Plato and Paul

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On another thread, a few of us (including Touchstone) were debating the connections between Plato and Paul. It was extraordinarily off-topic there, so I’m giving it its own thread. The basic conversation is this: what are the commonalities between Plato and Paul? Did Paul distort Plato’s philosophy? etc.

That said, some replies to Touchstone’s most recent remarks…
For Plato, “the Good”, no matter who much we struggle to understand it, even by indirection, remains divine as a principle. It’s higher than any personality could be, and that’s Plato’s basis for exalting it – it’s NOT tainted by the will, by passion, by subjectivity.
But Paul corrupts this completely, personalizing “the Good” as being found in the nature of God, and thus source in personality, obtained from a will.
“God’s will” does not refer to anything except our anthropomorphic conception of God. God is not described by will, passion, nor subjectivity. Nevertheless, the Christian revelation is not so snobbish as to reject anthropomorphism – we cannot but reduce the concept of God by talking about Him, and yet our words can nevertheless approximate something true. You’ll see similar anthropomorphisms even in Plato’s description of the Good; that’s how we talk when we talk about the divine.
Note in Euthyphro how radically different the divine is from Paul’s God – it’s complete, lacking nothing, wanting nothing, silent. It would be a fool who thought it was something to “worship” or “proptiate” somehow. And this is the core of Plato’s exaltation of it.
Why did Plato talk so glowingly about it, then? His attitude was not that of a man with a bus ticket to where he wants to go.
The one that springs to mind is:

Quote:
Matt 5:48 “Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect.”
OK, but your point was that Paul, when faced with Euthyphro, said that God and good were identical. A quotation from someone other than Paul isn’t relevant. Furthermore, the quotation doesn’t indicate that Jesus considered the Father identical with good, only that Jesus considered the Father perfectly good. The word is being used to predicate, not to define.
Which means that what Plato says and Paul says about human goals are widely divergent. For Plato, man is really aiming at enlightened rational self-interest. For Plato sic], man is really aiming at faithful, righteous God-interest.
How is following God’s will not enlightened, rational self-interest, if God is the one who decides your fate? :confused:
Oh, few to none, then or now. But that’s no more here than noting that the sky is blue on sunny days. It’s a fact of nature.
Likewise, the most convincing interpretation of Paul is this: extraordinarily few people have the background nor the sincerity nor the faith to see God in this life. But if they did, they would.
22Paul then stood up in the meeting of the Areopagus and said: "Men of Athens! I see that in every way you are very religious. 23For as I walked around and looked carefully at your objects of worship, I even found an altar with this inscription: TO AN UNKNOWN GOD. Now what you worship as something unknown I am going to proclaim to you.
But you had said that in the passage God “doesn’t love the good because the good is good, but is good because that’s his nature, to define good.” I don’t see that in Acts 17 at all.
 
Did Paul distort Plato’s philosophy?
Nothing wrong with keeping some of Plato’s ideas and discarding others of course. He was pretty silly sometimes.
Touchtone said…
For Plato, “the Good”, no matter who much we struggle to understand it, even by indirection, remains divine as a principle. It’s higher than any personality could be, and that’s Plato’s basis for exalting it – it’s NOT tainted by the will, by passion, by subjectivity.
Couple things:
  • If something has personhood, it does not necessarily have “passion” or “subjectivity” (although, what do you mean by subjectivity?)
  • Did Plato say that if something is divine, it does not have a will? (I don’t think he said this)
  • If the good lacks personality, then humans would have something that the good did not have (and we would be better than the Good), unless it can be proved that personality is an perfection that implies an imperfection … however, I might be going a bit Aristotelian here
Touchtone said…
But Paul corrupts this completely, personalizing “the Good” as being found in the nature of God, and thus source in personality, obtained from a will.
I’m not quite sure what’s being said here.
Touchtone said…
Note in Euthyphro how radically different the divine is from Paul’s God – it’s complete, lacking nothing, wanting nothing, silent. It would be a fool who thought it was something to “worship” or “proptiate” somehow. And this is the core of Plato’s exaltation of it.
The Christian God does not need to be worshipped for the fulfillment of God nature. God needs to be worshipped for the fulfillment of our nature.

