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Luke_K
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Yes, it seems that way. There is absolutely no time between the man sitting and standing, so he would be sitting and standing simultaneously. This appears to be a contradiction.
Please explain why the first cause/necessary being must be personal
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danserr
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Belorg, thanks for the replies.
Now, I have pointed out that God may be atemporal without creation and temporal after creation. To which you try to claim that this doesn’t make sense because “after implies before.” It depends what you mean. The “after” refers to every point after creation. Creation is the point “before” implied by the after. But there is not “before” creation, since time began to exist with creation. Therefore we say that God existed causally prior, but not temporally prior to creation. This may be unfamiliar to you, but it is a perfectly coherent idea.
Finally, you claim that Craig tries to obfuscate things by adding steps, but you don’t really consider his argument and I can’t tell if you actually read it. All you do is say, “God’s will is sufficient for the exercise of his power.” But you offer no argument that this is the case and what is more, it seems patently false. It is not enough that God will something (though he willed it from eternity), rather he must also exercise his causal power. Doesn’t this seem obvious in the case of the man sitting from eternity? He may will to stand from all eternity, but that is not a sufficient condition to stand. He must also exercise his causal power to stand. Thus, he would enter time, which, for the sake of argument, I grant.
As to the KCA being dead, you certainly have not demonstrated that here (though of course, that was not the purpose of this thread), nor have I seen you do elsewhere. On the other hand I have seen Craig successfully defend repeatedly in his debates and writings, and I am inclined to consider it a good argument.
You still try to claim that an mind need not be personal. I have shown why this is mistaken in my post 29 where i say:
Finally, and here is the real interesting part of your post; you finally make the jump and claim than a (personal) embodied mind is an incoherent idea. This is a bold claim. Essentially you are saying that the concept of an embodied mind is self-contradictory, (like a married bachelor), and therefore logically impossible. This seems very implausible. Saying "an unemodied (personal, since minds are personal) mind exists does not seem at all self-contradictory and the burden is on you to prove it is. Otherwise, your objection to an unembodied (personal, which is redundant) mind as the cause of the universe evaporates.
I’m inclined to think that rather than Craig trying to obfuscate things, as you suggest, you are by what seems to be your only partially understood appeal to quantum mechanics. I have pointed out that first of all, the indeterminate view of qm, which you appeal to, is seen as unsatisfactory by many modern scientists; second on the qm model, it is not the case that something comes from nothing, but that it comes from a quantum vacuum. Now this is not an attack on the personhood of the first cause, but on the idea that something can’t come from nothing, which is flawed for the reasons I mention above. It could also be taken as an an attack on premise 2 of the KCA and try to claim that the universe never began to exist, but this I don’t need to reply to because it is a flawed idea and you have said that you don’t even believe (or accept) it yourself. (More on this below under my consideration of my first argument for the person-hood of the universe).
Now, I have pointed out that God may be atemporal without creation and temporal after creation. To which you try to claim that this doesn’t make sense because “after implies before.” It depends what you mean. The “after” refers to every point after creation. Creation is the point “before” implied by the after. But there is not “before” creation, since time began to exist with creation. Therefore we say that God existed causally prior, but not temporally prior to creation. This may be unfamiliar to you, but it is a perfectly coherent idea.
Finally, you claim that Craig tries to obfuscate things by adding steps, but you don’t really consider his argument and I can’t tell if you actually read it. All you do is say, “God’s will is sufficient for the exercise of his power.” But you offer no argument that this is the case and what is more, it seems patently false. It is not enough that God will something (though he willed it from eternity), rather he must also exercise his causal power. Doesn’t this seem obvious in the case of the man sitting from eternity? He may will to stand from all eternity, but that is not a sufficient condition to stand. He must also exercise his causal power to stand. Thus, he would enter time, which, for the sake of argument, I grant.
As to the KCA being dead, you certainly have not demonstrated that here (though of course, that was not the purpose of this thread), nor have I seen you do elsewhere. On the other hand I have seen Craig successfully defend repeatedly in his debates and writings, and I am inclined to consider it a good argument.
