Based on your argument that inscrutable suffering is improbable on theism because any world is improbable, then the same would apply to atheism. That the chances inscrutable suffering would occur is improbable because any world is improbable.

Well, the first thing I want to say is that I’m concerned with theism, not necessarily Christian theism. I see Christian-theism as a theological elaboration of theism, telling us more about who God is, what he desires and what he’s done etc

But Christian theism may offer us more information about God’s nature that would be relevant to the question.

 

[Perplexity]

Danserr: You’ve made some excellent points, I’ll need to revise. It seemed to me that before we consider the probability of inscrutable suffering given theism, we needed to understand that any particular world is improbable on theism. This way, when we did evaluate the relevant probability we’d have to say “there’s really nothing about theism itself that implies that inscrutable suffering would occur, in fact, it’s pretty surprising.”

But, I don’t know how to protect atheism from the same reasoning. There are relevant differences…like there being no ‘selector’ on atheism, I’m not sure what mechanism atheists would need to posit to explain why any possible world actualizes.

So then, I have two initial and tentative replacements to obtain the same result; namely, that inscrutable suffering is improbable on theism.

1. If theism is true, then skeptical theism is true. I don’t really want to defend that just yet; but, thought there are some here who already accept that, so this is aimed towards them. On skeptical theism, we can’t say what world God would probably actualize since the process of selecting a world bares moral implications, and God’s moral justifications are beyond-our-ken. Therefore, the highest probability P(I|T&K) would get is 0.5; but, it’d still be lower than this because we’re surprised, not doxastically indifferent.
2. Because our knowledge of and beliefs about persons believing suffering to occur must be removed from K in this evaluation; the theist must show how the theistic hypothesis itself implies that (i) suffering will occur, (ii) sentient beings will reflect on that suffering, and (iii) some sentient being who reflects on the moral nature of the suffering will fail to know its moral justification. But, there’s nothing at all about the theistic hypothesis that predicts any of this. It’s still controversial whether the theistic hypothesis even implies that God would create anything at all, much less (i)-(iii). Therefore, P(I|T&K) is very low.

 

[prodigalson2011]

My qualms with this argument:

1. Scrutability is entirely relative to the intellect apprehending the information at hand. Quantum theory is inscrutable to me, not necessarily so to a physicist. Furthermore, any philosophically minded person in the Judeo-Christian tradition would probably immediately point out that, viewed from their particular theistic perspective, the issue of seemingly inscrutable suffering is addressed thoroughly in our theological tradition.
2. You cannot label something morally gratuitous without a logical, and more importantly definite, ground for morality itself. Atheists themselves will concede that, by the very nature of their philosophy, no absolute morality can be deduced from it. If morality is not absolute, you have no point of reference by which to gauge the moral gratuity of anything.

In summary, your theory is predicated on entirely subjective grounds and is thus invalidated.

No response? Or are my objections beneath the lofty heights of your logic?

 

[empther]

that inscrutable suffering is improbable on theism.

What does that mean? Nothing. :hey_bud:

1. If theism is true, then skeptical theism is true.

What does that mean? Nothing. :hey_bud:

It’s impossible to disprove Perplexity’s statements because they mean nothing.
He’s found a formula that will keep suckers uselessly trying to make sense of his babblings forever,
which is what he wants.

 

[prodigalson2011]

What does that mean? Nothing. :hey_bud:

What does that mean? Nothing. :hey_bud:

It’s impossible to disprove Perplexity’s statements because they mean nothing.
He’s found a formula that will keep suckers uselessly trying to make sense of his babblings forever,
which is what he wants.

As so much philosophy does. I, for one, would really like to know how he calculates all these “probabilities,” especially those relating to the probability of God doing a or b. It’s balderdash, and he has thus far been unable or unwilling to expound upon his theories, short of telling people they just aren’t educated enough to understand. I suppose dansser has taken the most effective and perhaps appropriate approach of entertaining his wild assertions. I suppose I must admit I’m not all that patient. And, Perplexity, if you’re reading this, no hard feelings, really. But, I still stand by this philosophy of philosophy and hope you will take the time to entertain my simple mind and read it :