Also, you would need to prove that Euthyphro is showing that the gods do not need to be worshipped (for our sake), because I don’t think that’s what it’s saying, especially judging by the fact that the dialogue ends abruptly without any conclusion. If it WAS saying that, it certainly contradicts Plato in several other dialogues, such as Phaedo, where he explains how we must be subservient to the gods.
Touchtone said…
Which means that what Plato says and Paul says about human goals are widely divergent. For Plato, man is really aiming at enlightened rational self-interest. For Plato [sic], man is really aiming at faithful, righteous God-interest.
These two things can be the same, provided they are defined in a certain way.

For one to be faithful to God and righteous before God, it is necessary to have a degree of knowledge (both about nature and God). One cannot love what one does not know. Thus, “enlightenment” as well as being “rational” is a necessary perquisite of faithfulness and righteousness. Also, “self-interest” and “God-interest” can be united as well, for we are fulfilled and made happy when we are with God.
 
Gentlemen,

Thanks for the thread and responses. Am travelling and in the throes of a major software release for our company this week, so this is a marker to leave until I come up for air on Thurs. See you then, and looking forward to continuing on this.

-TS
 
Gentlemen,

Thanks for the thread and responses. Am travelling and in the throes of a major software release for our company this week, so this is a marker to leave until I come up for air on Thurs. See you then, and looking forward to continuing on this.

-TS
Thanks for the update. Good luck on the release. 🙂
 
“God’s will” does not refer to anything except our anthropomorphic conception of God.
Oops… not so.

Will is connected to impetus and motion which is connected to logic and rationality. There need be no human like anthropomorphic imagery to conceive of will.

This relates to how intent and desire came from a purely logical existence. God has desire and will, not merely from an anthropomorphic stand, but from Logical causality, though granted such a connection is not trivially imagined.
 
Oops… not so.

Will is connected to impetus and motion which is connected to logic and rationality. There need be no human like anthropomorphic imagery to conceive of will.

This relates to how intent and desire came from a purely logical existence. God has desire and will, not merely from an anthropomorphic stand, but from Logical causality, though granted such a connection is not trivially imagined.
OK, but I was talking about the ordinary language meaning of the term “will”. I would agree that there may be a real meaning of “God’s will”, much like there is a real meaning of good, independent of our ideas of good – in this sense, “God’s will” and “good” might be synonymous. But those things that we know about our will (for example, its subjectivity) do not necessarily apply to God’s will.

Our anthropomorphisms are the only way we can talk about God, but they are nevertheless an obstacle to understanding Him.
 
“God’s will” does not refer to anything except our anthropomorphic conception of God. God is not described by will, passion, nor subjectivity. Nevertheless, the Christian revelation is not so snobbish as to reject anthropomorphism – we cannot but reduce the concept of God by talking about Him, and yet our words can nevertheless approximate something true. You’ll see similar anthropomorphisms even in Plato’s description of the Good; that’s how we talk when we talk about the divine.
I think you are still having trouble seeing Plato outside of the lens of Paul and other hellenized Chrisitians. Consider Protagoras, one of Plato’s intellectual heroes, famous then and now for his claim that “man is the measure of all things”. In *Protagoras, *we see Plato’s idea that Protagoras, the original relativist was so disposed because Protagorist was driven by the virtue of courage, and this inclined Protagoras to embrace the idea that sublime truths were not knowable, for this was a a realization that demanded heroism and courage to acknowledge and accept. Protagoras found in his relativism an expression for his noble self, according to Plato, for a world where such truths were unknowable demanded the virtues that Protagoras admired so deeply – courage and fortitude.