You keep trying to claim that maybe something else fits these categories, but you are completely unable to say what that is. Until you give a clear possibility, then you suggestion that there is something else is just empty words. And it does not help you to claim that a proto-universe (whatever that is) operating under qm. I don’t even know what this means, and I am not sure that you do. Is this universe physical in any way? and remember the quantum vacuum is a rich sea of fluctuating energy, it is not atemporal! so your suggestion seems to risk incoherence.
You still try to claim that an mind need not be personal. I have shown why this is mistaken in my post 29 where i say:
Here you have no response to make besides accusing me of begging the question. An immaterial computer is an incoherent idea. It could not be made of up parts, and so would not be a computer. If you have gotten to the point where you are tying to claim that an immaterial computer could have a mind, then I think you are really stretching.
Finally, and here is the real interesting part of your post; you finally make the jump and claim than a (personal) embodied mind is an incoherent idea. This is a bold claim. Essentially you are saying that the concept of an embodied mind is self-contradictory, (like a married bachelor), and therefore logically impossible. This seems very implausible. Saying "an unemodied (personal, since minds are personal) mind exists does not seem at all self-contradictory and the burden is on you to prove it is. Otherwise, your objection to an unembodied (personal, which is redundant) mind as the cause of the universe evaporates.
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danserr
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This is all I have time for now, I will look over your other replies later if I have time, but to be brief, I have answered alot of them earlier and you just ignore some of my points.
In terms of you “what caused God” idea,
You have never refuted the KCA in this thread for the simple reason we have not discussed it. I have shown that we have evidence that the universe began to exist, but do not have evidence God began to. The arguments for the beginning of the universe do not apply to God. If you object tell me how the scientific evidence for the Big Bang model for the origin of the universe from nothing could possible apply to God. It obviously does not. Nor the philosophical arguments for the KCA. This is so because God is atemporal without creation, which I have shown above is perfectly coherent. Your notion of an atemporal universe seems incoherent since the universe by definition includes all time, space, and matter.
If you are really unable to see a different between an agent causing something and a law of nature acting on matter causing something, then I am not sure where else to go here. Your view seems to me evidently wrong and to beg the question in favor of physicalism, but even in this case, it seems to me that there would be a different. In which case, if universe cannot be accounted for in terms of laws operating on initial conditions (which seems obvious), then the only other option is that it be accounted for in terms of agent and volition. Therefore the cause of the universe is personal.
Since you don’t even accept any of the quantum models, I don’t need to bother discussing them. I have no interest in discussing views when you don’t even accept what you are saying. (ps. by believe, I just mean accept a view of probable-- do you seriously not believe anything. ie, not accept any view on anything as probable)?
In terms of you “what caused God” idea,
You have never refuted the KCA in this thread for the simple reason we have not discussed it. I have shown that we have evidence that the universe began to exist, but do not have evidence God began to. The arguments for the beginning of the universe do not apply to God. If you object tell me how the scientific evidence for the Big Bang model for the origin of the universe from nothing could possible apply to God. It obviously does not. Nor the philosophical arguments for the KCA. This is so because God is atemporal without creation, which I have shown above is perfectly coherent. Your notion of an atemporal universe seems incoherent since the universe by definition includes all time, space, and matter.
If you are really unable to see a different between an agent causing something and a law of nature acting on matter causing something, then I am not sure where else to go here. Your view seems to me evidently wrong and to beg the question in favor of physicalism, but even in this case, it seems to me that there would be a different. In which case, if universe cannot be accounted for in terms of laws operating on initial conditions (which seems obvious), then the only other option is that it be accounted for in terms of agent and volition. Therefore the cause of the universe is personal.
Since you don’t even accept any of the quantum models, I don’t need to bother discussing them. I have no interest in discussing views when you don’t even accept what you are saying. (ps. by believe, I just mean accept a view of probable-- do you seriously not believe anything. ie, not accept any view on anything as probable)?
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belorg
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Danserr. Thank you for the intersting discussion.
just a few remarks.
As to the KCA:. I have shown beyond any reasonable doubt that the ‘cause’ required by the KCA cannot possibly be a personal a-temporal agent, because, while His will alone is not a sufficient cause of the universe, it is nevertheless a sufficient cause of God’s exercise of His causla powers, which, if the will is eternal, must also be eternal. Therfore the effct of this causal power is eternal too. It cannot possibly **begin **. And no matter how many inetremdeiate steps one can imagine between Gods will and the result of His will, this does not change the fact thta, by his very definition,each of these steps is a sufficient cause for the next step, entailing that if the first step does not begin, then neither does the second, nor the last. You have not argued against tjis, and neither has Craig (and FYI I have read his arguments as well as his debate with Wes Morriston and his pepliy to Morriston’s objections).
