Returning to number 1, particularly your statement that the theistic hypothesis must predict inscrutable suffering. This lies beyond the bounds of general theism and must necessarily move from the category of genus to species, as the prediction of such things as suffering will depend on the nature of the deity. Once we move beyond the basic assertion of a god’s existence, we must still determine his exact nature. Is he benevolent or malevolent? Does he allow free will? The theistic hypothesis asserts only that a higher intelligence is responsible for the universe, and nothing more.
I’m not sure I’ve ever heard someone say the bold statement before.
The theistic hypothesis, as used in the philosophy of religion, almost always refers to this:
There necessarily exists at least one essentially immaterial, omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good person who causally explains all of contingent reality.
It’s also sometimes referred to as classical theism and bare-theism. It’s the God that philosophers reflect on, and the God they debate about.
Funny. I’d like you to refer me to one atheistic philosopher (present reader excluded) who believes in an absolute morality. Sartre was at least honest in stating that in the absence of God, the only absolute is absurdity. So, on the contrary, I think the burden of fancy foot work is on your shoulders… Or feet, as the case may be.
I’m not sure what honesty has to do with Sartre’s belief.
If by absolute morality you just mean moral realism, then you have very, very, very few people who’d agree with you.
Moral cognitivism is the position that moral judgments are able to be true or false. Moral realism is an addendum to moral cognitivism: it says at least some of these beliefs are true.
As Stephen Law told Craig in their recent debate, most philosophers are moral realists (they believe moral judgments are truth-apt, and at least some are actually true), but only like 15% of them are theists. Even Richard Swinburne, one of the world’s most renowned theist philosophers thinks the argument you’re using here is unsound.
So, for starters I’d say Stephen Law, who is an atheist moral realist.
Also, aggressive as he may be, I would like to defend empther’s assertion that the statement, “If theism is true, then skeptical theism is true,” is a meaningless one. I say this because skeptical theism is not an affirmative position. Skepticism makes no claims, only doubts them. Skepticism is essentially perpetual questioning. A question can neither be true or false. Ergo, skeptical theism is not a truth claim.
You’re the first person I’ve ever met who doesn’t think skeptical theism is a truth claim.
There are many versions of skeptical theism (making stronger or weaker claims); but, they all make truth-apt claims.
Here’s one easily accessible
source:
Skeptical theism is the view that God exists but that we should be skeptical of our ability to discern God’s reasons for acting or refraining from acting in any particular instance.
…
If skeptical theism is true, it appears to undercut the primary argument for atheism, namely the argument from evil.
So, in response I’d say your objection doesn’t stand.
“If theism is true, then skeptical theism is true” translates as:
“If there necessarily exists at least one essentially immaterial, omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good person who causally explains all of contingent reality, then we should be skeptical of our ability to discern God’s reasons for acting or refraining from acting in any particular instance (or whatever flavor of skeptical theism you want).”