The divine and sublime for Plato are decidedly impersonal on that view, not “relational”, not dealing with man’s connection to God – a foreign concept in Plato – but with man’s disposition towards true virtue, which in Plato’s foundationalist perspective was just as “man-centered” as Protagoras’ view, Protagoras being decidedly relativist by comparison. On all sides here, the object of man’s pursuits is impersonal principle – sublime virtue. Whatever anthropomorphic language gets invoked does not personalize the idea of “courage”, beyond it’s being a human virtue, for example. Courage is not god, but something the gods esteem, as do better men on their better days.

When Paul says “God is Love”, there’s a much different kind of anthropomorphic language being invoked. For Paul, God is personal, and to esteem “love” without a relationship to God-as-a-person is to miss out on sublime, divine love – to settle for phileo when (Christian) agape is available in the person of God. This is anthropormorphization on a whole different level. It’s not just useful language, Paul is anthropomorphizing, personalizing love itself – see the continue of that verse in 1 John 4: “whoever lives in love lives in God and God in him”.
Why did Plato talk so glowingly about it, then? His attitude was not that of a man with a bus ticket to where he wants to go.
Sorry, didn’t get this – missed the bus ticket reference. Maybe you can rephrase this?
OK, but your point was that Paul, when faced with Euthyphro, said that God and good were identical. A quotation from someone other than Paul isn’t relevant. Furthermore, the quotation doesn’t indicate that Jesus considered the Father identical with good, only that Jesus considered the Father perfectly good. The word is being used to predicate, not to define.
This goes right back, then to my original citation of Roman 3 – “No one is righteous”, according to Paul. Whether one adopts an “infused righteousness” model, as Catholics do, or an “imputed righteousness” model, as Protestants do, righteousness comes from God and is sourced in his character. Whether one see righteousness as a matter of legal standing with respect to God’s covenant – being a good human, covenantally – or as an infused moral/religious quality – being a good human through partaking in God’s righteousness – the ultimate source of the good is God. This is Paul’s point in invoking Isaiah.
How is following God’s will not enlightened, rational self-interest, if God is the one who decides your fate? :confused:
That’s Paul’s entire point – there is no “self-interest” for man apart from “God-interest”. This was not Plato’s view at all, which is the point I keep coming back to here. One might as well say young earth creationists are promoting scientific rationalism, because, really, the most rational, scientific view is the true one, which is that the Bible is inerrantly true in its literal, face-value reading, and the earth is 6,000 years old. Real rational thinkers accept a young earth, doncha know.

This is co-option, the subordinating of human ideas of the noble and sublime to the sovereignty of personal deity, the replacing of principle with personality at the top of the moral hierarchy.
Likewise, the most convincing interpretation of Paul is this: extraordinarily few people have the background nor the sincerity nor the faith to see God in this life. But if they did, they would.
Agreed, but that’s just a practical matter, as I said before. People, by nature, are conflicted, and get bogged down by their appetites and “empirical interests”. This is a pragmatic limitation, not the object of man’s “real interests”. Even so, your summary of Paul is indicative of his divergence from Plato. Plato saw “virtue” in the actualized man. Paul sees “God in his life”. Christians are typically so steeped in a “Paulified”, or more generally a “Christianized” Plato, that they do not see the difference. Reading Plato, though, this comes through clearly.
But you had said that in the passage God “doesn’t love the good because the good is good, but is good because that’s his nature, to define good.” I don’t see that in Acts 17 at all.
Ah, I thought you were referring to the “unknown god” reference I made in that comment. Paul makes no such claim in the Mars Hill appeal. I was pointing to Paul’s connecting the “unknown god” with Yahweh as an indication of his objective to co-opt and subsume hellenistic theology, “Christianizing” it, or more precisely “Paulifying” it.

-TS
 
  • If something has personhood, it does not necessarily have “passion” or “subjectivity” (although, what do you mean by subjectivity?)
  • Did Plato say that if something is divine, it does not have a will? (I don’t think he said this)
Plato did not think the Divine had a will, because that would imply knowledge of that which was outside itself and movement outside itself, and therefore imperfection.

I think this relates to the problem of the human individual seeking to follow God’s will, which is in a way meaningless for Plato, since god has no will for his creation at all.