I wish to poin t out that I have given youi an alternative to a mind, although since i do not make a positive claim I do not even have the burden to give one.
The fact that you do not fully understand what a proto-universe might be is irrelevant. You do not fully comprehend what a non-physical mind is either. A proto-unierse is a non-physical, non-spatial and a-temporal phase in the development of the universe.What is so hard to undersyand about that?Is a lot less complex than a non-physical a-temporal mind,
As to a mind being non-personal, you claim that an imaaterial compuyer is an incoherent idea. You seem to know a great deal about the laws governing the immaterial world to make the claim that a personal mind is possible under the laws of the magical immaterial world, but the much more primitive intelligence of a computer-like mind is not? that’s a very bokd assertion, I must say.
Also, whereon earth do you get the idea that I claim the idea of an unembodied mind is incoherent? All I’m saying is that it is patently false that we know unembodied minds exist. We do not know this.
And yes , I am unable to see the differnce between an agent causing something and some sort of law acting on something else causing something. There isn’t even a suggestion of physicalism in what I am saying. An event is either caused by some sort of law or it is uncaused, it is as simple as that. Either inside the agent’s mind some law triggers something which causes the agent to decide something, or else there is no law inside the agent’s mind and it just makes decisions completely uncaused. But if decisons are uncaused, why do they need a mind? Or why do they need an agent?.
And finally, no I do not accept any of the models as trrue. That’s what a theist does. I accept some models as more plausible than others.
And of course I accept some things as more probable than others. But that does not mean I belive them. I tend to keep an open mind. Right now I know with 100% certainty that the God of classical theism does not exist, and that any other sort of God is extremely improbable. But if some convincing argument shoukl come along, I am always willing to change my mind.
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Since you don’t even accept any of the quantum models, I don’t need to bother discussing them. I have no interest in discussing views when you don’t even accept what you are saying. (ps. by believe, I just mean accept a view of probable-- do you seriously not believe anything. ie, not accept any view on anything as probable)?
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tonyrey
Guest
Your inability to see it proves nothing!
Your whole argument is based on the assumption that the model of physical reality with its laws applies to the mind.
What about events caused by persons? That is a universal legal presumption.
Pure supposition! Do you have no control over your decisions? How do you explain the fact that we can choose to be unreasonable? What law triggers that?
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Where do you obtain your knowledge?
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belorg
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That s true, but since I am open-minded, feel free to enlighten me, Tony
No, it’s not. it’s based on the logical inference that whatever a mind is, it is not a choatic system, so it operetaes under certain laws What exectly thiose laws are is irrelevant for this discussion.
Of course it’s a legal presumption but that does not mean it has any sort of philosophical or metaphysical significance.
ultimately: no.
In the same way I would explain every other choice.
If the mind is physical, then this is probably due to the laws of physics, which include qunatum mechanics.What law triggers that?
If the mind is non-physical, then it operates under the very mysterious laws of the immaterial world. You should ask danserr, he seems to know exactly which laws are possible in that realm.
Pure logic, my friend. Somethinh that is logically incoherent cannot be true. And the God of classical theism is logically incoherent., but that’s really another discussion.
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danserr
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Belorg, thanks for our discussion, which I guess is winding down, but I’m too stubborn to end yet and have a couple more remarks.
You asked “where on earth do I get the idea that you claim an unembodied mind is incoherent.” I get it from here, your post 37, where you say:
Now, as to the personal atemporality of the first cause, you are still trying to claim that is such is the case, then the effect must be eternal. You have modified you opinion slightly to accept my claim that God’s will is not a sufficient condition and that he must exercise his causal power as well. But then you try to claim that God’s will is a necessary condition for his causal power. But you can offer no evidence for this, and it seems patently untrue, The fact that a person will something does not necessarily make it the case that he will be exercising his causal power simultaneously. Recall the man sitting from eternity. By exercising his causal power, of course, he changes and enters time, but without exercising his causal power, he remains sitting forever.