“s for the “deconstruction” that is carried out (also mentioned in the debate), I can’t comment, because most of it seems to me gibberish. But if this is just another sign of my incapacity to recognize profundities, the course to follow is clear: just restate the results to me in plain words that I can understand, and show why they are different from, or better than, what others had been doing long before and and have continued to do since without three-syllable words, incoherent sentences, inflated rhetoric that (to me, at least) is largely meaningless, etc. That will cure my deficiencies — of course, if they are curable; maybe they aren’t, a possibility to which I’ll return. These are very easy requests to fulfill, if there is any basis to the claims put forth with such fervor and indignation. But instead of trying to provide an answer to this simple requests, the response is cries of anger: to raise these questions shows “elitism,” “anti-intellectualism,” and other crimes — though apparently it is not “elitist” to stay within the self- and mutual-admiration societies of intellectuals who talk only to one another and (to my knowledge) don’t enter into the kind of world in which I’d prefer to live. As for that world, I can reel off my speaking and writing schedule to illustrate what I mean, though I presume that most people in this discussion know, or can easily find out; and somehow I never find the"theoreticians” there, nor do I go to their conferences and parties. In short, we seem to inhabit quite different worlds, and I find it hard to see why mine is “elitist,” not theirs. The opposite seems to be transparently the case, though I won’t amplify. To add another facet, I am absolutely deluged with requests to speak and can’t possibly accept a fraction of the invitations I’d like to, so I suggest other people. But oddly, I never suggest those who propound"theories" and “philosophy,” nor do I come across them, or for that matter rarely even their names, in my own (fairly extensive) experience with popular and activist groups and organizations, general community, college, church, union, etc., audiences here and abroad, third world women, refugees, etc.; I can easily give examples. Why, I wonder The whole debate, then, is an odd one. On one side, angry charges and denunciations, on the other, the request for some evidence and argument to support them, to which the response is more angry charges — but, strikingly, no evidence or argument. Again, one is led to ask why. It’s entirely possible that I’m simply missing something, or that I just lack the intellectual capacity to understand the profundities that have been unearthed in the past 20 years or so by Paris intellectuals and their followers. I’m perfectly open-minded about it, and have been for years, when similar charges have been made – but without any answer to my questions. Again, they are simple and should be easy to answer, if there is an answer: if I’m missing something, then show me what it is, in terms I can understand. Of course, if it’s all beyond my comprehension, which is possible, then I’m just a lost cause, and will be compelled to keep to things I do seem to be able to understand, and keep to association with the kinds of people who also seem to be interested in them and seem to understand them (which I’m perfectly happy to do, having no interest, now or ever, in the sectors of the intellectual culture that engage in these things, but apparently little else). Since no one has succeeded in showing me what I’m missing, we’re left with the second option: I’m just incapable of understanding. I’m certainly willing to grant that it may be true, though I’m afraid I’ll have to remain suspicious, for what seem good reasons. There are lots of things I don’t understand – say, the latest debates over whether neutrinos have mass or the way that Fermat’s last theorem was (apparently) proven recently. But from 50 years in this game, I have learned two things: (1) I can ask friends who work in these areas to explain it to me at a level that I can understand, and they can do so, without particular difficulty; (2) if I’m interested, I can proceed to learn more so that I will come to understand it. Now Derrida, Lacan, Lyotard, Kristeva, etc. — even Foucault, whom I knew and liked, and who was somewhat different from the rest — write things that I also don’t understand, but (1) and (2) don’t hold: no one who says they do understand can explain it to me and I haven’t a clue as to how to proceed to overcome my failures. That leaves one of two possibilities: (a) some new advance in intellectual life has been made, perhaps some sudden genetic mutation, which has created a form of “theory” that is beyond quantum theory, topology, etc., in depth and profundity; or (b) … I won’t spell it out." -Noam Chomsky

 

[Perplexity]

1. Scrutability is entirely relative to the intellect apprehending the information at hand. Quantum theory is inscrutable to me, not necessarily so to a physicist. Furthermore, any philosophically minded person in the Judeo-Christian tradition would probably immediately point out that, viewed from their particular theistic perspective, the issue of seemingly inscrutable suffering is addressed thoroughly in our theological tradition.
2. You cannot label something morally gratuitous without a logical, and more importantly definite, ground for morality itself. Atheists themselves will concede that, by the very nature of their philosophy, no absolute morality can be deduced from it. If morality is not absolute, you have no point of reference by which to gauge the moral gratuity of anything.

In summary, your theory is predicated on entirely subjective grounds and is thus invalidated.

#1: I readily acknowledge that my notion of inscrutability is subjective, I’m not sure why you think that’s a bad thing. It just means this argument will only persuade you if you believe in inscrutable suffering, and I provide reason why you should.

I also acknowledge certain theologies explain inscrutable suffering. But, two important points. First, Theism is a core-belief of Christian-theism. Christian-theism is a theological elaboration of theism, telling us more about who God is and his plans for us etc. So, while Christian-theism might have a response here (I don’t think it does), if Theism doesn’t, then it doesn’t matter if Christian-theism does, the rug has been pulled out from under its feet. Second, it needs to be shown that the theistic hypothesis predicts inscrutable suffering, not that it explains it.