But - one can seek to live in accordance with the Good, which is essentially living in accordance with the nature of being. Rather Zen-like really, it could only be foolish to attempt to live in a way that is against the nature of reality. And for Paul, though God does have a will, and knowledge of creation, to live in accordance with God’s will means much the same thing - to live in accordance with Truth and the nature of reality.

But I think where another large difference can be seen is that for Plato, it will be ultimately impossible to live in accordance with the Divine nature, because matter is corrupt and we are tied to it. Thus even his vision of the perfect city in the Republic, no matter how carefully governed, will in the end fail.

Paul, as a Jew, say matter not as something other than the Divine or somehow opposed to God’s nature, but created by God and in accordance with his nature. Matter is true, and good. So to live in accordance with God’s will is not difficult for us because matter itself is somehow corrupt, and in the end creation and humanity will in some sense be united with the divine, in a way Plato despaired of.

I agree though, that pul probably did not think of God having passions, though I could be assuming a later Christian POV to him.
 
Plato did not think the Divine had a will, because that would imply knowledge of that which was outside itself and movement outside itself, and therefore imperfection.

I think this relates to the problem of the human individual seeking to follow God’s will, which is in a way meaningless for Plato, since god has no will for his creation at all.

But - one can seek to live in accordance with the Good, which is essentially living in accordance with the nature of being. Rather Zen-like really, it could only be foolish to attempt to live in a way that is against the nature of reality. And for Paul, though God does have a will, and knowledge of creation, to live in accordance with God’s will means much the same thing - to live in accordance with Truth and the nature of reality.

But I think where another large difference can be seen is that for Plato, it will be ultimately impossible to live in accordance with the Divine nature, because matter is corrupt and we are tied to it. Thus even his vision of the perfect city in the Republic, no matter how carefully governed, will in the end fail.

Paul, as a Jew, say matter not as something other than the Divine or somehow opposed to God’s nature, but created by God and in accordance with his nature. Matter is true, and good. So to live in accordance with God’s will is not difficult for us because matter itself is somehow corrupt, and in the end creation and humanity will in some sense be united with the divine, in a way Plato despaired of.

I agree though, that pul probably did not think of God having passions, though I could be assuming a later Christian POV to him.
Good comments, there. I think it’s good to remember Paul’s conversion experience as a reference frame for his idea of God having a will. I suppose (and have read) that one could posit that Paul was not a trinitarian in the orthodox sense, and had a much stronger ontological distinction in mind between Jesus and Yahweh than the unity later adopted by the church via the concept of homoousia, but even so, Paul clear considers Jesus divine, and recounts his encounter with a “voice and a light” that identified itself, when asked as “I am Jesus, whom you are persecuting” (this is in Acts, IIRC). This same voice provides very specific instructions for Paul – he’s to go to Jerusalem and wait further commands, etc.

This is Paul’s frame of reference in writing what he did. He’s met Jesus, and talked with him. In 1 Cor 9 Paul asks, rhetorically: “Am I not an apostle? Have I not seen Jesus our Lord?”.

Now contrast that with Plato, who in Symposium 203 declares: “No god associates with men”. Elsewhere, – I think in Nicomachean Ethics – Plato denies that man and god(s) can associate. It’s impossible, the gulf between them is too wide. It is this sensibility in Plato, and Greek thought in general that Paul is referring to, I suggest, in 1 Cor 1 that “the doctrine of the cross is folly to the Greeks, and a scandal to the Jews”. This one verse (1:23) nicely encapsulates Paul – informed by Plato (et al), but overturning his theology, and raised a hot-shot Jewish scholar who identifies as man as divine, the Son of God, overturning, or at least convoluting and confounding, centuries of Hebrew monotheism. In Paul we see the synthesis of the personal, passionate, monotheistic god, with the platonic concepts of sublime virtue and omnimax, transcendent being. Paul is well aware of both traditions, and both inverts them in part, and also infuses them into the new religious framework he founded, which we now call Christianity.

-TS
 
Plato did not think the Divine had a will, because that would imply knowledge of that which was outside itself and movement outside itself, and therefore imperfection.
You may be right. I don’t know Plato very well.