So here at least, you give no reason to doubt that value of the KCA (though that is really a topic for another thread).
Your notion of a proto-universe strikes me not only as hard to understand, but incoherent. I have told you that by definition the universe includes all time, space, and matter, you are suggesting a proto-universe that is atemporal. Frankly, it does not seem to describe anything, but is simply empty words that you have strung together in a stretch effort to try to give an example I ask for. But they remain empty words. An unembodied mind, however, being logically coherent and required by the argument is far more understandable.
You still try to suggest that a computer is personal, but you haven’t engaged my argument against this, or my demonstration that your analogy is flawed and that a computer is not analogous to a mind/(soul/self), but to a brain, which is a different thing. As to your mocking remark about my supposed knowledge about the “magical” immaterial world, you are just being silly, as I suppose you know perfectly well. We know that a computer is made up of parts, that it is analogous to, if anything, a brain, which is made up of parts, and that it is material. This does not require specialized knowledge about immaterial objects, only knowledge about computers, which we have. a computer is by definition material and made of parts; a mind is not. So your argument here fails on several counts.
As to your remark on decisions being uncaused. Decisions in the mind are made by the mind, so they are caused by the mind, but the mind has at least an indeterminate, element, making it not wholly caused. This is plausible in respect to a mind, but not so much so in respect to matter, which must inevitably obey the laws of nature. Since the latter cannot account for the origins of the universe, the cause must be an un-embodied mind. That being said, your denial of free will is interesting and probably is much of the reason for your difficulty here, and this does seem to come from you begging the question in favor of physicalism, since this is the only way to conflate agent causation with laws operating on initial conditions.
You asked “where on earth do I get the idea that you claim an unembodied mind is incoherent.” I get it from here, your post 37, where you say:
. Now as I say in my previous post; this is a very bold claim, contradicts what you say earlier, and seems patently false. There is no contradiction entailed in saying that an un-embodied mind exist. It may be unfamiliar to you, but is not thereby contradictory.
Now, as to the personal atemporality of the first cause, you are still trying to claim that is such is the case, then the effect must be eternal. You have modified you opinion slightly to accept my claim that God’s will is not a sufficient condition and that he must exercise his causal power as well. But then you try to claim that God’s will is a necessary condition for his causal power. But you can offer no evidence for this, and it seems patently untrue, The fact that a person will something does not necessarily make it the case that he will be exercising his causal power simultaneously. Recall the man sitting from eternity. By exercising his causal power, of course, he changes and enters time, but without exercising his causal power, he remains sitting forever.
So here at least, you give no reason to doubt that value of the KCA (though that is really a topic for another thread).
Your notion of a proto-universe strikes me not only as hard to understand, but incoherent. I have told you that by definition the universe includes all time, space, and matter, you are suggesting a proto-universe that is atemporal. Frankly, it does not seem to describe anything, but is simply empty words that you have strung together in a stretch effort to try to give an example I ask for. But they remain empty words. An unembodied mind, however, being logically coherent and required by the argument is far more understandable.
You still try to suggest that a computer is personal, but you haven’t engaged my argument against this, or my demonstration that your analogy is flawed and that a computer is not analogous to a mind/(soul/self), but to a brain, which is a different thing. As to your mocking remark about my supposed knowledge about the “magical” immaterial world, you are just being silly, as I suppose you know perfectly well. We know that a computer is made up of parts, that it is analogous to, if anything, a brain, which is made up of parts, and that it is material. This does not require specialized knowledge about immaterial objects, only knowledge about computers, which we have. a computer is by definition material and made of parts; a mind is not. So your argument here fails on several counts.
As to your remark on decisions being uncaused. Decisions in the mind are made by the mind, so they are caused by the mind, but the mind has at least an indeterminate, element, making it not wholly caused. This is plausible in respect to a mind, but not so much so in respect to matter, which must inevitably obey the laws of nature. Since the latter cannot account for the origins of the universe, the cause must be an un-embodied mind. That being said, your denial of free will is interesting and probably is much of the reason for your difficulty here, and this does seem to come from you begging the question in favor of physicalism, since this is the only way to conflate agent causation with laws operating on initial conditions.