2#: “You cannot label something morally gratuitous without a logical, and more importantly definite, ground for morality itself.”

You seem to be saying without God, I can’t reasonably say when there is or isn’t a moral justification. But, without any provided reason to think so all I can ask is ‘why?’

I don’t know many who’d endorse the position that God must exist in order to have an ‘absolute morality’ you’ll have to do some fancy foot work for this one.

 

[Perplexity]

What does that mean? Nothing. :hey_bud:

What does that mean? Nothing. :hey_bud:

It’s impossible to disprove Perplexity’s statements because they mean nothing.
He’s found a formula that will keep suckers uselessly trying to make sense of his babblings forever,
which is what he wants.

Aw, bless him. Can someone help our friend out here with what skeptical theism is?

 

[davidv]

I believe your argument fails at premise #1. It is not demonstrably true in the general case. Redefining words so that it looks true in a specific case, means any conclusion is only true in a limited sense. It also seems that the limits are so narrow that the conclusion cannot be applied to reality.

 

[prodigalson2011]

#1: I readily acknowledge that my notion of inscrutability is subjective, I’m not sure why you think that’s a bad thing. It just means this argument will only persuade you if you believe in inscrutable suffering, and I provide reason why you should.

I also acknowledge certain theologies explain inscrutable suffering. But, two important points. First, Theism is a core-belief of Christian-theism. Christian-theism is a theological elaboration of theism, telling us more about who God is and his plans for us etc. So, while Christian-theism might have a response here (I don’t think it does), if Theism doesn’t, then it doesn’t matter if Christian-theism does, the rug has been pulled out from under its feet. Second, it needs to be shown that the theistic hypothesis predicts inscrutable suffering, not that it explains it.

2#: “You cannot label something morally gratuitous without a logical, and more importantly definite, ground for morality itself.”

You seem to be saying without God, I can’t reasonably say when there is or isn’t a moral justification. But, without any provided reason to think so all I can ask is ‘why?’

I don’t know many who’d endorse the position that God must exist in order to have an ‘absolute morality’ you’ll have to do some fancy foot work for this one.

1.) I don’t think this stands up to scrutiny. For starters, I think it is a little misleading to say, “Theism is a core belief of Christian-theism.” While it is certainly true, in its way, it would be more appropriate to say that theism is the genus of which Christian-theism is the species. One necessarily provides more information than the other. Theism is, in itself, too broad of a concept on which to base any solid predictions. I think that eliminates the dilemma of the theistic hypothesis needing to predict inscrutable suffering, but I would go so far as to say that by it’s very nature, the theistic hypothesis should and could predict nothing further than a deity itself. By its very nature, it must be 1) conscious and 2) of higher order than its creations. That is to say that its creations cannot fully understand it or its workings. I have to run for the moment, but I will return to this…

 

[danserr]

Another atheist thread by Perplexity, the King of Quibblers :banghead::banghead:

Where are the moderators?

What does that mean? Nothing. :hey_bud:

What does that mean? Nothing. :hey_bud:

It’s impossible to disprove Perplexity’s statements because they mean nothing.
He’s found a formula that will keep suckers uselessly trying to make sense of his babblings forever,
which is what he wants.

Are you suggesting that I am a sucker for spending the time to think seriously about his argument?

I’m sure you didn’t mean to be as insulting as that, but you need to pay attention more carefully to what you say and write. And you did mean to be insulting, I assume, when you called him “king of the quibblers.” I just want to warn you to be more careful, because insulting posts are not allowed on this board and you could risk getting into trouble.

Second, I have to tell you something that I have told some atheists on this board before, not to make fun of things you don’t understand. If there is a post on a topic or a thread that you don’t understand, then either politely ask for clarification or else just don’t participate. There are threads I avoid because I don’t have the knowledge to deal with them yet. There is nothing wrong with that. But coming onto a thread and posting dismissive mocking replies doesn’t help anyone.

You have a lot of enthusiasm, which is good, but don’t yet have the knowledge to match it. Why not work on that then? Do some appropriate reading and learn a little more about some of this. If you have not read it, CS Lewis’s Mere Christianity is a useful place to start. Two other books by the Christian philosopher William Lane Craig are also useful. On Guard and Philosophical foundations for a Christan worldview. (The second is harder). In this way, you can start to understand some of these threads better and make more helpful contributions. You will also find that your own posts become more effective as well.