However, does anyone know if Plato regarded the Demiurge as divine? (the Demiurge was the creator … or “crafter” … of the material world, by combining pre-existing matter with the eternal forms). The Demiurge would seem to have movement outside itself and all that … and yet would it also be divine? I wouldn’t be surprised if Plato contradicts himself here. He seems to do that a lot.😃

Also, it seems like in Plato’s Apology, that Socrates believes that “the god” (which probably refers to Apollo) does have a will. He keeps mentioning how the “the god has commanded him” to live the life of the philosophers and to examine people and so forth. Does anyone know what I’m talking about?
I think this relates to the problem of the human individual seeking to follow God’s will, which is in a way meaningless for Plato, since god has no will for his creation at all.
Once again, in the Apology, he seems to indicate that “the god” does have a will for Socrates at least.
But I think where another large difference can be seen is that for Plato, it will be ultimately impossible to live in accordance with the Divine nature, because matter is corrupt and we are tied to it. Thus even his vision of the perfect city in the Republic, no matter how carefully governed, will in the end fail.

Paul, as a Jew, say matter not as something other than the Divine or somehow opposed to God’s nature, but created by God and in accordance with his nature. Matter is true, and good. So to live in accordance with God’s will is not difficult for us because matter itself is somehow corrupt, and in the end creation and humanity will in some sense be united with the divine, in a way Plato despaired of.
Yes, this is probably the biggest difference. Plato hated matter. However, I would not say that Plato thought it impossible to live in accordance with the divine nature. He seems to indicate in the Phaedo (and the Apology) that our soul, when separated from the body, will have no obstacle from contemplating the divine forms.
 
Areopagite,

You’re right to say that Plato often contradicted himself – this is a nasty tendency that arises when people are actually looking for truth, not imposing a system on observations. Both methods (systematizing and searching) have their drawbacks, but I myself tend to side with Plato here. You can see something of the same contrast in comparing Augustine to Aquinas, although Aquinas is certainly a far better systematizer than, say, Hegel. (Read Kierkegaard on Hegel, if you haven’t: it’s first class comedy).

The Demiurge is a late development in Plato, but has many of the characteristics of a creator god – except not omnipotence. Certainly, the demiurge had a will, of some sort.

The larger point, which I agree with, is that Plato thought that the gods (if there were gods) were bound by the Good. According to Touchstone, the Christian God is not. But I fail to see any Scripture that indicates biconditionality between God and good – that is, that “everything that is good is God”. If this statement is true (which Jesus seems to have indicated), it is a contingent truth. It might have been otherwise, as Genesis 1 indicates.
 
You may be right. I don’t know Plato very well.

However, does anyone know if Plato regarded the Demiurge as divine? (the Demiurge was the creator … or “crafter” … of the material world, by combining pre-existing matter with the eternal forms). The Demiurge would seem to have movement outside itself and all that … and yet would it also be divine? I wouldn’t be surprised if Plato contradicts himself here. He seems to do that a lot.:

Yes, this is probably the biggest difference. Plato hated matter. However, I would not say that Plato thought it impossible to live in accordance with the divine nature. He seems to indicate in the Phaedo (and the Apology) that our soul, when separated from the body, will have no obstacle from contemplating the divine forms.
Well, the Demiurge, if I recall correctly, is an unwilled product of the Good. THis was PLato’s big problem - there was something required in the system that had knowledge and will, but he could not identify it with the Good itself, because that would impinge on its divinity. How to get a world and multiplicity out of something completely self contained? Aristotle tried to do it by giving knowledge of self to god, so he was both subject and object, multiple and singular at the same time. But this solution was resoundingly rejected by Plato’s other followers as dividing god.

So, the Demiurge is divine, but not the One who is the source of all being.

It seems to me that PLato also thought that we would not be permanently free of matter - that we got thrown back in again, so we wouldn’t be free of matter for any length of time. But perhaps I am confusing him with one of the neoplatonists.
 
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