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belorg
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Never mind, I am stubborn too.
You should read more carefully; danserr. A personal atemporal cuase of the universe is incoherent for the reasons I have given but I have never claimed an unembodies mind is incoherent. I think it is incoherent, but since I cannot prove it, I am not claiming it, nor does it matter for my argument.
If God’s will is not a necssary condition, then God can will something without doing it, which means He is not omnipotent.
So you claim that this man can will from eternity to stand up but still remian seated for eternity? That coukldbe true for an ordinary man, but for the alleged omnipotent creator of everything? The poor guy desperalty wants to get up but cannot do so.
And notice the bolded part. Why will he be exercising his wil simulatneously?’ How about: because there is no time, what do you suggeest, that he waited a few years before he exercised his power. He is atemporal, there are no moments to wait, so that’s why he will be exercising his power simultaneousky, or rather, he will be exercsing it since eternity.
Well, you suggest a mind that is atemporal.
I don’t even need an example. Can you prove this notion is logically il^mpossible? If not, then I have proven that your argument is false.
It is not because something is required by the argument that it necessarily makes sense, . That would be a severe case of question-begging. And whether it is understandable or not is irrelevant. As long as you cannot prove it is logically impossible, your argument still fails.
I most certainly don’t. I like discussing this with you, danserr, but please, read more carefully. I am suggesting the opposite: a computer is a kind of mind that is NOT personal.
I do not knowhat a brain is a different thing, that is presuming dualism. So, yes, I propose that a computer is analogous to an impersonal mind.
Of course a computer is material, but an immaterial computer isn’t. Does it exist? I do not know, but unless you do have some special knowledge about the mysterious laws that govern the immaterial realm, you are not justified in saying an immaterial computer cannot exist.
It’s an analogy, danserr, a mind generally cannot create things from nothing, so the supermind youi propose is also only not analogous to the minds we know (if we do knwo minds, which of course, we don’t)
So, there are indeterminsitic things about the mind, but it is completely impossible that other things are indeterminsitic?
So matter cannot possibly behave in a indeterministic way? That is a bold assertion.
So you think an action or a decision caused by nothing is actually free will? How is that? And where do I deny free will?
I am not begging the question in favour of physicalism You beg the question in favour of dualism.
Now, to summarize.
Your claim was that there are only two known non-physical, non-spatial and atemporal causes: abstract objects and minds.
Saying that the mind is a known non-physical etc cause is begging the question in favout of dualism, so this is one reason why your argument is patently false.
At most , if you don’t beg the question, you can say that a non-physical mind is logically possible, but so is an atemporal proto-universe (which would eliminate the insurmountable problem of creation from nothing), so, there are not only 2 possiblities, but at least 3 Again, you argument fails.
And as I’ve shown, Craig’s claim that the cause of the universe must be personal because otherwise, the effect would be eternal too and would not have a beginning, is false. It’s actually a personal cause that would bring about an eternal effect.
So, to answer the OP: the first cause needn’t be personal and in fact if there is a first cause, an impersonal one is a far simpler explanation, with fewer problems.
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tonyrey
Guest
That is the standard reply of anyone who cannot provide an explanation. It amounts to an admission of ignorance!
It’s not a question of imagination but logic:
- Purpose implies hindsight, insight and foresight
- Impersonal processes lack hindsight, insight and foresight
- Impersonal processes cannot be purposeful - unless they are magically endowed with those powers
Have you ever seen things do something deliberately?
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danserr
Guest
Yes, I am afraid I keep forgetting that you are using language in ways it is not really meant to be used. Here is the problem, you admit that you cannot show that an un-embodied mind is incoherent, and for good reason. Since minds are personal, as I have shown your suggestion of an immaterial, personal, atemporal computer is badly flawed, this means that if logic demands such a thing be the cause of the universe, unless you can show that it is incoherent (which would be a very bold and remarkable claim), then we are right to conclude than an un-embodied mind is the cause of the universe.
Now to consider more specifically your claim that a personal atemporal cause is incoherent, I have shown that God’s will alone is not a sufficient condition of his action. Rather, as an agent/person, He must also exercise his casual power. Your most recent attempt to escape this is to claim that “If God’s will is not a necssary condition, then God can will something without doing it, which means He is not omnipotent.” This, however, is clearly untrue. For instance, God willed that humans should not sin, he left them free, and they sinned anyway. This does not make him less than omnipotent.
Remember omnipotence is not a matter of sheer, raw, infinite, power. It is a matter of the ability to actualize potential states of affairs. For instance, then, God can’t make a square circle because those words, “square circle,” do not describe a potential state of affairs; they are empty words and incoherent nonsense. Same with the outdated notion of God making a stone so heavy he can’t lift it. Such words describe no potential state of affairs. So God’s will is not a sufficient condition at all, rather he must exercise his causal power. But this does not make him less than omnipotent at all since he still retains the ability to actualize all potential states of affairs (there are one or two minor qualifications to this to be precise, but for now, you get the point). Hence, you see why your next suggestion that this entails poor God eternally willing to stand up and unable to do so just doesn’t follow. God eternally “could” have exercised his causal power, he simply did not. Hence he remains omnipotent.
So, on the contrary, there is nothing incoherent at all about the idea of an immaterial, atemporal, (personal, since minds are by definition personal) mind as the cause of the universe. Since the argument demands this, we infer that an un-embodied mind is the cause of the universe.
I do see the difficulty we are having expressing our ideas about time here, just in terms of language. For this reason, Aquinas distinguished between eternity and aeviternity (as long as time existed), but I don’t think the challenge of language changes the point. An atemportal agent, exercising his causal power will change and enter time, this entails that time must have a beginning point and cannot be eternal as you claim.
An un-embodied mind makes sense because it is not incoherent as I have shown. Since the argument requires it as the cause of the universe because there are no other options, since we know that minds cause things (despite your odd claim that they don’t), the conclusion of an un-embodied mind as the cause of the universe makes sense.
- If hypothesis A is most probable on evidence E, then it is reasonable to conclude that hypothesis A is true. That is not question begging at all. I do not have to first prove that A exists. Similarly, I do not have to first prove that an un-embodied mind exists to conclude that it is the cause of the universe, since it is the hypothosis that is most probable on the evidence.
As to minds we know not being able to create from nothing, this is true, but minds to act, stand in causal relation, and are not incoherent terms. So, all that is required is that we realize another feature of the cause of the universe, namely that he be very powerful to be able to create the universe without material cause. And this fits the description of God.
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danserr
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I am not begging the question in favor of dualism at all. I am simply not assuming a priori that it is impossible. Since the argument concludes to an un-embodied mind as the cause of the universe, I accept it as the cause. On the other hand, some of your objections rest on the idea that physicalism must be true, because as long dualism is even possible, then I am rationally justified in concluding that an umembodied mind is the cause of the universe.
So as I have shown above to conclude that an unembodied mind is not incoherent at all and is required by the argument as the cause of the universe. Similarly, there is nor reason to insist that a personal cause must have always been creating the effect and at any rate this seems demonstrably false, God’s will alone to create is not enough, he must also exercise his causal power. An impersonal cause as an explanation is not possible for the 3 reasons I have given repeatedly above, and the problems you try to raise are not really serious problems at all. Indeed, your repeated appeal to things like an “immaterial computer” or an “atemporal proto-universe” (whatever that is) are such stretches of the imagination that you should accept the simpler and more plausible explanation that an unembodied mind is the cause of the universe.
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belorg
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No denserr, you simply do not read my replies carefully enough, which leads to you knwobking down straw men.
If He wills te exercise His causal powers then His will is a suffient condition for His causal power. It’s as simple as thta. And if His will is eternal, then so is His exrecise of His causal power.
No, He ‘waited’ before exercsing it. The problem: he is atemporal and cannot ‘wait’.
So, it remains an incoherent idea until you can get round this problem. But a little word of warning, danserr, I have had this discusion with several Craig worshipers, and nobody has ever been able to deal with this problem. Most of them back out, but one or two conceded I had a point.
An atemporal agent exercising his cuasal powers from eternity will be changing and enetring time eternally, this entails that time cannot have a beginning pointas you claim.
Brains cause things, saying that minds cause things once again begs the question in favour of dualism.
It is not. It is, at most, a logically possible hypothesis, but so is my hypothesis.
No, it would be an immaterial computer-like thing.So what. God’s ‘mind’ is also an immaterial mind-like thing.
An immaterial mind creating things fromp nothing may also be incoherent. Even more: I have at least given an argument why it is incoherent.
An atempral mind could also just be nonsense.
All the minds that are known (admitting for the sake of the argument that minds exist)to act etc. do so in time. I have no idea what an atemporal act is or what it might be. Mind act over time: they think about something, decide which is the best option and either act or not, this all requires time. Claiming that an atemporal mind can do the same is very speculative, and may be logically possible, but to echo your words, ‘could just be nonsense’
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belorg
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If you say that there are only two ‘known’ causes, you are begging the question.
If one of these causes doesn’t exist or possibly does not exist, it is not a know cause.
None of my objections rest on the idea that physicalims must be true. That’s, again, a strawman.
And I am not disputing that you are justified in believing in your favourite cause, all I am claiming is that, contrarily to your claims, it is not the only possible cause.
My real objections are, danserr, your strawmen of course are not a problem. But that is because you clearly do not understand the problems. You just keep dodging them.
An unemboied mind is is no way simpler than an atemporal proto-universe, danserr and it not more of a stercht than an unemboied mind that possesse all possible knwoledge without explanation and is able, through some unknown process, to change nothingness into somethingness. That is a stretch. A proto-universe does not pose those problems, so it is to be preferred as an explanation.
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belorg
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Au contraire, my friend, the definition of an argument fropm ignornace is an argument that concludes from the fact that somebody does not knwo how something can happen that teherfore something cannot happen. That’s exactly what you are doing.
But: noner of this entails that impersonal processes cannot lead to beings that do have
hindsight, insight and foresight.
I have done something deliberately, and I am a complex thing.Have you ever seen things do something deliberately?
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ThinkingSapien
Guest
Time and matter are co-relevant. You cannot separate the two from each other. The passage of time varies depending on a velocity or gravity reference point (yes, being near an object of astronomical size has an impact on the passage of time of objects within that objects gravity field). That doesn’t answer the question of “why must time begin with creation” though. That there was a creation is a commonly held belief but not something that has ever been confirmed or observed.
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ThinkingSapien
Guest
What does that mean? When speaking about something that is quantified I can make some sense of this (ex: the energy output of a system will never exceed the energy (name removed by moderator)ut of that system). But we aren’t talking about watts and volts. So I can’t understand this phrase in this context.
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DianaCC
Guest
Right, the second law of thermodynamics is an example of the principle, and so is the abiogenesis you learn about in high school biology. Another way of putting it is “you can not give what you do not have”. In general when you have something capable of doing something, what it can produce is always of an equal or lesser order than what the agent is. Trees for example can generate trees but not squirrels because squirrels are a higher kind of being.
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Trevor_Stamm
Guest
Hi belorg,
Apologies jumping into your debate, hate ganging up on people and like debates between two parties so I will be brief.
Are you suggesting that a infinitely regressing universe (multi-verse) is more plausible then regressing to a first efficient cause simply because the agent of the efficient cause is itself infinite, identical of its essence and existence, and pure act void of potentiality?
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belorg
Guest
Hi Trevor
No, I am not suggesting anything about an infinitely regressing universe. That is a logical possibility, but personally I am not fond of it.
What I am suggesting is a timelessly eternal proto-uviverse that spontantously underwent some change. e.g. some sort of ‘quantum vacuum’ that did not begin to exist and was atemporal until the first 'fluctuation 'occured, which means a change and thus the proto-universe became temporal. To mimic WL Craig in this: the (proto)universe was timeless sans ‘fluctuations’ and temporal with the ‘fluctuations.’
As to the second part of your post, “the agent of the efficient cause is itself infinite, identical of its essence and existence, and pure act void of potentiality”. this seems to be a more orthodox Thomist view on things.
The main problem I see with it is that this seems to entaiil that there was an (ontic) instance at which there was only pure act ,void of potentiality, in which case potentiality cannot possibily be accounted for.
The only way to get out of it would be to posit some kind of eternal potential universe alongside the purely actual first mover (as Aristotle suggested)., which would mean that the Christian idea of God as the creator of everything is false.
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tonyrey
Guest
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